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This thesis discusses the revisions of the Egyptian Islamic Group and al-Jihād Organisation with a 
special focus on the theology and ideology of the two movements. The main question is: how 
could these groups revise their thought using Islamic theological arguments though their 
previous pro-violence thought was also based on Islamic theological arguments. Textual 
analysis, coupled with the relevant aspects of framing literature, is the main tool used to discuss 
the ideology of the two groups and answer the research questions. Yet, the thesis also provided 
extended literature review of the topic as well as historical sociopolitical and economic accounts 
of the two organisations in order situate the texts in their proper contexts and link thought to 
action. 
The thesis provides detailed description and analysis of the two groups’ ideologies and 
concludes that one of them has genuinely revised its thought while the other has not. After 
explaining how this change has happened in theological textual as well as in framing terms, the 
thesis provides an analysis on why one group could change while the other could not. The thesis 
shows the level of change in any Jihadist movement thought corresponds with the level of 
concepts it transfers from the static to the flexible sides of the Sharia, and that the nature and 
original objectives of each group at the time of its establishment play a great role in any revision 
process when violence proves counterproductive to the original objectives of that group. 
The thesis also proves that it is not just the ideas or ideological arguments that matter but also 
the process through which these ideas and arguments are framed. In addition, the fact that only 
one of the two groups has genuinely changed while both have undergone the same structural 
sociopolitical and economic conditions in the same country shows the failure of structural 
sociopolitical and economic approaches in explaining the reasons of violence and revisions of 
Islamist movements in causal terms, and illustrates the ability of the textual approach to reveal 
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Chapter One: Literature Review and Situating the Study 
 
Introduction 
Egypt’s largest militant Islamist movements, al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic Group or the IG) 
and al-Jihād Organisation renounced violence and started to argue against the jihadi1 ideology 
worldwide. This process is called murājʿāt or ideological revisions, which is the process wherein 
the two groups had reviewed their previous violent thoughts and started to argue against 
violence using Islamic religious reasons, just as their earlier violence was also based on religious 
justifications.2 As the two groups have deployed concepts from Islamic traditions to organise 
their repertoires of actions and interventions in the social and political sphere, before and after 
revision, this dissertation aims to explore these concepts or frames. So the dissertation explores 
the violence and also the revisions of the two groups with a focus on the text and ideology as 
expressed in the two groups’ theological justifications in their literature.  
As the main goal of the dissertation is to explain the thoughts of the two groups and analyse 
how theological texts were used to justify their ideological stances, the dissertation covers the 
topic primarily from an ‘Islamic studies’ perspective, and not from a ‘political science’, 
‘international relations’, ‘social science’, or ‘historical’ perspective, or from any other field, 
though some relevant aspects of these sciences have been employed and highlighted. As the 
following literature review shows, the relevant literature on this issue covers these other fields 
by focusing on causal factors of violence or on the revisions with only little attention to ideology, 
which leaves a gap in the literature on militant Islamism. Thus, this study intends to break this 
norm by focusing on ideology, in theological terms, as reflected in the literature written by 
Islamists on violence and non-violence. However, other causal factors are discussed briefly to 
contextualise the topic and link thought to action.  
This chapter presents a general review and assessment of the literature on militant Islamist 
movements and the transformation some of them have undergone. The chapter shows that the 
relevant literature on this issue is mostly political, with a view to showing the causal factors of 
violence and non-violence. Though most of this literature refers to ideology, it pays ideology 
                                                          
1 This and similar terms are defined below.  
2 M. A.  A. Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence: A Study of the Revisions of the Egyptian Al-Jihād Organization,” (MA 
Dissertation, Leiden University, 2008), 1. 
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minimal attention as it refers to it in general terms and does not provide a detailed discussion of 
Islamists’ ideology or their theological justifications. As the literature is excessively broad, only 
the general relevant approaches used to study Islamism will be discussed and their relevance to 
the two groups under discussion will be highlighted, together with the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. This includes the cultural defence theory, state culture approach, 
the political process approach/social movement theories, the political culture approach 
(civilisational approaches) as well as textual approaches.  
 Next, a survey of the literature on the transformation of Islamist movements will be provided 
and discussed. This includes the most relevant approaches which are the traditional approaches 
(harmony restoration hypothesis), inclusion-moderation hypothesis, repression hypothesis and 
social movement theories/the political process approach. Then a review and discussion of the 
works that deal with the transformation of the two groups under discussion will be provided. 
This will help situate this study in relation to previous works and so reveal the gap in the 
literature that this dissertation fills. In addition, a rationale of the case selection and why the 
dissertation focuses on the theological and ideological dynamics rather than the external causal 
reasons of violence will be provided. A discussion of the relevant Arabic sources will also be 
given while explaining the reactions to the revisions, which will take us smoothly to the next 
chapter that provides a historical background and a brief causal justification for the processes of 
violence and also the revisions undergone by the two groups under discussion. 
However, as the two groups under investigation and other similar groups are often described in 
the literature as Jihadists or Salafi Jihadists, it is important, before providing an overview of the 
literature, to define these frequently used terms which refer to adherents of Jihadism or Salafi 








Typology and Definitions 
 
This section provides a typology of the Salafi Movement in general and its subset of Salafi 
Jihadism in particular,3 and defines the terms that are used in this chapter and in the literature 
on Islamism in general.4 There is a lack of agreement in the relevant literature on the definition 
of these terms,5 but the definitions below are the most common and acceptable ones, and also 
the ones adopted in this dissertation. 
 
 Salafism and its Subgroups 
Salafism at large is a Muslim Sunni religious denomination that attributes its beliefs to Islam as it 
was practiced by Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of Muslims. They consider 
the first three generations of Muslims to be the best because they were closer in time to 
Prophet Muhammad, and thus best represent his teachings and way of life.6 It is “the method of 
modeling one’s thought and behavior on Muhammad and the first three generations of 
Muslims, called the ‘forefathers’ (Salaf).”7 The term Salafi means a follower of the Salaf, or 
Salafism.8  
There are three major divisions of Salafism: Scientific or Scripturalist Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-
ʿIlmiyya), Political Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-Siyāsiyya), and Salafi Jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-
Jihādiyya).9 They differ mainly in their position towards violence, democracy and political 
                                                          
3 For a meticulous typology and framework on the differences and commonalities of movements of Sunni Islamism in 
general, see Christoph Schuck, “A Conceptual Framework of Sunni Islamism,” Politics, Religion & Ideology (14, no. 4 
[2013]), 485-506 
For a typology of Islamists in general, see Omar Ashour, The De-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed 
Islamist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2009), 7-11. 
4 Definitions of the individual theological concepts that form the ideology of the two groups are provided in 
subsequent chapters when these concepts are discussed in detail. 
5  International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons, Jakarta and Brussels,” Asia Report (No. 142, 
[November 2007]), 11; Angel Rabasa, et al, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists (Arlington, Virginia: Rand Corp National 
Security Research Division, 2010), 1. 
6 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Towards Understanding the Significance of Religion for Jihadi Violent Non-State Actors,” 
(PhD dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 2014), 11. 
7 William McCants, “The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt,” Saban Center at the Brookings 
Institution (Middle East Memo, no. 23 [May 2012]), 1. McCants also notes that though Salafism prefers not to 
exclusively follow any of the four Sunni schools of law, it reveres the ninth century founder of the Ḥanbalī School of 
Law, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, and adheres to his theological teachings. Ibn Ḥanbal’s legacy received a strong ideological 
boost from Ibn Taymiyya in the fourteenth century, who skilfully elaborated the school’s doctrines and refuted its 
critics. Therefore, Salafis in general particularly revere both Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Ḥanbal.  
8 Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 7. 
9 This classification is presented and adopted, e.g., in the following works: Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the 
Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (29, no. 3 [2006]), 207-39; Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, 
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participation. For Scripturalist Salafism, democracy is “tempting, but ultimately dead-end 
street.”10 They see engagement in democracy as an activity that leads to a compromise of 
religious principles; rather than making the political system compatible with the Sharia, 
democracy is more likely to make a Muslim resemble the non-Muslims and follow their 
principles. Thus, adherents of this subset of Salafism live ‘apolitical lives of quietist piety’.11 
Adherents of the second category, Political Salafism, differ with Scripturalist Salafism in that 
they believe that participation in democratic politics is justified despite its flaws because it 
‘could serve as a vehicle to attain a more caliphate-like, Sharia-based polity’.12  
Salafi Jihadism, which is the category to which the groups under discussion belonged, dismisses 
democracy, believing it is an act of disbelief, and thus rejects participation in democratic 
systems and adopts violence as a means of changing the political order.13 It is defined by Omar 
Ashour14  as “a modern Islamist ideology which believes that armed confrontation with political 





                                                                                                                                                                             
Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Monica Marks, “Youth 
Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics (18: no. 1 [2013]), 104-11. 
10 Marks, “Understanding the Jihadi Current,” 109.  
11 Marks, “Understanding the Jihadi Current,” 109. 
12 Marks, “Understanding the Jihadi Current,” 109. For more information, see Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 7-
8. 
13 This is explained in detail in chapters 3 and 5. See also Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” 208; 
Marks, “Understanding the Jihadi Current,” 109; Gartenstein-Ross, “Significance of Religion,” 12. 
14 Ashour is an outstanding researcher on causes of de-radicalisation of Islamist movements. He wrote his PhD 
dissertation on the causes of transformation of Islamists and later published it as a book. He also wrote several 
articles and book chapters on the de-radicalisation of various Islamist movements. All of Ashour’s publications 
emphasise the same argument on the causes of de-radicalisation and that is why the review mentioned later in this 
chapter on Ashour’s theory applies to all of his publications. Ashour’s works on the topic are: Omar Ashour, ‘‘Lions 
Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group,’’ Middle East Journal (61, no. 4 
[Autumn 2007]), 596–627; Omar Ashour, “De-Radicalization of Jihad? The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on 
Al-Qaeda,’’ Perspectives on Terrorism (2, no. 5 [Spring 2008]), 11-14; Omar Ashour, ‘‘Islamist De-Radicalization in 
Algeria: Successes and Failures,’’ The Middle East Institute Policy Brief (No. 21 [November 2008]); Omar Ashour, “A 
World without Jihad? The Causes of De-radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements,” (PhD dissertation, McGill 
University, 2008); Omar Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, Op. Cit; Omar Ashour, ‘‘Hamas and the Prospects of De-
Radicalization,’’ in Klejda Mulaj ed., Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010); Omar Ashour, "Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist 
Movements," Terrorism and Political Violence (23, no. 3 [2011]), 377-397; Omar Ashour, “Egypt's Revolution and the 
Transformation of Armed Islamist Movements towards Unarmed Activism,” in Veronique Dudouet, ed., Civil 
Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle (London: Routledge, 2014), 
173-89. 
15 Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 4; Ashour, “Egypt's Revolution,” 174.  
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Jihadism and Jihad 
‘Jihadism’ or ‘Jihadist Movement’ is an Islamic movement that embodies a “respect for the 
sacred texts in their most literal form and an absolute commitment to jihad.”16 The word 
‘Jihadism’ or ‘Jihadists’ should not be confused with the traditional Islamic concept of ‘jihad’, 
which literally means struggle. Generally speaking, the term ‘jihad’ is not exclusively used to 
indicate fighting or the use of physical power, for there are several forms of carrying out this 
religious struggle non-violently, including struggling peacefully to create a more just world. In 
Islamic tradition, different kinds of jihad that may not involve violence include ‘jihad of the 
tongue, the heart, and the hand’.17 Thus, speaking out against injustice and oppression or hating 
them in one’s heart is considered jihad. However, for Salafi Jihadists, jihad essentially means the 
obligation to fight ‘disbelievers’ using physical violence.18 It is this sense of jihad as understood 
by Jihadists that will be used throughout this dissertation. 
 
Islamist Movements 
‘Islamist movements’ are “socio-political movements which base and justify their political 
principles, ideologies, behaviours, and objectives on their understanding of Islam or on their 
understanding of a certain past interpretation of Islam.”19 Islamist movements agree that 
religion and politics are inseparable, and that state legislation needs to be based on the Islamic 
Sharia. However, they differ in their interpretations of the Sharia and how to promote the goal 
of establishing the Sharia; through education and a gradual Islamisation of society, through 
promoting the good and forbidding the evil, through participation in politics and direct political 
pressure, or through a violent take-over of the state. These differences are based on different 
theological interpretations of the Sharia.20 
Therefore, Islamist movements can be either moderate or radical. According to Ashour, 
moderate Islamist movements are those which ideologically accept, at minimum, electoral 
                                                          
16 Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 220. This includes the 
Egyptian and other Jihadists. Therefore, if any of these terms is used, it refers to Jihadists in general, and if the word is 
meant for a specific type of Jihadists, it will be qualified with a specific description (e.g. Egyptian Jihadists, IG 
Jihadists), or will be indicated by the context of the sentence. 
17 Asma Barlas, “Jihad, Holy War, and Terrorism: The Politics of Conflation and Denial,” The American Journal of Social 
Sciences (20: no. 1 [2003]), 47. 
18 Gartenstein-Ross, “Significance of Religion,” 13. For more details, see Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 8-9. 
19 Ashour, “Egypt's Revolution,” 174; Ashour, De-Radicalization of Jihadists, 4. 
20 Ioana Emilia Matesan, "The Dynamics of Violent Escalation and De-escalation: Explaining Change in Islamist 
Strategies in Egypt and Indonesia," (PhD dissertation, University of Syracuse, 2014), 34. 
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democracy and political and ideological pluralism. These are the groups that aim for gradual 
social, political and economic changes and accept the principle of working within the established 
state institutions, regardless of their perceived legitimacy, refusing the use of violence to 
achieve their goals.21 By contrast, radical Islamist groups “are those movements that 
ideologically reject democracy as well as the legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism. 
They also aim for revolutionary social, political and economic changes and refuse to work within 
the established state institutions. Radical Islamist movements may use violent and/or 
nonviolent methods to achieve their goals.”22 
Even though the term Islamists or Islamist movements is generally used to refer to followers of 
both violent and nonviolent movements of political Islam, it is also used as a synonym with the 
words ‘jihadi’, ‘Jihadists’, and ’Salafi Jihadists’ when indicated by the context, as the latter usage 
is included in the definition of the word.  
Radicalisation/Radical 
Radicalisation is “a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or 
behavioral transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the 
peaceful change of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly 
to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political 
goals.”23  
It is defined by Neumann and Rogers as “the changes in attitude that lead towards sanctioning 
and, ultimately, the involvement in the use of violence for a political aim.”24 Thus, the term 
‘radical’ as used in this study refers to people or groups that ideologically accept or justify the 
use of violence to achieve their political aims, even though not all who hold this view will act 
violently themselves. 
 
Revisions/ De-radicalisation/ Moderation and Disengagement 
By revisions, moderation or de-radicalisation of Islamists, this study refers to the process in 
which a violent Islamist group or person ideologically reverses the core ideas that form the 
                                                          
21 They may also be called revolutionaries, extremists or exclusivists. See Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 4. 
22 Ashour, De-radicalization of Jihadists, 4. 
23 Ashour, De-Radicalization of Jihadists, 5. 
24 Peter Neumann & Brooke Rogers, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe 
(London: ICSR, 2007), 11. 
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violent ideology and de-legitimises the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while 
moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a 
pluralist context.25 So, these terms refer to the modification of Islamists’ ideology (beliefs) and 
consequently behaviour (actions) to bring them in line with a nonviolent interpretation of 
mainstream Sunni Islam.  
This clarifies the difference between de-radicalisation/moderation/revisions and 
disengagement. By the first three terms, the dissertation means the process in which a group or 
an individual changes their belief system, rejects the extremist ideology, and embraces 
mainstream Islamic values. Disengagement refers to a change in a person’s radical behaviour 
(i.e., refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organisation) but not necessarily a 
change in his ideology, for a person could leave a radical organisation and refrain from violence 
but yet maintain a radical worldview.26 Usually, disengagement entails an instrumental change 
in behaviour due to a change in political opportunity, conditions or constraints, such as the costs 
suffered or benefits gained by pursuing a different course of action.27  
As a consequence, if a militant disengages solely for pragmatic reasons, the militants may once 
again take up arms if circumstances change. Conversely, when de-radicalisation or moderation 
accompanies disengagement, it hinders the return to violence even when circumstances 
change,28 as the core tenets of the violent ideology have changed. This means that 
disengagement may be temporary while de-radicalisation or moderation is of a more 
permanent nature.29 Therefore, a genuine and successful de-radicalisation or revision process 
must produce a change in an individual’s underlying ideology and beliefs, not just a change in his 
behaviour.30 In addition, successfully challenging radical Islamist ideology with an alternative 
interpretation of Islam is more likely to not only effect a more permanent change in the 
                                                          
25 Ashour, De-Radicalization of Jihadists, 5-6. 
26 Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, xiii. 
27 Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 6. 
28 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent 
Extremism (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008), 12; Ashour, “De-radicalization in Algeria,” 10. Rabasa, 
Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, xiv. 
29 For more on disengagement, see John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis,” in Tore Bjorgo 
and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York: Rutledge, 
2008), 21-7. 
30 Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 6. 
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militants’ worldview, but also help weaken the radical Islamist movements by discrediting their 
ideology.31 
Thereupon, though moderation is connected in the literature to liberal notions of individual 
rights and democratic notions of tolerance, pluralism, and cooperation,32 it will be used in this 
study as defined above to suit the conditions of the Islamist movements under discussion who 
still reject many of the liberal values. Thus, the words moderate, de-radicalised or revisionist in 
the context of the two groups under investigation refer to a person or a group that has gone 
through a process of ideological reversal of their militant ideology. In this regard the 
descriptions of moderate, radical, or similar terms, do not refer to the individual or group in 
general but to their particular view on the issue being discussed. As Jillian Schwedller argues, 
terms like moderate and radical may be problematic because an individual or group may hold 
moderate views on some issues but radical views on others. Thus, she recommends adopting 
distinctions specific to individual issues instead of using terms like moderate or radical. 
Examples include using terms like ‘legalists’ and ‘contextualists’ concerning the interpretation of 
religious texts, and ‘accommodationists’ and ‘non-accommodationists’ concerning participation 
in state processes.33 However, though specific terms like those suggested by Schwedler are 
sometimes used, this study will continue to describe, as Schwedler herself does, some acts or 
ideas of its subjects as being radical or moderate, noting that these terms are not used to label 
these individuals or groups as a whole but to label their attitudes towards the specific issue 
being discussed, as per the definition above. 
 Having defined the main terms, the chapter will now turn to review the literature on the topic, 




                                                          
31 Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 30. 
32 Jillian Schwedler, "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis," World 
Politics (63, no. 02 [2011]), 352 
33 Schwedler, "Can Islamists Become Moderates,” 351-2. 
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Literature on Reasons of Islamist Political Violence34 
In addition to social movement theories, there is a wide range of theories on the causes of 
political violence in general, whether Islamist or otherwise. The most common of these are 
known as structural-psychological (social) approaches. They examine violence by situating it 
within the systemic structural grievances, whether social, economic, political, or identity-based. 
Focused on one or more of these subcategories, a structural approach seeks to attribute the 
eruption of violence to the deficiencies rooted in infrastructure of the environment in which 
violence erupted.35 On the societal level of analysis, explanations are primarily sought in the 
historical development and culture of a larger society or system, and in its contemporary social, 
economic and political characteristics. So, research often focuses on a causal relationship 
between certain characteristics of a society and the emergence of political violence within the 
same society. The most relevant examples of these include the ‘political alienation theory’,36  
the ‘J-Curve theory’,37 ‘relative deprivation theory’,38 ‘state legitimacy theory’,39 in addition to 
some other theories that explain the mechanisms of violence such as the ‘collective 
action/mobilisation theory’.40 
Contradicting or complementing one another, none of these theories can be generalised in all 
cases or claim to be the only valid theory in explaining the violence of any case study, though 
they can be partially valid in explaining some of the causal reasons of violence.41 Moreover, 
none of these theories succeeds in explaining why a few individuals, among millions in almost 
identical political and socioeconomic positions, pursue violence. In addition, the below-
mentioned theories generally suffer from a lack of good empirically tested findings. Ted Gurr has 
rightly noted that the research questions raised in the sources presenting these theories are 
                                                          
34 This section of the review is largely informed by the review of Omar Ashour in his PhD dissertation. See Ashour, “A 
World without Jihad,” 38-67. 
35 For further explanation and categorisation of the roots of conflicts see, e.g., K. Rupesinghe, “The Disappearing 
Boundaries between Internal and External Conflicts,” in K. Rupesinghe, ed., Internal Conflict and Governance (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 14-20. 
36 An example of this is in David Schwartz, “A Theory of Revolution,” in James C. Davies ed., When Men Rebel and Why 
(New York: The Free Press, 1971). 
37 See James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review (27, no. 1 [February 1962]), 5-
19. 
38 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).  
39  For more on this, see David Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); 
Seymour Lipset, Political Man, The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963). 
40  For more information on this theory, see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 
1978). 
41  Supportive arguments of this will be provided later in this chapter. 
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often noticeably more interesting than most of the evidence brought to bear on them.42 Thus, 
this section of the review will briefly highlight the most relevant theories of violence while 
bearing in mind that many of these theories are not well empirically tested.  
Theories on Islamist political violence build on these general theories. Therefore, a common 
feature with almost all the literature on Islamism in general and Egyptian Islamism in particular 
is that it mostly aims to explain the external causes of the Islamists’ violence. This is also the 
case in the few works which have been written on the transformation of Islamist movements. 
Little attention has been paid to ideology or religious theological justifications. After 9/11, 
abundant literature began to emerge, exponentially growing in the months following the 
attacks, as well as theories suggesting the motivations for the strikes and the reasons behind 
Islamists’ violence in general and al-Qaeda in particular. However, the majority of the new 
literature generally built on the older theories of violence, but with greater detail and variation, 
with a new focus on al-Qaeda and its conflict with the US and the West, instead of the domestic 
violence of local Islamist groups. Thus the general approaches on the causes of Islamists’ 
violence both before and after 9/11 will be discussed together, bearing in mind that the majority 
of post-9/11 literature built on the previously existing theories and approaches in explaining al-
Qaeda’s violence.  
Most of the approaches in the literature argue that Islamists rebel as a reaction to the 
socioeconomic, political, and/or cultural strains. With the lack of peaceful outlets, structural 
strains produce psychological discomfort and prompt a rebellious action.43 Implicitly leaning on 
theories of crises, these approaches basically argue that social, economic, cultural and/or 
political environments create a crisis within Islamist movements which invoke reactions that 
take a religious form. Thus, most of the below approaches are centred around the notion of 
crisis or frustration though they are given several names: structural-psychological approaches, 
frustration-aggression approaches, social theories, or crisis approaches.  
 
                                                          
42 Ted Robert Gurr, “Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and how it might be Improved,” in 
Robert Slater & Michael Stohl, eds., Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 
115. 
 
43 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 6. 
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Socioeconomic Approaches  
Socioeconomic approaches seek to situate the violence of Islamists in the wider socioeconomic 
contexts which, fuelled with frustration, cause psychological alienation and invoke a violent 
action with the lack of a peaceful outlet to the undergone worries. Coupled with  rising levels of 
urbanisation, education and thus aspirations, the sub-human conditions, the abject poverty 
encountered by the masses who hardly find a channel for their worries and burdens, the sharp 
inequalities of wealth distribution, widespread corruption and political exclusion, inevitably lead 
to resurgence in one way or another.44 Fred Halliday, for example, argued that the emergence of 
Jihadist movements is the result of contemporary social and economic conditions.45 
Within this approach lies the literature that considers more contemporary issues, such as the 
challenge of modernity and globalisation, as reasons of insurgence. This literature argues that 
Islamist movements are the result of societies moving from the traditional agrarian to the urban 
capitalist systems, and that globalisation is the root of suspicion and hatred towards the West.46 
The ‘economic approach’ is in fact a reproduction of the ‘relative deprivation theory’ introduced 
by Ted Gurr, who defines relative deprivation as the perceived discrepancy between people’s 
value expectations and their value capabilities, Gurr argues that, along with other factors, the 
more the discrepancies between ‘value capabilities’ and ‘value expectations’ increase without a 
timely solution, the more the sense of ‘frustration’ grows and the likelihood of resort to violence 
or ‘aggression’ increases. The intensity of violence would increase when the deprivation affects 
‘core’ concerns such as physical, economic and/or social interests.47   
In fact, relative deprivation or frustration resulting from socioeconomic injustices explains a 
great deal of the causation of violence in Egypt. The frustration resulting from sub-human 
conditions, the absence of any peaceful outlet and the inability of the government to meet the 
high aspirations of the community, coupled with widespread despotism and oppression— all led 
                                                          
44 Examples of works on Egypt that employed this approach are: Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet 
and Pharaoh, Trans., Jon Rothschil (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985); D. J. Sullivan and S. Abed-Kotob, Islam in 
Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). 
45 Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
46 Examples of this include: Lionel Stapley, Globalization and Terrorism, Death of a Way of Life (London: Karnac Bods 
Publishers, 2006); Stanley Hoffman, Chaos and Violence: What Globalization, Failed States and Terrorism Mean for 
U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Overlook Press, 2005); John Bellamy Foster, Naked Imperialism: U.S. Pursuit of Global 
Dominance (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006). 
47 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 59.  
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to violence in Egypt.48 Nonetheless, relative deprivation cannot alone account for rebellion, 
though it might successfully explain part of the causation of violence. As Crozier suggested, 
"Men do not necessarily rebel merely because their conditions of life are intolerable: it takes a 
rebel to rebel.”49 
In addition, though there are some empirical data to support this in several case studies, these 
explanations are simply challenged by the fact that these socioeconomic conditions are common 
to all and are not exclusive to Islamists. Thus, the issue of why the dispute takes an Islamic form 
as opposed to leftist or communist directions, for example, remains unanswered. In addition, 
though socioeconomic strains do exist, many members of the Islamist groups, even leaders such 
as al-Ẓawāhirī and Bin Lādin, are wealthy and far from being affected by these socioeconomic 
conditions. So these approaches pursue a selective way of investigation that focuses only on the 
poor classes and ignores or fails to account for the radicalisation of the upper or upper-middle 
classes, in addition to their failure to explain why these movements assume an Islamic form.50 
State Culture Approach (Political Alienation)  
This approach builds on such general theories of violence as political alienation theory and state 
legitimacy theory. It proposes that Islamism is the result of political exclusion, state repression 
and authoritarianism which, with the lack of peaceful solutions, create violent reactions as 
rebels reject and challenge the legitimacy of the established state order.51 This approach helps 
in explaining some of the reasons of violence in Egypt. As explained in the following chapter, the 
authoritarian rule of the Egyptian regime deprived the opposition from any peaceful political 
participation and repressed them under severe political and security conditions. This, together 
with the dominance of the radical thought at that period, contributed greatly to the eruption of 
violence in Egypt as Egyptian militants considered the regime illegitimate because it did not 
implement the Islamic Sharia and because of its despotism and failure to sustain an honourable 
life for its people. However, though there are supportive empirical evidence of this approach, 
repression alone cannot be taken as a vehicle of radicalisation. Many other factors have to exist 
                                                          
48  Further discussion of this is provided in chapter 2. 
49 B. Crozier, The Rebels: A study of Post-War Insurrections (London: C Hatto& Windus, 1960), 9. 
50  For more on this point, see Omar Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 39-41.  
51 Examples of this approach include: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2002); Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel? Repression and Resistance in the 
Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis De la Calle, “Domestic 
Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence,” Annual Review of Political Science (12 [2009]), 31-49.   
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in addition. Also, this approach faces the same critique levelled at the socioeconomic 
approaches explained above.52  
After 9/11, this argument was extended to include not only local governments in the Muslim 
world, but also Western countries who practise exclusion and a lack of understanding towards 
Muslims. The proponents of this approach argue that the Western lack of understanding and 
interaction with the other (Muslims) causes Islamists to be caught in their own otherness and 
forces them to devise strategies of resistance.53 
Cultural Defence Hypothesis/ Challenging to the Hegemon    
This approach argues that Islamism is a reaction to the cultural invasion or imperialism of 
Muslim cultures and identities by non-Islamic Western values and cultures. This reaction is 
further fuelled by the Western states’ intervention in the internal affairs of Muslim countries 
and cultures, whether militarily politically or culturally. Thus, radical justifications of religion 
followed by violent actions occur as a means of cultural defence.54  
American imperial ambitions, Western intrusion in Muslim affairs, and US support of Israel are 
commonly mentioned as causes of Islamists’ violence, asserting that the American insistence on 
the one-size-fits-all notion of democracy is, in part, what generates extremists’ violent 
reactions.55 Like other approaches, this approach hinges on the notion of crisis which, in this 
case, is not caused by domestic powers but by external outside forcers that try to culturally 
invade the Islamic identity.  
Close to this approach is the hypothesis introduced by John Turner in his book published in 
2014, where he argues that violence of Salafi Jihadists is a challenge to US hegemony and the 
international order that stand at odds with Islamic history in general and the Salafi ideology in 
                                                          
52 For more on this approach and its critique see, for example, Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 44-6.  
53 Anour Majid, Freedom and Orthodoxy, Islam and Difference in the Post Andalusian Age (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 105. An example of this explanation can be found in Timothy Marr, The Cultural Roots of 
American Islamicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
54 For examples of this approach, see Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement of North Africa 
(Austin: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 1997); Martin Kramer, The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan 
Centre, 1997); Graham Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs (82, no. 2 [March- April 2002]), 48-64. For 
more information, see Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 41-2.  
55 Majid, Freedom and Orthodoxy, v. Examples of these in the post 9/11 writings include: Mark Hubbard, Brutal 
Truths, Fragile Myths: Power Politics and Western Adventurism in the Arab World (New York: Westview Press, 2004); 
W. H. Thorton, New World Empire: Civil Islam, Terrorism and the Making of Neo-Globalism (New York: Rowan and 




particular. As particular aspects of US hegemony and the international system are incompatible 
with these historical and ideological understandings of Jihadists, Muslims rebel against this, 
using violence as a means to change such an international order and hegemony.56 Though this 
approach has some validity in explaining some aspects of major concern to Islamists, it fails to 
justify why violence is mostly domestic, and not directed towards the cultural imperialists 
themselves. In addition, though Turner arguably answered the question of why it is only the 
Muslims, and not the rest of the world, who challenge US hegemony in that way,57 he did not 
answer the ensuing question of why this applies to only some Muslims, and not to the majority 
of those who profess the Islamic faith. 
Generally speaking, the approaches above are classified within structural approaches which face 
a great deal of critique. The main critique of these theories is that they are partial and selective. 
Millions of people live under frustrating conditions and never tried violence; and many terrorists 
do not belong to the desperate classes whose frustration they claim to be expressing. Thus 
though frustration may explain part of the causation of some Islamist political violence, 
frustration-aggression arguments are alone insufficient to explain political violence.58 
 In addition, many of these theories depend on psychological explanations of violence and 
overgeneralisation is their most common feature. In this regard, Walter Reich has warned that 
"psychological accounts of terrorism are replete with explanations that ignore or blur the variety 
and complexity... a product of loose and weak thinking, a disregard for the need for evidence, 
and the habit, unfortunately endemic in so many areas of psychological discourse, of having a 
single idea and applying it to everything.”59  
Another major challenge to these approaches is that they fail to account for transformation of 
Islamists under the same ongoing structural strains. Moreover, the structural strains which are 
used to justify the emergence of radical Islamism are common to many other societies, including 
                                                          
56 John Turner, Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order (London & 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
57 He ascribed that to the nature of Islam as a religion that provides discourse for political organisation, arguing that 
the ability to construct an ideology that inspires global ‘terrorism’ out of a religious base to counter the prevailing 
world order is something unique to Islam and Salafi Jihadists. By this, Turner is in fact using a mixture of cultural 
defence hypothesis and political culture approach. See Turner, Religious Ideology, 32-3. 
58 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (49, no. 1 [February 2005]), 19. 
59 Walter Reich, “Understanding Terrorist Behaviour: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry,” in W. 
Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
Centre Press, 1990), 262. 
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non-Muslim societies, but they do not always lead to radicalisation. Among others, the author of 
‘Why Muslims Rebel’ logically proved that the level of Islamists’ violence in several Middle 
Eastern countries does not correspond to the level of the structural, especially socioeconomic, 
strains.60 Another similar factor is that such strains do not always render Islamists violent; 
otherwise, the overwhelming majority of Muslims would have been militants. Even when these 
approaches are successful in explaining the nature of grievances in specific case studies, they 
cannot account for the level and scope of violence: national vs. international, revolutionary vs. 
pragmatic, limited vs. expansive or short vs. prolonged.61   
The Political Process Approach/ Social Movement Theories 
The Political Process approach has a great deal of similarity with social movement theories as it 
is based on the same central elements of social movement theories: political environment, 
mobilisation structures (resource mobilisation) and ideological frameworks (or framing in SMT). 
Investigating the wide range of social movement theories shows that the central components of 
classical and recent social movement theories evolve around the same elements.62 Thus, the 
political process approach can be described as the political version of SMTs. Despite having 
elements from the previous approaches, the political process approach is both distinct from and 
more dynamic and comprehensive than the above approaches. It builds on collective 
action/mobilisation theory that focuses on the effect of collective action/mobilisation as a 
mechanism within a given political environment in creating domestic violence. The collective 
action/mobilisation theory largely explains the mechanism of violence by considering 
mobilisation of the discontented people in the society crucial to the eruption of violence.63   
The Political Process Approach emphasises the importance of the political environment and the 
primacy of the process over the structural strains. It proposes that it is neither necessary for 
Islamists to be satisfied to become moderate nor enough for them to be deprived to become 
rebellious.64 In Carrie Wickham words, “Even under the most extreme conditions of human 
                                                          
60 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel. 
61 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 47-9.  
62 For further details on social movement theories and Islamist movements, see, e.g., Salwa Ismail, “Islamist 
Movements as Social Movements: Contestation and Identity Frames,” Historical Reflections (30, no. 3 [Fall 2004]), 387 
ff. 
63  See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
64 Examples of this approach include: Carrie Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in 
Egypt (New York: Columbia Press, 2002); Mohammed Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A political Process 
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misery and exploitation, the emergence of collective protest is not assured.”65 Therefore, the 
political process approach fills several gaps in the frustration-aggression approaches, especially 
their lack of dynamism and focus on causal-linear relationships.66 
The political process approach explores Islamist movements’ radicalisation by investigating the 
political environments in which they operate, the mobilisation structures through which they 
attain funds and support as well as the ideological tenets through which they justify or legitimise 
their actions. This is based on the triple elements of which the approach is composed: political 
environment, mobilisation structures and ideological frameworks. Thus, Islamism is perceived as 
the product of the correlation of political opportunities, mobilisation structures and ideological 
frameworks.67  
This approach is useful in explaining the mechanisms of violence witnessed by Egypt since the 
1960s. The general discontent and frustration explained before took a practical form of 
opposition when it found groups of Islamists carrying similar beliefs and eager to put their ideas 
into action through a process of ‘mobilisation’ after they found mutual ‘interest’ and could 
‘organise’ themselves and ‘mobilise’ their resources in their way to capture the available 
‘opportunity’ and take the ‘action’ of armed struggle against the Egyptian regime. 
Though more dynamic than other approaches, the political process approach is usually criticised 
for its too general components. Terms like ‘political environment’ and ‘mobilisation structures’ 
are too general to produce a general theory that encompasses the diverse ideologies and tactics 
of Islamism.68 As will be shown later in this study, Islamists’ ideology may be considered too 
sacred to be violated or to be weighed by costs and benefits.69 Thus, the element of mobilisation 
structures does not always work with Islamists who in several cases conduct their actions 
without taking into consideration their capabilities in comparison with those of the state or 
other opposing forces.70  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria," in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 37-60. 
65  Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 7.  
66 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 19-20; Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 49. 
67 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 50.  
68 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 50. 
69 This is particularly clear in the revisions of al-Jihād Organisation, and it is fully substantiated in chapter four and in 
the conclusion of this dissertation.    
70 For examples of these, see Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 51.  
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However, the ideological framework component of this approach, which is originally derived 
from the framing notion of social movement theories, proves quite useful for the purpose of this 
dissertation as it resonates well with and provides a useful analytical tool on the ideological 
religious concepts that the current study analyses. Therefore, it will be used as a theoretical tool 
of analysis in this study.71  
The Political Culture Theory (Civilisational Approaches) 
The political culture approach proposes that Islamism is based on two inherent characteristics in 
Muslims and Islam. The first is that Muslims have an acute religious and cultural identity that 
shapes their worldviews and reactions. The second is that Muslim political attitudes are shaped 
by Islamic texts and scriptures, which are general and vague enough to accept radical 
interpretations. This approach differs from the cultural defence hypothesis in that the latter is a 
structural crisis-based approach that traces Islamism to reactions of Islamists to cultural or 
political colonialism while the former traces it to the Islamic classical texts’ inherent 
generalisation and openness to radical interpretations.72 Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilisations theory’, which considers the notion of civilisational identity as the cause of clash 
between Islam and the West, can be included under this category.73  
The manifestations of the political culture approach are very common among Western political 
discourse and mass media. However, this approach lacks definitional and methodological 
accuracy: what is culture and how can it be fairly measured? Also, implicit in these explanations 
are sweeping unproven claims such as the assumption that religious and national identities are 
always strong among not only Islamists but also all Muslims. Another inherent claim is that 
political Islam is the natural product of these strong identities, whether national or religious, as 
                                                          
71 Details will follow in this chapter. 
72 Examples of this approach include: Moorthy Muthuswamy, Defeating Political Islam (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 2009); J.  Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East 
(New York: Macmillan, 1986); Gregory Davis, Religion of Peace? Islam’s War Against the World (Los Angeles: World 
Ahead Publishing, 2006); Robert Spencer, Religion of Peace? Why Christianity Is and Islam Isn’t (Washington, DC: 
Regnery, 2007); Mordechai Kedar & David Yerushalmi, “Sharia Adherence Mosque Survey: Correlations between 
Sharia Adherence and Violent Dogma in U.S. Mosques,” Perspectives on Terrorism (5, no. 56 [December 2011]), 81-
138; Bernard Lewis, Political Language of Islam (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991); Emmanuel Sivan, 
Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985); Turner’s book 
‘Religious Ideology’ can also be classified under this approach as it argues that Islamists’ violence is a challenge to the 
hegemony of the U.S., and this comes from Muslims because of the incompatibility of Islamic beliefs with the U.S.-Led 
Western Hegemony.      




well as the Islamic scriptures. Thus, this approach fails to show the assumed relationship 
between these identities and classical texts on the one hand and the Muslim political behaviour 
on the other hand.74 
More problematic is the overgeneralisation assumed by this approach. As argued by Edward 
Said, such sweeping generalisation and characterisations are unacceptable in light of the scope 
of such studies which comprises a very small part of what already happens in the Islamic World 
which “numbers a billion people, and includes dozens of countries, societies, traditions, 
languages, and, of course, an infinite number of different experiences”. Therefore, “It is simply 
false to try to trace all of this back to something called ‘Islam’.”75  
Textual Approaches  
Textual or theological approaches intersect with political culture theories in that many of the 
scholars of the latter employ a textual approach to arrive at their conclusions. In this, they look 
at Islam as a ‘cultural system’ or ‘civilisation’ that inherently clashes with Western culture and 
civilisation. Proponents of these approaches argue that Islamism’s most effective tools lie in its 
ability to challenge peaceful interpretations of Islamic texts and render them into radical ones. 
The appropriation of Islamic symbols and lexis creates an option for various claims and 
counterclaims. Various interpretations of religious texts thus become an effective means of 
mobilisation and political change.76  
In this regard, there are two main camps of scholars. The ‘confrontationists’ or ‘essentialists’, 
such as Daniel Pipes, Martin Indyk, Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, give prominence to 
the textual interpretation of Islam, which they consider an enduring and immutable insight into 
the ‘essence’ of Islam and the Muslim world. They see Islamism as a representation of the 
‘essence’ of Islamic ‘civilisation’ or ‘culture’ which is, espoused by self-interests and an 
                                                          
74 For a detailed critique of this approach, see Lisa Anderson, “Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political 
Culture Approach,” in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in 
the Arab World, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1: 77-92; Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 42-3.  
75 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How Media and Experts Determine How We see the Rest of the World (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997), xvi.  
76 Textual approaches have been boosted in the post 9/11 climate. Knudsen notes that “there is a general tendency in 
academia to revert to Scripturalist scholarship and textual exegesis as a means of uncovering the hidden meaning of 
the Islamic revival and the roots of the fundamentalist revolt.”  See Are Knudsen, Political Islam in the Middle East 
(Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute of Development Studies and Human Rights, 2003), 20. For more on this, 
see e.g., Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). For more on this approach see, for example, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4-5; Knudsen, “Political Islam in the Middle East,” 20-1.  
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antagonistic worldview, opposed to Western values and political thought.77 The main 
methodological assumption is that the Muslim World is dominated by a set of relatively 
enduring and unchanging processes and meanings, to be understood through the texts of Islam 
itself and the language they generate.78 Focusing on an antagonistic relationship between Islam 
and the West, proponents of this approach see Islamic revivalism as a danger that needs to be 
toppled before it turns into a fatal global threat.79  
Contrary to the previous camp, the ‘accommodationists’ or ‘contingentists’, such as John 
Esposito, James Piscatori and Edward Said, reject the notion that Islamic teachings are 
inherently antagonistic to the West or are a force of radical ideology. They reply to the 
confrontationists’ views by focusing on the diversity of Islamic movements and the fact that 
they are shaped by contingent factors, hence the label ‘contingenists’. By showing differences 
between various tendencies in Islamic movements, accommodationists debunk the 
confrontationists’ claims and assert that Islam is far from being inherently anti-Western or anti-
democratic. The whole puzzle lies in that Islam lends itself to various interpretations including 
democratic ones, and thus flexibility, rather than rigidity, is the norm within the ‘Islamic 
culture’.80  
In his ‘Orientalism and its critics’, Fred Halliday proposes a third perspective, one in which there 
is an analysis of what actually happens in the Muslim world. He argues that the debate is 
largely about different ‘representations’ of the Muslim world. While one camp focuses on the 
role of texts and language in painting its ‘essentialist’ picture; the other camp focuses on 
`discourses’ about the region. Therefore both camps, Hallliday notes, can be charged with 
ignoring what is actually occurring in the region.81 
 Therefore, although textual approaches play a great role in our understanding of the 
dynamisms of Islamists’ thought, they have to be taken cautiously, in order to create a fair 
image of Islamism, and not be stripped of their broader economic and socio-political contexts. 
                                                          
77 For more on this point and on other approaches on Islamism, see Knudsen, “Political Islam in the Middle 
East.” 
78 Fred Halliday, “Review Article: The Politics of ‘Islam’-a Second Look,” British Journal of Political Science, (25, no. 3 
[1995]), 401. 
79 Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 25. A critique of this was mentioned in the discussion of the previous approach.  
80 For more on this debate and classification, see Halliday, “The Politics of ‘Islam’,” 400-1; Michael Salla, “Political 
Islam and the West: A New Cold War or Convergence?” Third World Quarterly (18: [1997]), 729-31.  
81 Fred Halliday, “‘Orientalism’ and its Critics,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (20, no.2 [1993]), 145-50.  
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While this study will use a primarily textual approach, as clarified below, it is worth noting here 
that this study differs from the above works in that it does not try to claim or find out whether 
Islamic teachings and texts are compatible or incompatible with the Western cultures and 
civilisations. It rather objectively sheds lights on how Islamic texts are interpreted by Jihadists to 
justify or retract violence, and the dynamics of these interpretations in religious textual terms. 
 This was a brief overview of the dominant literature on the political violence of armed Islamist 
movements. A general critique of this literature is highlighted by Randy Borum in a review of the 
main social science theories in the field and of post-9/11 conceptual models of the radicalisation 
process as well as post-9/11 empirical studies of radicalisation. Borum states, “each model 
remains underdeveloped: none of them yet has a very firm social-scientific basis as an 
established "cause" of terrorism, and few of them have been subjected to any rigorous scientific 
or systematic inquiry. ”82 
As this dissertation discusses both violence and nonviolence, a brief overview of the dominant 
literature on the transformation of Islamist movements is given below.  
 
On Transformation of Islamists 
As the process of militant Islamists’ transformation is a recent development, writings about it 
are quite limited and less developed than writings on Islamist’s violence. This is also because 
most of the attempts to explain the transformation of militant groups into peaceful groups are 
individual studies and not meant for generalisation or the creation of a general theory. In an 
attempt to interpret transformations among some case studies of Islamism, academic works 
mentioned several arguments in this regard, building on other general theories of 
transformation. 
Cooperation/ Inclusion Hypothesis 
This approach is based on the general cooperation/inclusion hypothesis that is common in the 
literature on democratisation and transitions towards democracy.83 It also makes use of the 
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traditional approaches of transformation or what is known as ‘harmony restoration hypothesis’ 
that interpret conflict transformation as a means of restoration of order and harmony of the 
community.84 The ‘inclusion can lead to moderation’ hypothesis proposes that inclusion in the 
political process, cooperation with non-Islamist parties, involvement in the political process 
and/or receiving institutional incentives can lead to ideological moderation in Islamists’ political 
thought. In this process, moderates persuade radicals of the value of working within a 
democratic system and with other parties, as moderates themselves have increasing contact 
with diverse ideologies and worldviews. 
This is in fact a reversal of the structural approach of state culture explained above. Thus, this 
hypothesis reverses the same linear causal relationship used by state culture approach on 
causation of violence. The main argument is that if Islamists rebel because of repression and 
exclusion, then they would change their directions if they are included in the political process 
and if the government cooperates with them.85 The vast majority of the literature on the 
inclusion-moderation hypothesis highlights the ways in which institutions and political 
opportunities offer incentives for excluded groups to enter the system and abandon radical 
tactics and ideologies.86 
With regard to Islamist movements, this approach is used extensively in explaining the 
moderation of the Lebanese Hezbollah and some Islamist organisations in Jordan, Turkey and 
Yemen.87 With the two groups covered in this dissertation, inclusion could mean the incentives 
offered by the state to encourage the militants to renounce violence and the strategic 
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calculations they employed to justify the transformation and maximise their available ‘gains’ 
and minimise ‘losses’.  
The main critique of this hypothesis is that it lacks both empirical evidence and clearly specified 
mechanisms for change. It does not provide a precise answer to the question: how and under 
what conditions does inclusion or cooperation lead to moderation? As shall be seen from the 
case studies of this dissertation, though some incentives are offered for the two groups to 
renounce violence, inclusion in the political process is rather limited or hardly existent. So, the 
inclusion-moderation hypothesis has a very limited impact in explaining the case studies of this 
dissertation. In her comparative research on Islamists in Jordan and Yemen,88 Schwedler and 
Clark challenge this hypothesis and argue that Islamists’ cooperation with leftists and other 
ideologically opposed groups is insufficient evidence of Islamists’ ideological moderation. 
Rather, internal party debates must be investigated to see whether the boundaries of 
justification have been altered. Moderation therefore must be examined on a case by case 
basis.89 Also, it has been argued that Morocco’s Islamist Party of Justice and Development has 
continued to be moderate despite the reversal of earlier political openings offered by the 
state.90 After all, this approach is based on the assumption that all Islamist movements are 
interested in political participation, even though one of the core principles of Jihadist groups is 
the refusal of democracy and political participation.91 
Repression Hypothesis  
In contradiction with the previous approach, the repression hypothesis argues that Islamists 
change their directions when they undergo severe repression with a limited incentive of political 
accommodation in the electoral process. An example of this approach is the argument advanced 
by Mona El-Ghobashy in her explanation of the ideological moderation of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood.92 Excessive repression has been considered by Omar Ashour as one of the main 
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reasons for transformation of the two groups of this dissertation as will be discussed below in 
detail. Also, the moderation of Turkey’s Islamists was considered as a case of ‘exclusion leading 
to moderation’.93 
However, as argued by the political process proponents,94 the causal linear relationship does not 
rightly reflect the causes of either radicalisation or transformation of Islamists, though it might 
be successful in explaining some cases. Moreover, the space between inclusion and 
transformation is unaccounted for and thus the mechanisms by which Islamists transform are 
kept largely unspecified.95 As explained before, repression could lead to radicalisation while the 
repression-moderation hypothesis states that repression could lead to moderation. This raises 
the still inadequately answered question: when does repression lead to moderation and when 
does it lead to radicalisation?  
The Political Process Approach/ Social Movement Theories 
Likewise, the political process approach/ SMTs are utilised to explain the transformation of 
Islamists. An example of this is Carrie Wickham’s study about the transformation of the Egyptian 
al-Wasaṭ Party, wherein she utilised the political process approach to find out how cross-
ideological cooperation could lead to Islamists’ moderation. According to Wickham, Islamists’ 
beliefs have moderated as a result of the learning process that occurs through the interactions 
between Islamists and secular opposition leaders as they pursue common goals. Wickham 
argues that while Islamist leaders could have adopted certain political positions for purely 
instrumental purposes, those attitudes eventually “metamorphosed into matters of 
principles.”96 
However, Wickham acknowledges that that there is a tension between the al-Wasaṭ Party’s 
religious and democratic commitments, but for Wickham, these are issues for which political 
learning has not yet taken place. Thus, she concludes that the reasons behind the 
transformation of al-Wasaṭ Party are political learning and strategic calculations.97 The core 
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difference between Wickham’s study and that of Schwedler is that the latter sees cross-
ideological cooperation as an effect of shifting ideological commitments, while the former views 
cooperation as a mechanism that produces ideological moderation. 
In her PhD dissertation, Dalia Fahmy utilised the political process approach to account for the 
moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a case study of Islamist movements. She concluded 
that moderation of the MB is the result of the political process that involves interplay between 
three variables: political inclusion, internal organisation of the movement and ideological frames 
choice.98  
 The political process approach has also been utilised by Omar Ashour to explain the causes of 
transformation of several Islamist movements including the two groups under discussion. As 
Ashour’s contribution is the most relevant and most comprehensive academic work on the 
topic, it will be reviewed in detail. In his study, Ashour tried to answer two main questions: why 
do radical Islamists revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives and initiate a de-
radicalisation initiative? And under what conditions will this process be successful?  
To answer these questions, Ashour analysed three Egyptian groups (the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the IG and al-Jihād) and two Algerian cases (The Islamic Salvation Army and the Salafi Group for 
Preaching and Combat). The first Algerian case represents an example of de-radicalisation 
success while the second case represents an example of de-radicalisation failure. Based on these 
cases, Ashour proposes that four interdependent variables are necessary for the success of any 
de-radicalisation process: repression, selective inducements, social interaction, and leadership. 
If any of these four variables is missing, the de-radicalisation process will not succeed.  
So, a combination of state repression directed against leaders and members, selective 
inducements offered by the state to these movements to renounce violence, social interaction 
between different levels of the movement (internal interaction) as well as between the 
movement and the ‘other’ (external interaction), and charismatic leadership in control of its 
followers are all necessary for the initiation and success of any de-radicalisation process. State 
repression and interaction with the ‘other’, Ashour argues, affect the ideas and the behaviour of 
the leaders of a radical organisation who start changing their beliefs and worldviews after 
calculating the costs and the benefits. After that, the leadership initiates a de-radicalisation 
                                                          




process when the state offers selective inducements. Then the leaders start to have internal 
interactions with the grassroots in an effort to convince them with de-radicalisation. Ashour 
stresses that the four variables are ‘necessary’ for the success of any de-radicalisation process 
and that this hypothesis “can also explain the de-radicalization processes of other armed 
Islamist movements elsewhere and possibly the de-radicalization of armed groups in general.”99 
Ashour’s study is an original contribution to our understanding of the causes of transformation 
of armed Islamist movements. However, the stress on the necessity of interaction between the 
four variables is neither uncontested nor always necessary. This could have been the case had 
the findings of the study been confined to its selected cases only, but the study is in fact trying 
to lay a general hypothesis for the transformation of Islamists, a process which would definitely 
lead to unfilled gaps in the arguments due to the inevitable differences between various Islamist 
movements.  
Regarding leadership, for example, the study emphasises that “[T]he charismatic leadership of 
an armed Islamist organisation seems to be the decisive factor in the success or the failure of 
any de-radicalization process.”100 Though it is undeniable that leaders have great influence on 
their followers and are, in most cases, the main drivers of a de-radicalisation process, this is not 
always the case. To mention only one example, the Salafi Jihadists of Mauritania renounced 
their previous violent beliefs and vowed to quit violence forever upon long sessions of 
arguments and theological debates with scholars who are neither their leaders nor affiliates of 
any other Salafi-Jihadi movement.101 Also, many small Salafi-Jihadi factions joined the de-
radicalisation process of al-Jihād Organisation in Egypt though they are neither affiliated to al-
Jihād Organisation nor cognisant of the leaders who wrote the theological arguments 
rationalising the process of de-radicalisation.  
Schwedler argues that it is not necessarily the case that “only a charismatic leader can advance 
persuasive justifications; it is the process of engaging in debates about ideological 
commitments—and collectively agreeing to adhere to the outcomes of internal votes on the 
substantive issues being debated—that can produce ideological moderation.”102 Other variables 
                                                          
99 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 295.  
100 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 298.  
101 Muḥammad Aʿmārī, “Al-Diddū: Aqnaʿnā al-Salafiyyīn bi Tark al-ʿUnf,” Al-Jazeera Website: 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/504D20DC-D842-431D-A173-2206F9455BC7.htm  (Last accessed 13 November 
2015).  
102 Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates,” 360. 
26 
 
may also be questioned. Repression, for example, is arguably a major reason for radicalisation. 
Considering it as a reason for de-radicalisation requires an answer to the ensuing question: 
when does repression lead to radicalisation and when does it lead to de-radicalisation? Though 
some insights into this are provided,103 the answer still needs more substantiation.  
The third variable of ‘social interaction’ between the leaders and the ‘other’104 is also 
contestable. ‘The other’ refers to the more radical takfīrīs, some liberals and Leftists 
intellectuals, and may be some religious scholars. Such interaction has very limited, if any, effect 
on the leaders. As Ashour’s study itself reports in another place, several attempts of 
reconciliation were made and several scholars visited the leaders of the Egyptian movements 
and debated with them their ideas and ideologies. They were always depicted as state-agents or 
sympathisers. When it comes to the leftists or liberal intellectuals, they were, and are still, 
dismissed by these groups even after de-radicalisation. The change these movements have 
undergone in this regard is no more than moderating their rhetoric regarding these liberals and 
ceasing to depict them as infidels or apostates, which does not mean they have accepted their 
ideas or have taken them into consideration.  
Moreover, though selective inducements, the fourth variable introduced by Ashour, can have 
some effect, it cannot be taken as an incentive of de-radicalisation while the ideology is still 
unchanged. As this study will show with the revisions of al-Jihād Organisation, selective 
inducements can encourage the militants under repression to revise their thoughts but never 
make them adopt something they are unconvinced of. So, inducements come as supporting 
incentives, not initiators, of already running ideological shifts. Also, in the most successful case 
of de-radicalisation, the IG leaders declared their non-violence initiative in 1997 without any 
inducements or cooperation from the state. Inducements came later on after 9/11 attacks when 
the Egyptian regime changed its policies and decided to prove to the West it could successfully 
rehabilitate ‘terrorists’.105  
Moreover, though Ashour’s study established its arguments on the political process approach, 
the overwhelming majority of the arguments depended on the political environment element of 
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the political process approach and, to some extent, on the mobilisation structures. However, 
comparatively very little attention was paid to the ‘ideological framework’ element, which 
constitutes the third component of that approach. Thus, the employment of the political 
process approach is incomplete as the study did not sufficiently explain how the ideology 
integrated with other variables to initiate the whole process of de-radicalisation.  
Lastly, the current study will prove that, on the ideological and behavioural levels, there is a 
great difference between the revisions of the IG and al-Jihād though both of them have 
undergone the four variables of Ashour and are considered by Ashour as successful behavioural 
and ideological de-radicalisation cases. This variation in the revisions of the two groups proves 
that the four variables do not work for all cases that undergo the same conditions. Despite all of 
these remarks, Ashour’s work fills a wide gap in the literature and provides great insights into 
our understanding of Islamists’ transformation.   
Ashour also offers a helpful framework for evaluating various groups’ differences by examining 
three dimensions: ideology, behaviour and organisational capacity. He divides de-radicalisation 
into three types: ideological, behavioural and organisational. Ideological de-radicalisation is 
defined as a process in which a violently radical group “reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes 
the use of armed methods to achieve political goals while also moving towards an acceptance of 
gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context.”106 
He defines behavioural de-radicalisation as, “abandoning the use of violence as a tactic to 
achieve political goals, without a concurrent process of ideological de-legitimization of 
violence”.107 Organisational de-radicalisation refers to the process that follows ideological or 
behavioural de-radicalisation and involves “dismantling the armed units of the organisation, 
which includes discharging and dismantling their members without splits, mutiny or internal 
violence.”108 However, the last two types of Ashour’s classification are problematic as they, by 
definition, mean that groups who stopped violence because they had become incapacitated, 
totally defeated,  overwhelmingly deterred or fragmented, such as the Egyptian al-Jihād in 1995, 
can be defined as ‘de-radicalised’. 
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Taken in various combinations, Ashour’s three dimensions produce three distinct paths for de-
radicalisation.  If the three processes are achieved as in the case of the MB and the IG, this is 
called ‘comprehensive de-radicalisation’. If the ideological and behavioural dimensions are 
achieved, but the organisational de-radicalisation is not achieved, this is called ‘substantive de-
radicalisation’, which involves a successful de-radicalisation only on the ideological and 
behavioural levels. Ashour counted al-Jihād Organisation as an example of substantive de-
radicalisation because though the majority of the organisation has been ‘substantively de-
radicalised’, other factions still follow al-Qaeda and reject de-radicalisation.109 The third and last 
combination of Ashour’s categories is ‘pragmatic de-radicalisation’, which involves successful 
behavioural and organisational but not ideological de-radicalisation. An example of this is the 
Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and the militias affiliated with the Tajik Islamic Renaissance 
Party.110 
Thus, Ashour counts the IG as an example of comprehensive de-radicalisation and al-Jihād as an 
example of substantive de-radicalisation that has happened on both behavioural and ideological 
levels. The findings of the present study will approve Ashour’s thesis on the IG but will disprove 
his assumptions regarding al-Jihād. As this study is concerned mainly with ideology, it will assess 
the revisions of the two groups as per the definition of ideological de-radicalisation given by 
Ashour. It will argue that for a movement to become ideologically de-radicalised, the core ideas 
that the group previously used to justify violence need to be reversed or retracted. This is 
particularly the case in this study as both groups under discussion behaviourally stopped 
violence long before their revisions, and those of them who went through the revision process 
had no arms to lay down at the time of the revisions.111 Thus the other two types of de-
radicalisation as defined by Ashour do not factually apply to the members of the two groups 
who accepted revisions, though obviously behavioural abstention from physical acts of violence 
after revisions is necessary to prove the sincerity of the ideological retractions.112 
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Not far from the political process approach and Ashour’s findings, Matesan examined four 
Islamist movements in Egypt and Indonesia. For the Egyptian cases, she examined the MB and 
the IG, but not al-Jihād Organisation. She employs a process-tracing approach to explain the 
causal mechanisms of what she calls violent escalation and de-escalation. The main argument of 
the thesis is that violent escalation is a slippery slope that emerges from the interaction of 
grievances caused by external factors (repression, low domestic policy convergence and salient 
threats to the Ummah) with intra-organisational competition over authority and public norms of 
resistance. De-escalation occurs when organisational crisis and widespread public condemnation 
of the group lead to a re-evaluation of the cost of violence and a re-thinking of their overall 
mission and vision.113  
She concludes that “[W]hile religious justifications might play an important role for mobilisation, 
violent tactics are adopted when there is a broader precedent for violence in society, which is 
unrelated to the issue of religious interpretation and justification, or when there are 
organisational pressures are more powerful catalysts for the adoption of violent tactics than 
simply the adoption of a hard-line religious interpretation.”114 By organisational dynamics, 
Matesan is referring to strength and cohesion. Strength refers primarily to the capacity of the 
organisation, like having resources, adherents and mobilisation potential. Cohesion refers to the 
extent to which there is a unitary line of command and whether there are factions within the 
organisation or competition over authority. This also depends on the presence of a strong leader 
capable of unifying and controlling the group and imposing authority. 
Thus, she generally notes that violence is primarily driven by the logic of grievances, and de-
escalation is driven by the logic of disillusionment. For the IG in particular, she argues that high 
levels of repression coupled with strong public condemnation of the group led to widespread 
disillusionment with the cause, which created an organisational crisis and in turn led to de-
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escalation of violence.115 While Matesan’s thesis successfully explains causal mechanisms of 
violence and non-violence and gives more attention to and emphasis on the role of ideology, it 
fails to show the impact of the tenets of ideology on external causal reasons and it lacks depth 
and sufficient details of ideology as it employs only secondary sources in its general overview of 
the IG and the MB literature. 
 
Literature on the Transformation of Egyptian Militants 
The previous section covered literature on de-radicalisation or moderation of Islamists in 
general, while this section covers the literature on de-radicalisation of the Egyptian militants in 
particular. In addition to Matesan and Ashour’s works, a limited number of works on Egyptian 
militant Islamists’ transformation have been written. In her 2015 study on the revisions of the IG 
and al-Jihād, Dina Al Raffie also notes that “Since Ashour’s study, there have been few follow up 
studies carried out on the Egyptian Islamist militants.”116  
In his 2015 essay titled “Assessing Islamist Armed Groups’ De-Radicalization in Egypt”, Drevon 
comments on the scope of the literature on this topic, stating, “This academic corpus is 
nonetheless still inadequate to fully comprehend the ramifications of these revisions, 
considering the absence of research based on rich primary sources and interviews with these 
groups’ members and leaders.”117 This deficiency is what the present study aims to fulfil and 
what gives it merit over other studies in this field.Some of the works on the topic are in 
English.118 However, the majority of these are in Arabic and take the form of news articles119 and 
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archival interviews.120 Some of these interviews were collected and published in a book form.121 
Some books included a chapter on the social analysis of the positions of al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya in 
their first four books included under the series of Taṣḥīḥ al-Mafāhīm.122 Like other secondary 
sources, none of the Arabic secondary sources was devoted to providing a detailed analysis of 
the IG or al-Jihād Organisation’s ideological and religious attitudes. 
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against al-Qaeda, the article draws implications for U.S. counterterrorist messaging, focusing particularly on the utility 
of wielding this theological–juridical approach as compared to other ‘counter narrative’ approaches, and the vital 
need to accurately characterise Islamism and its relation to terrorism. See Paul Kamolnick, “Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: 
Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (36, no. 5 [2013]), 394-
418. Lahoud’s article reviews some of Faḍl’s old and new views and argues that there is a great shift and stark 
contradiction between Faḍl’s old writings and his new ones, and questions Faḍl’s failure to definitely clarify the 
relation between his earlier and recent writings and his reluctance to admit that his new writings are revisions or that 
his old writings were mistaken. Therefore, it depreciates the significance of his writings and dismisses the view that 
his revisions will have a significant impact on Jihadism. See Nelly Lahoud, “Jihadi Recantations and their Significance: 
The Case of Dr Fadl,” in A. Moghadam, and B. Fishman, eds., Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and 
Ideological Fissures (London: Routledge, 2011), 138-57. Another article by Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin offers an 
historical overview of the revisions of the IG, and a very brief review of those of al-Jihād. It provides a description of 
their views on jihad, takfīr and ḥisba. The article is highly descriptive and concludes by saying that the authors cannot 
causally attribute the groups’ decision to lay down arms to ideological reorientation as opposed to other regime 
actions like repression. However, the Egyptian experience is highly suggestive as it indicates that the ideology of 
Islamist groups is not exogenous and fixed, but is rather endogenous and flexible. The Egyptian experience also shows 
that ideological reorientation may be more effective at stemming militancy in the long run compared with rival 
approaches. See Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin, "Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting 
Militant Islam in Egypt," Terrorism and Political Violence (20, no. 4 [2008]), 461-79. Another article by Amr Hamzawy 
and Sarah Grebowski provides a generalised description of the revisionist attitudes of the IG and al-Jihād towards the 
state, politics, and society, and how they eventually agreed on the nonviolent interpretations of the MB. They 
conclude that Jihadi revisionism has led both groups to forego violence and has shifted Egypt’s Islamist spectrum 
towards moderation. Yet, the revisions of al-Jihād are less developed than those of the IG because the revisions of al-
Jihād are quite recent and need more time to develop. See Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowski, “From Violence to 
Moderation: Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2010). Available at: 
 http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de:8080/receive/HALCoRe_document_00008333?lang=de (accessed 14 January 
2016). 
119 Examples of these include: Jamāl al-Banna, “Jamāl al-Banna Yaktub: Wathiqat Muḥāwalat al-Tarshīd:  Mā Lahā wa 
mā ʿalayhā,” Al-Maṣrī al-Yawm (Online. [5 Dec. 2007]Downloaded 6 January 2011); Yusrī al-Gharabāwī, “Al-Murājʿāt 
mina al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya ilā al-Jihād,” procedures of  Al-Murājʿāt mina al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya ilā al-Jihād symposium 
at Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsiyya wa al-Istrātijyya,  Islamonlin.net (Online: [5 July 2007] Downloaded 06 June 2011); 
Sherīf Ḥilmī, “Azhariyyūn Yu’aiyydūn al-Duktūr Faḍl wa Yakhshawna al-Ẓawāhirī: Ṭanṭāwī wa al-Muftī Yarfuḍān al-
Taʿlīq biraghm Ḥuṣūl al-Kitāb ʿalā Muwāfaqat Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (Kuwait [30 Nov. 2007]), 8.  
120 Examples of these are the interviews conducted by Makram Muḥammad Aḥmad with leaders and members of the 
IG, which he published in al-Muṣawwir Magazine. 
121 See, e.g., Makram Muḥammad Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājʿa: Ḥiwār maʿa Qādat al-Taṭarruf fī Sijn al-ʿAqrqb 
(Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq al-Dawliyya, 2003). 
122 Ḍiyā’ Rashwān, ed., Dalīl al- Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī al-ʿĀlam, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Mu’assasat al-Ahrām, 2006).  
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The greatest deal of these writings cover only the description of the event, the history of the 
two groups,123 the reactions to these revisions, their effect on the broader jihadi trend and 
speculations on whether or not  the revisions were sincere. 124  
As the majority of these sources discuss the sincerity of the revisions and whether they were 
written as genuine convictions or under coercion in addition to the possible effect of these 
revisions on the jihadi movement worldwide, these sources will be discussed under the general 
titles: ‘reactions’ and ‘impact on Jihadists’. So the following section provides a literature review 
of the majority of Arabic sources on the revisions of the two groups in addition to informing the 
reader of how the revisions were received and reacted to. The reactions towards and the impact 
of the revisions of each of the two groups will be discussed separately, starting with the IG as 
their revisions took place first. 
 
Reactions 
The revisions of the two groups have sparked many controversies over their nature and political 
implications. “Many observers have branded these revisions a deceiving tactical move to break 
out of prison….On the other hand, a few academics have conversely endorsed a more optimistic 
outlook, and stressed that collective de-radicalization demonstrates that militant Islamist 
ideologies can be reinterpreted by former proponents of violence, and serves as a guideline for 
broader renunciations of violence by militant groups evolving in other contexts.”125 Thus, in 
addition to giving a detailed review of the existing literature and arguments on the revisions of 
the two groups, this section gives a broader idea on how the local and international community 
received and interacted with the revisions, and thus enhances our understanding of the 
revisions, their background and people’s perceptions of them. It shows how actors within the 
collective action arena and concerned commentators and observers who engage with this 
reality construction work are involved in the politics of signification.  
 
                                                          
123 See, for example, Salwā Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya al-Musallaḥa fī Miṣr 1974-2004 (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq al-
Dawliyya, 2006).  
124 See, for example, ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī, Al-Muqāmara al-Kubrā: Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf bayna Rihān al-Ḥukūma wa 
al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya (Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa li al-Nashr wa al-Khadamāt al-Ṣaḥafiyya wa al-Maʿlūmāt, 2002).  




Though the IG declared its initiative in 1997, the government did not interact with it except after 
2001. The Egyptian regime's indifference to and then interaction with the IG initiative generated 
different reactions. Some observers considered the revisions as a manoeuvre; some considered 
them as a consequence of coercion by and/or a deal with the government, while others opined 
that the revisions are the product of a genuine change in the beliefs and attitudes of the IG. 
Based on this, the reactions generated in this regard can generally be categorised into the 
following three main categories: 
1- Deal 
Some writers and journalists, such as ʿ Abd al-Raḥīm ʿAlī and Haytham Jabr, considered the IG 
revisions a deal with the government and not a genuine change in the beliefs and attitudes of 
the IG.126 The deal entails that the IG renounces its violence and stops criticising the 
Government in return for the release of its members from prison and giving them a margin of 
freedom. Such a deal was made at that particular time because the IG and the government 
shared mutual interest to stop violence at that point for different reasons. The proponents of 
this view argued that this was confirmed by the fact that a large number of the IG members 
were released from prison and rehabilitated.127  
2- Pressure 
The proponents of this attitude do not claim that there is a deal between the IG and the 
government, but they argue that the revisions are the outcome of the governmental pressure 
on the IG. Yet, they differ on the way they interpret this pressure. Some Islamists consider that 
the IG has renounced its cause in order to relieve the governmental pressure; and some other 
Islamists consider that the IG has been obliged to retract but did not forsake its cause. Other 
non-Islamists interpret this as a success to the governmental iron-fisted policy which has been 
able to neutralise the IG. 
 For example, during the early days of the initiative, the governmental newspaper al-Ahrām 
published several articles and comments that depict the initiative as a manoeuvre by a terrorist 
group and that it arouses the suspicion of the government security forces. According to the 
                                                          
126 See, e.g., Haytham Jabr, "Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya wa Azmat Niẓām Mubārak," Egyptian Socialist Centre:  
http://www.e-socialists.net/node/1087 (accessed 11 October 2011); ʿAlī, Al-Muqāmara al-Kubrā.” 
127 See e.g., ʿAlī, Al-Muqāmara al-Kubrā. For more details on this, see al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya, 171. 
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newspaper, the initiative was planned by the IG lawyer Muntaṣir al-Zayyāt who visited all the 
leaders abroad and asked some of them to support the initiative while others should reject so 
that the new attitudes would not be looked at as a result of a deal. In another article, the 
newspaper stated that the initiative came only after the security forces succeeded in putting a 
halt to the activities of the Group through security raids and prevention of communication and 
funding to the ‘terrorists’.128 Examples of Jihadists who argued in favour of the pressure view 
include Abū Ḥamza al-Maṣrī129 and Hānī al-Sibāʿī.130  
3- Genuine Convictions 
The proponents of this view argue that the revisions are the result of a genuine change in the 
theological convictions, beliefs and orientations of the IG, and not the product of pressures or 
deals. They consider the revisions as the product of the theological studies of the leaders. This 
view was less prevalent in the early days of the initiative but became the most dominant as time 
passed and the IG kept constant on its new stances, supporting them with several writings. The 
IG members and leaders and the governmental security officials all confirm that the revisions 
are genuine changes in the convictions of the IG. Outside this circle, the pro-regime journalist 
Makram Muḥammad Aḥamd was the first to support this view and defend the IG as he was 
allowed by the regime to attend the IG teaching and discussion sessions that were conducted to 
activate the initiative. He made several interviews with the IG members and leaders and 
published them in four long articles in the pro-regime magazine al-Muṣawwir. He then collected 
the four articles along with some other material and published them in his book Mu'āmara am 
Murājaʿa.131 In addition to the IG and the government, several Islamists and intellectuals 
supported this interpretation. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood132 as well as several 
intellectuals, thinkers and analysts.133    
                                                          
128  See a summary of the two articles in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Manāwī, Shāhid ʿalā Waqf al-ʿUnf, Taḥawwulāt al-Jamā‘a al-
Islāmiyya fī Miṣr (Cairo: Aṭlas li al-Nashr, 2005), 99-100 
129 See Abū Ḥamza al-Maṣrī, "Qalīl mina al-Ḥayā' wa al-Inṣāf yā Qādat al-Jamāʿa," Minbar al-Tawḥid wa al-Jihād: 
http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=u4n2rhg5 (19 October2011). For a detailed discussion of al-Maṣrī's attitude, see al-
Manāwī, Shāhid ʿalā Waqf al-ʿUnf, 101-4. 
130 See, e.g., Ḥānī al-Sibāʿī, “Ḥiwār Jarīdat al-Dustūr maʿa al-Shaykh al-Duktūr Ḥānī al-Sibāʿī," Al-Dustūr Newspaper, 
republished at al-Sibāʿī's website:  http://www.almaqreze.net/ar/articles_read.php?article_id=227 (19 October 2011). 
131 See Aḥmad, Mu'āmara am Murājaʿa, 27-136. 
132  For comments of several MB leading figures on the IG revisions, see Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, "Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya: 
ʿAshrat Aʿwām ʿalā al-Murājaʿāt," Amn Fiikri website: http://www.amnfkri.com/articles.php?action=show&id=804 (19 
October 2011). 
 133 Examples include Ḍiyā' Rashwān, Waḥīd ʿAbd al-Majīd, ʿAmr al-Shubakī and Rafīq Ḥabīb who are all Egyptian 
thinkers and experts in Islamist movements. This also includes previous Jihadists such as Kamāl Ḥabīb and Muntaṣir 
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As the above review shows, the majority did not believe in the genuiness of the IG revisions 
when they were first announced in 1997. Yet, nowadays there is little doubt as to the genuiness 
and sincerity of the IG anti-violence views. The volume and depth of the IG anti-violence 
literature greatly exceed any expected effort that would be needed to arrive at a deal with the 
government or skip a governmental pressue, and it does reflect a genuine rethinking of the 
Group's ideology.134 In practicval terms, the IG  has not committed any act of violence  since 
1997, and none of its members has committed any breach in this regard after they were 
released from jail.135 The fact that the revisions of the IG are the real choice of the IG leaders is 
acknowledged even by Jihadists such as Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri, despite their severe criticism of the 
revisions, considering them as a retraction from jihad and a betrayal to Islam.136  
 
Al-Jihād Organisation 
As will be discussed later in this dissertation, the revisions of al-Jihād are much more limited and 
controversial than those of the IG. These revisions were written by the Jihadist ideologue Sayyid 
Imām who is more known as Dr. Faḍl.137 The rest of al-Jihād members just approved and signed 
their acceptance of the arguments of what Faḍl has written. However, some of the views of Faḍl 
on some core issues such as God’s sovereignty and takfīr are ambiguous. This, along with the 
strong links of al-Jihād Organisation with al-Qaeda and the weight of Faḍl in the jihadi circles, 
provoked extensive reactions and polemic among Islamists and observers of Islamist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
al-Zayyāt. The views of these and other intellectuals and experts can be found, e.g., in Ibrāhīm ʿArab, "Al-Jamāʿa al-
Islāmiyya Tamudd Yad al-Muṣālaḥa li al-Dawla al-Miṣriyya,” Al-Ḥaqīqa al-Dawliyya Newspaper (14 July 2007), 
republished on Muntaṣir al-Zayyāt website: http://www.elzayat.org/show_files_20.htm (20 October 2011); Ḥamdī 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, "Al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya bi Miṣr lā Tawba walā Ṣafqa," Amn Fikrī website: 
http://www.amnfkri.com/articles.php?action=show&id=1141 (20 October 2011).  
134 Y. Carmon et al, “The Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal,” MEMRI (No. 309 [22 
December 2006] available at: http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=1802&param=IDTA (Last 
Accessed 16 December 2015). 
135 Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed,” 617; M. Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence in the Revisions of the Egyptian 
Islamic Group,” (MA Dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2009), 24-5. 
136 Before the ideological content of the IG revisions was published and before the government adopted the revisions, 
al-Ẓawāhiri criticised the IG leaders and acknowledged that their revisions reflected their own thoughts. See Ayman 
Al-Ẓawāhirī, Firsān Taḥta Rāyat al-Nabiyy (n. p: al-Saḥāb Media, n. d., Ms Word version available at: 
http://www.tawhed.ws,)190-236, downloaded on 14 May 2011). 
137 Faḍl published his writings under three different names, but all of his publications would be mentioned in the 
footnotes under the name of Faḍl. The original name printed on each publication can be found in the bibliography 
with a note that says that this name refers to Faḍl.  
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movements. Generally speaking, the reactions on al-Jihād revisions can be classified under the 
following categories:138  
1- No Comment 
Some High-ranking official religious authorities in Egypt such as, the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar at 
that time, Muḥammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī and the former mufti of Egypt ʿAlī Jumʿa declined to give 
any comment when they were questioned about their options on the revisions.139 Nonetheless, 
some other scholars  from Al-Azhar supported the revisions.140 
2- Support 
In Egypt, the majority accepted and appreciated the revisions of al-Jihād. This includes members 
and leaders of the IG,141 the Muslim Brotherhood,142 many analysts and thinkers,143 as well as 
most of the jailed and freed ex-Jihadists.144 Moreover, the revisions were lauded by several 
Arab145 and internationals146 commentators and analysts who expressed their optimism on the 
revisions and their impact on international jihadi violence. Those who supported the revisions 
without critical comments considered them as a strong reversal and a stark condemnation of 
                                                          
138 This section on reactions to Faḍl’s revisions is based mainly on my discussion of these reactions in my MA thesis. 
See Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 14-18. 
139 Ḥilmī, “Azhariyyūn Yu’aiyydūn al-DuKtūr Faḍl.” 
140 Ḥilmī, “Azhariyyūn Yu’aiyydūn al-DuKtūr Faḍl;” Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 15. 
141  See, for example, Kamāl Ḥabīb, “Sayyid Imām mina al-ʿUdda ilā al-Naṣīḥa,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (18 November 
2007), 12; Muntaṣir al-Zayyāt, “Al-DuKtūr Faḍl Taqaddama ḥīna Taqāʿasa al-Ākharūn,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (18 
November 2007), 13; Kamāl Ḥabīb, “Yakfī al- Murājāt Binā’ Tayyār Jāmiʿ,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (21 November 2007), 
13; Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm, “Wathīqat Tarshīd al-Jihād wa al-Arḍ al-Mumahhada li al-Ḥarth,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (23 
November 2007), 9. 
142 Muhammad Bahā’, “Al-Ikhwān Yatabar’ūn min Taṣrīḥāt Murshidihim al-Sābiq wa Yuʿlinūn Sabqahum Murajaʿāt al-
Jihād’,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (28 November 2007), 12.  
143 See, for example, Rafīq Ḥabīb, “Al- Murājʿāt Iḍāfa li al-Waṣaṭiyya al-Islāmiyya,” Interview published in 
Islamonline.net ([5 December 2007] (no longer available Online [ accessed 9 June 2011]); al-Banna, “Jamāl al-Banna 
Yaktub.” 
144 See, for instance, Nizār Ghurāb, “Al-Qiyādī al-Jihādī Nizār Ghurāb li al-Jarīda: ʿAbbūd al-Zumur Yadʿam al-Murājʿāt 
wa al-Maṭlūb al-Samāḥ li al-Jihād bi al-ʿAmal al-Siyāsī.” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (3 December 2007), 13. 
145 Examples include the Tunisian thinker Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Jurshī and the Iraqi analyst Jawād al-Khalṣī. See Salāḥ al-Dīn 
al-Jurashī, “Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Jurashī: Al-Murājʿāt Mubādara Tantaẓir al-Taswīq,” Interview by ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭaḥāwī, 
OnIslam Website: http://www.onislam.net/arabic/islamyoon/armed-action/103394-2007-12-26%2010-35-51.html  
(accessed 24 October 2011); Jawād al-Khalṣī “Al-Khalṣī: al-Jihādiyya al-Miṣriyya Manbaʿ ʿUnf al-ʿIrāq,” Interview by 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṭaḥāwī, OnIslam Website: http://208.43.71.196-static.reverse.softlayer.com/arabic/islamyoon/armed-
action/103839-2008-01-17%2010-31-40.html (24 October 2011). 
146  Examples include Frank Cilluffo, Rohan Gunaratna and Lawrence Wright. See Frank Cilluffo, quoted  in Eli Lak, 
“Senior Qaeda Theologian Urges His Followers to End Their Jihad,” The Sun: http://www.nysun.com/foreign/senior-
qaeda-theologian-urges-his-followers/68433/ (25 October 2011); Gunaratna, quoted in Lake, “Senior al-Qaeda 
Theologian;” Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: The Radical Challenge to al-Qaeda's Ideology,” Annual Reports 
of the U.S. Counterterrorism Office ( 30 July 2008). 
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violent movements like al-Qaeda by one of its main ideologues as well as a straightforward call 
for cessation of Islamists’ violence against local regimes. However, some other analysts had an 
opposing view.147 
3- Rejection and Disparagement 
A limited number of jailed al-Jihād Organization members and some members of al-Qaeda have 
vetoed the revisions of Faḍl and considered them a wicked attempt to stop jihad for the benefit 
of Western and America interests. Media coverage of these debates between Jihadists who 
support the revisions and Jihadists who reject them shows that the debate assumed personal 
subjective directions. Supporters such as Faḍl and Nabīl Naʿīm depict their critics of several 
shortcomings such as hypocrisy and acting as agents for foreign or regional security 
apparatuses. On the other hand, the detractors such as al-Ẓawāhirī and al-Sibāʿī depict the 
supporters of being agents to the Egyptian security apparatus or of retracting under coercion. In 
a clip available on Jihadi website, al-Ẓawāhirī attacked the revisions of Faḍl even before they 
were published and noted that they were the product of torture and pressure, depicting Faḍl as 
“a ruined, desperate person who is looking for a way-out from prison.” and his revisions as  ‘a 
call to a new American religion., 148  Later on,  al-Ẓawāhirī published a lengthy book of 
approximately 92000 words entitled al-Tabri’a (The Exoneration) to rebut Faḍl’s views.149 Other 
al-Qaeda-related figures or sympathisers such as Muḥammad al-Ḥakayma150 and Hānī al-Sibāʿī151 
expressed similar views. The lengthy response of al-Ẓawāhirī and other al-Qaeda supporters 
would indicate that al-Qaeda has taken Faḍl’s revisions seriously and was greatly alarmed by the 
consequences they might have on the foundations of their violent ideology.152  
                                                          
147 Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 15.  
148 Al-Jarīda, “Al-Ẓawāiri Hājama Shaykhah fī Risāla Istabaqat al-Murājʿāt wa Waṣafahu bi’annahu Munhār Yā‘is  
Yabhath ʿan Makhraj mina al-Sijn,” Al-Jarīda Newspaper (19 November 2007), 12. 
149  Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, Al-Tabri’a: Risāla fī Tabri’at Ummat al-Qalam wa al-Sayf min Manqaṣat Tuhmat al-Khawar wa 
al-Ḍaʿf. N.P.: al-Sahāb li al-Intāj al-‘Iʿlāmī, 2008..  
150 For the reaction of al-Ḥakayma and al-Ẓawāirī before the Faḍl’s book on revisions was issued, see al-Jarīda, “Al-
Ẓawāiri Hājama Shaykhah."  
151  He is an Egyptian Islamist refugee in London who heads al-Maqrīzī Centre for Historical Studies. On his website al-
Sibāʿī always publishes articles that support the jihadi thought, See Hānī al-Sibāʿī, "Taʿlīq Awwalī ʿalā Wathīqat Tarshīd 
al-ʿAmal al-Jihādī,” Markaz al-Maqrīzī li al-Dirāsāt al-Tārīkhiyya:  
http://www.almaqreze.net/ar/news.php?readmore=96 (27 October 2011). 
152 Terrorism Focus, “Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri Repudiates Dr. Fadl’s ‘Rationalization of Jihad’,” Terrorism Focus. (17 [30 
April 2008]), 3-4; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 16. 
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4- Still Radical 
The fourth category of responses argues that Faḍl is still having his previous radical views 
concerning rebellion as he wants to stop violence merely for pragmatic reasons as he argues 
that violence brings more harm than benefits. This means that he has not renounced his beliefs 
regarding violence and therefore if violent operations become successful, he will promote them. 
ʿAbd al-Rahīm ʿAlī153 and  Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī154 are examples of supporters of this view. Al-
ʿAlwānī, for example, noted that Faḍl’s revisions “cannot be considered revisions, Fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence), or even a smell of Fiqh.”155  As armed rebellion against the state is the main issue 
in Faḍl’s revisions, the above views rely in their overall evaluation of the revisions only or mainly 
on this issue.156 
 To avoid repetition, further details and investigations on whether or not the revisions of Faḍl 
were written under duress will be provided in the following chapter. The second most discussed 
aspect on the revisions in the secondary sources literature is the influence of the revisions on 
other jihadist groups. This is what the following section covers. 
Influence of the Revisions on other Jihadists157 
In their discussion on expected influence of the revisions on international Jihadist Movements 
like al-Qaeda, analysts pay more attention to the revisions of the al-Jihād than to those of the IG 
because of the weight of Faḍl in the jihadi circles and the fact that al-Jihād members, unlike 
those of the IG, have the strongest ties with al-Qaeda. As a result, the effect of the IG revisions is 
discussed in passing while the focus is mainly on the effect of Faḍl's revisions. In this regard, 
there are different opinions regarding the effect of revisions on international jihadi movements. 
The views in this regard can be categorised under the following three categories:  
                                                          
153 ʿAbd al-Rahīm ʿAlī, “Mulāḥaẓāt Manhajiyya ʿalā Murājʿāt al-Jihād,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper (10 December 
2007), republished on the author's website: http://www.abdelrahim.com/arabic_page_08_11.html (14 October2011).  
154 This means that they still consider armed action a duty, but they have stopped practising it because they are 
incapable of doing it.  
155 Ṭāha Jābir al-ʿAlwānī, “Al-Faqīh wa al-Mufakkir al-DuKtūr Ṭāha Jābir al-ʿAlwānī fī Ḥiwārih maʿa Islamonline.net (1& 
2)” Interviewed by Islām Faraḥāt, OnIslam website: http://www.onislam.net/arabic/fiqh-a-tazkia/fiqh-
papers/8079/102991-2007-12-06%2016-11-51.html (18 October 2011). 
156 Ibrahim, “Kiohadists Quit Violence,” 17. 
157 The link between this section and the rest of the chapter is that this section shows and reviews large part of the 
writings on the issue. The information in this section on the influence of Faḍl’s revisions on al-Qaeda is based on my 
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1- Considerable Influence 
Several analysts, thinkers and affiliates of Egyptian ex-Jihadist movements opined that the 
revisions could have a significant impact on other Jihadists including al-Qaeda. Some of them 
went as far as hoping that Faḍl’s revisions could cause al-Qaeda to revise its though, or result in 
creating internal splits or weakness among the supporters of al-Qaeda.158 However, they 
concede that revisions alone cannot halt violence worldwide. For example,  the Jihadist leader 
Aḥmad Yūsuf Ḥamdallah emphasized that the Wathīqa constitutes a ‘tsunami’ in the Jihadi 
thought.159 
Some researchers like Omar Ashour categorised al-Qaeda into three sections. The first section 
which comprises the second-in-line leaders around al-Qaeda leaders is unlikely to be influenced. 
The second section that comprises al-Qaeda’s affiliates in countries like Algeria, Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt. Of these, the Egyptian branch is most likely to be influenced due to the prestigious 
scholarly position of Faḍl and because of the IG revisions. The third layer which includes 
‘internet militants' or ‘self-recruited members’ would be influenced the most.160 Unlike Ashour, 
Ḍiyā’ Rashwān sees that the first section would be influenced the most as they know Faḍl and 
appreciate his writings more than the other two sections. 161  
This view founds itself on that al-Jihād Organisation is strongly connected to al-Qaeda, for its 
members were the founders and main reason behind the establishment of al-Qaeda. This view 
also supports itself by arguing that Faḍl is a chief Jihadi ideologue who is a highly perceived 
amongst Salafi Jihadi movements in general and al-Qaeda in particular. Because al-Qaeda’s 
tends to market its violent ideology to its followers and sympathisers using Islamic theological 
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December 2007), 13; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 19. 
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justifications, countering this by Faḍl, the IG and similar groups would influence some of al-
Qaeda’s affiliates, potential recruits and sympathisers.162  
Rabasa et al summarises this view: 
These critiques by former radicals can lead extremists to question their 
beliefs in addition to deterring those who may be at risk of radicalization. 
Moreover, there may be a tipping point: When enough ex-militants 
denounce radical Islamism, that ideology and the organizations that 
adhere to it are fatally discredited. Even short of this tipping point, as 
greater numbers of militants renounce extremism, radical Islamist 
organizations will experience greater hurdles in attracting adherents and 
sympathizers within the Muslim community.163 
2- Limited Influence 
Jihadist leaders and al-Qaeda sympathisers, such as al-Ẓawāhirī and al-Sibāʿī, emphasise that the 
revisions of Faḍl will have extremely minor influence because Jihadi movements believe that any 
scholar could make a mistake and because they believe such ‘retractions’ are the product of 
coercion.164 That view that the influence of the revisions is limited is also expressed by some 
analysts and researchers like Nelly Lahoud who argues that  if revisions had an impact on 
Jihadists, why is it that the responses of Jihadists have been to denounce rather than to obey 
Faḍl’s new writings?165 Khalil al-Anani argues that the revisions will have little effect because 
violence is not driven by the intellectual factor. Instead, violence is driven by structural reasons 
such as the socio-political and economic conditions. These conditions together create a sound 
environment for the violent current to exist. Thus, ideological ideas are not the driving factor of 
violence.166 This point of view also relies on the fact that some new ideologues, such as Abū 
Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, have taken the lead in theorising for violence after Faḍl. Therefore, 
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Faḍl’s writings no longer constitute a significant part of the Jihadi literature as they were 
replaced by writings of new ideologues.167 
3- Shaking but not Collapsing  
Some researchers such as Rafīq Ḥabīb168 and Hānī Nusayra169 contend that the revisions shall 
merely shake violent groups without leading to their demolition for violence is engendered by 
multiple reasons, such as structural factors including injustices and socioeconomic problems, so 
religious justifications constitute only a fraction of these reasons. Lawrence Wright, e.g., argues 
that it is “unlikely that Al Qaeda will voluntarily follow the example of the Islamist Group and 
Zawahiri's own organization, Al Jihad, and revise its violent strategy. But it is clear that radical 
Islam is confronting a rebellion within its ranks, one that Zawahiri and the leaders of Al Qaeda 
are poorly equipped to respond to.”170 Thus, all views, albeit different, concede that revisions 
alone cannot cause international violence to collapse, and they also agree that Faḍl’s new 
stances will somehow influence the global jihadi thought. However, they diverge on the extent 
and magnitude of that influence.171 
As violence is the product of several socio-political, economic and structural factors in addition 
to the intellectual and ideological factor, it is more likely that violence will continue as long as 
these factors continue, though the revisions may influence the ideological factor feeding 
violence and cause some sort of recalculations and reconsiderations of some Jihadists in dealing 
with the unpleasant wider context. Revisions may also have an impact on discouraging potential 
freelance Jihadists or jihadi sympathisers who may not be members of any group, but are 
supportive of Jihadism because they share the same ideology or common grievances. However, 
the appearance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and its expansion to different countries 
practically substantiates the ‘little effect’ view as Islamists’ violence has increased 
internationally. 
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Revising one's beliefs and ideas is a complex process that takes multiple factors into 
consideration and needs a long period of time, particularly if it is undertaken by a large group of 
people who have different thoughts, concerns and interests. Thus, the effect of the revisions, 
particularly on local violence, cannot be immediate and needs a long time to become apparent. 
The greatest immediate merit of the revisions, however, is that they have provoked an extensive 
ideological, theological and political discussions and debates amongst the jihadi circles about 
the central issues and tenets according to which violence is justified. Such discussions and 
debates constitute a challenge from within and are healthy phenomenon and important step 
that will have implications on the ideological theorisation of violence perpetrated by militant 
Islamist movements. 
Though the revisions of the IG are less effective on the international level because the IG is a 
local organisation and its activists do not have strong ties with al-Qaeda, they are effective on 
the national and regional levels. On the national level, the revisions of the IG have opened the 
gate for other militant groups and individuals in Egypt to renounce violence. This is clear in al-
Jihād’s revisions which were inspired and encouraged by the success of those of the IG. 
Furthermore, the revisions of the IG were adopted by some minor jihadi cells that carried out 
attacks in Sinai in 2004 and 2005. Leaders of the IG explained the ideological content of their 
revisions to the members of these cells who accordingly renounced violence and followed the IG 
new thought. This contributed to the success of the government in preventing further attacks in 
Sinai Peninsula. On the regional level, the revisions of the IG were taken as a model in other 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Tajikistan, Malaysia and Indonesia as 
these countries had militant groups or individuals who similarly declared their renouncement of 
violence.172 
In addition, revisions of the IG have the merit of being the first, of being unilaterally declared by 
the IG without being requested by the regime and of being the ones that produced the most 
prolific writings and argumentations against violence.173 In addition, the detailed theological 
evidences presented by the revisions of the IG provide counter arguments to the jihadi thought 
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targeting new recruits, which would in the least mitigate or alleviate the influence of that 
thought. This may dissuade some of the new recruits away from the jihadi camp. 
As the above reviews show, most of the writings on violence and the transformation of Islamists 
pay little attention to the ideology or theological component of the whole process, though it is 
the axis around which violence and revisions spin. Therefore, ideology will be the main focus of 
the current study, which will try to fill the lacunae in the literature regarding this point. This is 
further motivated by the following illustration on ideology. 
 
Why Ideology? 
This section defines ideology and explains why this study focuses more on ideology than on 
other factors. While there is no agreed-upon definition of ideology, Lyman Sargent defines 
ideology as a “system of values and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes of 
society.”174 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines ideology as “any wide ranging system of 
beliefs, ways of thought and categories that provide the foundations of programmes of political 
and social actions.”175 Ideology helps to attract recruits, legitimises a group’s use of violence, 
and helps maintain group solidarity. It does so by providing a description for the current world 
order, a picture of a preferred future, and an explanation of how to realise the aspired 
objectives.176 Ideologies have a high potential for mass mobilisation, manipulation, and control. 
Therefore, they are ‘mobilised beliefs’.177 Thereupon, Freeden notes that those who construct 
ideologies are engaged in the manufacturing of history and also claim universal validity that 
arises out of the need for a simplified marketable account of reality and the desire for control 
and power over others.178 Ideology provides a relatively durable set of ideas that define 
parameters for what is conceivable among movement adherents. Deeply rooted ideological 
beliefs can construct individuals’ world-views, thereby influencing the kinds of cognitively 
recognised options that are available in responding to different conditions.179 
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Ideology is crucially important to militant movements. It is a tool through which movements 
describe themselves and the world around them, and distinguish their ‘in-group’ from ‘out-
groups’. Ideology is an instrument of opposition and contestation that provides movement 
adherents with a ‘cognitive map’ that filters the way social realities are perceived. These maps 
render that reality easier to grasp and more coherent, and thus more meaningful. Ideology 
therefore offers some measure of security and relief in the face of ambiguity– particularly in 
times of crises. Ideology plays several functions. It raises awareness to adherents and explains 
why social, political, or economic conditions are as they are. It helps establish a group identity 
by juxtaposing the out-group’s allegedly harmful traits with certain positive traits that 
supposedly characterise actual or potential adherents of the ideology. It mostly attributes blame 
for the in-group’s dilemma on some out-groups whose behaviour allegedly undermines the well-
being of the in-group. It also offers a course of action that is cited as the remedy to the in-
group’s predicament, and it exhorts adherents to implement that course of action.180 
Jihadist ideology performs these functions by re-explaining and raising awareness of the past; 
Jihadists argue to Muslims that Islam is in a state of decline. They identify the alleged source of 
the Muslims’ plight in the persistent attacks on Muslims by an anti-Islamic alliance of 
‘apostates’, ‘Crusaders’, and ‘Zionists’. They attempt to create a new identity for their adherents 
by offering them membership in a global community of like-minded believers. Moreover, like 
other ideologies, jihadist ideology presents a program of action, namely violent ‘jihad’.181 
Thus, ideology is crucial in understanding the religious principles and founding beliefs of any 
organisation. It shapes the vision and goals of Islamist groups and influences the way their rivals 
are perceived and the context is interpreted. As studying their ideology enables us to better 
understand the mind-set of Islamist organisations, the formative texts of these groups should 
receive as much, if not more, attention as the strategies and tactics they employ. 
Within the literature on Islamism, there is a dispute on whether or not religious ideas constitute 
a causal factor in motivating people towards the use of violence. There are three views in this 
regard. The minimalist view is the dominant view in the field as can be seen from the literature 
review above. Scholars representing this view argue that religious ideas are not a significant 
causal factor and that religious rhetoric is often a post hoc justification for violence. Therefore, 
they either give more prominence to external materialistic causal factors or argue that Jihadists 
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are not actually religious during the course of their radicalisation.182 This is also the view of Jillian 
Schwedler in her review of some academic works on the moderation of Islamist Movements. 
She believes that “moderation may have little to do with religion and everything to do with 
historical power struggles and local contexts.”183  
Yet, the assertions about the lack of religiosity of Jihadists are made without any sort of 
framework for making such determinations. They are made on an ad hoc basis, without the use 
of any systematic evaluation or objective measurable means by which one could evaluate 
whether these individuals were religious or not. Therefore, “[E]valuation of religiosity comes 
down to the subjective judgment of researchers.”184 Maryann Love notes that both politicians 
and major academics “consistently and spectacularly get religion wrong in world affairs.”185 
The maximalist view sees ideology as the main causal factor and considers Islam as a religion, 
and not any particular subset of Islam, to be the fundamental force driving those who turn to 
violence.186 As the argument that Islam in general is the fundamental problem is mostly written 
for a popular rather than academic audience, this view is well represented in popular discourse 
on the subject and has asserted itself in Western policy debates and the mass media.187 
 
The middle ground view argues that religious ideology is a very important causal force in driving 
people towards jihadist violence, but they ascribe that to the Salafi Jihadist ideology rather than 
to Islam as a whole.188 Another field of contention among those who acknowledge the role of 
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ideology is the extent to which religious interpretations and ideological beliefs cause violence. 
Some see religion and culture as autonomous forces that directly shape group behaviour.189 
Others recognise the legitimising and mobilising power of religion, but ascribe the emergence of 
Islamist groups and their strategic choices also to the broader socio-political and economic 
contexts.190 Even within this last view that acknowledges the importance of both ideology and 
context, there is a disagreement over the level of importance and the space that ideology 
consumes in relation to the context. In this regard, Khaled Hroub, for example, concludes in his 
edited volume on context versus ideology that the ideology of Islamist groups “remains 
significant, but mainly at a rhetorical level, thinly concealing politics and responses that are 
formed by the contextual reality.”191  
Despite this fierce contention over the role of religion or religious ideology, there is a consensus 
that understanding what motivates people to join the Salafi Jihadist Movement is important. 
Such an understanding is fundamental to be able to accurately describe the movement.192 This is 
where part of the value of this dissertation becomes clear. Understanding the ideas that 
motivate people to undertake religiously justified violence or retract from violence is of 
paramount importance in fashioning organisational and state-level policies that can minimise 
the attraction of violent Islamist movements and help avoid policies or ideas that pose a major 
risk of strengthening it.  
The causal role of religious ideas is usually misunderstood because, as explained by Scott 
Appleby, the paradigm for understanding religion and political violence is doomed by two 
extremes. He argues:   
Recent debates about the roles of religion in deadly conflict find analysts 
gravitating toward one of two extremes. Some follow in the tradition of religion’s 
cultured despisers, pointing to incidents of religious terrorism or to the 
religiously inspired atrocities in conflict settings like the Balkans as evidence that 
religion is inherently opposed to progress, threatening a return of the Dark Ages. 
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Others, including secularists who are friendlier to organized religion, as well as 
many religious officials themselves, expect it to uphold the humanist credo, 
including the proposition that human life is the highest good, the one inviolable 
reality. These proponents of enlightened religion tend to explain away acts of 
terrorism, murder, and sabotage committed in the name of religion. This is not 
Islam, this is not Christianity, this is not Sikhism, they contend, precisely because 
the act and agents in question violate the sanctity and dignity of human life (e.g., 
unconditional obedience to God’s law).193 
 
Appleby boldly describes this either/or method of analysing the role of religion as ‘patently 
absurd’, arguing that both views are reductionist, as the sceptics of religion overlook “the 
profoundly humane and humanizing attributes of religion,” while the other view makes the 
converse error by failing “to consider that an authentic religious precept—a sincere response to 
the sacred—may end in subordinating human life to a higher good.”194 Based on that, 
Gartenstein-Ross asserts that “as long as religion is so crudely understood, it is easier for the 
extraordinarily poor justifications for regarding religion as marginal that dominate the 
scholarship to go unchallenged: religious ideas, quite simply, are not treated with the same rigor 
as academics treat other topics.”195 
 Likewise, as the religious ideology of revisionists is mainly built on cost-benefit analysis, 
understanding the ideology becomes crucial; for without explaining the new ideology and 
understanding the importance emphasised by Islam on continuously evaluating the costs and 
the benefits of any action on the Muslim community, it is difficult to grasp the real importance 
of evaluating the effectiveness of violent or nonviolent tactics in their broader social context - 
for it may lead to confusing a nonviolent ideology with a pacifist strategy.196 
Thereupon, of the three views on the importance of ideology, the arguments and conclusions of 
this dissertation support the middle ground view and show the importance of ideology in taking 
the decision to support or retract violence. The fact that several Islamist movements have 
renounced violence and argued against the Salafi Jihadist ideology using Islamic theological 
arguments gives more weight to this view and indicates that the problem is not with Islam as a 
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religion but with this particular ideology/ interpretation of Islam known as Salafi Jihadism. It also 
suggests that moderate interpretations of Islam can be one of the most effective tools in 
neutralising violent ideologies.  
Stephen Biddle rightly argues that ideology is the centre of gravity and the tool used to rally 
support for religiously inspired terrorists, arguing that the real enemy in the war against 
terrorism is not terrorism itself, but radical ideology; as terrorism is only a tactic. Therefore, 
unless the ideology is defeated, counterterrorist efforts will inevitably fail.197 This is what is 
generally termed in literature as a ‘war of ideas’ or ‘the battle for the hearts and minds’.198 
The literature review above shows that most of the writings on violence of Islamists focus on 
causal external factors while paying minimal attention to the ideology or moral legitimisation or 
de-legitimisation of violence. The same applies to Social Movement Theory literature. In this 
regard, Quintan Wiktorowicz notes that ideology received little treatment in the dominant SMT 
framework. “In the haste to conceptualise social movements as constituted by rational actors 
responding to opportunities and threats, scholars have downplayed the ideational motivation 
for collective action, often portraying it as epiphenomenal to contention. Typically, ideas are 
incorporated into dominant models only in so far as they constitute a cultural resource for 
framing, and in many cases collapsing, ‘ideology’ and ‘frame’ into a single concept such as 
‘ideological frames’.”199 
Furthermore, Rogan notes,  
[I]t is essential that we strive to understand the ideological 
underpinnings of radical Islamic terrorist groups in order to 
investigate potential mechanisms for engaging this conflict. Towards 
that end, greater attention must be given to what is written and 
what is said by the leaders of these groups; which is mostly absent in 
extant communication-based research… Though individual acts of 
terrorism can be extremely destructive, it is the promulgation of an 
ideology of intolerance for pluralism, equality, and respect for the 
sanctity of human life, along with a jurisprudence for the wilful 
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destruction of self and others, grounded in a premise of divine truth 
that is perhaps most dangerous. Understanding this ideology is the 
challenge confronting policymakers and scholars of 
communication.200  
 
Even writings which consider ideology as an important causal factor either overgeneralise 
and/or do not explain the details of that ideology and how it is utilised to justify or retract 
violence. After reviewing some works that spoke about violent ideology in general terms, 
Matesan rightly notes, “None of these works that have examined the religious underpinnings of 
Islamist violence have expanded their analysis to also study the recent ideological revisions of 
groups that have denounced violence.”201 
While there is a limited number of writings on the ideology of Jihadists in general and al-Qaeda 
in particular,202 there is no work devoted to the detailed explanation of the ideological concepts 
of the two groups under discussion, nor are there any writings that explain and analyse the 
details of the religious ideology of ex-Jihadists who have renounced violence and the ideological 
and theological dynamics of these changes. In addition, authors of extant writings on jihadist 
ideology, as in the case of Habeck for example, only draw the general image without paying 
attention to details and are evidently untrained in Islamic studies or theology, and therefore 
they rely almost completely on English language secondary sources in discussing the ideological 
concepts of Jihadists.203 This lack of training and expertise in Islamic studies and lack of use of 
primary Arabic sources often lead to a broad-brush approach, a certain lack of depth and some 
inaccuracies.204 Furthermore, the lack of theological training deprives authors of these works 
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from paying more attention to details, from a proper evaluation of the theological arguments 
and from an adequate evaluation of the theological appeal or legitimacy behind them. 
This problem is also identified by both Maryann Love and Gartenstein-Ross, who argued that 
lack of religious training is evident in arguments advanced by scholars that misunderstand basic 
religious rules. Having identified some examples of the mistakes committed by scholars due to 
lack of religious training, Gartenstein-Ross argues, “This lack of training may accentuate 
scholars’ tendency toward projection: religion is not an important motivating force for most 
Western scholars, so they assume that this must be the case for others, too.”205  He also makes 
the point that: 
Religion as a topic in the context of Jihadist violence makes most Western 
scholars extremely uncomfortable: not only do they not understand the 
Islamic faith well for the enumerated structural reasons, but also dwelling 
too much on religious ideology surely risks accusations of bigotry. The net 
result is that scholars tend to, without adequate justification; negate 
religious ideology as a causal mechanism. This is a tremendous mistake that, 
quite simply, means that scholars do not understand the very things that 
they are trying to explain. The subject of violence claiming its inspiration 
from religion should not be cheapened by an unwillingness to explore topics 
that may be difficult for Western researchers to broach.206 
Having received proper training in Islamic theology and Islamic studies, the author of this 
dissertation claims more merit in explaining and arriving at the theological roots and 
justifications of Islamists and revisionists. A comparison between the scope and depth of this 
dissertation on the theological aspects and religious mechanisms of violence and revisions, and 
between any other available work on the revisions of the two organisations and other similar 
groups, clearly reflects the value and significance of theological training in studying and 
revealing the religious claims and mechanisms underpinning the process of violence and 
revisions. Lacking depth and theological insight, other studies offer no more than a general and 
superficial sociological, discursive or political reading of the theological contents of the process 
of revisions, with many of them containing theological mistakes or misunderstandings due to 
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the lack of a theological Islamic background, and thus sometimes lead to erroneous 
conclusions.207  
 Thus, ideology is crucial as it constitutes the centre of gravity and provides the key raison d’etre 
from which groups’ programmatic elements take their ideals/goals. Without a proper 
understanding of the ideology of extremists, counter-ideological efforts would be ineffective 
and correct alternative ideas could not be offered. A clear understanding of the ideology also 
helps to better distinguish each group’s features and so minimise the danger of mistakenly 
attacking some ideas and groups and prevent unnecessary antagonising of others, which only 
complicates the problem.208 Therefore, Habeck emphasises that only by understanding the 
elaborate ideology of Jihadists “can the world determine how to contain and eventually end the 
threat they pose to stability and peace.”209 
Thus, as Turner rightly observes, the discourse in which the causal arguments on Jihadism have 
mainly been presented often detaches the issue from ideational factors. Explanations of Jihadist 
violence are usually conceptualised through the lens of exclusively contemporary issues and 
without due consideration to the importance of ideas. “This has the unfortunate effect of 
relegating religious ideology and historical political objectives to a position of limited 
importance. It is not only material forces that are of significance when observing Salafi 
Jihadism….ideas are equally of value and have a role to play.”210 Gartenstein-Ross also notes 
that religious ideas had been unfairly marginalised as a causal factor, something which he 
describes as “a bias against recognizing religion’s relevance.”211 Having highlighted the main 
trends in the literature on the importance of religious ideas, Gartenstein-Ross concludes that 
“religious ideas as a radicalizing factor or a factor shaping the outlook of violent groups can be 
more rigorously studied.”212 
Cornelia Beyer explains how ideas are important and how they relate to material actions:  
One may regard the material and the ideational as quite distinct; they are, 
however, closely related and partly independent…. For material change to 
occur ideas have to be expressed in creative or destructive action. Humans 
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therefore act as creators of ideas and as mediators between ideas and the 
material. Regarded by realists as material facets (population) and in 
constructivism as bearers of ideas (agents) humans operate in both 
dimensions, able to transform the ideational into material and vice-versa.213 
Though the above accounts of ideology are analytically applicable to jihadist ideology, jihadist 
ideology differs from other conceptions of ideology, like the Marxist perception of ideology for 
example, as  other perceptions view ideology as a secular, obscure reality that provides a 
singular account of the political world.214 The difference lies in the fact that Jihadist ideology is 
not derived from secular concepts, but instead from notions of ‘extra-rational agency’ (religious 
symbols) that go beyond the material and are claimed to possess a ‘cosmic origin’. It is further 
distinguished by the fact that Islam generally does not separate between the secular and 
religious spheres of life, and that both Islam and Jihadism share the same source of knowledge: 
the Quran and Sunna.215 However, ideology and religion are analytically separable as religion 
seeks to increase the value of the individual through group participation, while ideology seeks to 
increase group benefit through individual participation.216Thus, jihadist ideology is distinct from 
Islam as well as from ordinary political ideologies.217  
However, in Islamism, religion and political ideology are interwoven; jihadist ideology contains 
elements of both religion and political ideology. Thus, in this case, political ideology becomes 
equivalent to religious beliefs.218 Jihadists use religious words, symbols and values that distinctly 
political ideologies tend to avoid. Rivals are described by Jihadists in religious terms; the strategy 
and the goals are described through religious means; and acts of violence are justified through 
an interpretation of religious texts.219 Though secular ideologies also motivate adherents, 
religious ideology provides a different type of motivation due to its promise that the devoted 
will receive an everlasting reward in the Hereafter.220 As religious radicals believe that they are 
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fulfilling a Divine duty, they are more willing to put aside moral reservations about murder.221 
Their violence may not be instrumental but merely demonstrative;222 and they are less likely to 
admit defeat because they believe that God will reward their steadfastness and suffering by 
eventually assuring their victory.223 
As shown in the jihadi literature and explained in this study, religious ideology plays a crucial 
role in Jihadists’ propaganda to attract followers and win sympathy from ordinary Muslims. They 
emphasise the point that that they are striving for Islam in almost every page they write, and 
they quote verses from the Quran and the Sunna as well as opinions of classical Muslim 
scholars, giving the impression that their ideas are founded only and exclusively on Islam. The 
entire struggle is based on religious ideas that emphasise working for Islam and for the sake of 
Muslims as reflected in framing in concepts like sovereignty, jihad, caliphate, submission and 
allegiance to God alone and the supremacy of Islam. Salafi Jihadism can then be termed a 
‘religio-political ideology’,224 ‘religious ideology’ or, as David Philpott calls it ‘political 
theology’.225 
Tarrow rightly notes that religion is a very reliable source of emotion and is therefore a recurring 
source of social movement framing. It provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that 
can be accessed and appropriated by leaders of these movements.226 Rashwan notes that 
intellectual and ideological foundations are particularly important for Islamist movements, “The 
decisive influence of intellectual foundations extends to all aspects of Islamist movements, from 
their names, the symbols and terms they adopt, their organisational structures, to their 
strategies and operational tactics. This distinguishes them from other social and political 
movements.”227 
Thus, without an ideology that persuasively appeals to the followers of Islamist movements, all 
external factors simply fail to engender, or keep alive, violent collective actions that the 
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perpetrators would normally consider to be immoral or unlawful. More specifically, ideology 
serves two roles: it helps Islamists justify acts of violence, and it helps them to morally disengage 
themselves from their act and from the victim.228  
Also, in his study about counter-ideological work against terrorist ideologies, M Bin Hassan 
asserts that the political influence of al-Qaeda and similar groups is less about the individual’s 
actions and more about the dominance of the ideology.229 In his analysis of Qutb’s discourse, 
Ahmed Moussali rightly notes, “The rise of fundamentalism is, in most cases, attributed to 
social, psychological and/or economic causes, and there have been few attempts to understand 
fundamentalism on its own terms…To study the Middle East correctly and intelligibly, religion 
should be viewed as one of the major causes of change.”230  
In addition, Philpot warns that the religious ideology, or what he terms ‘political theology’, is a 
notion that international relations theorists are often unwilling to account for. Therefore, “If 
International Relations scholars are to understand the violence of September 11, then they 
must come to understand how religious movements like radical Islamic revivalism, acting on 
their political theology, challenge the Westphalian synthesis, the fundamental authority 
structure of the international order.”231 
The same applies to moderation or de-radicalisation; causal factors are insufficient without 
ideological support. Tezcur notes that the integration of an extremist group into the political 
system, for example, “will not result in moderation unless party leaders have enough intellectual 
resources to reorient their ideological worldviews. In this sense, ideological evolution remains a 
precondition for behavioural change.”232 Browers also rightly notes that moderation requires 
intellectuals who are free to interact and develop alternative frameworks for politics and 
society.233 In a study about de-radicalisation dialogues with Islamist militants in Yemeni jails,  
Ane Birk notes that because these dialogues were based on Islam and Islamic law as the 
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ultimate source of truth and legitimacy, they are more compelling than other approaches and 
are therefore more effective in moderating the prisoner’s beliefs.234 
Authors of ‘Decline and Disengagement’ emphasise that ideology plays a more significant role in 
motivating Islamist radicals than other factors; because Islamists are so ideologically motivated, 
they may be less susceptible to structural rewards and punishments.235 Rabasa et al also 
emphasise that religious doctrine distinguishes militant Islamists from other extremists, and that 
the effects of this have not been explored. “Because they are motivated by faith, Islamist 
radicals are more committed than nonreligious extremists and therefore are less likely to de-
radicalise. Nevertheless, precisely because Islamist ideology plays such a central role in these 
groups, it is necessary to change militant Islamists’ beliefs as well as their behaviour. Moreover, 
while it may be difficult to alter the worldview of Islamist radicals, there is an opportunity to use 
mainstream Islamic theology to undermine radical Islamist ideology.”236 
The argument that ideology is of paramount importance gained greater credit in the recent 
literature as there is “an emergent consensus among counterterrorism analysts and 
practitioners that to defeat the threat posed by Islamist extremism and terrorism, there is a 
need to go beyond security and intelligence measures, taking proactive measures to prevent 
vulnerable individuals from radicalising and rehabilitating those who have already embraced 
extremism. This broader conception of counterterrorism is manifested in the counter and de-
radicalization programs....”237 As most of these programs primarily target and counter the 
ideology or religious justifications of violence,238 this stands as an undisputable recognition of 
the role ideology plays in Islamists’ violence and de-radicalisation.  
On the individual level, the authors of Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists rightly argue that 
quitting an ideologically based radical Islamist group is different from leaving a criminal group or 
a gang, as the latter is an essentially non-ideological entity. “Leaving an Islamist group implies 
the rejection of a radical ideology or of essential parts of that ideology…. the articulation of 
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theologically grounded imperatives for renouncing violence by credible authorities is an 
important factor in catalysing the decision to leave the group.”239 
In addition, “[I]f a radical ideology is left unchallenged, it is more likely to continue attracting 
recruits. Even if an organization espousing the ideology fades away, another group is likely to 
adopt this world view and continue the struggle. Therefore, to truly extinguish the threat from a 
radical philosophy, it may be necessary for members to renounce their beliefs and explain why 
they are erroneous. In other words, a wholesale rejection of this worldview may be required.”240 
Thereupon, violence ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even 
glorifies violent acts. However, this does not mean that ideology is the sole reason for violence; 
rather it means that it is a significant reason without which all other contextual reasons fall 
short to engender or justify any violent act, as without ideological legitimisation, acts of violence 
would be considered immoral or illegitimate by the perpetrators and thus religiously 
unjustifiable. As Islamists’ ideology almost always takes a religious form, the ideology and 
theology of these movements need more attention and a more detailed study. However, this 
should be done only after investigating the broader socioeconomic and political contexts in 
which a specific ideology was born and survived or died. 
However, while other causal justifications of violence warrant some merit and do play a role, 
without understanding the ideology, such explanations are, however, limited as they are caught 
in temporal, individual and geographical contexts that limit their ability to address the issue as a 
whole..241 The above clearly motivates and supports the objective of this dissertation: to focus 
on the religious ideology after delineating the broader structural context within which the 
ideology was framed. Thus, this dissertation concedes that the causes of violence and non-
violence are complex and need to be located in the interplay of personal motivations, strategic 
and tactical objectives of the violent groups, and also in the larger structural factors affecting 
the society in general and these groups in particular.  
As argued by Paul Wilkinson in his study on terrorism, explanations of ‘terrorism’ should 
concentrate on the social context of the terrorists’ ideologies and beliefs. The best way for 
understanding ‘terrorism’ is to explore the individual political motivations of terrorists, and to 
relate them to particular ideologies and beliefs. Wilkinson, meanwhile, emphasises that “it is 
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essential to take account of the unique political, historical, and cultural context, and the 
ideology and aims of the groups involved.”242 
Moreover, in his study about ‘Terrorism in the Name of Religion’, Magnus Ranstorp maintains 
that although some ‘terrorists’ have religious motivations, they are also driven by “day-to-day 
practical political considerations within their context-specific environment.” Yet, Ranstorp 
asserts that Islamist groups are difficult to analyse because religion and politics cannot be 
separated in Islam and that Islamist groups include their short and long-term objectives within 
an encapsulating framework of religion. Within this framework, their agenda may also “contain 
a nationalist-separatist agenda in which the religious component is often entangled with a 
complex mixture of cultural, political, and linguistic factors.”243 
Therefore, exploring the important factor of religious ideology in detail is what distinguishes this 
study from other studies which focus on external causal factors, paying only little attention to 
ideology. Thus, this dissertation not only considers ideology as one of the causal factors but also 
the most important factor. However, it considers it as an internal causal factor rather than an 
external one. Therefore, other causal factors are described as ‘external causal factors’ or 
‘contextual factors’ while ideology is described as an ‘internal causal’ or ‘textual’ factor, for 
other external factors, such as repression, socioeconomic and political conditions, are used as 
contextual justifications and support for Islamic movements’ internal understanding and 
interpretation of some Islamic Sharia texts. Therefore, the ideology of Islamic movements often 
takes a religious form supported by existing structural injustices, and this is the case for the two 
groups under investigation in this study (IG and al-Jihād).  
This clarifies the relationship between religion, ideology, causal factors and violence. Ideology is 
the set of beliefs of any organisation, and in the case of the two groups under discussion it takes 
a religious form which uses other external causal factors as justifications and support for its 
internally-built religious ideology, which together lead to physical acts of violence. Mary Habeck 
rightly notes that the pronouncements and acts of violence of al-Qaeda- related figures are not 
just reactions to the US policies but rather “a reflection of their own most deeply held religio-
                                                          
242 Paul Wilkinson, “Terrorism: An International Research Agenda,” in Paul Wilkinson & Alasdair M Stewart, 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), ix. 




political views of the world.”244 Therefore, the current study focuses on ideology as opposed to 
external causal factors for, as shown in the above literature review and discussion, existing 
literature focuses on external factors and pays only minimal attention to ideology despite its 
crucial significance.  
Though Islam is recognised as a factor in several sources on international politics, these sources, 
in general, view Islam and religion as a factor to be understood in the context of existing 
International Relations theories, and not as an approach on its own.245 Even when literature 
speaks about ideology, it often classifies it as part of the causation without explaining the details 
of this ideology or how it is employed in theological terms to arrive at specific conclusions. 
Therefore, this dissertation tries to fill this gap by focusing on how Islamic texts (whose Salafi 
Jihadist interpretations form the ideology of these two groups) are used, in theological terms, to 
justify or retract violence. Therefore, it is worth emphasising again that the main contribution of 
this study is not concerned with why the two groups have committed or retracted violence, 
though insightful answers of this are provided. It is concerned with how they theologically argue 
for or against violence using religious arguments in both cases, which makes it a dissertation in 
the field of Islamic studies, and not in any other field. 
 
Case Selection 
The Egyptian cases are selected because the Egyptian Jihadists are the nucleus of the jihadi 
movements worldwide and the co-founders of the international jihadi movement. As will be 
shown later, the writings of the Egyptian jihadi ideologues are the most effective and most 
quoted among Jihadi movements worldwide. The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, for example, is known 
to have been the godfather of the Jihadi thought worldwide; and the writings of Faḍl are 
considered the major manifestos of al-Qaeda and similar militant Islamist movements. More 
importantly, though there are several cases of Islamists’ revisions worldwide,246 the Egyptian 
cases are the most comprehensive ones and are the cases which have prolifically produced anti-
violence literature that can be effectively evaluated and analysed. Other cases of transformation 
are partial and lack ideological justifications in a written form, and thus their discourse or 
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ideology would be extremely difficult to analyse. Thus, “Egypt’s militant groups are the most 
important ones due to their early rise to notoriety, influence upon global jihadi ideology, 
contribution to Afghan mujahideens, and inspiration for al-Qaida.”247 
 
Specificity versus Generalisation 
In his discussion and literature review of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, Alex Schmid rightly 
notes that factors which can lead to radicalisation, de-radicalisation and disengagement are very 
large. Yet, “[I]n the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case 
studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional.”248 Thus, 
the main issue with all studies seeking a general hypothesis is that they cannot accurately 
combine and theorise about the excessive diversity of the Islamic world and the varied 
contextual circumstances that give rise to Islamist movements or cause their transformation 
within this multicultural diversity. As circumstances and motivations of movements differ from 
one another, every case or country should be analysed individually to accurately analyse the 
stances of a specific Islamist group. The current study will show how the strategies and 
ideologies of the two groups analysed in this dissertation are different, despite some 
commonalities, both in their justifications of violence and transformation, though they have 
undergone the same cultural strains and the same political process in the same country.  
Lia Brynjar and Skjølberg Katja argue: 
There is a multitude of situations capable of provoking terrorism. We find 
terrorists among deprived and uneducated people, and among the 
affluent and well educated; we find terrorists among psychotic and 
‘normal’ healthy people; and among people of both sexes and of all ages. 
Terrorism occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern 
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industrialized world and in less developed areas; during a process of 
transition and development, prior to or after such a process; in former 
colonial states and in independent ones; and, in established democracies 
as well as in less democratic regimes. This list could easily be extended, 
but it suffices as a demonstration of the wide diversity of conditions we 
need to consider when trying to develop an understanding of terrorism. 
Obviously, this diversity makes it difficult to generalize about terrorism, 
and the dynamic nature of most of these conditions makes it hard to 
predict anything about future terrorism.249 
Jack Goldstone also criticises generalisation, arguing that factors associated with violence have 
different effects in different societies. So, wide cross-societal generalisations are of relatively 
little use, and therefore it is better to closely examine the interaction of forces in a particular 
setting rather than make sweeping generalisations.250   
Therefore, though some conclusions are generalisable, it is necessary to avoid unwarranted 
generalisations in making assessments, analysis, and conclusions. Giovanni Caracci notes that 
the cultural matrix of terrorism differs from case to case. Yet, researchers find it “easy to over-
generalise and engage in reductionism.” He then quotes Walter Reich’s statement that 
researchers should take special care to identify the groups they are studying and limit their 
explanations to only these particular groups, defining the circumstances under which those 
explanations are valid, and not claim that their studies are valid for other than these particular 
groups.251 Because of that, many scholars of Islamism prefer to explain this phenomenon by way 
of country or organisational case studies. That is why this dissertation will explore specific 
groups rather than attempt to generalise. Yet, the common features and generalisable points 
that apply beyond the cases of this study will be highlighted. 
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Approach, Methodology, Objectives and Conclusion 
Motivated by the arguments above, this dissertation focuses on the theological and ideological 
dimensions that show how religious thoughts that form the ideology of Islamists are extremely 
important as they can challenge, just as they can be influenced by, socioeconomic and political 
considerations. Unless the ideology that gives rise to violence changes, the root cause of 
violence will remain in force because ideology is the fuel of collective actions of violence. Walid 
Phares rightly notes that post-9/11 attempts to understand Islamists’ violence “still link the rise 
of Jihadism to poverty and global attitudes instead of seeing it as a result of mass mobilisation 
by jihadist ideologues and movements. Jihadists are mobilising radicalised Muslims not on the 
grounds of America’s image, but to follow the injunction of Allah.”252 
M. Bin Hassan also emphasises that “[T]here are various approaches in responding to the ideas 
of the terrorists but any meaningful approach should take into account the theological nature of 
terrorists’ ideas, couched in juristic and jurisprudential pronouncements.... This is an important 
point to bear in mind in any effort to make the ideological response succeed and be widely 
accepted. This underscores the importance of the theological and juristic approach in the 
ideological war against terrorism.”253 Therefore, this study joins other studies in emphasising 
that “[I]deology plays a crucial role in the member’s decision to join Islamist groups, and that 
perceived failure of the ideology often plays a central role in members’ decisions to exit militant 
Islamist groups.”254  
In addition, rather than attempting to make excessive generalisations, the dissertation focuses 
on specific cases within a particular country. Even inside one country like Egypt, where the 
structural and psychological as well as the political process circumstances are common to all, 
there are sharp disagreements and differences between various Islamist groups. Such 
differences are ideology-based, not circumstantial or structural. This is one of the main reasons 
why ideology will be the focus of this study. However, to fully explain the motivation of the 
groups under investigation, their acts need to be positioned in their cultural and contextual 
milieu, and therefore the broader contextual economic and socio-political factors will be 
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explained, and other ideological and thematic commonalities among various Islamist 
movements will be outlined.  
As this study will briefly highlight the context and external causes of violence and 
transformation in chapter 2, a mixture of the above-mentioned relevant approaches will be 
utilised in that chapter, namely the structural-psychological approaches and the political process 
approach. The main purpose of this is to set the scene and contextualise the ideas that together 
form the ideology. However, to analyse the focus of the dissertation, which is the two groups’ 
theological textual arguments, textual analysis will be the main player.  
Textual analysis is a method for analysing data that closely examines either the content and 
meaning of texts or their structure and discourse.255 It comprises a variety of primarily 
qualitative methodologies that focus on the analysis of textual content. Methodologies and 
approaches that fall under textual analysis include hermeneutics, content analysis, semiotics, 
phenomenology, rhetorical analysis, interaction analysis, and performance studies.256 
As textual analysis is a flexible approach that is centred around a systemic way of reading and 
interpreting texts, researchers can use a number of theoretical frameworks when interpreting a 
text. The framework adopted depends on the researcher's preferences. Some researchers 
explore texts, their meanings and conventions, and their relationship to the context, whereas 
others assess the construction and reinforcement of ‘cultural myths’.257 As this research focuses 
on texts’ meanings, content, hermeneutics and relationship to context and realism, it will 
employ a mixture of the above methodologies, more particularly hermeneutics and content 
analysis, and tailor them to suit the nature of the text being investigated. Another merit of using 
this mixed method approach is that it gives the opportunity to compensate for the weaknesses 
of one method with the strengths of another, for each single methodology has its own nuances, 
strengths, and weaknesses.258 
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Because textual analysis refers to a variety of research methods that emphasise meaning and 
bring structure to large amounts of unstructured information embodied in written language, it 
has been defined in different ways. However, all definitions emphasise its flexibility and primary 
usage as a means of reading and interpreting texts. For example, Johnny Holloway defines it as 
“a research technique designed to make systematic and replicable inferences from texts.”259 
John Scott defines it as “a method of analysing the contents of documents that uses qualitative 
procedures for assessing the significance of particular ideas or meanings in the document.”260 
Scott adds that textual analysis is rooted in the hermeneutic tradition of textual interpretation, 
and that the “interpretation of a text must always be undertaken from the reader's particular 
standpoint. The inference of meaning is possible only by relating the text to some other frame 
of reference and entering into a dialogue with the text. We must comprehend a text by 
understanding the frame of reference from which it was produced, and the researcher's own 
frame of reference becomes the springboard from which this becomes possible.”261 This is what 
this study aims to do, and Scott’s emphasis on this supports my previous argument that 
analysing the text from the frame of reference it claims to represent, Islamic theology, is 
essential, and that having a solid Islamic theological background is crucial for a sound reading of 
the text. 
McKee explains textual analysis as a way for researchers to gather information about how other 
human beings make sense of the world: 
It is a methodology— a data-gathering process— for those researchers 
who want to understand the ways in which members of various cultures 
and subcultures make sense of who they are, and of how they fit into the 
world in which they live… When we perform textual analysis on a text, we 
make an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations that 
might be made of that text. We interpret texts … in order to try and obtain 
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a sense of the ways in which, in particular cultures at particular times, 
people make sense of the world around them.262 
So, to textually analyse a text means to break it down into its component parts, and then 
examine and offer an interpretation of the component parts as well as of the whole. By means 
of interpretation we are able to go beyond the obvious meaning of the text and to read the 
implied meaning or sub-text.263 This is what this study does: it divides the main themes in the 
texts of the two groups into different categories, examines them one by one, and offers an 
interpretation of each category as well as of the whole to arrive at its conclusions.  
Textual analysis is selected as the primary method of analysis in this dissertation because it 
fruitfully increases our understanding of the construction of textual meanings in texts. As will be 
seen from this study, textual analysis provides, through close and detailed scrutiny of texts, a 
rich discussion of presentational and structural specifics and subtleties that would remain 
unidentified if a cursory analysis was conducted. Textual analysis also benefits from the fact that 
its data source (texts) exists before the researcher decides to analyse them, which saves 
meaning constructions and the ideological implications of texts from the biases that accompany 
the situation when the data sources are created for, or around, the research project. Also, as 
texts are readily available, this can quicken the research process and minimise ethical difficulties 
surrounding access to data.264 
McKee notes that “[T]exts are the material traces that are left of the practice of sensemaking— 
the only empirical evidence we have of how other people make sense of the world.”265 John 
Hartley uses the metaphor of forensic science to show the importance of textual analysis and 
how it helps make sense of the practices/actions of others.266 As Hartley says, forensic science 
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relies on `clues'. This is also how textual analysis works. We can never know for certain how 
people interpret a particular text but we can look at the clues, gather evidence about similar 
sensemaking practices, and make educated guesses.267 
In this sense, textual analysis does not attempt to provide a conclusively single ‘correct’ 
interpretation of a text, but is rather used to identify which interpretations are more possible 
and more likely, for texts have multiple and varied meanings. However, such ‘semantic 
instability’ does not mean that researchers can force a text to mean whatever they wish it to 
mean. They are restricted by the fact that interpretation of the meaning is derived from the 
genre of the text, its codes and  conventions, and also its ideological, cultural, socio-political and 
historical context—which work together to convey a preferred reading of the text.268 
This should largely address the concerns of the critics of textual analysis who question its validity 
and objectivity, claiming that reading of a text echoes the perspective of the researcher and that 
the specific approaches used to analyse texts are as ideological as the texts themselves.269 These 
concerns are also addressed in this dissertation by the fact that the text is interpreted in 
conjunction with its socio-political context, and evidence that supports the interpretation is 
provided. The socio-political dimensions of interpretations of texts enable researchers to further 
benefit from the different textual analysis approaches and allow multi-perspectival textual 
analysis, which reduces risks of subjectivity and the enforcement of an ideologised reading of 
the text.270 Combining the text and the context also saves this research from one of the oft-
repeated critiques of textual analysis: that it is conducted in isolation—i.e. the text is all that 
matters, and it is the central, or the only, focus of analysis.271 Combining textual analysis with 
contextual and framing analysis prevents this risk of textualising the world and acknowledges 
the world that exists outside of texts.272 
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Therefore, before answering the main research questions, this dissertation will answer another 
significant question: What are the external causal reasons (contextual factors) of violence and 
revisions? This question will be answered in chapter two by examining the context and providing 
a brief socioeconomic and political background of the history of the two groups under 
discussion, and shedding light on the external causal factors that led them to their decisions of 
violence and non-violence. Therefore, the employment of the above-mentioned structural and 
political process approaches is required in this particular chapter (chapter 2). 
After chapter 2, the remaining four chapters will answer the main research questions, which will 
categorise and analyse the main themes in the texts of revisionists and offer a contextualised 
textual reading of their interpretations. To do so, the dissertation seeks to answer the following 
two main questions: 1- What were the theological and ideological attitudes of the revisionists 
both before and after revision, and how could they affect their stances concerning violence? 2- 
How could the revisionists reverse from violence to non-violence based on Islamic theological 
reasoning in both cases?  
To textually analyse the literature and answer these two broad questions, the research will 
categorise the main themes in the texts and examine the interconnections of meanings both 
inside and outside the text by linking the specific text or theme to the broader text and the 
outside context. Thus, after explaining the context in chapter two, the textual analysis in later 
chapters will cover the ‘rhetorical context’ of the text. The textual analysis will unobtrusively 
answer such sub-questions as: Who created the text? What topic or issue is being addressed? 
What are the authors' intended messages? Who is the intended audience? What are the specific 
textual characteristics? How is the audience addressed? What is the central theme or claim 
made? Is there evidence or an explanation from reality to support or defend the theme or 
claim? What is the nature of this evidence or explanation, if any?273 Together, this will shed light 
on the wider context of the text, i.e., how the text relates to the context as well as to other texts 
in the same genre or format.  
 The first main research question is answered by providing overviews and a textual analysis of 
the arguments of the two groups both before and after revisions. The violent ideology of al-
Jihād Organisation is discussed in chapter three and the revisions are discussed in chapter four. 
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The IG pro-violence ideology is discussed in chapter five and their revisions in chapter six. The 
second main question of how they could change from violence to non-violence using Islamic 
theological reasoning in both cases is answered in the analysis provided at the end of chapter 
four and six, and also in the final conclusion.  
This will be the main contribution of this study, and it aims at understanding the dynamics of 
change in the revisionists’ theological and ideological attitudes regarding the following concepts 
or themes: jihad, dār al-Islām wa dār al-ḥarb (abode of Islam and abode of War), ḥākimiyya 
(God’s sovereignty), al-walā’ wa al-barā’ (allegiance to the believers and dissociation from the 
disbelievers), takfīr (considering other Muslims as disbelievers), ḥisba (enjoining the good and 
forbidding the evil), jizya (taxes to be levied by Islamic states on the Christian or Jewish residents 
living under their protection), amān (covenant of security given by Muslims to a non-Muslim or 
vice versa) and tatarrus (using Muslim prisoners as human shields in war). These are the main 
Jihadi concepts and themes that together constitute the ideology of Jihadists.274 
These concepts constitute the ‘frames’ of collective action for these movements. Due to some 
limitations of textual analysis,275 and because Islamist movements are, after all, ‘social 
movements’ that employ a massive cultural ‘toolkit’ of ideas, beliefs, and narratives to target 
multiple audiences in order to gain support for its political objectives,276 the notion of ‘framing’ 
or the ‘ideological framework’ component of the political process approach/social movement 
theories will also be used as a theoretical tool, together with textual analysis, to help explain 
these concepts.277 Wiktorowicz notes that though the majority of studies on Islamic movements 
assume that a particular set of grievances, translated into religious symbols and idioms, triggers 
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mobilisation, different generations of social movement theories and accompanying debates 
have proven that other factors, such as frame resonance, resource availability and shifts in 
opportunity structures, are inseparably linked to the mobilisation.278 
Thus, although this study is not trying to follow the same course as social, political or other 
sciences that make use of framing, the study will utilise the relevant theoretical aspects of 
framing to help explain the ideological framework of Islamists. The concept of framing is not 
only widely used in social sciences but also in other disciplines such as psychology, linguistics, 
discourse analysis, communication and media studies, political science, and policy studies. 
Therefore, there is a wide range of scholarship on collective action frames and framing 
processes in relation to social movements to the extent that framing processes have come to be 
regarded as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of such movements.279 
As violence is usually legitimised through ideological ‘frames’ that are, or try to be, resonant 
with the public, ‘frames’ refer to the struggle of social movements with the construction of 
mobilising and counter mobilising meanings and ideas. In this sense, social movements are not 
seen as mere carriers of existing meanings and ideas that result automatically from 
unanticipated events, structural arrangements, or already extant ideologies. Instead, movement 
actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the construction and maintenance of 
meanings for constituents, bystanders, observers or rivals.280 So, ‘framing’ is a form of meaning 
construction which refers to “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and 
contention at the level of reality construction…. the resultant products of this framing activity 
are referred to as ‘collective action frames’.”281 The term ‘frame’ is used throughout the 
literature on the topic both as a noun and as a verb that means to construct a frame or argue a 
case or a meaning in a particular way.282 
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The utility of collective action frames is manifest in their ability to sort and categorise how 
organisations employ different ideas, beliefs, narratives, and traditions to mobilise adherents.283 
Frames constitute interpretative schemata that offer cognitive tools and a language to make 
sense of events and experiences as social movements need to produce and disseminate 
interpretations required to mobilise adherents and garner support.284 As linguistic devices, 
frames are the mechanisms by which individuals or groups communicate their 
conceptualisations about themselves, other parties and the conflict.285 
Frames help render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organise 
experience and guide action. Frames serve an interpretive function by focusing, articulating, 
and extending meanings to activate adherents, transforming bystanders into supporters, and 
exacting concessions. Frames perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing 
aspects of the ‘outside world’, but in ways that are meant to mobilise constituents and 
potential adherents, to garner bystander support, and demobilise opponents.286 Therefore, 
framing is a very useful tool in understanding how a group has managed to transmit messages 
to their audiences.287 
Thus, collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation. With the IG and al-
Jihad, this refers to the above concepts of jihad, ḥākimiyya, ḥisba etc. The framing notion helps 
this dissertation explain the ways in which meanings are produced, articulated and disseminated 
by movement actors through interactive processes. It shows how adherents are convinced to 
participate in a movement and how individual participants conceptualise themselves as a 
collectivity.288 The use of framing by Islamist groups reflects the ideational and cultural elements 
of contentious politics. Though frames alone do not explain every dimension of collective action, 
they constitute significant interpretive tools that translate grievances and perceived 
opportunities into the mobilisation of resources and movement activism. Therefore, framing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Meijer, "‘Defending our Honor’: Authenticity and the Framing of Resistance in the Iraqi Sunni Town of 
Falluja," Etnofoor (17, no. 1/2[2004]), 23-43. 
283 Page et al, “Framing Narratives,” 154. 
284 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” 
Mediterranean Politics (7, no. 3 [2002]), 202; Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 15. 
285 Rogan, " A Frame Analysis of Jihadist Ideology,” 395. 
286 David Snow and Rbert Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization,” International Social 
Movement Research (No. 1, [1988]), 198; Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 124. 
287 Emmanuel Karagiannis, "Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach," Mediterranean 
Politics (14, no. 3 [2009]), 379-80. 
288 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 15. 
70 
 
provides a useful tool for examining the interaction of ideas and mobilisation,289 which is 
essential for achieving the objectives of this dissertation. As Rowland and Theye argue, ‘‘If 
terrorism is fundamentally rhetorical, understanding the nature of that message and why some 
find it so appealing that they are willing to sacrifice for it is essential.’’290 
Furthermore, using the dynamic ‘frame analysis’ that connects thought to action and shows how 
conclusions are arrived at in light of events and pre-existing ideological beliefs helps overcome 
the basic problem with the conventional use of ideology as a kind of explanatory variable. Such 
a problem, identified by Snow and Byrd, lies in that the conventional treatment of ideology 
tends to consider it as though it is reified and a given fact, rather than as a topic for analysis, and 
thus glosses over the discursive ideological work whose understanding is required to articulate 
and elaborate the array of possible links between ideas, events, and action.291 In addition, 
exploring jihadist ideology through frame analysis fills in a gap in the existing literature. In his 
‘Frame Analysis of Jihadist Ideology’, Randall Rogan notes that after 9/11 attacks researchers 
focused on exploring the mechanisms by which Bush’s speeches and Western media frame 
radical Islam, yet there is a paucity of scholarly research investigating the writings, 
pronouncements, or communiques of Jihadists themselves. He also notes that there exist only 
scant communication-based analyses of radical Islamic discourse, though such analyses are 
critical. Therefore, frame analysis is important as it provides a methodology for gaining an 
insight into the communicative devices by which jihadist leaders articulate their jurisprudence 
for the consequent acts of violence. 292   
It is worth clarifying that though ideology and frames are usually used interchangeably,293 they 
are not one and the same. Ideology is a broad and relatively durable set of beliefs that affect 
one’s orientation not only towards politics but towards life in general. It has a long staying 
power. On the other hand, frames serve as innovative amplifications and extensions of, or 
antidotes to, extant ideologies or components of them. Therefore,  ideology serves as both a 
resource and constraint in relation to framing processes and collective action frames.294 
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Collective action frames have two characteristic features: the first refers to the interactive, 
discursive processes that attend to the core framing tasks and thus are generative of collective 
action frames, while the second refers to their action-oriented function.295 The above concepts 
of jihad, ḥisba, etc., constitute the first feature and are constructed partly because movement 
followers share a common understanding of some problematic condition or situation they 
define as being in need of change (the non-implementation of the Sharia and the widespread 
corruption and injustice), make attributions regarding who or what is to blame (local 
governments and others listed below), articulate an alternative set of arrangements (rebellion 
against the ruler and re-Islamisation of the society through ḥisba, etc), and urge others to act 
collectively to affect change.296 
The second characteristic feature (action-oriented function) will be highlighted by examining the 
theological and ideological attitudes of revisionists towards the above-mentioned concepts 
before and after revisions in relation to their impact on violence-related actions. The violence-
related actions associated with these concepts are: armed rebellion against the ruler, attacking 
tourists and Westerners in Muslim lands, attacking Christian minorities living in Muslim lands, 
attacking Western targets and civilians, making ḥisba by force, independently of the authority of 
the state, and killing Muslims who are accidentally present at the time of an attack on non-
Muslims. These are the main articulations that constitute the discursive field of Jihadism and the 
ones that represent the jihadist production of Muslim and Islamist identities.  
As the identification of culprits is essential to the articulation of oppositional identity frames, 
outlining these frames requires outlining who should be blamed (the attribution component of 
diagnostic framing). So the dissertation will also show the impact of the ideology and framing of 
violence and revisions on the revisionists’ attitudes towards the following categories who were 
assigned part of the blame:297 rulers and governments of Islamic lands, Muslim communities, 
other nonviolent Islamic movements, Christian minorities, Western countries and communities, 
civilians, and also al-Qaeda and other jihadi movements. 
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The above functions together constitute the three core framing tasks highlighted by framing 
researchers, most notably David Snow and Robert Benford. These are diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational framing. First, movements construct frames that ‘diagnose’ a condition as a 
problem in need of a solution. This includes attributions of liability and defining targets of blame 
(diagnostic framing). This diagnostic framing addresses the problem of consensus mobilisation 
by diagnosing some event, aspect of life or system of government as being problematic and in 
need of repair or change, and attributes blame or responsibility to identified culprits. It answers 
the question of what is or what went wrong? and “who or what is to blame? In general, the 
answers to such questions recast features of political or social life that were previously seen as 
being misfortunes or being unpleasant but tolerable facts of life as being intolerable injustices or 
abominations that demand transformation.298  
Second, movements offer solutions to address the problem by stipulating specific remedies or 
solutions and the general means or tactics to achieve these objectives and to rebel against 
injustice (prognostic framing). Thus, ‘prognostic framing’ addresses the question of what is to be 
done?299 Finally, movements provide a rationale to motivate supporters and engender collective 
action (motivational framing). While potential participants may share common understandings 
about causation and solutions to a particular problem (i.e., they agree on both diagnostic and 
prognostic framing), the mobilisation or activation of ideological adherents—that is, those who 
subscribe to the diagnostic and prognostic framings— remains unattainable without 
motivational framing. Thus, motivational framing can be defined as “the elaboration of a call to 
arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis.”300 
Therefore, motivational frames help convince potential participants to practically engage in 
action and overcome the fear of risks often associated with collective action, thereby rendering 
bystanders into movement participants. These three framing processes are the main discursive 
mechanisms through which ideas, beliefs, and values—the stuff of ideology—and different 
social events are strategically linked together in a fashion that facilitates the mobilisation or 
support of targeted constituents and even bystanders.301 
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While most Islamist movements agree on diagnostic framing (non- implementation of the Sharia 
and the necessity to implement it, corruption and injustices), they greatly differ on the 
prognostic framing (their offered solutions to implement the Sharia). Therefore, there are 
significant divergences over specific strategies and tactics among Islamists.302 Nonetheless, the 
three central framing tasks do provide an analytic handle for comparing and contrasting Islamist 
movements in terms of ideational factors and meaning construction. Thus, framing helps fill a 
conceptual void and provides an analytic purchase on how to understand the interpretive work 
of movement actors, and thus enhances our understanding of the role ideational factors and 
meanings play in relation to the course and character of movements in general and of Islamist 
movements in particular.303 
Thus, as shown above, most of the publications on Islamist movements propose that a particular 
set of grievances, translated into religious symbols and idioms, engenders mobilisation. 
However, various explanations in the social movement theory and related debates have 
demonstrated that other factors are inextricably linked to mobilisation patterns, including 
resource availability, framing resonance, and shifts in the political opportunity structure.304 By 
explaining these elements through frame analysis, together with textual analysis, the 
dissertation will be able to develop more sophisticated tools of analysis and a deeper 
comprehension of the dynamics of Islamist movements. This mixed methods approach enables 
the research to build a more holistic picture of the topic under investigation, ensures that the 
results are not methodological artefacts, and allows to compensate for the weaknesses of one 
method with the strengths of another. Furthermore, it is especially useful when comparatively 
little research has so far been conducted on the topic of the study.305 
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Chapter Two: History, Contextualisation & Causation 
 
Introduction 
While one of the military trials of the IG members was taking place in July 1997, one of the 
group’s activists read aloud a statement that had been signed by six of the group’s former 
leaders. It declared a unilateral ceasefire and called upon all members to cease all acts of 
violence, whether perpetrated within or outside the boarders of Egypt.306 This act was the 
starting point for what later became known as ‘the non-violence initiative’ (mubādarat Waqf al-
ʿUnf) or ‘revisions’ (murājaʿāt), an initiative through which the heads of the IG renounced their 
commitment to violent methods that they had justified theologically.307 Ten years later, in 2007, 
a similar process was declared by al-Jihād Organisation, the second largest Egyptian militant 
group. The two revisions indicate the militants’ acknowledgement of the failure of violence as a 
means of political change. 
As framing researchers sustain, the framing of ideology is a dynamic, ongoing process, yet it 
does not occur in a structural or cultural vacuum. It is rather affected by the structural elements 
of the political and socio-cultural context in which it is embedded. The most common 
components of these elements are: political opportunity structures,308 cultural opportunities 
and constraints, and the targeted audiences.309 Therefore, this chapter highlights these 
structural elements and their effect on drafting the ideology of violence and revisions. It shows 
how various contextual factors facilitated or constrained the framing processes of al-Jihād and 
the IG. In order to do this, the chapter historically tracks the development of the two groups 
from their establishment until the present, highlights their mobilising structures, and provides 
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brief socioeconomic and political accounts of the Egyptian scene since the 1960s. These concise 
accounts are meant mainly to acquaint readers with the context in which the two groups arose, 
developed, practised violence and then retracted from it. In other words, this chapter sets the 
scene and defines the historical, socio-political and cultural contexts and constraints in which 
the ideology on violence and revisions was formed and the movements’ texts were written. It 
briefly answers the question: what are the most important causal reasons that led the IG and al-
Jihād to practise violence and then retract from it? As explained in the previous chapter, 
analysing texts and the framing of textual theoretical justifications would not be properly 
conducted if they were stripped of their contexts. Moreover, because it is necessary to verify 
the genuineness of the new attitudes before trying to understand and evaluate them in 
theological terms, the chapter also provides a discussion on whether the revisions were written 
under duress or as a result of genuine convictions. 
To achieve this, the chapter divides the history of the two groups into six distinct chronologically 
arranged stages, highlighting the general features of each stage. The first stage discusses the 
two groups’ establishment, growth and ideology, and the second stage speaks about the unity 
of the two groups and their collaboration in assassinating Sadat. The third stage covers their 
imprisonment and disengagement, while the fourth stage covers the rebuilding of the two 
groups, their production of literature, and their military training in Afghanistan. The fifth stage 
covers the confrontations between the regime and these movements and their military defeat 
(as well as the dissolution of al-Jihād, the coalition with al-Qaeda, and the IG revisions). The sixth 
stage covers al-Jihād revisions, jihadi polemics, and new developments in the IG revisions. 
While doing so, the chapter also briefly highlights the structural strains and miserable living 
conditions of the Egyptian masses during the reign of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, and how they 
contributed to the mayhem. In order to do this, the chapter very briefly employs the political 
process approach together with relevant structural socio-political and economic approaches 
used to explain violence. By tracing contexts of the IG violent operations, the chapter argues 
that both the development of the events on the ground and retaliation were the main reasons 
behind the IG’s random response to the violence of the regime. To justify this, the IG used the 
general justification of violence in their literature though in fact the specific religious details in 
the literature were not observed. The chapter also shows that revisions came after the military 
defeat of the two groups by the regime and after losing people’s sympathy. However, before 
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delving into these details, the chapter starts by tracing the origins of Islamic militant movements 
in the 20th century and sheds light on the influence of the Arab defeat of 1967 on the rise of 
religious movements aimed at the restoration of the Islamic Sharia. 
 
The General Context 
The fall of the Islamic caliphate with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 not only put an 
end to 13 centuries of Islamic empires but also to the Islamic caliphate itself. This resulted in a 
new kind of political order through the division of the region into nation states by colonial 
powers, and also weakened the possibility of religiously sanctioned governance. This particular 
historical event constituted a distinct obstacle to the notions of unity and legitimacy of Muslim 
states.310 This, together with the invasion of Arab and Islamic countries by Western powers, 
generated several social and political reactions and movements. Among these, Islamic 
movements were calling for the return to Islam, restoration of caliphate and the re-
implementation of the Islamic Sharia which they saw as the only solution to the problems facing 
the Ummah. The first and biggest of these movements was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that 
was established in Egypt in 1928. These Islamic movements called for Islam as a comprehensive 
way of life that should govern the whole social, economic, political and religious life of people. 
The end of the colonisation of Muslim and Arab countries generated a rapid movement to 
reunify the Arab World under the banner of Pan-Arabism. However, Pan-Arabism failed not only 
in achieving its objectives but also in suppressing religious voices that demanded not only unity 
but also rule by God’s law. Thus, the Middle East came to represent a state system reflective of 
the norms of Westphalian sovereignty.311 Generally speaking, it is this new system, being 
incompatible with the historical ideology of Islamists, that provoked Salafi Jihadists to challenge 
leaders in the Islamic world and international powers who maintain this status quo with a 
particular discourse of unity and religious legitimacy derived from their ideological 
understanding of Islam and Islamic history.312 
Though there were periods of harmony between the Egyptian regime and religious movements, 
the Islamic movements, having gained publicity and supporters, were eventually seen by the 
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ruling regimes as an immediate threat to their authority and thus a clash started. The violence of 
the Nasserite regime against the MB triggered radical thought and a desire of revenge. Nasser’s 
concentration camps, systematic torture and excessive repression of the MB marked a great 
shift in the religious movement’s attitude towards the Egyptian regime, which provoked a 
mutiny in 1967. This ended up with younger and more radical elements being isolated in special 
confined quarters. This allowed them to start an intensive discussion of religious and political 
affairs, and they argued that rulers who tortured Muslims just because of their commitment to 
the teachings of their religion could not themselves be considered Muslims even if they claimed 
to be so. Thus, the culture of takfīr, revenge and rebellion started to prevail.313  
Sayyid Quṭb, who is considered the godfather of Jihadism, was a prominent MB thinker who was 
executed by Nasser. Quṭb’s writings introduced political interpretations of Islam and employed 
some Islamic concepts, such as the concept of ḥākimiyya (God’s sovereignty), in a severe 
critique of the political regimes that do not implement the Islamic Sharia. Quṭb’s thought started 
in the 1950s and its influence intensified after his execution in 1966. Influenced by savage 
torture and cruelty afflicted by the Nasser regime, Quṭb considered the regime to be jāhilī 
(pagan) as it challenged the ḥākimiyya of God and subjugated and tortured the believers. 
According to Quṭb, peaceful reform from within the regime is as useless as growing seeds in the 
air, and the regime must be completely ousted as it challenges the purely Divine right of 
ḥākimiyya.314 Though the takfīrī trend within the MB was contained quickly, Quṭb’s thought was 
reinterpreted, framed more efficiently and acted upon by new Islamist movements that 
originated in late 1960s and early 1970s as offshoots of or independent from the MB whose 
peaceful Islamic action was considered insufficient or impractical.315 This was the general 
political and cultural context that gave rise to militant Islamist movements. 
Of these, al-Jihād Organisation and the IG were the biggest and most active groups that accused 
the regimes of disbelief and practised violence in an attempt to enforce Islamic ethos and oust 
what they considered apostate pagan regimes. As the history of the two groups is usually mixed 
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and confused in the relevant literature though they are two distinct groups, this chapter 
provides a simplified historical account of both groups, noting the differences and 
commonalities. To keep the chronological order, six main stages in the history of the two groups 
are identified and used below for periodisation and simplification purposes.  
 
Historical Phases 
Establishment, Growth and Ideology (1968-1979) 
The Arab defeat of 1967 created upheaval in the Egyptian society that sought a logical 
justification to the defeat, which started a stronger resurgence based upon faith.316 The loss was 
deemed to be as a result of distancing from the Islamic faith and, through this interpretation, 
the remedy to the problems facing the nation was seen as being a return to the teachings of the 
religion. This interpretation of the cause and remedy became a widely held view, particularly 
among university students.317  
In this environment, the different jihadi movements were born. According to al-Ẓawāhirī and Al-
Sibāʿī, the first cell of al-Jihād Organisation was founded by Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī and others in 
1968. The founders were influenced by the writings and execution of Sayyid Quṭb who was 
described by al-Ẓawāhirī as a forensic pathologist who skilfully anatomises the body of the 
society with high professionalism and technicality. Established in the Cairo suburb of Maʿādī, this 
cell included al-Ẓawāhirī, Faḍl, Nabīl al-Buraī, Ismāʿīl Ṭanṭāwī, Nabīl al-Dimīrī and others, with al-
Ẓawāhirī as the emir.318   
The members were students in the school age who knew one another through the school. They 
used to gather in mosques reading and discussing Islamic sciences until they ended with the 
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books of Ibn Taymiya which heavily influenced them. They, driven by religious zeal and 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing circumstances, decided to defend their religion and country as 
they deemed proper. Like other Islamists, the Arab defeat of 1967 strengthened in them the 
desire of collective work in search for a practical solution as they thought that the non-
implementation of the Islamic Sharia was the main reason behind all of the nation’s troubles.319 
This represented the diagnostic framing of this and other jihadi movements.  
Unlike al-Jihād cells which started in Lower Egypt (Cairo and the Delta), the IG started in Upper 
Egypt (al-Ṣaʿīd) as student associations that were motivated by Islamic religious beliefs and 
orientations and aimed at restoration of what they saw as the correct Islamic creeds and 
practices. These Islamists’ student associations started in late 1960s and later became the 
dominant force in Egyptian university campuses during Sadat’s presidency, as Sadat, unlike 
Nasser who suppressed them, gave Islamists freedom and support to counterbalance his 
Marxist and Nasserite rivals. They managed to take over the campuses when they defeated 
Marxists and Leftist-Nasserites. During that time, the IG evolved into a more organised structure 
and had its current name in 1974. Though initially supported by Sadat’s regime, Islamists soon 
became independent of the regime and acted independently. Their slogans and tactics directly 
addressed students’ social problems by providing several campus services such as private busses 
for girls, student services and support for the needy.320The religious discourse and symbolism of 
these groups soon became the tool through which the middle and lower classes expressed not 
only their discontentment with corruption, inequality and decadence, but also their antagonism 
with the very state apparatus that fostered these evils.321 
In this environment of relative freedom, al-Ẓawāhirī’s small group and the IG managed to extend 
their membership. Unlike the IG, al-Jihād members were more focused on recruiting army 
officers for they believed that the army was the easiest and quickest means for toppling the 
regime. The most famous of these officers were ʿIsām al-Qamarī and ʿAbbūd al-Zumur who 
joined the Organisation on the hope that they would be able to launch a coup against the 
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regime.322 However, al-Ẓawāhirī’s group was not the only group as there were other small jihadi 
groups such as that of Kamāl Ḥabīb, Sālim al-Raḥḥal and Ṣāliḥ Sariyya. They all carried the same 
goal of implementing the Sharia by ousting what they considered an infidel regime. During this 
period, there were no organisational structures or formal connections between these groups; 
only personal relationships connected members of the different groups.323  
They used to receive military and spiritual training in the desert areas of Cairo especially 
Dahshūr and Ṣafṭ al-Khaṭāṭba. According to al-Sibāʿī, this was just training but there was no 
intention for direct clashes with the regime at that point. Al-Ẓawāhirī and other leaders’ view 
was that immediate clashes would not achieve the intended goal of toppling the regime, for 
jihadists neither infiltrated the army nor gained supporters from among those who held 
sensitive military positions.324  
On the other hand, the IG was more active in social and preaching services. For the IG, the years 
between 1970 and 1974 saw an increase in religious adherence among the youth and an 
increase in da’wah (Islamic preaching) as a mechanism through which people would be invited 
to Islam. Unlike al-Jihād, violence was not recognised by the IG as a means of establishing a 
Sharia-based order when one was to be founded. Violence was later resorted to when the IG 
began to sue force against their Nasserite and Marxist adversaries who were responsible for 
introducing theories, ideas and notions at university campuses that the IG affiliates considered 
alien to Islam, which gave rise to the idea of ‘changing the evil by force’. Similarly, they did not 
subscribe to the taking up of arms against the state at that time as they were only concerned 
with propagation of Islam and ḥisba.325 
The latter half of the 1970s saw Sadat shifting Egyptian foreign policy, where he was negotiating 
treaties with Israel and courting the United States Government.326 The result of one such policy, 
the open door economic policy (infitāḥ), was that it worsened the economic well-being of the 
poor and middle classes. In turn, this had the knock on effect of fuelling the frustration and 
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anger of the devout youth. 327 The IG, which by that time had become a very large organisation 
that had a clear hierarchy,328 and groups with Islamist motivations found it difficult to tolerate 
such sweeping reforms in Egyptian economic and foreign policies. In addition to this, Sadat’s 
failure to implement the Islamic Sharia was the major concern to Islamists.329Additionally the 
widespread corruption, prevalent injustice, intolerable sub-human conditions and the severe 
poverty of the masses created social, economic and political congestion that would eventually 
feed and fuel revolutionary thought.330 
Islamists invested in these conditions by using them as ‘injustice frames’. ‘Injustice frames’ is a 
term that refers to the injustices directed at a specific community or group and used by 
movement articulators to justify to their audience that a specific collective action is a proper 
response to rebel these injustices. These injustice frames represent any group’s central 
component of ‘diagnostic framing’.331 They are meant to create a link between the movement 
and its objectives and the un-mobilised residents of the areas in which they are active, for 
frames are developed and organised to achieve the purpose of acquiring resources, recruiting 
new members, mobilising adherents, etc. Thus though miserable sub-human conditions and 
grievances were common to all, the public masses lacked the organisational structure that 
would enable them to express their discontent and disapproval of the status quo. 
The Islamist’s discourse provided both the meaning and the organisational structure for the 
poor un-mobilised citizens and linked them to the Islamist movement and its collective actions. 
As Jihadist movements, like other social movements, were seeking to remedy or alter some 
problematic situation (injustices that they attribute to the non-implementation of the Sharia), it 
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follows that directed action is contingent on identification of the sources of causality, blame, 
and/or culpable agents. This attributional component of diagnostic framing attended to this 
function by focusing blame or responsibility mainly on the regime and its policies. The resolution 
of these issues was put in the context of demolishing the established ‘un-Islamic’ order that 
fosters these evils and establishing an Islamic state (Caliphate) that would abort these evils and 
restore justice and welfare, which represented the motivational framing of these groups. 
In this atmosphere, preaching alone was seen as insufficient by the IG as a means of changing 
the conditions of the country. With their numbers and influence soaring during the 1970s,  the 
IG began using force to effect what they perceived as the correct application of Islam.332 Their 
influence widened to most Egyptian universities as they imposed their rules and regulations  
upon students, at times in a violent manner.333 One of the principal motivators behind this was 
their distancing themselves from the MB and proving that they were not simply government 
tools through which Sadat could counter the Nasserites and Marxists.334 
The IG and al-Jihād leaders and members disagreed with the MB due to their disapproval of the 
political pragmatism demonstrated by the MB and emphasised the key role a traditionalist Salafi 
creed had in shaping religious practices. Another point of contention they had with the MB was 
the Mb’s moderate tolerance of other Islamic schools of thought, like the Sufis and Shia.335 This, 
together with their clashes with Marxists and leftist students, led the IG leaders to regard  the 
use of physical force, which they termed jihad, as one of three principal means by which they 
could fulfil their objectives.336 The MB, in contrast, completely dismissed the use of violence as a 
vehicle for political reformation .337  
Revival of the Sharia through capturing power by armed force, and the foregoing tactics, training 
and interaction with people constitute the second core element in the framing process of the 
two groups, namely ‘prognostic framing’, where articulation of a proposed solution to the 
problem, a plan of action, and the strategies for carrying out the plan are drafted to addresses 
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the important question of what is to be done, as well as the problems of consensus and action 
mobilisation.338 Thus, in the second half of the 1970s, the power of the Islamist organisations so 
increased that the Sadat regime saw them as a direct threat to its existence. Hence, Sadat took 
strict measures against members of these organisations, incarcerating many and depriving them 
of electoral rights at university campuses.339 This intensified their injustice frames and pushed 
towards a more radical response that culminated in Sadat’s murder.  
Unity and Assassination of Sadat (1979-1981) 
Al-Jihād multiple factions were acting separately until they were united in 1979 and then the 
unified jihadi factions made further coalition with the IG. The unity of jihadists occurred when 
their struggle with Sadat was on the rise as Sadat changed his policy when he felt that Islamists 
got strong and independent enough to threaten his rule. Sadat’s peace with Israel, hosting of 
the Iranian Shah who was ousted by the Iranian ‘Islamic revolution’, and mocking of Islamic 
symbols all added more fuel to the fire and increased the fury and anger of the already 
frustrated youth. To them, peace with the ‘Zionist enemy’ was high treason and the antagonistic 
discourse of Sadat at that time deepened their feelings of an immediate governmental threat 
that needed to be toppled before it would hunt all of them. Sadat attacked several religious 
scholars depicting them as dogs and mad and mocked some Islamic symbols such as the hijab 
which he described as a tent. In the investigations of Sadat’s murder, the assassins said they 
killed Sadat because he made peace with the Jews and betrayed the Palestinian cause,  did not 
implement the Islamic Sharia, insulted Muslim scholars, imprisoned Islamists, courted Christians 
at the expense of Muslims and helped them infuriate Muslims, permitted alcohol and 
nightclubs, mocked the hijab, behaved antagonistically towards issues of the Muslim world, 
separated between religion and politics, oppressed the poor (by his open door economic policy) 
and created widespread corruption.340   
Only in this critical atmosphere did the jihadi groups tolerate their ideological and organisational 
differences— driven by the common goal of establishing the Islamic Sharia and ousting what 
they all considered an apostate regime— as the need for collective action overcame the need 
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for agreement on ideological nuances.341 This proves that the extent to which government 
policies in foreign and domestic affairs are incompatible with the mission and vision of an 
Islamist group influences the level of antagonism towards the regime and provides a stimulus 
for collective action.342 Thus, the intensifying appeal of the jihadi frames and the success of their 
mobilisation structures stemmed from the interactive effect of the growing power of Islamists 
and the escalating repression of the regime that was successfully used by Jihadists as an 
injustice frame. Moreover, the state was beginning to face a legitimacy crisis by the end of the 
1970s due to its unpalatable domestic and foreign policies.343 
This enabled the author of the famed pamphlet: Al-Jihād al-Farīḍa al-Ghā’iba [Jihad: The 
Neglected duty]344, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Faraj, to unify jihadist groups in 1980. Faraj was a 
mechanical engineer from Lower Egypt who was influenced by the writings of Ibn Taymiya and 
Sayyid Quṭb and had a marvelous enthusiasm to his dream of establishing the Islamic caliphate. 
The pamphlet argued mainly that the neglect of ‘jihad’ was the reason for backwardness, 
frustration and humiliation of the Muslim Ummah. He recalled several classical Islamic fatwas 
especially those of Ibn Taymiya regarding fighting the Tartars and his fatwa on a city called 
Mardīn which was considered neither an abode of Islam nor an abode of disbelief.345 He 
compared these situations to the Egyptian scene and applied Ibn Taymiya’s rulings to the 
Egyptian regime concluding that the regime was infidel like the Tartars and thus must be ousted 
and that Egypt was not an abode of Islam because it was governed by infidel laws like the city of 
Mardīn. In addition, he specified sections in his pamphlet for refuting the arguments of those 
who seek change by social, political or other peaceful means. Though the issues discussed by 
Faraj were not unfamiliar to many jihadists, they were not previously coined together in one 
book, presented efficiently and applied to contemporary regimes in such a way as Faraj did. 
Meanwhile, the IG, which was located mainly in Upper Egypt, was looking for presence and 
popular support in Lower Egypt and managed by the end of 1970s to have forged relations with 
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other Salafi Jihadist groups across Egypt.346 Faraj was introduced to Karam Zuhdī, one of the IG 
historical leaders, and an agreement on cooperation and joint collective action was made 
between the IG and the Jihadi groups despite the differences between them. The objective was 
to assassinate Sadat and capture some governmental premises, followed by announcing a revolt 
in the TV to call the public for participation in toppling the regime. On 6 October 1981 they co-
assassinated Sadat and two days later the IG launched an assault upon the Asyut security 
administration. Their goal in this was twofold; to gain control over the governorate and catalyse 
public action against the regime. Although they managed to assassinate Sadat and the IG were 
successful in capturing government institutions, such as police stations and the Security 
Administration, in Asyut the assassins and other members were caught and the government 
launched a sweeping counterattack that resulted in killing some of the IG members and 
detentions of most of the IG and al-Jihad leaders as well as a large number of members.347  
Imprisonment and the Split (1981- 1984) 
After Sadat’s assassination and the IG subsequent attack on Asyut, Islamists were captured in 
massive governmental raids, and the trials continued for two years. Large numbers of Islamists 
were imprisoned while the four assassins and Faraj were executed. As each group of the co-
assassins of Sadat had its own thought and distinct features, they disagreed in prison and 
separated. This was mainly due to disagreements about leadership, ideology and tactics.  
Regarding leadership, the IG wanted to appoint its mufti Dr. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, as the 
leader but al-Jihād figures objected because ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was not a military man and was 
blind; arguing that in Islam leadership cannot be assigned to the blind in military matters. Al-
Jihād figures wanted to appoint the imprisoned officer ʿAbbūd al-Zumur, but the IG argued that 
leadership of the captive (prisoner) is forbidden in Islam.348  
                                                          
346  As shall be discussed later, the IG was the dominant Islamist organisation in Upper Egypt (al-Ṣaʿīd) particularly in 
Asyut, al-Minyā and Sūhāj governorates, while al-Jihād factions were more active in lower Egypt (the Delta, especially 
Cairo and Alexandria). 
347 For further details on the process of assassination and the attack on Asyut security administration, see, e.g., 
Jansen, the Creed of Sadat’s Assassins; Muhammad Hasanain Haikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (New 
York: Random House, 1983); Mūrū, Tanẓīm al-Jihād; Ḥammūda, Qanābil wa Maṣāḥif; Abū al-ʿlā Māḍī, interview in ʿAlī, 
Al-Muqāmara al-Kubrā, 146-7; Al-Manāwī, Shāhid ʿalā Waqf al-ʿUnf, 35; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 7. 
348 Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, “Qiṣṣat Murājaʿāt al-Jihād,” Al-Maṣrī al-Yūm Newspaper (19 November 2007, available at: 




The disagreement in ideology was regarding the takfīr of rulers’ supporters and soldiers. While 
the IG considers the ruler only as apostate, al-Jihād considered both the ruler and his soldiers 
and supporters to be apostates. This disagreement branches from the concept known as ‘al-
ʿudhr bi al-jahl’ (excuse due to ignorance). The concept means that if someone has committed 
an act of disbelief as a result of ‘ignorance’, they should be excused and saved from punishment. 
Al-Jihād argued that if the violating person did not exert sufficient effort to gain knowledge 
about that, then that person is considered apostate and must be punished. The difference in 
understanding and implementing this principle had serious implications on judging the soldiers 
and assistants of what militant Islamists perceived as apostate regimes. The IG believed that the 
soldiers and assistants of the apostate rulers were not apostates due to their ignorance and 
therefore those soldiers are still Muslims. On the other hand, al-Jihād leaders argued that both 
soldiers and leaders of these regimes are apostates because they have not exerted enough 
effort to learn and therefore cannot be protected by the concept of al-ʿudhr bi al-jahl. Due to 
the disagreement about this concept, the IG accused al-Jihād of following non-Sunni ‘deviations’ 
and allying with takfīrī groups which the IG did not consider as Sunnis due to its strong 
disapproval with the issuing takfīr against anybody other than the ruler.349 
The dispute about tactics occurred in the first place regarding the attack on Asyut security 
administration in 1981. The IG said it was a correct action but al-Jihād viewed it as a useless 
action as it caused lots of bloodshed and led to the capture of a large number of activists. 
Another more important tactical difference was that the IG preferred public action in mosques, 
streets and universities through preaching and ḥisba, while al-Jihād preferred secrecy and 
underground action in preparation for a military coup which al-Jihād leaders thought of as the 
fastest and most effective way of ousting the regime and establishing the Sharia. Thus their 
plans concentrated more on infiltrating the army.350 As each party stuck to its own view, 
separation was the outcome.  
Rebuilding, Military Training in Afghanistan and Production of Literature (1984-1989) 
Only after the trials and the release of the acquitted members and those who had short prison 
sentences did al-Jihād activists start to slowly recover and rebuild the Organisation. However, 
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350 Ayubi, Political Islam, 79; Al-Sibāʿī, “Qiṣṣat Ta’sīs al-Jihād;” Ḥabīb, Taḥawwulāt al-Ḥarka al-Islāmiyya, 26-7. 
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inside prison, the IG was active and managed to recruit greater numbers of Lower Egyptians, 
which widened the membership of the Group and expanded its logistic and geographical 
existence. Additionally, by 1984 a number of IG prisoners who had served their sentences and 
were released made links with members who were new to the group. Thus, the time in focus 
saw significant efforts to re-establish the group, following the devastation it had faced at the 
hands of the Egyptian military and security forces due to their assassination of Sadat. Due to the 
fact that the former leaders were imprisoned, this task of rebuilding was steered by the second-
in-line commanders.351  
So, the IG managed not only to rebuild itself but also to expand from universities and mosques 
to the street through preaching, charitable and social activities such as helping the poor and 
offering free and low-cost healthcare and other social services,352 to attract and link people to 
the Group, which helped spread their cause and ideology. In addition to this, new members 
from Lower Egypt helped old members in Upper Egypt to widen their areas of activity across 
Cairo and other cities in Lower Egypt. This explains the group’s spread in Lower Egypt, after it 
had been mainly concentrated in Upper Egypt. There were also two distinct groups within the 
ranks of the IG; those who were incarcerated, which included almost all the charismatic leaders, 
and another group who were free, outside the confines of prison. The latter group consisted of 
grassroots members and some second-in command commanders.353   
The released members undertook the implementation of the mobilisation and recruitment 
structures by spreading the IG’s philosophy through propagation, social relations, and the 
distribution of pamphlets authored by those in prison, as well as piety sessions in mosques. 
These all, especially mosque attendance, were occasions for collective experience of embodied 
forms of piety. This shared experience through rituals could be incorporated into political 
formation and action. Potential or actual recruits are entered into programs of discipline and 
piety-inducement, through prayers and religious study which also involves control of the body 
that sustains observance of the reproduced codes - sexual abstinence for example. The assertion 
of a Muslim identity associated with these practices places adherents on a continuum ranging 
from a position of a multazim (practising the religion) and mutadayyin (pious) to that of Islāmī 
(Islamist or activist). The sliding from one position to another would be examined in context and 
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cannot be determined a priori. So, the move from a practising to Islamist or activist would be as 
much shaped by changing identity frames as by mobilising structures. Therefore, Islamists’ 
networks of social relations constituted the setting for oppositional activism.354  
The above constitutes some mobilising structures355 of Islamists who anchor themselves in 
spaces that tend to practise and protect the religion and work in opposition to the state. In 
doing so, they draw on participants from familial, religious and employment networks that tend 
to be neighbourhood based, making use of the resources that are made available by these 
networks. However, they were constrained by limited formal organisation and the existing 
institutional set-up that limited the context in which they operate and which can be described as 
repressive.356 Therefore, during this period Jihadists did not conduct acts of violence as this 
would have instigated the regime against them again. So the 1980s was a period of calm 
between the regime and Islamists as the powers of the latter were so weakened that the regime 
felt they were too fragile to represent a serious threat to the state.357 Islamists too were busy 
rebuilding themselves. Thus there were no important instances of violence conducted by the IG 
or al-Jihād against the regime in this period.358 Yet, the IG and al-Jihād rebuilding process was 
completed in Afghanistan. 
During the second half of the 1980s, the Egyptian regime allowed Islamists to travel to 
Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets. The government facilitated this to achieve double gains: 
to get rid of jihadists by sending them outside the country where they were likely to be killed or 
absorbed in another society, and to respond to the American demands of helping in the 
Afghans’ war against the Soviet troops. This lined with the desire of the enthusiastic religious 
youth who viewed participation in this ‘jihad’ as a religious obligation, in addition to their desire 
of seizing the opportunity of receiving filed military training outside Egypt in preparation for the 
awaited confrontation with the local regime.359  
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Al-Jihād members including al-Ẓawāhirī and Faḍl travelled to Afghanistan, which allowed them 
to interact with and transport their thought to more jihadi recruits through jihadi training camps 
and teaching sessions.360 The theological credentials of Faḍl constituted a great asset in the 
ideological mobilisation of the recruits. Faḍl,361 who fled Egypt after the assassination of Sadat in 
1981, headed towards Pakistan to help treat the wounded in the Afghani war where he was 
appointed as a director of the Kuwaiti Red Crescent Hospital in Peshawar. Meanwhile he was 
selected by the Organisation’s leaders as the emir due to his top theological credentials and he 
was given the name ʿAbd al-Qādir b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, because he did not want others to know who 
the actual emir was for he preferred subterranean action and committed himself to learning and 
teaching religious knowledge.362 It was al-Ẓawāhirī who took charge of executive and logistical 
leadership, and members used to give their bayʿa (oath of allegiance) to him. Thus, only a few 
members knew the actual emir while the rest believed that the emir was al-Ẓawāhirī as he was 
in charge of the executive leadership and the one to whom the bayʿa was given.363 
Thus, jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan was an optimal source of inspiration and 
mobilisation to Jihadists. In this environment of jihad and warfare, the arguments and thoughts 
of confrontation greatly appealed to the enthusiastic youth who met one another there, though 
many of them had not belonged to a specific jihadi group before. Frames of jihad, caliphate, 
ḥākimiyya, etc., were used as mobilising factors that united youth who were coming from 
different orientations and backgrounds but shared the same goal of jihad and supporting the 
religion. Therefore, it was a golden opportunity for al-Jihād leaders to revive the Organisation, 
making use of the general atmosphere of jihad in the ideological mobilisation of adherents and 
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from the skills and expertise gained from warfare in military training and preparation. Thus, al-
Jihād Organisation was fully rebuilt and re-mobilised in Afghanistan in 1987/88.364  
Although al-Jihād Organisation at this time was looking for expanding its membership, it used to 
carefully select its new members.365 This accounts for the Organisation’s small size compared 
with the IG. Another reason why the IG is larger in size and more active than al-Jihād is because 
of its ability to address larger sections of the society by having wider frames than those of al-
Jihād. While al-Jihād restricts its central framing to purely dogmatic issues of ḥākimiyya and 
takfīr which appeal only to limited sections of the society, the IG has the wider framing of jihad, 
daʿwa and ḥisba and addressed more social and economic problems of the society in a more 
coherent and interrelated fashion. This confirms the hypothesis of some framing researchers 
that “the larger the range of problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups 
that can be addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilisation capacity of the frame."366  
This process of recruitment outside Egypt coincided with a similar process of recruitment inside 
Egypt where new members were recruited and sent to Afghanistan to perform jihad and receive 
militarily training. However, Faḍl and other al-Jihād leaders had the view that direct 
confrontations with the local regime must not start until sufficient military training and greater 
numbers of mobilised adherents and resources were obtained. Therefore, they trained the 
youth to keep them prepared for confrontation at the suitable time. Thus, the thought of the 
leaders of al-Jihād Organisation was mainly based on quick wide scale military attack after 
having enough time and resources that would support that action.367  
After the war, Jihadists returned with a good degree of military training and a mobilised 
ideology. They had acquired military skills and techniques in guerrilla warfare that would be 
utilised in their fights with the local regime.368 The above changes in the structure of political 
and cultural opportunities were reflected on the ability of the two groups to successfully 
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mobilise adherents and resources and facilitated collective action and collective action frames, 
which was reflected in their literature and activities following their return to Egypt.369 
Social and Organisational Structure 
Regarding the social structure of al-Jihād, Ayubi notes that the militants were mostly university 
graduates or students, especially in scientific subjects. In terms of socio-economic background, 
active Jihadists belonged mostly to a certain segment within the lower middle classes which is 
economically humble but which rates relatively high on the scale of literacy, mobility and 
political consciousness. Also, they tended to be urban but with recent rural or small town 
backgrounds. Being still quite close to their recent rural and provincial origins, the educated 
militants who dominated the leadership of al-Jihād in the seventies had managed by the 
beginning of the 1980s—and with the help of their kinship networks—to break into the ranks of 
the lower middle classes at large and to recruit important elements from this class. Therefore, 
Ayubi concludes, ‘al-Jihād members are firmly rooted in the social and popular map of Egypt.’370  
As for the geographical locations of al-Jihād activists, Gilles Kepel states that al-Jihād movement 
had two bases one in big cities including Cairo, Giza and a few small Delta towns while the other 
in Upper Egypt, concentrated in particular in the three provinces of Al-Minyā, Asyut and 
Sūhāj.371 It should be noted that Ayubi and Kepel are speaking about the unified al-Jihād 
Movement that comprised members of al-Jihād Organisation and the IG. Of the two groups, The 
IG was concentrated in Upper Egypt while al-Jihād Organisation was concentrated in Lower 
Egypt or the Delta.   
The fact that the Jihadi movement was dominant in Cairo’s slums and deprived areas of Upper 
Egypt indicates how the socioeconomically deprived segments can provide a fertile ground of 
recruitment and participation in movement’s collective actions when targeted and incorporated 
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into an appealing discursive strategy that is specifically meant for recruitment and 
mobilisation.372 This was utilised by Islamists whose religious discourse invested in cultural, 
economic and socio-political conditions to become effective and tactical in mobilising recruits 
and securing their content heart-driven participation in the movement’s collective action.373 
On the organisational internal level, al-Jihād Organisation was based on a “kind of ‘democratic 
centralism’, and a system of commissars (mas’uli al-Tanzim). On the central level the 
organisation is said to have had a governing ‘scholars’ council’ and a ‘consultation council’, as 
well as three commissions, one for armament, one for finance, and one for preaching. At a 
lower level there are believed to have been revolutionary committees and mosque units, in 
addition to well-armed militias formed of student and skilled worker elements.”374 
On the other hand, the IG was organised with a clear chain of command, and two kinds of 
leadership. The first were the compelling leaders of old who served the group as spiritual 
leaders, following their sentencing in 1981 as a result of Sadat’s assassination. These leaders all 
had lengthy sentences and were behind bars at the time the non-violence initiative took effect. 
The IG leaders of this description, and members of the Consultative Council who drafted the 
literature of violence and revisions were: ʿAlī al-Sharīf,375 ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid,376 Fu’ād al-
Dawālībī,377 Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān,378 ʿIṣām Darbāla,379 Karam Zuhdī,380 Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm,381 and 
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imprisonment, from Cairo University. He then joined postgraduate studies to obtain a master’s degree in law from 
Cairo University. He was arrested in 1981 as a collaborator in Sadat’s assassination and was sentenced to life. Aḥmad, 
Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 28. 
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Usāma Ḥāfiẓ.382 It is noteworthy that no one of these leaders has been a graduate of a religious 
institution,383 nor did they succeed in recruiting or attracting graduates or students of 
theological or religious faculties. This would indicate that they were not part of the official 
religious establishment and that they did not have the religious education that would qualify 
them to take action based on sound well-established religious discourse. These heads formed 
the IG Shūrā (consultative) Council. Of these, Karam Zuhdī and Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm are cofounders of 
the IG,384 while the principal characters involved in the group’s writings at this stage were Nājiḥ 
Ibrāhīm, ʿIṣām Darbāla, and ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid.385  
Those Charismatic heads of the group only began to produce literature while being incarcerated 
when they had the opportunity to put their thoughts in writing. This was in addition to intensive 
teaching and mobilisation of members. These books386were written in the period between 1983 
and 1989 and they provided the spiritual and socio-political legitimisation of the use of force 
against the state and its citizens. Characterised by  an array of repression, isolation and torture, 
the conditions they faced in prison was likely to have been a key factor that contributed to the 
authoring of works related to radicalism.387 Written by leaders who had been sentenced to 
death and were experiencing severe torture, these books were written under conditions that 
were inhumane, which fuels radical beliefs and practises.388 
                                                                                                                                                                             
381 Ibrāhīm is the chief ideologue of the IG and the author of the majority of its new literature. He was born in Dayrūṭ, 
a town in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Asyut. He got a BA in medicine and worked in Dayrūṭ Central Hospital. 
He was arrested in 1981 and was sentenced to life. During imprisonment, he got a bachelor degree in Islamic Studies 
from Al-Minyā University in 1991 and a degree in Law from Cairo University in 1998. Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 
28. 
382 Ḥāfiẓ was born in Al-Minyā in 1953, and he got a bachelor of engineering after which he worked for the 
Administration of Housing in Asyut. He was the IG emir of al-Minyā governorate. He was arrested in 1981 and was 
imprisoned for 10 years after which he was released but soon re-detained under the Egyptian emergency law to 
neutralise his activities. He was finally released in 2004. During prison period, he got a BA in Islamic Studies from the 
Faculty of Arts, al-Minyā University. Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 29. 
383 For example, ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid, Usāma Ḥāfiẓ and Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān have bachelors of engineering, Fu’ād al-
Dawālībī and ʿAlī al-Sharīf have studied commerce. Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm has studied medicine, ʿIṣām Darbāla has a bachelor 
of arts, and Karam Zuhdī has a bachelor from the Cooperation Academy in Asyut. So, their education is anything but 
theological. This finding matches the findings of Christopher Boucek in his study of Saudi ex-militants where he 
confirmed that many of the radicals had little to no formal religious training and therefore were particularly 
susceptible to extremist propaganda. See Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: 
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (Washington Dc. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 14-15. 
384 Ashour, “A world without Jihad,” 96-7.  
385 Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 104; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 9-10.  
386 A detailed discussion of the concepts related to violence in these books is provided in chapter 5. 
387 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,”102.  
388 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 11- 12. 
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 This was the same for Faḍl who wrote his two books in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan 
between 1988 and 1993 within an environment of warfare and chasing.389 Therefore, apart from 
Faraj’s pamphlet, neither al-Jihād nor the IG produced their own writings except after 
imprisonment that followed Sadat’s assassination. Before that, they used to recruit members 
through oral preaching and discourse, small leaflets and by reference to some arguments of 
classical Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim.  
The other type of leadership was the ‘second-in-line commanders’ who had served as 
organisational and decision-making leaders since the mid-1980s. They tended to be younger 
advocates who joined the group in the late 1970s and early 80s and were given short prison 
sentences in the trials that followed Sadat’s killing. These commanders would highly respect and 
follow the instructions of the historical leaders.390 Therefore, unity, organisation and the 
command chain were features of the IG that they became known for. Any decision that had to 
be made would be taken by the Consultative Council, who would vote for a majority course of 
action. This decision would then be communicated to the second-in-line commanders who 
would then action it through the grassroots members. Members of the group were known for 
their loyalty and reverence to the group’s leaders, so  any decision made by the leaders would 
be respected and followed.391   
Confrontations and Military Defeat (1989-1997) 
The success of jihadists in removing the Soviet threat from Afghanistan made them believe that 
they can similarly enforce political change inside their local communities through the use of 
force, and granted empirical credibility for their framing. The fact that violence and 
confrontations intensified in Egypt after the successful removal of the soviet from Afghanistan 
and the triumphant return of the militants confirms the importance of what framing researchers 
call ‘empirical credibility’.  
                                                          
389 Details about this literature are given in chapters 3 and 5.   
390 Ashour, “Lions Tamed,” 604-5. 
391 Al-Manāwī, Shāhid ‘alā Waqf al-ʿUnf, 76-7; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 9-10. It will be explained later 
how the unity of the IG facilitated processes of violence and revisions, unlike the fragmentation of al-Jihād groups 
which constrained their revisions.   
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Empirical credibility refers to the apparent fit between a movement’s frames and events in the 
world, a factor that greatly affects the resonance of the collective action framing.392 The 
diagnostic and prognostic claims of the two groups could be empirically verified by the 
successful removal of the soviets through the general framing of jihad and the establishment of 
an Islamic rule in Afghanistan; thus doing the same in Egypt was practically within the realm of 
possibility. As emphasised by framing researchers, the claimed connection between the frame 
and the real world does not have to be generally believable, but it suffices to  be believable to 
some segment of prospective or actual adherents, and therefore, "empirical credibility is in the 
eyes of the beholder.”393  
The extra motive and credibility gained from the Afghani war further encouraged members of 
al-Jihād to clandestinely train themselves and prepare for a quick overwhelming military coup as 
per their ideology, while the IG, whose ideology preferred public action, became more active 
and started forcing its etiquettes and rules on areas where it had strong presence, which 
strongly alarmed the regime. On the other hand, the overwhelming electoral victory the 
Islamists achieved in Algeria at that time was a strong message to the Egyptian regime that 
Islamists would represent a serious threat to its legitimacy and power if they were allowed free 
elections and social or political work space. This was reflected in the political alienation and the 
excessively repressive measures imposed by the regime on Islamist movements at that time, 
such as wide scale arrests, referral to military justice, intensive systematic torture, raids, etc., to 
neutralise any possible military or political threats posed by religious movements in general and 
jihadists in particular.394  
In addition, the regime was alarmed by the success of the group’s growth in Lower Egypt and 
their attempts to effect change by force what the members saw as ‘un-Islamic’ practices, in a 
clear challenge to the authority of the state. Examples of using force by members of the Group 
to implement Islamic rules included punishing women who do not wear hijab, burning 
                                                          
392 Frame resonance refers to the capacity of a frame to resonate with potential adherents. When a specific frame 
draws upon indigenous cultural symbols, language and identities, it is more likely to reverberate with prospective 
joiners, thus enhancing mobilisation. Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement,” 202-3; Wiktorowicz, 
Islamic Activism, 16. 
393 J M Jasper and J D Poulsen’s, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights 
and Anti-Nuclear Protests,” Social Problems (42, no. 4 [November 1995]), 496; Benford and Snow, “Framing 
Processes,” 620. 
394 Ḥabīb, Taḥawwulāt al-Ḥarka al-Islāmiyya, 106. 
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nightclubs and video shops and preventing dancers and singers from performing in wedding 
parties.395 
The regime reacted by suppressing the IG advocates. In 1990, in an attempt to stifle this 
suppression, the group issued the so-called ‘six demands appeal’. However, the government 
took no notice of the demands, continued its repressive measures and assassinated the IG 
spokesperson, ʿAlā’ Muḥyī al-Dīn on 2 August 1990.396 The escalating governmental repression 
and the assassination of the IG spokesperson provoked the most violent confrontations with the 
regime as the IG responded quickly by assassinating the Egyptian head of Parliament Rifʿat al-
Maḥjūb on 12 August 1990 and subsequently the government increased its repression. This 
explains why violence intensified in the first half of the 1990s and why security raids against 
Islamists in general was so severe in the 1990s though there was a period of calm in 1980s.397 As 
Toth notes, “the accumulative effects of constant government arrest, torture, and humiliation. . 
. pushed pious activists across the thin line that heretofore had separated them from those 
committed to mayhem.”398 
This marked the activation of the IG third means of change: jihad. Thus, retaliatory violence, 
supported by the general theorisation in the literature, pushed the IG members to target the 
state, Copts and tourists with violent operations in retaliation for the Government’s attacks 
against them. In view of the IG members, defending the religion was the legitimacy for which 
they fought and the one thing that gave them immunity. Legitimising these acts in this way 
served as divine justification to members of the group, who were intrinsically fervent in their 
faith, that they could carry out such bloody strikes in the name of Islam.399   
Although some of the acts of individual IG members were based on their interpretation of 
theoretic Islamic notions, such as ḥisba and jihad, many of their operations diverged from their 
ideological, Sharia-based theorisation because the majority of their actions since then were 
                                                          
395 Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 116.  
396 ʿAlā’ Muḥyī al-Dīn was the IG spokesperson and one of its most active members. Because of his fluency, 
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merely reactions to the abuses and attacks of the establishment against their members.400 This 
was enhanced by the culture of vendetta (ṭār) and the prevalence of arms as well as the weak 
state authority in Upper Egypt, the hometown of most IG members, and the place they had 
been born and brought up.401 The majority of militant acts at that time were legitimised through 
their legitimisation of taking up arms against the regime in a general sense, as stated in IG 
writings, not necessarily with the permission, or specific instruction from leadership .402  
The leaders were imprisoned and, unlike before, communication at that time was no longer 
attainable due to excessively repressive measures. Thus, the second-in-line commanders and 
their followers reacted to the governmental raids without specific instructions from the 
historical leaders. In addition, they launched several violent operations only to pressurise the 
government to release the imprisoned leaders and members, to allow the IG the freedom of 
preaching and to remove restrictions on their economic and political activities and resources.403 
As they did not gain guidance and instruction from the leaders at that time, the consequence of 
the IG members’ random retaliatory responses to the governmental raids was a number of 
attacks which highlighted inconsistencies in understanding and of application of the literature 
that justified these actions, in a general sense.404 
 With continuous raids against IG members, the strict security policy resulted in the killing and 
arrest of many of the second-in-command leaders of the group by the end of 1992. Some of 
these leaders escaped imprisonment by fleeing abroad, resulting in three general factions to the 
group; one that was incarcerated; another that was at liberty (within Egypt) and another that 
had fled outside Egypt. This inevitably lead to difficulties in communication between the three 
factions and resulted in their acting unilaterally. Any action conducted by any member of any of 
the three branches would be ascribed by the media to the IG without differentiation. This period 
saw a lack of guiding leadership, as leaders were isolated inside prisons with no means of 
communication, explaining the random acts of violence that took place during that period. This 
situation was further worsened by the IG principle of ‘unity’ according to which the IG leaders 
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and members committed themselves to overcoming any possible disagreements within the 
Group in order to keep all lines united. Before communication was made unattainable, the 
leaders’ commitment to the principle of unity delayed their objections to the random acts of 
violence committed by their followers outside prisons though the leaders tried several times to 
stop acts of violence.405  
It is claimed that efforts to end the bloodshed and revise the group’s ideology were started in 
the 1980s, immediately after the killing of Sadat.406 However, the fact that the IG depended only 
on daʿwa and ḥisba in the 1980s was not a reflection of a change in the ideology or of an 
existing desirability of peaceful change but was acknowledgement of the failure of violence to 
cause revolution at this stage as proven by Sadat’s assassination and subsequent attacks on 
Asyut. They followed the two means that were available at that time and suspended the third 
means as they needed to rebuild their lines again to get enough power to successfully and 
efficiently carry out the third means. In framing terms, they acted according to the available 
political opportunity structures. The fact that their ideological literature in the 1980s, especially 
the Charter, argued for violence, means that it was an option that was being prepared to. The 
rebuilding of the movement and the scripting of the ideological and theoretical legitimisation of 
violence occurred in the 1980s, after which many brutal attacks were carried out with the 
leaders’ consent.407  
This being the case, there had been some attempts, by individuals, to stop the brutality since 
then but these were tactical rather than genuine and were deficient in ideological legitimisation, 
which reduced these efforts to attempts at a truce, rather than actual reversals of ideology.408 
Examples of these attempts include the decision of some imprisoned leaders to prevent some 
actions of forced ḥisba due to their harm, and the attempt of the famous sheikh al-Shaʿrāwī and 
others to mediate between the IG and the government to stop violence. All of these attempts 
failed for different reasons, including the dominance of the security situation on the ground, the 
lack of trust between both parties, and media leaks and pressures on the regime to not 
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negotiate with ‘terrorists’.409 Furthermore, attempts to ideologically delegitimise violence during 
an ongoing conflict are hardly achievable, considering that such an environment is more 
conducive to negotiating pressing demands rather than supportive religious interpretations, and 
that militant groups’ leaders are less likely to credibly address the religious legitimacy of the 
rationale for violence with their followers when an armed struggle is rising.410 
Thus, the 1997 initiative is distinguished from previous efforts to cease violent actions as the 
latter did not argue against the group’s ideology or render the use of brutal force forbidden. 
Rather, they were strategic and lacked the ideological legitimisation. Attempts of a temporary 
truce with the government and other efforts of putting an end to the shedding of blood were 
justified theoretically by the conciliation that Prophet Muhammad had with his enemies in the 
Treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya, as a transient strategic resolution.411 This meant that the group’s prior 
convictions had not been abrogated, as attempts of having a truce with the regime were not a 
renouncement of the pro-violence ideology but a tactical ceasefire that was not ideologically 
legitimised. Although these attempts of pacification failed, they did imply that the leaders’ 
juristic and theological orientations altered slightly after Sadat’s assassination.412  
Meanwhile, the operations and confrontations of the IG members with the regime not only 
resulted in the killing and arrest of many of the IG activists but also led to the exposure of the 
subterranean al-Jihād Organisation. The assassination of the Head of the Egyptian parliament by 
the IG in 1990 was the first thread that led the government to expose members of al-Jihād 
Organisation. The detainees confessed, under torture, that they had military training in 
Afghanistan and spoke about different kinds of weapons and the names of camps and how they 
used to communicate. They also spoke about the other groups that received training and 
returned to Egypt. This revealed to the regime the role played by the war in Afghanistan and 
how serious Islamist groups had become.413 As a result, around 1000 of the al-Jihād trained 
members were arrested and subjected to military trials in early 1993 in the case known as Ṭalā’iʿ 
al-Fatḥ (Vanguards of the Conquest).414 
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Those arrested in the ‘Vanguard of the Conquest’ case belonged to different places and different 
Jihadi groups but they had one thing in common. When they were asked about the names of 
those who received them in Afghanistan, they mentioned three names ending with al-Ẓawāhirī. 
Thus all of them came to know that they all belonged to the same mother organisation led by al-
Ẓawāhirī without knowing about one another. They did not mention Faḍl’s name because they 
did not know that he was the emir as he was not involved in any paramilitary action.415 
The arrest of this large number infuriated other members abroad who felt ashamed as their 
fellows were arrested without any resistance or retaliatory action. In their view, the arrest was 
shameful because their counterparts in the IG were conducting several operations to release 
their imprisoned members while they did nothing and were further arrested without shooting a 
single bullet. They also accused the leadership of inefficiency and negligence and pressed for 
punishing the leaders held responsible for this large-scale arrest. This ended up with a dissident 
group that challenged al-Ẓawāhirī’s policies and wanted to take immediate violent action. As the 
war in Afghanistan had finished by that time, most of al-Jihād members outside Egypt had 
travelled to Yemen and then to Sudan as the Sudanese regime sponsored Islamists and 
encouraged them to move to Sudan. However, Faḍl stayed in Pakistan and when he was asked 
to travel to Sudan to solve the problem of Jihadi dissent, he refused and resigned, and al-
Ẓawāhirī took office after consultation with the Organisation’s Consultative Council.416  
Shortly afterwards and in the same year of 1993, another dispute occurred between Faḍl and 
other leaders of the Organisation because of Faḍl’s book Al-Jāmiʿ fī Ṭalab al-ʿIlm al-Sharīf which 
he completed in 1993. The book greatly widened the scope of takfīr and criticised most of the 
Islamist movements, including the IG and branches of al-Jihād. The views in the book, 
particularly those on takfīr, were considered too radical even by al-Ẓawāhirī and other Islamists. 
Therefore, al-Ẓawāhirī and al-Jihād figures altered some of the views in Faḍl’s book and removed 
the critique of Islamist movements and reprinted the book under a different name. This further 
increased Faḍl’s fury with al-Ẓawāhirī and al-Jihād and marked a total separation between the 
two. Faḍl, who by that time had moved to Yemen, considered his knowledge and effort greater 
than the ability of the Organisation to revise them and reacted by issuing a second edition of the 
book with an announcement in the introduction where he launched a fierce attack at his 
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previous Organisation, describing it with extremely coarse descriptions and a declaring his non-
affiliation to any jihadi movement.417 
Faḍl’s criticism of Islamists and attack on his own organisation al-Jihād shows the nature of 
Faḍl's relationship with his Organisation in particular and other Jihadists in general at that 
particular time. The level of fury shown in this announcement goes well beyond any expected 
reaction to the mere act of abridging and retitling a book without its author's permission. The 
announcement seemed to be the final word in Faḍl's relationship with al-Jihād Organisation and 
other Islamist movement.  
After Faḍl’s resignation and abandonment of jihadi work, al-Jihād Organisation split into two 
groups: the old guard led by al-Ẓawāhirī and the new guard that favored guerrilla clashes with 
the regime. Then al-Jihād members, with al-Ẓawāhirī’s reluctant approval, conducted two 
attempts on the life of the Egyptian Prime Minister ʿĀṭif Sidqī and Minister of Interior Ḥasan al-
Alfī in retaliation to the arrest of their fellows. Not only did the operations fail but also the 
Egyptian authorities escalated its campaign against the organisation, which resulted in the arrest 
and killing of more members and confiscation of many properties and financial assets. In 
addition, a crisis started in the relationship between the Sudanese intelligence and the 
Organisation that culminated in firing the Organisation from Sudan,418 which deprived the 
organisation from the material resources and support they used to get from the Sudanese 
government. This exhausted all the resources of the Organisation, which forced al-Ẓawāhirī in 
1995 to declare a cease of violent operations within Egypt due to lack of capacity.419 
The splits between al-Jihād groups and the consequent practical end of their activities inside 
Egypt as declared later by al-Ẓawāhirī in 1995 confirm the framing principle that frame 
resonance is affected by the perceived credibility of the frame articulators (leaders). 420 Here, 
failure to cause any harm to the regime and the arrest of this big number of activists cast doubts 
on the executive and managerial, but not necessarily the religious and theological, credibility of 
                                                          
417 Al-Khaṭīb, “Riḥla Ṭawīla li al-Duktūr Faḍl.” See the critique and the story in the introduction of Faḍl’s al-Jāmiʿ, 9-11. 
418 Hānī Al-Sibāʿī, “Hānī al Sibāʿī Yarwī Qiṣṣat al-Ikhtirāq al-Ladhī Taʿrraḍat Lahu Jamāat al-Jihād fī al-Khurṭūm,” Al-
Ḥayāt Newspaper (4 September 2002), 10; Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, “Al-Hijra ilā Afghānistān wa al-Taḥawwul li Istihdāf al-
Maṣāliḥ al-Amrīkiyya: Al-Sharq al-Awṣaṭ Tanshur Kitāb Al-Ẓawāhirī aw al-Waṣiyya al-Akhīra,” Al-Sharq al-Awaṣaṭ 
Newspaper (2 December 2002), 10.  
419 Ashour, “A World without Jihad,” 117; Al-Sibāʿī, “Qiṣṣat Ta’sīs al-Jihād.” 
420 Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and SMT,” 203; Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 621; Wiktorowicz, Islamic 
Activism, 16.  
102 
 
the leaders, which resulted in splits. This was not the case with the IG at that time as the IG 
activists were launching successful attacks and the leaders could not be blamed for any failure 
due to their imprisonment. 
Thus, the above demonstration shows that in the first half of the 1990s the governmental iron-
fisted measures against the IG and al-Jihād became stricter and the regime took the lead in 
attacking Islamists. Moreover, ‘terrorism’ cases were considered only through military justice to 
ensure severer sentences. The government then adopted a policy on detention whereby 
suspects were arrested on suspicion alone, resulting in wide-scale arrests. Detainees were 
remanded without trial or any idea as to the length of their sentencing. Communication of such 
offenders was restricted within corrective facilities so that members of the group could not 
communicate with one another. Acts of repression were carried out that included beating and 
other acts that deliberately caused injury to inmates. As a result, several inmates died. The 
families of those incarcerated under such policy were also made to suffer, with the government 
targeting them with social and economic discrimination.421 
Besides, the government was successful in stopping foreign donations reaching the Islamists. 
Also, Sudan’s and Iran’s policies, which used to support revolution, were altered due to their 
international isolation.422 According to official reports, during 1992-1995, 471 Islamists were 
killed and around 30,000 were detained. This period also featured extra-judicial killings, mass-
murders, systematic torture in prisons, military show-trials and regular curfews in Upper Egypt. 
Therefore, by 1997 almost all of the IG’s activities came to an end, as those sympathetic to their 
cause within Egypt, save those staying in hideouts, had been arrested or killed.423As a result of 
these strict governmental policies and extremely repressive measures,424the political 
opportunity structures of the two groups were disabled, which constrained collective action of 
the IG and al-Jihād who were unable to launch attacks by 1995 as conflict with the government 
had led to the regime putting an end to members’ activities outside prison. This was confirmed 
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by al-Ẓawāhirī’s declaration of 1995 on the halting of all operations inside Egypt due to the lack 
of capacity and the great losses they had experienced.425 
Despite the fact that the Islamists viewed rebellion as the most viable method of resistance to 
oppression and suffering, the Islamists, robbed of public sympathy and the requisite backing, 
were not in a position to have a drawn out confrontation with the Egyptian regime. Instead of 
seeking this support and building bridges, Islamists engaged in a ‘hasty and short-sighted’ 
military confrontation with a powerful regime, failing to appreciate the strength of the forces 
they were going up against. In other words, they had lost touch with reality, feeling empowered 
and arrogant.426  
Al-Jihād Dissolution and Coalition with al-Qaeda and the IG Revisions (1997-2004) 
By 1995, the regime’s iron fist managed to practically stop violence. As a result, the IG members 
remained helpless in prison, hideouts or abroad and al-Jihād members abroad looked for a 
country to host them after their expulsion from Sudan. So, al-Ẓawāhirī and his fellows went back 
to Afghanistan in early 1996 and built strong relations with Usāma Bin Lādin that culminated in 
their unity and the declaration of the establishment of al-Qaeda in 1998. According to al-Sibāʿī, 
this was a unilateral decision from al-Ẓawāhirī and some of the Organisation’s Shūrā Council 
members while most of the other members did not know about it except after the declaration, 
which created more disagreements inside the Organisation.427  
Al-Ẓawāhirī and his fellows joined al-Qaeda under the influence of great financial and security 
pressures as their expulsion from Sudan meant a loss of both their secure haven and the 
financial support they got from the Sudanese government. However, other members viewed 
that the Organisation was changing its ideology of focusing on Egypt and the Egyptian affair 
only. They argued that the focus of struggle should not be widened as this would be 
catastrophic to the Organisation. The Organisation’s view was that fighting the near enemy (i.e. 
the local ‘apostate’ regimes) should be given priority over fighting the far enemy (international 
‘infidel’ regimes). This is based on their belief that the punishment of the ‘apostates’ is graver 
than that of the ‘original disbelievers’ who were neither born Muslims nor accepted Islam at any 
time. Thus, they had the view that fighting the apostate local regimes is of the highest priority as 
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they were the ones who brought occupiers to Muslim lands. This is contradictory to the ideology 
of al-Qaeda which believes that fighting Western powers is more important that fighting the 
local ‘apostate regimes’.428  
Thus, by that time, al-Jihād organisation split into several groups: some joined Bin lādin and 
some adhered to their early beliefs but without further activities, while the majority was in 
prison. This remained the case until the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 which 
increased the dissipation of the remaining members of the Organisation which no longer existed 
except in Egyptian prisons and some mountain areas on the Pakistani-Afghani borders.429 
Regarding Faḍl, he moved to Yemen after he cut relations with al-Jihād and he continued to live 
and work there until he was detained by the Yemeni authorities under pressures from the US 
after 9/11 attacks. He was kept in Yemeni jails for 29 months before he was extradited to Egypt 
by the end of February 2004 to serve a life sentence in the case known as ‘The returnees from 
Albania’ (Al-ʿĀidūn min Albāniya) despite the fact that he never travelled to Albania.430   
Though different in ideology and course of action, the IG and al-Jihād prisoners inside Egypt 
went through the same structural strains and the same excessively repressive conditions. 
However, the IG leaders, due to the Group’s solidarity and unified leadership, tried to quickly 
put an end to these miserable conditions. Having resulted in bloodshed and civilian casualties, 
the operations of the two groups deprived them from the Egyptian masses’ sympathy and 
added legitimacy to the repressive actions taken by the regime against them.431 This public 
alienation of the two groups, together with counter framing by al-Azhar and media, featured the 
loss of the cultural opportunity and the cultural context the two groups had before, which 
constrained their collective action framing.432  
An understanding of the cultural context or the ‘social milieu’ within which Islamist groups 
operate is essential to understand their decisions to undertake or renounce violence. This 
context or social milieu refers to public opinion, prevailing norms about the adequacy, 
legitimacy or effectiveness of violent or non-violent tactics, and also public condemnation, 
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acceptance or toleration of a particular group. Strong public condemnation of violent attacks 
and of the groups launching such attacks exercises powerful pressure on mass-based groups like 
the IG. This pressure is particularly acute for leaders, who, when faced with strong public 
condemnation and organisational crisis, are forced to rethink the mission of the group and to 
push for reform.433 
Thus, the loss of the ‘cultural context’ and the support of the ‘social milieu’ affected the two 
organisations and their targeted audience, which in turn affected the framing and message of 
the two groups. Likewise, it has been established in communication studies and framing 
literature that the target of the message can affect the form and content of the message, and 
that the audience targeted is one of the major contextual factors that help explain why 
movements seek to modify their collective action frames from time to time.434 Thus, in addition 
to the above explained changes in the political opportunity and structural conditions, the loss of 
public support as a result of unwarranted bloodshed and the random operations of violence led 
to the loss of not only the cultural context but also the targeted audience. This is confirmed by 
research that emphasises that public norms of resistance affect the likelihood of movement’s 
use or renunciation of violence. If the regime is widely perceived as illegitimate and violent 
resistance is widely accepted, the adoption of violent tactics does not alienate a group from the 
society and thus becomes an effective option. On the other hand, if public norms of resistance 
change and the public strongly condemn violence, violence would be of a much higher cost to 
the organisation and thus a decision of revisions or de-escalation would be more likely.435  
Thus, the loss of political opportunity, the support of the cultural context and audience, as well 
as the change of public norms of resistance raised the leaders’ consciousness such that they 
recognised their followers’ practices had deviated from the Sharia, and that the situation would 
get progressively worse and a further violent act would result only in more repression, 
detention, spilling of blood and sins that the leaders and the followers would accrue. This, 
together with their military and spiritual defeat, drove them to think of solutions.436 Thus, 
changes in the cultural, material and structural conditions led to changes in frame resonance, 
which in turn led to reframing. 
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Moreover, the ideology of violent movements had resonance in Egypt due to the lack of 
moderate authoritative religious guidance or direction (as could be attained from the scholars of 
al-Azhar), and the feeble presence of the moderate Islamic movements such as the MB in Upper 
Egypt, also gave radical ideologies and thoughts the opportunity to take the lead. The vacuum of 
moderate Islamic guidance was filled by ideologies that were essentially alien to Egyptian 
society, a society that had never witnessed such systematic jihadist and takfīrī trends before.437 
In the 1990s, this vacuum was broadly filled by the governmental religious establishment  (al-
Azhar), at a time when the regime launched theocratic warfare against Jihadists to appeal to the 
hearts and minds of the masses, through the media and the governmental religious 
institution.438 In addition, in 1993 there were efforts of reconciliation led by prominent sheikhs 
like Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Muḥammad Mitwallī al-Shaʿrāwī to counsel on and discuss 
religious justifications of violence with the IG leaders, which, though unsuccessful, gradually 
influenced the orientations of the leaders.439 
 Furthermore, Al-Azhar scholars wrote numerous works in refutation of the Salafi Jihadist 
ideology,440 and the government gave the imprisoned leaders access to books of Jurisprudence 
and writings of mainstream Muslim scholars. Coupled with practical factors, access to 
mainstream religious texts made it possible for the IG leadership to rethink their previous 
understanding of the Sharia and put the teachings of their oft-quoted Islamic ideologues in a 
more nuanced, contextualised and historical context. According to a former IG member, the 
leadership changed its views after first studying simple and then more complex Islamic texts.441 
This exposure to books of mainstream Muslim scholars and intellectuals enhanced the political 
learning and religious capability of the leaders and drove them to view the issue from a wider 
angle. 
Thus, the Egyptian jihadist movement faced a dilemma after the relentless confrontations with 
the regime. They discovered that the regime made fighting against them its first priority, and 
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they also recognised that were undergoing a vicious circle of violence and counter violence, 
which proved to be useless and destructive. This also seemed to them contradictory to the 
moral code they, especially the IG, have committed themselves to as their main job shifted from 
moral religious upbringing and righteousness to bloodshed and violence. They also recognised 
they were drawn to the use of force that was not governed by Islamic manners, piety and self-
discipline, and thus proved counterproductive.442 Having recognised that changing the ‘un-
Islamic reality’ by force would be impossible and having suffered a comprehensive military and 
spiritual defeat, the IG leaders attempted to change this dire situation. As a result, they began to 
question their thought and though of changing their attitudes , which marked the birth of non-
violence initiative in July 1997.443 
The media and the government met this declaration with suspicion and surprise, a suspicion 
that increased a few months later in November 1997, when some IG members carried out a 
bloody operation at Luxor, resulting in tens of casualties. The IG leaders claimed that the 
massacre had taken place due to a lack of communication. They maintained that it had been 
carried out by some members of the group who were in hiding so had not heard of the (peace) 
initiative and had carried it out fulfilling orders that had been given some years before the 
initiative.444 This was the last, but most fatal, act of violence committed by the IG members, and 
was strongly condemned by the former leaders and those head who were abroad.445  
The decision to make the initiative was taken by the imprisoned historical leaders without 
consultation with or approval from the leaders abroad who firstly showed refusal as they 
thought the imprisoned leaders were forced to declare this initiative. So, initially there was no 
consensus between IG members and the second-in-line leaders abroad. Yet, the leaders abroad 
were convinced of the importance of ceasing violence after the authorities allowed the 
imprisoned leaders to have extensive communication and debates with the leaders abroad. This 
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culminated in a statement issued by the IG leaders abroad, on 28 March 1999, in which they 
declared their support of the non-violence imitative.446   
This featured a new stage for the initiative as the regime started to take it seriously, which 
facilitated the start of the process of discursive ideological legitimisation of the new thought. 
The regime allowed the imprisoned historical leaders to tour prisons and conduct teaching and 
debate sessions with the second-in-line commanders and other members to convince them of 
the new thought. After 9/11 attacks, the Egyptian regime took a further step forward and 
extensive media coverage was given to the IG to air their new views. They also helped by 
disseminating their new literature. The Egyptian regime wanted to send the message to the 
Western Powers that it was successful in neutralising ‘terror’. It removed thousands of potential 
supporters and affiliates of al-Qaeda from its camp, and as a result should not be held to 
account for its repressive measures and human rights abuses.447  
In order to disseminate the new thought and provide evidence that their initiative is based on a 
genuine paradigm shift and not a tactic, leaders of the IG issued a series of works that 
documented their renewed ideology, religious discourse and proofs. These books came under a 
series titled Silsilat Taṣḥīḥ al-Mafāhīm (A Series of Correcting the Concepts), a title which 
indicates that previous understandings were incorrect and are now being rectified. This is an 
implicit declaration that the basis upon which their legitimacy rested (their understanding of 
Islam) was misunderstood and misinterpreted.448 
These books present counterarguments and reframing of the ideology they had previously 
subscribed to, using Islamic juristic principles. The new literature centres upon the notion that 
the evils of violence are greater than the benefits it brings about. They also maintain that 
previous actions of violence have no connection with jihad in its correct sense or Islam in its 
truest sense. Violence cannot guide people to the straight path but impacts negatively upon the 
Ummah’s unity, weakens Egypt and demeans its ability to face challenges. Furthermore, it 
tarnishes the image of Islam and violates the lives of innocents who were victims of a struggle 
that turned out to be against the spirit of the Sharia.449 The government's adoption of the 
initiative and the release of the first four books that argue against violence marked the third 
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stage of revisions which was publicised in January 2002 when the ideological content of the IG 
revisions was first released to media. 
As the literature that propagated violence was produced under the auspices of the old leaders, 
countering the works they had previously promoted and convincing members that the old 
ideology was mistaken would be more likely to succeed only if undertaken by the same leaders. 
In addition to the ultimate respect and veneration from the followers to the leaders, those 
leaders are, beyond suspicion in the eyes of their followers, as they are the only credible 
authority in any such arguments who would not yield to any pressures to change their genuine 
convictions. Sources outside these were not deemed credible and dismissed as being agents of 
the regime who had been co-opted or weakened by torture and repression.450 This confirms the 
importance of effective and credible leadership in any process of transformation or ideological 
de-legitimisation of violence. Thus, the IG and similar ex-jihadist revisionists could be much 
more effective in reaching or reorienting potential or already-existing jihadists than any other 
religious establishment or figure.451 
Al-Jihād Revisions, Jihadi Polemics and New Phases in the IG Revisions (2004- present) 
Though some of al-Jihād members joined the IG revisions and though they experienced the 
same prison conditions as those of the IG members, decentralism and the lack of unified highly 
respectable leadership delayed the revisions of al-Jihād. By the summer of 2004, there started a 
process of revisions led by Nabīl Naʿīm, leader of one of the Jihadi faction in Egyptian prisons. 
Naʿīm and his group, further motivated by the success of the IG revisions, succeeded in 
attracting some other factions. However, due to the severe factionalism and decentralisation of 
the different jihadi groups and the weak religious and charismatic credentials of Naʿīm, the 
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attempt failed and several factions refused them. This remained the case until Faḍl took the lead 
in late 2006.452  
Because of Faḍl’s outstanding theological credibility and the ultimate respect and authority he 
has in the jihadi ranks, it was only him who could unite these groups. This supports framing 
researchers’ emphasis that the higher the status and perceived knowledge and expertise of the 
frame articulator in the sight of members and potential adherents, the more credible and 
resonant the framings or claims they present.453 It also shows that the credibility of frame 
articulators is vital for the acceptance of a group’s message, and that leaders with a good 
enough reputation can elicit trust and enhance prospects for successful message dissemination. 
Therefore, the credibility of the messenger or frame articulator is a necessary precondition for 
frame alignment.454 
Thus, Faḍl was the right figure to lead the different Jihadi groups due to his unrivalled 
theological knowledge, status and credibility. Faḍl toured prisons to convince different jihadi 
factions of a non-violence initiative similar to that of the IG. This took several months and ended 
by the approval of the majority of al-Jihad leaders and members who signed and approved his 
new theological arguments.455 Faḍl's revisions were published in a series of 15 articles in the 
Egyptian al-Maṣrī al-Yūm and the Kuwaiti al-Jarīdā newspapers, as of 18 November 2007. The 
Egyptian authorities encouraged and facilitated the whole process but preferred to keep its role 
unpublicised.456  
Faḍl’s book was titled “Wathīqat Tarshīd Al-ʿAmal al-Jihādī fī Miṣr wa al-ʿĀlam” (Correct 
Guidance for Jihadi Operations in Egypt and the World Over). It included concentrated 
theological arguments about the jihadi issues, especially rebellion against rulers and attacking 
non-Muslims, tourists and western targets. Faḍl’s Wathīqa spoke only about theological aspects 
of the issues pertaining to violence and concluded with delegitimising them without speaking 
                                                          
452 Muntaṣir al-Zayyāt, “Al-Khurūj ʿalā al-Mujtamaʿāt wa al-ʿAwda Ilayhā [1-2],” Al-Maṣrī al-Yūm Newspaper: 
http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=84554 (Downloaded 27 December 2010); Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, 
“Qiṣṣat Murājaʿāt al-Jihād,” Al-Maṣrī al-Yūm  Newspaer: http://www.almasry-
alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=83478 (Downloaded 27 December 2010). 
453 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 621. 
454 Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad,” 163-4. 
455 See, for instance, Ṣāliḥ Jāhīn, "Interview with Ṣāliḥ Jāhīn," Al-Jarīda Newspaper (2 December 2007), 12. 
456 Al-Zayyāt, “Al-Khurūj ʿalā al-Mujtamaʿāt;” Al-Khaṭīb, “Qiṣṣat Murājaʿāt al-Jihād.” 
111 
 
about other socio-political aspects. A few days later, Faḍl revealed some of the socio-political 
background of the revisions in a long interview with the London-based al-Ḥayāt Newspaper. 
While Faḍl’s revisions as published in the Wathīqa stayed still without developing further 
arguments or commenting on other communal issues, the revisions of the IG went two stages 
further. After the three stages of the IG revisions mentioned above, the fourth stage began in 
2005 when the IG leaders started publishing books to comment on current occurrences or 
incidents in and outside Egypt such as the bombings of Riyadh and Casablanca, and the 
operations and ideology of al-Qaeda. This stage also marked the Launch of the IG website457 and 
the publication of several detailed books about issues related to the jihadi movements and 
concepts used for justifying political violence such as the concepts of sovereignty and Takfīr. 
Although Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm is the leader who has written the majority of the IG revisions, the rest of 
the group’s leaders have had input in the process; writing  part of the of it and/or revising and 
approving all of what Ibrāhīm had put forward.458 A fifth stage started after the Arab spring 
when the IG became politically active, launched its political party ‘Al-Binā' wa al-Tanmiya’ 
(Construction and Development) and introduced candidates for the Egyptian parliamentary 
elections, declaring a new political phase in the history of the Group.459  
Having clarified the context and causation of violence and revisions above, it would be more 
fruitful to discuss the sincerity and genuineness of the revisions before analysing their contents, 
a task that is undertaken in the following section. 
 
Were the Revisions Written under Duress? 
A sound  revision of one’s ideology should be in essence a reflection of freedom in thought and 
actions and, therefore, should emanate from an environment that is not dominated by fear, 
                                                          
457 A few years after the activation of the non-violence imitative, the government allowed the IG to start its website ( 
http://www.eigportal.com) to publicise their new stances and make peaceful preaching of Islam.  
458 Therefore, any reference to any of the IG publications or arguments will be ascribed to the IG leaders in general. 
See Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 21.  
459 Drevon, “Assessing Islamist De-radicalization,” 303. Also some members of al-Jihād established a political party 
following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. For more on the two political parties, see Jérôme Drevon, "The 
Emergence of Ex-Jihadi Political Parties in Post-Mubarak Egypt," The Middle East Journal (69, no. 4 [2015]), 511-526. 
The article investigates the two groups’ organisational dynamics and internal dialogues in order to uncover the 
rationale of their political participation after the January 2011 uprising and its internal ideational legitimisation. It 
argues that both groups embraced nonviolent participation in democratic politics through an internal reassessment of 




detention, torture or violation of human rights and dignity. As the revisions were primarily 
produced in prison under strict security measures and with encouragement from the official 
political and security forces, they seemed to be justificatory reconcilatory theological thought 
aimed at achieving some social and politcal gains through reconcilation with the security forces 
and ending the imprisonment and torture of the detainees. Though this does not necessarily 
mean that the revisions are not genuine, it  does represent an unsound environment for any 
process of revisions or reform in the thoughts that, in order to be a fruitful and productive, 
needs an atmosphere of religious, intellectual and politcal freedom and tolerance that allows 
free unrestircted argumentations, debates and exchange of different views between various and 
perhaps opposing religious and cultural contributors.460 Nonetheless, the below review will 
show different views on whether the revisions were genuine or a product of torture and 
presssure, starting with the IG. 
The IG 
Unlike Faḍl’s revisions, the practical attitudes of the IG leaders and members, together with the 
depth and scope of their anti-violence literature, dissipated the fears of suspicious analysts that 
the IG revisions might not be genuine or that they could be tactical or written under the 
influence of pressures or as a deal. Though there was a lot of suspicion and skepticism at the 
beginning of the revisions, all the fears and suspicion dissipated after the IG published its 
massive literature and confirmed their ideological stances with their practical attitudes. The 
general view became that someone under pressure would not produce thousands of pages and 
hundreds of interviews and articles to assert and reemphasise the mistakes of the past and 
establish a new set of beliefs that are confirmed with their practical actions. 
 In addition, according to ʿAbd al-Munʿim Munīb who shared the same prison with the IG leaders 
at the time of the initiative, it was Karam Zuhdī who voluntarily suggested opening a dialogue 
with the government and launched the initiative. Munīb concludes that what he saw inside 
prison was that the revisions and the initiative before them were launched by the free will and 
choice of some important leaders and members who then convinced other leaders and 
members.461 Furthermore, if there was any kind of pressure in prison on the imprisoned leaders, 
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there was no such pressure on the leaders abroad who were free to accept or reject. Yet, the 
leaders abroad unanimously approved the revisions in 1999 though they initially opposed them 
and claimed that they were the product of pressure.  
The fact that the government cooperated with the initiative only after two years of its launch 
proves that the revisions were genuine and represent the personal convictions of the leaders. 
The fact that the government later helped the IG spread their new ideas and receive extensive 
media does not mean that the initiative was made under pressure or as a deal but means that 
the regime found them genuine and beneficial and thus decided to sponsor them to put a 
peaceful end to one of the bloodiest struggles in Egypt's modern history.  
This became particularly clearer after the collapse of the Mubarak regime as the IG explanations 
and approach in the revisions remained unchanged and the IG played a political role and formed 
a new political party that aims for political change through peaceful means. 
After the July 2013 coup and the subsequent extremely repressive policies of the government 
against Islamists, the IG remained peaceful. It challenged the coup only through universally 
accepted peaceful means of protest such as demonstrations, sit-ins and rallies. When some of 
the rallies were stormed by police and army forces, resulting in several massacres, the IG 
reacted by calling for more rallies and demonstrations, and completely shunned political 
violence.462 
AL-Jihād 
Unlike those of the IG, Faḍl’s revisions did not receive the same level of approval. They have 
provoked several supporting, suspicious, cautious and opposing reactions. Because of the 
weight of Faḍl in the jihadi circles, al-Ẓawāhirī criticised his revisions harshly even before they 
were published and later on published a lengthy book titled al-Tabriʿa (the Exoneration) 
criticising Faḍl’s revisions in detail, but Faḍl answered back in a furious polemic called al-Taʿriya 
li Kitāb al-Tabriʿa (Uncovering the Book of al-Tabria). Also, several other jihadists responded to 
Faḍl and his fellows accusing them of yielding to governmental pressures and forsaking their 
beliefs. Faḍl also answered back.  
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Such polemics and challenges to Faḍl and the IG new stances are known in framing literature as 
opponent ‘counter-framing’. This refers to the contestants’ opposition to the changes advocated 
by a movement or a person by publicly challenging the movement's diagnostic and prognostic 
framings, in an attempt to neutralise, disprove or undermine the opponent’s interpretive 
framework or versions of reality.463 The IG and Faḍl’s replies to these challenges (as in Faḍl’s al-
Taʿriya and the IG in their criticism of al-Qaeda) constitute a reframing activity that attempts to 
neutralise, contain, reduce or reverse potential damage to the group’s previous claims or 
frames.464 Such polemics between movements and their detractors have been referred to as 
‘framing contests’, which can also occur internally.465 A broader discussion of this extensive 
jihadi debates and polemics is given below. 
Jihadi Polemics and Accusations of Duress 
As will be explained later, al-Jihād revisions, unlike those of the IG, have several limitations and 
are of controversial nature, and it is they who provoked most of the polemics and challenges. 
Therefore, they need extended discussion to establish whether they were written under 
pressure or were the product of genuine convictions. Generally speaking, opinion is divided in 
two as to whether Faḍl’s Wathīqa was written under coercion of the Egyptian regime:466  
1- Coercion 
Members and supporters of al-Qaeda put forward the argument that the Wathīqa was written 
as a result of torture and coercion at the hands of the Egyptian authorities, and a promise of 
release, or more favourable conditions in prison. This being the case, they say that a captive’s 
statement or action cannot be accepted.467   
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In al-Tabri’a, al-Ẓawāhirī launched a fierce attack against Faḍl trying to prove with all possible 
means that he wrote the Wathīqa under pressure.468 Al-Ẓawāhirī’s serious efforts to neutralise 
the Wathīqa under the assumption that it was the product of torture and coercion made him go 
as far as requesting others not to accept a word from anybody even himself if they are taken 
prisoners and later change their arguments while imprisoned.469 Similar arguments were made 
by other Jihadists like Muḥammad al-Ḥakayma,470 jihadi sympathisers like Hāni al-Sibāʿī471and  
non-Jihadists like Maḥfūẓ ʿAzzām.472  
2- Genuine Revisions 
That Faḍl’s revisions are genuine convictions and not the product of pressure is the view of the 
majority, including Faḍl himself, members of the IG, affiliates of al-Jihād Organisation who 
accepted the Wathīqa, as well as most of the journalists and observers.473 As the revisions of the 
IG have proven genuineness and the view that they were written as a deal with the authorities 
or under pressure have turned out to be mistaken; this influenced the observers' reactions 
towards the revisions of Faḍl. Examples of the supporters of this view include the analyst Jamāl 
al-Bannā474, ex-member of al-Jihād Aḥmad Ḥamdallah475 and some websites concerned with 
analysis of Jihadist positions like Political Islam Online.476The Jihadist ideologue Abū Basīr al-
Ṭarṭūsī noted that he believed that the revisions are not written under duress because a coerced 
person will write only one or two pages to rid himself of coercion. However, Faḍl wrote a 
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lengthy document and did his best to convince others using sophisticated theological and 
pragmatic arguments to prove his views. This will not be the case for someone under duress.477 
It is Conviction or Duress?  
After careful consideration of  both views, the following facts support the view that the revisions 
were written out of conviction:478  
1- Chronological sequence of events supports the view that the revisions of Faḍl are 
written willingly. Faḍl called for cessation of attacks on the regime fifteen years before 
he wrote his revisions when he was free and when there was no pressure of any type 
laid upon him. This is testified even by Faḍl’s rivals and detractors like al-Ẓawāhirī who 
stated that  Faḍl retracted Jihad in 1994 and announced this in his  book al-Jāmiʿ to lead 
a life of calm in Yemen where he was concerned only about his own personal life under 
the supervision of the Yemeni government.479 Such a statement of al-Ẓawāhirī shows  
lock of consistency in his  narrations, as he claimed that Faḍl wrote his revisions under 
coercion while in another statement he acknowledged that Faḍl retracted earlier in 
1994 when coercion was not there. By Faḍl’s retraction, al-Ẓawāhirī was referring to the 
note that Faḍl wrote in the preface of the 2nd edition of his book al-J āmiʿ wherein he 
harshly criticised al-Jihād Organisation and emphasised that he dissociated himself from 
all existing Islamist movements.480 This was also emphasised by Faḍl himself in an 
interview with al-Ḥayāt Newspaper. In this interview, Faḍl stated that he advised al-
Ẓawāhirī and his Organisation twice to stop their attacks on the Egyptian regime.481 This 
should prove that Faḍl called for cease of violent operations against the regime when he 
was not under incarceration, which would give considerable weight to the view that  his 
newly published views were not written under pressure.  
Reports made by Usāma Ayyūb, a former Jihadist leader based in Germany, add further 
weight that Faḍl called for a stop to violent means before he was arrested. Ayyūb said 
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that he intended to issue a proposal of non-violence, similar to the one issued by the IG, 
and contacted Faḍl, who was encouraging, for advice. Lawrence Wright states that 
Ayyūb told him that Faḍl was questioning his thinking before his arrest in Yemen. He 
added that Ayyūb contacted Faḍl in the early 2000s, informing him of his intention to 
make a non-violence pact of his own. Ayyūb said that he encouraged him, despite the 
fact that could not discuss the details due to some security concerns.482 
2- It has been claimed that the Wathīqa was written for appeasement of America but this 
has been rationally refuted by Faḍl, who said he had authored it in order to correct 
mistakes made in the name of Jihad and Islam. If this outcome pleases the United 
States, it cannot be a basis to reject the work, as the aim behind the work is not to 
benefit the US. In actuality, it brings about more benefits for the Muslims. To bolster 
this argument, he gave several historical examples, one of these being the Islamic jihad 
that was waged in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. None would claim that the jihad 
was waged to satisfy America and none would ask to stop it, as it brought more benefits 
for the Muslims than it did for the US. Benefitting the enemy was not the root objective 
in either of these examples but a by-product of them.483 
3- Although Faḍl had staunch views on takfīr and revolting against regimes, nothing in his 
earlier works indicates his support for the targeting of non-Muslim civilians or tourists. 
He actually argued in al-Jāmiʿ that if a Muslim were to enter a non-Muslim country, they 
must not do any harm there as they had entered with a visa, which is considered a 
covenant of security, which has to be honoured, even if the visa is fake.484 This 
corroborates what he said in the Wathīqa, as it was what he had said when he was the 
emir of al-Jihād. 
4- The assertion that other members of al Jihad signed the Wathīqa under coercion is 
countered by the fact that many members supported the revisions of the IG long before 
Faḍl was arrested. In addition, there had been two earlier endeavours by al-Jihād 
factions to make revisions. Though these attempts failed for various reasons, they show 
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that there were a number of members who wanted to make amendments of their own 
accord, before Faḍl had even written the Wathīqa.485  
Furthermore, ʿAbd al-Munʿim Munīb, who was an eye witness on the revisions inside 
prison, emphasised that though the prison officers asked al-Jihād members to sign and 
approve the revisions, the members had the option to reject them without much 
difficulty. Munīb stressed that though there were some restrictions486 on those who 
rejected the revisions, such restrictions were bearable whereas the incentives given for 
the supporters were minimal and could be easily discarded. In addition, there are 
members who already rejected the revisions and no one could compel them to accept 
them. Thus, there were limited pressures because the security apparatus did not want 
to practise serious public pressures in order not to undermine the credibility of the 
revisions and give others an opportunity to cast doubts on the genuine convictions of 
the revisionists.487 
5- In his narration of what happened inside prisons when the security apparatus asked al-
Jihād prisoners to make revisions similar to those of the IG, Munīb stated that al-Jihād 
activists were divided into three sections in this regard. The first section accepted 
everything that the security wanted; a second section rejected the mere idea itself and 
refused to make any concessions; and the third section led by Faḍl accepted to make 
the revisions on the condition that they would write whatever they wanted without 
intervention from the government. Munīb added that though the security officers 
inclined to those who accepted everything stated by them, the final selection was in 
favour of Faḍl because of his scholarly weight. Munīb added that the security officers 
asked Faḍl several times to change parts of the Wathīqa but he always refused and 
insisted on publishing it without any change.488 
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Before summarising the conclusions of this chapter, it is worth clarifying that the controversy 
and polemics provoked by the new framing of Faḍl and the IG leaders in their revisions, and 
even the earlier disagreement between al-Jihād and Faḍl regarding some issues in his book al-
Jāmiʿ or between different leaders of the IG, are all natural manifestations of any framing 
process. This is because the generation, elaboration and development of frames are contested 
processes. This means that movement activists and ideologues cannot construct and impose on 
their intended targets any version of reality they would like; rather, there are a variety of 
challenges confronting all those who engage in framing activities.489 These challenges include 
counter-framing by opponents, bystanders, and the media as well as frame disputes within the 
movements, which have been highlighted in the above section and the ‘reactions’ section in the 
previous chapter. The contests also include the conflict between frames and events, which has 
been highlighted earlier in this chapter and will be further analysed in the last chapter. These 
multiple prognostic frames of Islamists usually lead to a great deal of internal conflict and 
competition.490 
Thus, in addition to the discussion of jihadi polemics and establishing that the revisions of the 
two groups were the product of genuine convictions of their writers, this chapter has offered a 
chronological discussion of the history of the two groups and an account of the contextual 
structural socioeconomic and political conditions that influenced their activities. It briefly 
answered the question: what are the most important causal reasons that led the IG and al-Jihād 
to practise violence and then retract from it? In order to do this, the chapter employed a 
mixture of the structural approaches explained in chapter one and, more particularly, the 
political process approach, highlighting the political environment, mobilising structures and the 
ideological framework of both groups both before and after revisions. It divided the history of 
the two groups into six stages, highlighting the general features of each stage, from their 
establishment and use of violence until the revisions and participation in political life.  
To explain causal reasons, the chapter highlighted the structural strains and miserable living 
conditions of the Egyptians and how such conditions contributed to the mayhem. As violence 
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was not one of the IG objectives or tools of action at the time of its establishment, the chapter, 
by tracing the context of the IG acts of violence in the 1990s, argued that the violence of the IG 
in the 1990s was mostly retaliatory in response to the attacks of the regime against them that 
started mainly because of the IG excessive use of forced ḥisba. Members of the IG justified their 
violent retaliatory operations by the general justifications of violence in their literature, though 
in fact the specific religious details in the literature were not observed partly due to the lack of 
communication with the leadership in the early 1990s. This tells us that the link between 
religious justifications and actual behaviour is determined by the context. 
Likewise, the chapter has shown how the dialectic tension between collective action frames and 
collective action events (i.e., the theory and practice of the IG) acted as a strong contestant to 
the framing process of the IG, and eventually led to its modification or transformation. This 
consequence of a turbulent relationship between collective action framing and collective action 
practises proves that though framing helps to legitimise and make possible some forms of 
action, contradictory collective action can transform the meaning and the structure of the 
discourse, thereby limiting subsequent opportunities for collective action. This means that the 
discourse affects the events which, in turn, “may change the underlying ideas or beliefs that 
make up the discourses and frames used by movement actors, resignify which set of collective 
beliefs are salient, and alter the meaning of actors’ interests—all of which affect the power of a 
particular discourse or frame.”491 This clearly explains how the tension between the IG and al-
Jihād’s theory and practice partially led to the modification or transformation of their frames.   
Thus, the idea of revising the previous ideology arose in the minds of the revisionists as they 
started to question their ideas and convictions when they found that violence was 
counterproductive and had earned them and their societies nothing but bloodshed and 
miserable conditions. The military and political defeat of these movements was a natural 
product of their failure to achieve a collective popular support for their goals of toppling the 
regime and also their failure to estimate the huge military and logistic capabilities of a strong 
state. Added to this was the lack of external logistic and military support to Islamists at the time 
the Egyptian government was receiving support from major foreign powers such as the U.S. This 
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made it practically impossible to defeat the government militarily without overwhelming 
popular support and an uprising.  
This overwhelming military and spiritual defeat in addition to the subhuman conditions of 
imprisoned Islamists and their families and the failure to achieve any of their goals rendered 
these movements chased and banished from political, social and even religious life, and caused 
them to lose the support of the cultural context and the political opportunity structures that 
used to empower their previous approach. Added to that was the loss of public sympathy due to 
unwarranted bloodshed and the counter-framing by the state’s religious establishment and 
media, which led to a change in public norms of resistance, causing these groups to lose the 
support of their cultural milieu.   
All of these factors were the driving force behind their acceptance of the mere idea of revising 
their thoughts and convictions. Thus, the IG and al-Jihād experience led them to the conclusion 
that violence would not yield positive results for themselves or for Islam and the Muslims, which 
prompted them to rethink their convictions and change their approaches and methodologies in 
dealing with the religious text and its relationship with the present day reality. This also offers a 
clear example of the constraints that the cultural context imposes on social movement framing 
activities and how they can lead to reframing.492 
Thus, the above deconstruction of the context of both violence and revisions indicates that it 
would be an exaggeration to claim that Egyptian Jihadists have disavowed their views regarding 
using violent means solely for theological reasons or solely for pragmatic reasons. Given the 
strength of the Sharia arguments as relates to non-violence, it becomes evident that those in 
control of the discourse concluded to stop violence based on the juristic rules relating to of the 
effects they have in terms of harm and benefit (gains and losses) and in pursuit of God’s 
pleasure. However, it is it is equally clear that they came to this conclusion only after the 
suffering of great losses and harm on their part and the part of the Egyptian people in 
general.493 These two different explanations are in fact interdependent and complementary of 
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each other, for matters of the Sharia are influenced by issues of reality, as will be seen in the 




Chapter Three: Al-Jihād Organisation: Ideology before Revisions 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the ideology and framing of al-Jihād Organisation before revisions. It aims 
to identify and explain the Islamic theological concepts which the Egyptian al-Jihād Organisation 
(and other Jihadist movements) used to frame and justify violence against local regimes and 
other local, regional and international entities and individuals. These concepts or frames 
together form the ideology of al-Jihād Organisation. This chapter servers as a premise for the 
next chapter and is inseparably associated with it. As the main concepts that this chapter 
introduces have been given new interpretations after revisions, the following chapter provides 
an explanation of the new interpretations of the same concepts after revisions. A comparative 
textual analysis between the two interpretations (pro violence as explained in this chapter and 
anti-violence as explained in the next chapter) will highlight the change in the ideology and the 
extent of that change, if any, and also explain the dynamics of change in the revisionists’ 
ideology. 
The chapter introduces and defines the Islamic theological concepts or frames (the ideological 
framework) that Jihadists use to justify violence, and explains their meanings and how they are 
framed and employed by Jihadists in general and al-Jihād Organisation in particular to justify 
acts of violence. This is to arrive at and explain the assumptions underpinning the theological 
process of justifying violence from Jihadists’ perspective. Then the chapter, by coding Faḍl’s 
texts, argues that the frame of ḥākimiyya and its consequence of takfīr are Faḍl’s major concern 
and most influential tool to justify violence. As this chapter argues that these two concepts are 
the most important and most serious frames in the process of justifying violence, they, along 
with their practical implication of rebellion against rulers, will be introduced first. After that 
other concepts (frames) will be arranged; firstly, according to their relevance to these two 
concepts and the influence of these two frames on them, and secondly, based on their influence 
on the local and international levels. People and entities influenced by these frames are of three 
kinds: Local Muslim individuals and communities, non-Muslim citizens of Muslim countries, such 
as the Christians of Egypt, and then non-Muslim countries and their citizens. After categorisation 
based on their relevance to ḥākimiyya and takfīr, the frames related to local violence affecting 
Muslims will be mentioned first, then those affecting non-Muslim residents of Muslim countries 
and finally those affecting non-Muslim countries and their citizens. In some cases, there is an 
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overlap between these categories where an interpretation of one frame affects more than one 
category. In this case, these frames will be placed in this order: those affecting local Muslims, 
then local Muslims and/or non-Muslims, and finally local Muslims and non-Muslim foreigners. 
This categorisation is further motivated by the fact that the ideology of al-Jihād Organisation 
and Faḍl gives priority to fighting the near enemy (local regimes) over the far enemy (non-
Muslim enemies).  
By doing the above, this chapter answers two main questions: The first is: what are the religious 
concepts (frames) upon which al-Jihād as represented by Faḍl founded their violent ideology? 
And how were these concepts framed to justify violence before revisions? This will be answered 
by giving an explanation of these concepts and an analysis of how they are framed to support 
violence in addition to a detailed discussion of Faḍl's ideology before revisions. The second 
question is: how is ḥākimiyya (and its consequence of takfīr) the cornerstone in the process of 
justifying violence and how do they affect other concepts promoting violence? So, the main 
argument in this chapter shows that ḥākimiyya constitutes Faḍl's main concern and primary 
frame, and that his understanding of ḥākimiyya radically influences other issues related to. 
The chapter also shows how Faḍl is flexible with practical matters that are not directly related to 
ḥākimiyya. The main point of the argument is: if ḥākimiyya and takfīr are proven to be the main 
frames that influence most of the other concepts promoting violence, then the degree of 
change in Faḍl’s ideology can be accurately measured by the degree of change in his ideology on 
these two frames. Also, if it is shown that Faḍl can be flexible on practical matters that are not 
related to ḥākimiyya, the concessions or retractions he made in his revisions in practical matters 
could be precisely evaluated. This, when compared and analysed against the arguments in the 
following chapter, will help understand and accurately measure the degree of change in Faḍl’s 
ideology. 
As the aim of this chapter is to analyse the ideology of Faḍl as presented in the theological 
frames in his writings, textual analysis will be the main tool to analyse the basic tenets of Faḍl’s 
ideology together with the relevant aspects of framing. A look at the literature review in the first 
chapter shows the different approaches and methodologies used to analyse violence and the 
renouncement of violence. These different approaches and methodologies resulted in many 
different theories, all of which depend on external surrounding circumstances to situate and 
explain violence and nonviolence and all of which try to explain ‘why’ rather than ‘how’ this 
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happened. Though valid to some extent and in certain cases, different methodologies and 
different theories have led to different, sometimes contradictory, conclusions, all of which are 
based on exterior circumstances to explain their views and analyses. Therefore, textual analysis 
will be the best tool here as the aim is to analyse texts to arrive at how the change happened. 
This will be coupled with the relevant points of framing as the above concepts together 
constitute the frames or discursive processes through which the group under discussion 
mobilises its adherents. Discursive processes refer to “the talk and conversations- the speech 
acts- and written communications of movement members that occur primarily in the context of, 
or in relation to, movement activities.”494  
While external causal matters are important to be able to understand violence and nonviolence 
and their causation, objectively analysing and explaining the thought and ideologies of the 
concerned groups as shown in their texts can lead to more precise results, since it gives an 
image with a proof from within the literature itself and leads to more realistic conclusions. This 
is particularly the case when the question is about ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ the change 
happened. Thus, after presenting a detailed description and explanation of the frames used to 
justify violence in the writings of Faḍl, textual analysis will reveal the change in ideology, if any, 
and will explain how this change happened by exploring, situating, explaining and revealing the 
tenets and assumptions underpinning arguments of revisionists before and after revisions. The 
arguments and conclusions of this and the next chapter will give a solid proof of how textual 
analysis can precisely reveal what structural causal approaches and theories could not. 
A survey and coding of the jihadi concepts in the jihadi literature shows the centrality of the 
concept of ḥākimiyya to the jihadi issues and its influence on most of the other concepts related 
to violence. That is why the jihadi trend intensified tremendously in the second half of the 
twentieth century after the frame of ḥākimiyya had been woven and assigned its current 
intellectual and political dimension by al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb. The issue of ḥākimiyya—which is 
the main concept employed by Jihadists to issue judgments of takfīr to justify violence and 
rebellion—was framed in its current political form in the twentieth century after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and the suspension of many of the Sharia laws that were replaced with 
colonial powers' laws such as the English and French laws. Jihadi literature illustrates this point, 
where it points out their goal (motivational framing) to once again set up Sharia rule that had 
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been rendered inactive from the time the Islamic caliphate was abolished, as well as 
overthrowing the ‘apostate' rulers of Muslim lands who neglect the application of the Sharia 
(prognostic framing).495  
In the case of the IG and al-Jihād, as shown in their literature, local violence or confrontation 
with the local regime (rebellion against the rulers and their regimes) was the most serious 
practical implication of the issue of ḥākimiyya. In principle, ḥākimiyya and takfīr are the main 
tools through which Jihadists justify rebellion, for takfīr of the regimes cannot be fully justified 
except through ḥākimiyya. Hence, it is necessary to start by introducing the concept of 
ḥākimiyya and how it integrates with takfīr and rebellion. 
Ḥākimiyya, Takfīr and Rebellion: Interrelated 
Modern Islamic scholarship quite often connotes the meaning of the word ḥākimiyya as 
dominance or authority. The Qur’an does not refer to the word ḥākimiyya in this way, and only 
uses the root H K M and its derivatives. The Qur’an uses the root of this word when mentioning 
God and human beings, however, the meaning is expressed to various degrees and adapts to 
signify authority and its many types and forms.  Jihadists utilise the word ḥākimiyya to express 
Divine sovereignty only; even though in the Qur’an it has a number of meanings. Therefore, God 
alone is the legitimate lawgiver with the sole right to lay down and ordain the legislation that 
guides and directs the affairs of humankind. Qutb, and the Jihadists who followed his thought, 
opined that, due to this understanding, God alone has sovereignty in all spheres of life; from a 
religious perspective as well as politically and legally.496 This study is using this understanding of 
the word as it is interpreted by Jihadists. 
As for takfīr, it means ascribing a Muslim to apostasy or disbelief. Takfir is a weighty matter in 
Islam, which prescribes that the apostate should receive the death penalty. Indeed, it has 
serious ramifications. Because the dominant view in Islamic legislation states that insurrection 
against a Muslim ruler is proscribed, even if he was a tyrant,497 the only way in which rebellion 
                                                          
495 The writings of Faḍl and the IG are also laden with such reasoning, as will be shown below. An example of these in 
other jihadi writings is Faraj, Al-Farīḍa al-Ghāiba, 4-6; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,”29. 
496 For more information about this concept, see Khir, "Sovereignty,” Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān, ed., Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (Washington DC: Brill Online [2009]) (last accessed 14 May 2011). See also, Ibrahim, “Theology and 
Jurisprudence,” 26-7. 
497 See, for example, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, no date), 13: 7-
8; Yaḥya b. Sharaf al-Nawawī, Sharḥ al-Nawawī ʿalā Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1392 A.H.), 12: 
127 
 
against a ruler can be validated is to declare him an apostate. Al-khurūj ʿalā al-ḥākim (rebellion 
against the ruler) is the practical implication of the Jihadist understanding of ḥākimiyya and 
takfīr. Rebellion here refers to armed revolt aimed at the ruler of an Islamic territory and doing 
so with the intention to install a Muslim ruler who is just. These are the three main frames 
which together constitute the jihadi understanding of ‘jihad’; struggling against regimes that are 
considered ‘apostate’.498 Of these, ḥākimiyya and takfīr are diagnostic farms while rebellion is a 
prognostic frame as the first two serve as justification (diagnosis) of the action of ‘rebellion’ that 
needs to be taken (prognosis).  
Islamic legislation differentiates between Muslim rulers and apostate (kāfir) ones. If the ruler 
turns despot, but is still classified as a Muslim, the dominant view, which is also the view of 
Jihadists, is that it is impermissible to revolt against him.499 Scholars are of the opinion that if a 
Muslim ruler leaves the fold of Islam, it is incumbent (varying between permissible and 
obligatory) on the Muslims to depose him, however, the legitimacy of doing so depends on a 
number of considerations and circumstances. The most important of these is having the capacity 
to make rebellion successful without causing bloodshed or harm that is greater than the 
benefits of ousting this apostate ruler.500 Thus, in order to justify violence against their regimes, 
Jihadists have to declare these regimes apostate; and to declare them apostate, they frame 
mainly in ḥākimiyya. Therefore, ḥākimiyya and takfīr are necessary to justify any act of violence 
against rulers and regimes of Muslim countries.501 
In religious exegesis terms, there is a difference of opinions among early Muslim scholars on 
violation of God’s ḥākimiyya and whether or not a person is guilty of apostasy if he rules with a 
law other than what God ordained. Believing this to be so is based on interpreting the Quranic 
verse which reads, “And whoever does not judge by what God has revealed, then it is those who 
are the disbelievers.” [Qur’an 5:44]. A number of scholars such as al-Suddī and Ibrahim al-Nakhʿī, 
opine that the disbelief mentioned in the verse means major disbelief (kufrun akbar) which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
244; Muhammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār min Aḥādīth Sayyid al-Akhyār Sharḥ Muntaqa al-Akhbār (Beirut: 
Dār al-Jīl, 1973), 4: 511 & 7: 356- 62. 
498 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 27-8. 
499 See, e.g. al-Ẓawāhirī, Al-Tbari’a, 64. 
500 These conditions are detailed more particularly in books of creed. For an overview of these conditions, see, e.g., 
Ḥāfiẓ, Ḥurmat al-Ghuluww, 97-101. 
501 Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 29-30. Apostasy in general can be applied to individuals for several reasons, but 
in case of rulers and Jihadists, the main reason used to apply apostasy to the rulers is ḥākimiyya and then walā’, as 
explained in this dissertation and argued throughout the jihadi literature. 
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drives a person outside the fold of Islam; others, such as Ṭāwūs and Ibn Jurayj, opine differently 
and deduce this to be a form of minor disbelief (kufrun dūna kufr); meaning that it does not 
render the person outside the fold of Islam;  moreover, other scholars, such as al-Ḥasan and Ibn 
Masʿūd, believe that if someone rules by a law that God did not prescribe, they do not become 
apostates. This is so unless their ruling is accompanied by them renouncing God’s Law or 
ridiculing it., such as Ibn ʿĀshūr, argue that this is just a wrongdoing and deviation; and others, 
such as al-Shaʿbī and al-Naḥḥās,502 view that the verse is speaking about the Jews and that is 
why it does not apply to Muslims.503 
 Though the above scholars were merely interpreting the verse in theological terms without 
politically projecting it on rulers or others, generally speaking,  Jihadists adopt the view that a 
person is guilty of major disbelief if he rules with a law other than what God ordained, thus, 
rendering him apostate, and they politically framed this interpretation by projecting it on rulers 
and their regimes.504 So, aggression against such governments is established on the basis of 
takfir. In fact, there would be no religious justification to rebel against such governments if the 
Muslims saw that the rulers had not been rendered apostate, even if they are corrupt and 
tyrant. If it is believed that they are apostate, then the religious rationale comes into play as well 
as the considerations of such factors as capacity and harm and benefits.505  
There are a number of considerations that must be taken into account before the theoretical 
prescription of takfir can be applied to any one individual or group. This is so for anyone who 
sees that ruling by a law other than what God ordained brings about disbelief. General, 
theoretical rulings (aḥkām muṭlaqa) and implementing them to any one person or people 
necessitates that conditions have been fulfilled and impediments (taḥaqquq al-shurūṭ wa intifā’ 
al-mawāniʿ) have been removed. General, theoretical rulings (aḥkām muṭlaqa) and how they 
                                                          
502 The above scholars are classical exegetes of the Quran who interpreted the verses of the Quran that speak about 
ruling with other than what God has revealed (ḥākimiyya). The relevance of mentioning them here is that they are 
regarded as the Salaf, and therefore their opinions in this regard are highly appreciated by others, particularly Salafi 
Jihadists, and are taken as the basis of the different views on the issue among later scholars. 
503 For an overview of these opinions, see, e.g., al-Qurṭubī, A-Jāmiʿ li Aḥkām al-Qur'ān, ed., Aḥmad al-Bardūnī and 
Ibrāhīm Aṭfīs (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1985), 6: 190-1; Ibn ʿĀshūr, Al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr (Tunisia: Dār Saḥnūn 
li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī’, 1997), 6: 210-13; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-ʿAẓīm, ed., Sāmī b. Muḥammad Salāma (Cairo: 
Dār Ṭība li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī’, 2000), 3:119-20. See also Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 29-30. 
504 This is clearly visible throughout the jihadi literature. See, e.g., any of the writings of the two groups under 
discussion and any of the writings of al-Qaeda. For more details and explanations on the arguments of classical and 
modern Muslim scholars on this issue, see Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 30-40. 
505 Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 29. 
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are applied to a person or people, must satisfy the fulfilment of some conditions while ensuring 
that impediments  (taḥaqquq al-shurūṭ wa intifā’ al-mawāniʿ) are absent.506 It is not allowed– 
and this is acknowledged by jihadists - to rebel against Muslim rulers,507 and they frame their 
pursuit of dissent to the way in which they have understood and construed the verses 
mentioned previously along with some Prophetic sayings (Ḥadīth), arguing that any rulers who 
leave the fold of Islam (become apostate) do so because they have failed to adhere to and rule 
by the law imposed by God. Therefore, the controversy surrounding ḥākimiyya and takfīr are of 
pivotal importance to jihadists as these are necessary if they are to condone acts of dissent 
against Muslim rulers and their regimes.508 Due to the interrelated nature of these three central 
concepts, the discussion around them will take place under one heading.  
Al-Jihād Organisation: Ideological Stances before Revisions 
The discussion on the pro-violence writings of al-Jihād Organisation will be confined to the 
writings of Faḍl alone, being the main writer of the literature on violence and the sole writer of 
the revisions. Others only signed and approved what he wrote in his revisions. Though Faḍl left 
al-Jihād Organisation in 1993 for logistic and practical consideration, this did not affect his 
theological and religious credibility. He is still considered, as acknowledged even by his 
opponents, the most important and most credible spiritual leader and ideologue of the different 
factions of the Organisation. His writings are still considered the manifesto of Jihadists 
worldwide and he enjoys a renowned status among Jihadists in general and al-Jihād factions in 
particular.509 Therefore, it was him only who could unite the different jihadi factions after 
several attempts of revisions have failed.  
Generally speaking, al-Jihād in general and Faḍl in particular finished their first book only in 
Afghanistan. By 1989, Faḍl had finished his famous jihadi book ‘Al-ʿUmda fī Iʿdād al-ʿUdda li al-
                                                          
506 It may be helpful to offer a scenario: A is of the opinion that if someone were to rule by using a law that differs 
from Divinely ordained law then that would entail apostasy; and then B actually rules with manmade law. After 
establishing that apostasy results from governing with manmade law (the General theoretical ruling), A cannot say 
that B is apostate ( i.e., apply the general theoretical ruling of takfīr to this specific person) except when: first, A is an 
expert in Sharia and so is familiar with all the conditions and circumstances that would have compelled B to behave in 
this way second, A ensures that all the necessary conditions have been met by B in order for him to be deemed 
apostate, and third, all impediments have been removed for B, such as ignorance or coercion, as these would nullify 
the claim of apostasy. Islamic books concerned with creed detail the conditions and impediments surrounding the 
issue of takfīr.  See Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 30. 
507 See, e.g., al-Ẓawāhirī, Al-Tabri’a, 64. 
508 Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 30.   
509 See Kamolnick, “Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis,” 395; Ian Black, “Violence won’t Work: How Author of ‘Jihadists’ Bible’ 
Stirred Up a Storm. Revisionist Message from Prison Cell Shakes Al-Qaeda Colleagues,” The Guardian ([27 July 2007] 
Available http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/27/alqaida.egypt), (last accessed 26 November 2015). 
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Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh’ (The Master in Preparing for Jihad in the Way of God). The book spoke about 
the virtues and etiquettes of jihad and was meant for exhorting and guiding the Muslim youth 
confronting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Yet, it included sections on ‘infidel local regimes’ 
and the necessity of toppling them and establishing the Islamic Caliphate. Al-ʿUmda was, and is 
still, highly appraised and well received by jihadi groups who considered it their manifesto.510 By 
1993, Faḍl finished his encyclopaedic book ‘Al-Jāmiʿ fī Ṭalab al-ʿIlm al-Sharīf’ which tackled 
several issues of interest to Islamists and included more radical arguments on jihadi issues 
especially takfīr.511 In this book, Faḍl so widened the scope of takfīr that it included a wide range 
of civilian Muslims. He also emphasised and widened his previous views on ḥākimiyya and the 
necessity of armed rebellion against rulers of Muslim countries which he considered to be 
abodes of disbelief. Following is a review of Faḍl's views and framing on the jihadi concepts that 
contributed to violence as explained in these two books.  
Before Revisions: Ḥākimiyya, Takfīr and Rebellion  
The IG and al-Jihād framed in these three concepts to express their view on legal and societal 
governance and their conception of how to put it right. In all of Faḍl’s arguments, it appears that 
his understanding of ḥākimiyya is the main reason behind his takfīrī approach and the 
subsequent call for armed rebellion against local regimes. As with other issues, he frames his 
input within an encapsulating interpretation of some Islamic texts. 
 Faḍl considers rulers who do not implement the Islamic Sharia apostate, as in doing so, the 
individual violates God’s laws and instead, adheres to the laws of man, so it is said that such a 
person is guilty of ascribing partners with God (polytheism) because he has failed to 
acknowledge God’s sole right to legislate and command. To support this, Faḍl quotes the verse: 
Legislation is not but for God. He has commanded that you worship not except Him. [Quran 
12:40]512 Faḍl infers from that verse that whoever confers God’s right to legislate and command 
on a mere human being has, in fact, joined partners with God and thus has committed disbelief. 
This is also confirmed by the verse: Those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are 
indeed the disbelievers. [Quran 5:44]. Faḍl adds that such a person is undoubtedly a disbeliever 
                                                          
510 See, e.g., Black, “Violence won’t Work.” 
511 Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 7-8. 
512 All translations of Quranic verses in the dissertation are mine. In case of doubt, various translations online might 
be consulted, but no particular published translation is used every time throughout the text. 
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because God says: Then those who disbelieve equate [others] with their Lord.  [Quran 6:1]  
According to Faḍl, this verse means that such people assign a partner and a counterpart to God 
(i.e., commit polytheism and disbelief) in His personal attributes and actions including legislation 
(ḥākimiyya).513  
Therefore, he denounces any social, cultural, political or economic system that is not based on 
the laws of God and declares it to be polytheism: "By this, you, Muslim brother, can recognise 
that God did not give mankind the right to develop their own laws, whether positive laws, 
democracy, socialism, communism or any other form they can devise. All systems developed at 
the hands of men are a deviation from what God has revealed. Thus, they clearly fall under the 
category of disbelief (kufrun bawāḥ). It should also be clear that all the governing systems of the 
ṭawāghīt514, which is something that we find in a number of Muslim countries, blatantly defy 
God’s divine right over His creation on this earth."515 This represents the main injustice framing 
for Faḍl. Faḍl also interprets and frames the following verses to support his argument that rulers 
are apostate not only because they implement positive laws but also because they legislate 
these laws: Is it that they [who care for no more than this world] believe in forces supposed to 
have a share in God’s divinity? [Quran 42:21]; They have taken their priests and monks as 
lords besides God. [Quran 9:31]. So, he argues that though many such rulers insist that they are 
Muslims, they are in fact apostates since  they not only govern by a law that was not ordained 
by God, but they also enact laws as they desire, and in so doing, have designated themselves as 
lords and lawmakers instead of God.516 
After establishing the apostasy of those rulers (diagnostic framing), Faḍl has moved to what he 
sees as the only viable way of defending the usurped Divine sovereignty (prognostic framing). It 
is armed rebellion and nothing else. Sharia texts outline the necessary response of Muslims in 
                                                          
513 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 3-4; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 37. 
514 Ṭawāghīt is the plural of Ṭāghūt, which originally refers to false gods such as pre-Islamic gods of Arabia in Mecca, 
namely: al-Lāt and al-ʿUzzā. The phrase was also used to refer to Satan, magician and dissenter, as well as to any force 
that stood against Islam. However, the term is commonly used by Jihadists nowadays to refer to current rulers who 
do not apply the Islamic Sharia. They also use the term to refer to the laws that contradict the Islamic Sharia. Both the 
laws and the rulers are called ṭawāghīt. Jihadists call them as such because they consider them 'false gods' taken as 
deities besides God. For further information, see P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. 
Heinrichs, eds.,"Ṭāgh̲̲ūt," Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill Online, 2014: 
http://www.brillonline.nl/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/t-a-g-h-u-t-COM_1147 [accessed 05 October 2014]); 
Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 24..  
515 Faḍl, Al-Umda, 4. 
516 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 316; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 37. 
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the face of ṭawāghīt: fighting and nothing else as per the Prophetic ḥadīth in this regard517 In 
addition, there is common consensus among scholars that such rulers be removed. For this 
reason, performing ijtihād (scholastic human reasoning) on the subject of dealing with ṭawāghīt 
is not allowed since there are sacred texts and the unanimity of scholars in this regard. Anyone 
who insists on performing ijtihād even though there are sacred texts and the unanimity of 
scholars, will have deviated from right guidance.518 Thus, by considering fighting the only 
acceptable way, Faḍl not only refused any other peaceful form of opposition or resistance but 
also considered` mere accepting of such peaceful solutions as flagrant aberration. 
Considering armed rebellion as the only acceptable way of dealing with rulers stems from Faḍl’s 
consideration of ruler’s violation of ḥākimiyyah as the mother problem. This is not the case with 
the IG as the IG suggested other solutions, besides rebellion, such as daʿwa and ḥisba, because 
ḥākimiyya to them is a central, not the central frame. This confirms the premise of some social 
movements’ theorists that there is correspondence between social movements’ diagnostic and 
prognostic framing, .i.e., the identification of specific problems and causes (diagnostic framing) 
tends to constraint the range of possible ‘reasonable’ solutions and strategies advocated 
(prognostic framing).519 Here, Faḍl placed constraints on the ‘prognostic framing’ of his major 
issue of ḥākimiyya by restricting the remedy to armed rebellion while the IG suggested other 
solutions because their core framing includes two other concepts besides ḥākimiyya.520  
As words like armed rebellion are not culturally resonant with dominant customs and mores, 
Faḍl framed them in religiously and culturally respectable and resonant terms such as ‘jihad’ 
‘defending the Divinity of God’ and ‘religious duty’. Faḍl argued that violation of God's 
sovereignty makes it a religious duty upon Muslims to hasten and preserve the Divine rights of 
God by ousting those rulers and their regimes. This is called in the Sharia, Faḍl notes, ' jihad in 
the cause of God Almighty'.521  
                                                          
517 This refers to the ḥadīth in which Prophet Muḥammad told his companions that there would be unjust rulers. The 
companions asked the Prophet “should we fight those rulers?” He answered, "No, unless you see a crystal clear act of 
disbelief that you have Divine proof thereon."  
518 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 319; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 37-8.  
519 See, e.g., Snow and Benford, “Framing Processes,” 616. 
520 As explained before, ’prognostic framing ‘, refers to the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, a plan 
of action, and the strategies for carrying out the plan to address the question of what is to be done. See, e.g., Snow 
and Benford, “Framing Processes,” 616-18. 
521 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 4. 
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By this, Faḍl used one of the frame alignment522 strategies known as ‘bridging’523 by linking his 
frame of rebellion to a highly respected duty (jihad) which he considered a top priority 
obligation. As traditional ‘jihad’ is usually perceived to be a fight between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim country, Faḍl noted that fighting local regimes is not only a form of jihad but is also 
more important than fighting non-Muslims. Thus, according to Faḍl, jihad against those 
‘apostate’ rulers (the near enemy ) must be the primary concern over engaging others like Jews, 
Christians, and polytheists (the far enemy ).524 By declaring so, Faḍl is in line with the old 
traditional jihadi ideas and frames525 that prioritise fighting the near enemy (apostate local 
regimes) over the far enemy (America and the West).  
 As Faḍl saw jihad against those ṭawāghīt as a top priority individual obligation, he removed the 
constraints that could possibly hinder the application of that prognostic framing. An example of 
a constraint that he removed is arguing that it is permissible for a single person to fight a large 
group of the supporters of those rulers even if he is alone (Jihad of the individual[s]). Taking into 
consideration the difficulty and great sacrifice involved, Faḍl stated that such an individual 
fighter (or small group) has the choice not to fight a large group and may run away because of 
their numbers. However, he linked the choice of fighting to the motivational frame of 
‘martyrdom’ in order to encourage activists to fight, completely disregarding pragmatic 
considerations and the likely damage resulting from one person or a small group fighting a large 
group. “However, if he continues to resist and wants to gain martyrdom, this is good.” Faḍl 
notes. Having stated that, Faḍl reemphasised the importance and preference of collective 
fighting to achieve the intended goal of ousting these rulers, “Though fighting by individual(s) is 
permissible, the obligation is to fight in large groups as the purpose is to establish the religion 
and this can be attained only through fighting in large groups, not individually.”526 
                                                          
522 Frame alignment is defined as, ‘‘the linkage of individual and SMO [Social Movement Organization] interpretive 
orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are 
congruent and complementary.’’ See David A. Snow et al, ‘‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation,’’ American Sociological Review (51, no. 4 [August 1986]), 464.  
523 Bridging is a frame alignment strategy that involves the linking of two or more ideologically coherent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a specific problem or issue, through linking movement organisational 
frame(s) with an un-mobilised sentiment pool. See Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 624.  
524 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 321-2; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 38. 
525 Jihadi movements were first established with the goal of restoring the caliphate by fighting apostate local regimes, 
seizing local power and then using these captured Muslim countries to fight the far enemy. This is clear throughout 
early jihadi literature, e.g., Faraj, al-Farīḍa al-Ghā’iba. Hence, the traditional jihadi ideas gave priority to fighting the 
near enemy over fighting the far enemy. This was changed only after al-Qaeda was established in 1998 when al-
Qaeda leaders gave priority to fighting the far enemy. 
526 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 280. 
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Having recognised the difficulty of doing so, Faḍl inserted the condition of capacity. Rebellion 
becomes compulsory when Muslims have the capacity to make it successfully. In fact, there is 
nothing unique or new in inserting the condition of capacity here, as it is firmly established in 
Islam that all the commands of the Islamic Sharia are subject to having the capacity to do them. 
When the capacity is missing, there is no obligation.527 However, Faḍl notes, if Muslims become 
incapable of launching 'jihad' against those rulers, due to their weakness or lack of capacity, 
they have to make preparation for jihad, without trying any other means of reform. "Whoever 
says that they are unable to engage in insurrection, I respond by saying that compulsion at a 
time when the individual feels incapacitated is preparation, not participating in polytheistic 
parliaments.”528To grant his argument credibility, Faḍl, like other Jihadists, usually supports his 
opinion with quotations from the books of the greatest scholars of the Salaf. In this regard, he 
quoted Ibn Taymiya’s (d. 1328) statement that It is incumbent on the believers to prepare for 
jihad in terms of weaponry and power, if jihad cannot be waged because of one’s inability. This 
is because whatever is indispensable in order to secure something that is obligatory, becomes 
itself mandatory .529  
To Salafi Jihadists in general and the IG and al-Jihād in particular, Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328) and Ibn 
al-Qayyim (d.1350) are the most quoted scholars. With exception of their political 
interpretations of Islam, Jihadists follow the Salafi creed and prefer Salafi interpretations of 
Islam and therefore they are called ‘Salafi Jihadists’. As Ibn Taymiya and his student Ibn al-
Qayyim are the most important figures of Salafism, Salafis in general and Salafi Jihadists in 
particular hold them in the highest esteem and base many of their arguments on their views. Of 
these two, Ibn Taymiya stands as the most quoted and most important not only because he was 
the founder of contemporary Salafism but also because he issued a number of fatwas on jihad 
and political Islam that nowadays Jihadists use as their base to support and justify their stances. 
Ibn Taymiya lived in an era laden with political turmoil, such as the invasion of the Muslim World 
by the Mongols, and he issued a number of fatwas on jihad in response to the political affairs 
                                                          
527 For a full discussion of this, see the commentary on the Quranic verses [2:286 & 64:16] in books of exegesis 
(Tafsīr), e.g., Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurān al-ʿAẓīm, 1: 738-9. See also Taqiyy al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiya, Majmū‘ al-
Fatāwā, ed., ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Qāsim (Medina, Saudi Arabia, Majma‘ al-Malik Fahd li Ṭibā‘at al-Muṣḥf al-Sharīf, 
1995), 20: 49-50. 
528 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 319. 
529 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 4; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 37-8. 
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that existed at his time. Therefore, Ibn Taymiya’s writings in general and volume 28 of his 
Fatāwā in particular are the most quoted by Jihadists.530 
It is noticeable that in almost all of the texts which Faḍl quoted to support his views on fighting 
rulers, Muslim scholars whom he quoted were speaking about jihad in the traditional sense of 
the word, which refers to the case when a Muslim army confronts a non-Muslim army; they 
were not speaking about fighting Muslim rulers. Like other Jihadists, Faḍl invoked those texts 
speaking about traditional jihad and applied them to fighting Muslim rulers who do not apply 
the Sharia, on the assumption that fighting those rulers is also ‘jihad’. However, to call fighting 
those rulers ' jihad' is a disputable claim made by Jihadists in the twentieth century. Even when 
Muslim jurists spoke about fighting a rebellious group, they did not call it ' jihad' but called it 
'fighting of the rebellious' (Qitāl al-Bughāh).531 This is also the case when fighting ‘the refraining 
group’;532 they have not called it jihad. They have called it, as in the jihadi literature itself, 
"fighting the refraining group" (Qital al-Ṭā'ifa al-Mumtaniʿa).533 Thus, most of Faḍl’s argument 
on the necessity of fighting local regimes rely theologically on arguments and views of classical 
Muslim scholars on the traditional concept of jihad that were originally intended for actual 
traditional jihad (a Muslim army fighting a non-Muslim army) rather than for acts of violence 
that Jihadists nowadays call ‘jihad’.  
 By declaring that it is a duty on all Muslims to fight their regimes or, at least, make preparation 
for that fighting, Faḍl is requesting all Muslims to always be in a state of fighting or readiness for 
military confrontations with their local regimes, as if they have no other personal, familial or 
social duties and commitments. By this, he is not only equating this with jihad but is also 
invoking the rulings of what is known in Islamic jurisprudence as 'defensive jihad' (Jihād al-
Dafʿ)534 and is applying them to the case of rulers who do not apply the Islamic Sharia. This is 
                                                          
530 For more details on these scholars and their influence on Jihadism, see, e.g., Habeck, Jihadist Ideology, 12-14; H 
Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs eds. (Brill Online: http://www.brillonline.nl/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ibn-taymiyya-
SIM_3388 [05 October 2014]). 
531 See the chapters titled as such in books of Fiqh (jurisprudence); e.g., Zakariyya al-Anṣārī, Asnā al-Maṭālib fī Sharḥ 
Rawḍ al-Ṭālib, ed. Muḥammad Tāmir (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), 4: 1111 ff; Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-
Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyya, Al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya al-Kuwaytiyya (Egypt: Dār al-Ṣafwa, 1404 AH), 32: 317 ff. 
532  Explanation of this term will be mentioned later in this chapter. 
533 See for example, Faraj, Al-Farīḍa al-Ghā’iba, 9; Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 27. 
534 This kind of jihad refers to the case when a Muslim country is attacked by a foreign non-Muslim enemy. In such a 
case, resisting that enemy becomes an individual obligation on all Muslims including women and slaves who are not 
normally requested to participate in other kinds of jihad. This is in contrast with the other type of jihad known as jihād 
al-ṭalab (offensive Jihad) in which Muslims are not attacked but instead send armies to the enemies to spread Islam. 
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one of the strategies of ‘frame alignment’ known as frame amplification which is a process of 
idealisation, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs (jihad) so 
that the proffered frames (ḥākimiyya and rebellion) are associated with these cultural beliefs 
and values to make it resonate with potential constituents.535 This is what Faḍl did when he 
amplified and invigorated rebellion as ‘defensive jihad’ that requires every single Muslim to 
engage in it to defend his country and religion. Making preparation an individual obligation 
entails that every Muslim who does not make such military preparations will be neglectful of a 
top important religious duty and would therefore be, in the least, a sinner and wrongdoer.536  
In order to motivate audience and adherents, Faḍl employed what framing researchers call 
‘motivational framing’, which is the final core framing task that provides a ‘call to arms’ or 
rationale for engaging in collective action. This is done by constructing appropriate vocabularies 
of motive.537 As shown in his arguments, Faḍl’s motivational framing or main vocabularies of 
motive were restoration of Islamic caliphate, rule and supremacy of religion, jihad, annihilating 
tyrants and oppressors, martyrdom, etc. These theologically constructed motivational 
vocabularies provided adherents with compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and 
for sustaining their participation. For those seeking solutions for their social and economic 
problems, they provided a promise of conforming to a set of commonly agreed principles such 
as welfare and justice. 
Before Revisions:  Democracy and Participation in Political Life 
The above discussion of Faḍl’s conception of ḥakimyya showed that Faḍl refused any means of 
change other than armed rebellion as the violation of ḥakimyya rendered those rulers apostate. 
Therefore, any form of engagement with those rulers even through democratic or political 
opposition was not only rejected by Faḍl but also declared as a form of polytheism. In al-Jāmiʿ, 
Faḍl so widened and extended the frame of ḥākimiyya that he issued the ruling of takfir for 
sovereign leaders and their regimes; including their parliaments, the judiciary and anyone who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
This latter type of jihad is classified as farḍ kifāya (communal obligation), i.e., compulsory on the Muslim community 
collectively but not individually; which means that not every capable Muslim has to do it, but it suffices to have some 
members of the Muslim community who can sufficiently perform it. See, e.g., Gartenstein-Ross, “Significance of 
Religion,” 15. 
535 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 624. 
536 Rashwān, Dalīl al-Ḥarakāt, 340. 
537 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 617.  
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condones or participates in drawing up or enforcing manmade laws, as well as the public who 
elect members of parliaments or accept the democratic process. They are all ‘disbelievers’ 
because they help or support apostate rulers in their challenge of God’s ḥākimiyya.538 
In al-Jāmiʿ Faḍl considered democracy to be the ḥākimiyya of people that opposes the 
ḥākimiyya of God as it means that supremacy and authority will be for people who make 
legislations contrary to those of God. This includes all laws and constitutions of secularism which 
was imposed on Muslim lands by colonial powers. So anyone who drafts or takes part in these 
constitutions or accepts to be governed by them is a disbeliever. Faḍl went as far as rejecting 
the mere idea of drafting even ‘Islamic’ constitutions that are derived from the Islamic Sharia, 
and considered this to be religious innovation (Bidʿa) that contradicts Islam and substitutes the 
Divine constitution represented in the Quran and the Sunna.539 He also devoted lengthy pages to 
criticising those who call for establishing Islamic political parties and accused them of dividing 
the Muslim Ummah.540  
Faḍl’s arguments that refuse any form of peaceful solutions or means of change constitute what 
framing researchers call ‘counter framing’. As prognostic framing (here rebellion) takes place 
within a multi-organisational field that includes various social movements, their opponents, 
targets of influence, media, and bystanders, it follows that a social movement’s prognostic 
framing activity typically includes refutations of the logic or efficacy of solutions advocated by 
opponents as well as a rationale for its own remedies.541 This is what Faḍl did by counter-
framing other counterclaims of peaceful democratic solutions by extending his central frame of 
ḥākimiyya to include issues of democratic and political participation.  
Faḍl’s detailed and extra clarified response to opposing framing confirms the assertion that 
opposing framing activity can affect a movement's framings: by putting movement ideologue’s 
on the defensive, at least temporarily, and by frequently forcing it to develop and elaborate 
prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case.542 In the Egyptian case, the 
counter-framing came from the state, al-Azhar scholars, secularists and other moderate Islamic 
movements such as the MB. In addition, opposing framing served as a constraint of Faḍl’s 
                                                          
538 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 895-1044; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 11. 
539 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʾ, 877. 
540 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʾ, 884-5. 
541 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 616-17.  
542 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 617. 
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original framing that forced him to advance some concessions and accept a temporary 
alternative for armed rebellion. Faḍl declared that armed rebellion is the only acceptable way 
though there are other temporary ways of reform that can be applied until capacity is obtained. 
These temporary ways of reform are preaching (Daʿwa), giving advice, enjoining the right and 
forbidding the wrong and saying a word of truth to a tyrant ruler. This is what should be done 
until Muslims get enough power and establishment that enable them to overthrow apostate 
rulers by armed rebellion.  
Therefore, Faḍl sees that hastiness in launching rebellion involves lots of harm and corruption 
and therefore preparation of sufficient power is necessary before rebellion. Thereupon, though 
he strongly supports rebellion, Faḍl insists that proper military training and preparation is a 
must before clashes with the governing authorities in Muslims' lands. That is why he has warned 
enthusiastic Jihadists against launching any military operations against the regime in Egypt 
before gaining the required power and military preparation as he believes that ‘hastiness causes 
failure and deprivation’.543  
Faḍl counter-framed opponent’s arguments not only by defiling democracy per se as ‘kufr’, ‘new 
god’ and ‘a modern form of idolatry’, but also by placing more emphasis and elaboration, still 
within his master central of ḥākimiyya, on the evilness and illegality of such tools of democracy 
as elections. According to Faḍl, democracy is a new god and a modern form of idolatry. It is a 
rebellion against the authority of God. "Democracy assigns to man the attribute of Lordship by 
giving him the absolute right of legislation, thereby making him a god besides God and an 
associate in the Divine right of legislation."544 By this, democracy means violation of the divine 
right of legislation, and therefore both members of parliaments and those who elect them are 
disbelievers along with the judges and supervisors as well as delegates of candidates in elections 
as they all either exercise the act of disbelief (democracy), elect or help those who exercise it.545  
Faḍl did not even differentiate between members of the parliament who accept democracy as 
such and Islamic members of parliament who try to make use of this tool to support Islamic 
causes and issues. So, according to Faḍl, whoever accepts the democratic system is undoubtedly 
kāfir and those who claim that they do not accept democracy but join the parliament to support 
Islamic issues and make reform are also Kāfirs as they are trying to deceive ignorant people and 
                                                          
543 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 383-4.  
544 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 160. 
545 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 158-67. 
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find excuses for themselves to practice kufr under legal pretexts.546 Faḍl further criticised some 
scholars who allowed participation in parliaments such as Ibn Bāz and Safr al-Ḥawālī.547 Having 
emphasised all of this, Faḍl concluded, "Whoever shows us kufr, we will show him takfīr."548 
As per the above definitions, Faḍl gave a short list of those who are Kāfir in the countries 
governed by positive laws, 'such as all Muslim countries nowadays'. The most important 
categories listed by Faḍl are: 
a- Rulers of Muslim countries. 
b- Judges of the courts of these countries. 
c- Whoever willingly files a case in these courts. 
d- Members of legislative councils in these countries such as parliaments. This is because it 
is they who approve these laws of disbelief and legalise the new laws. 
e- Those who elect members of these councils and parliaments. This is because it is they 
who elect them as gods to legislate laws besides God.  
f- Any person who calls for such elections or encourages people to participate in them. 
g-  Whoever accepts or gives oath of allegiance to the rulers of such countries. 
h- Soldiers who defend these conditions of disbelief, as they fight for the sake of ṭāghūt 
while God says “And those who disbelieve fight for the Sake of ṭāghūt.” [Quran 4: 76]. The 
Ṭāghūt for which they fight here is of two kinds, Faḍl notes. The first is the tāghūt of legislation 
represented in positive laws and constitutions and the second is the rulers who apply these 
laws.  
i- Anyone who defends these apostate regimes by fighting such as soldiers and the police, 
or by words such as press and media figures and even sheikhs.  
As a result, it is prohibited for Muslims to serve in the armies of these apostate regimes or work 
in any position that helps or supports these rulers as this leads to apostasy. Furthermore, no 
Muslim is allowed to obey the rulers of these countries, and Muslims are free to break their 
laws.549 The most important implications of Faḍl’s judgment of takfīr on those who are included 
in the above categories include: cancellation of the guardianship of such ‘disbelievers’, 
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nullification of their prayers and the prayers of those who pray behind them and the annulment 
of their marriages. They also cannot inherit from a Muslim nor get inherited by a Muslim and 
their life becomes so violable that anyone can kill them.550  
 So, ḥākimiyya is the reason why Faḍl declared all of those categories of people apostate. In 
other words, they are disbelievers because they either rule with positive laws or help or accept 
the rule of those who apply or legislate these laws, and all texts of ḥākimiyya were invoked to 
support this line of argument. 
New Rules of Takfīr 
The above demonstration shows that because of Faḍl’s understanding of ḥākimiyya he accused 
of apostasy and rendered violable the lives of wide segments of Muslims using his most serious 
tools of ḥākimiyya and takfīr. However, Faḍl did not stop there but rather deduced and 
introduced new rules of takfīr that opposed the common mainstream rules outlined in Sunni 
books of creed.551 The new rules are meant to defend and buttress his framing of ḥākimiyya and 
prove the apostasy of rulers and their supporters, thereby lifting any constraints on the legality 
and morality of his prognostic framing of rebellion. In doing so, he criticised almost everyone 
including the greatest scholars he often quoted such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim. In all of 
the views he expressed, he not only counter-framed and rejected other opinions but also 
refused to accept the mere idea that these issues are subject to acceptable difference of views. 
His views are the only acceptable ones as they are either agreed upon or the only correct ones.  
Among the new rules of takfīr which Faḍl introduced is the cancellation of such preconditions of 
takfīr as jaḥd and istiḥlāl.552 So, he argued that a person who says or does something that causes 
apostasy or disbelief (kufr) is automatically considered apostate (takfīr) without the need for 
investigating whether or not he said or did so while considering it lawful (istiḥlāl) or as a denial 
                                                          
550 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 540-2. 
551 Usually, rules of takfīr are discussed in books of Creed (ʿAqīda) such as al-ʿAaqīda al-Wāsiṭiyya by Ibn Taymiya and 
al -ʿAqīda al-Ṭaḥāwiyya by Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī. For full details on this issue and the opinions of different scholars on 
what causes apostasy and the conditions of that, see, e.g., ‘Abd Allāh al-Atharī, Al-Īmān, Ḥaqīqatuh, Khawārimuh, 
Nawāqiḍuh ‘inda Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a (Riyadh: Dār al-Waṭan li al-Nashr, 2003), 108 ff. 
552 Muslim scholars opine that when a Muslim commits a sin that may cause apostasy, such a person would be 
considered apostate only if he considers that sin lawful (istiḥlāl) or if he denies a clear-cut ruling of God (jaḥd) in this 
regard. However, if such a person says or does that sin while acknowledging that it is wrong and that he is disobeying 
the command of God, this will be considered a sin that will not constitute disbelief or apostasy. See more examples of 
this view in Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 504-6. See also more details in Al-Atharī, Al-Īmān, 123-30. 
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of the ruling of God (jaḥd). In this regard, he criticised Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī, author of the most 
famous book of creed al-ʿAqīda al-Ṭaḥāwiyya, for saying that sins committed by believers does 
not render them apostates unless they consider these sins to be lawful(istiḥlāl) or deny that 
these are prohibited (jaḥd).553  
Faḍl classifies sins into two categories. The first is what automatically causes apostasy, such as 
abandonment of prayer and ruling with other than what God has ordained (breach of 
ḥākimiyya). Committing such a kind of sin is enough, according to Faḍl, to issue takfīr without 
conditioning jaḥd or istiḥlāl. The second category includes normal sins such as fornication or 
theft. In this category Jaḥd and Istiḥlāl would be required to issue takfīr.554  
Moreover, Faḍl not only removed the extant constraints on his most influential tools of 
ḥākimiyya and takfīr by cancelling the conditions of jaḥd and istiḥlāl in case of breaching 
ḥākimiyya but also tried to constraint possible counter-framing and deterred his opponents by 
extending his serious tool of takfīr to those who oppose his view in this regard, "Whoever 
considers these (jaḥd and istiḥlāl) as conditions is trying to correct God; rather he is denying the 
words of God which indicate the kufr of the person who did such acts, and a person who denies 
the words of God is a disbeliever."555 By accusing those who oppose his view of denying the 
words of God, Faḍl is practically equating his own interpretation to the words of God, which 
stems from his belief that his is the only valid interpretation, and therefore whoever rejects it 
would be a disbeliever for rejecting the command of God.  
Likewise, Faḍl tried to constrain other opposing views that might hinder application of apostasy 
to rulers and their supporters when he criticised other prominent scholars’ differentiation 
between the kufr of practice (al-kufr al-ʿamalī) which does not render its doer an apostate and 
the kufr of belief (al-kufr al-iʿ qādī) which constitutes apostasy. Those whom he criticised 
include the most famous classical and modern figures of Salafism such as Ibn Taymiya, Ibn al-
Qayyim, Ibn Bāz, Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn and others. For example, he criticised Ibn al-Qayyim for 
dividing kufr into kufr of practice and kufr of belief and for considering neglect of prayer and 
ruling with other than the laws of God to be among the kufr of practice. Similarly, Faḍl further 
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introduced other rules which have extremely serious implications on Muslim communities at 
large.  
He argued that every term of kufr preceded by the Arabic definite article (al) indicates major 
disbelief. Also any mention of the word kufr in the Quran indicates major disbelief; and in the 
Sunna of the Prophet, any mention of kufr with (al) is major disbelief and without (al) should to 
be interpreted as a major disbelief unless there is a sign to indicate otherwise. Among the new 
rules of takfĪr is that a man enters Islam with several things but only one act or saying of 
disbelief drives one out of Islam.556Thus, though Faḍl drew mainly on Salafi literature and 
approaches, he broke with the Salafi scholars on issues of ḥākimiyya and takfīr to lift constraints 
on his major frames, which made him take stances that were considered by Salafi Jihadists 
themselves to be too extreme. 
Faḍl justifies his expansion on takfīr and ḥākimiyya by arguing that the issue of belief and 
disbelief is the most important issue in the religion and that it is vital for the Muslim to know if 
he is apostate or not so he can save himself before it is too late. So, it leads to salvation. All of 
the above arguments and judgments, Faḍl notes, are in order for everyone to plainly know those 
who are ‘saved’ and those who are ‘doomed’. By this, Faḍl is applying another frame alignment 
strategy known as ‘frame extension’ in which specific frames are portrayed as extending beyond 
their primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to 
potential adherent.557 In fact this excessive form of takfīr is largely motivated by Faḍl’s 
conception of  the ‘saved sect ‘ which is a commonly known concept among Salafi sects in 
general and Salafi Jihadists in particular. 
Faḍl’s obsession with the concept of the 'saved sect' (al-firqa al-nājiya) or the ‘[divinely] 
supported denomination’ (al-ṭāʿifa al-manṣūra)558 made him go as far as excluding any person 
                                                          
556 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 550-6. 
557 For more details on this framing strategy, see Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 625. 
558 These concepts are based mainly on the Prophetic ḥadīth which indicates that the Prophet’s Ummah will be 
divided into seventy-three sects and only one of these sects will be saved from Hellfire, which is the Jamāʿa (the 
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the concept is more present among the Salafi groups in general and Salafi Jihadists in particular. The supported 
denomination is also based on the Prophetic ḥadīth, “A denomination of my Ummah will continue to support the 
truth, unharmed by those who oppose them until the Day of Judgement.” Though most of Muslim scholars opine that 
the saved sect is the same as the Supported Denomination, Faḍl argues that the latter is a branch of the former and 
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from salvation if he or she fails to achieve the criteria he set for the members of that sect. With 
Faḍl, this exclusionist approach took a takfīrī shape. As the framing of ḥākimiyya, takfīr, and the 
concept of the ‘saved sect’ dominated Faḍl’s writings before revisions, he looked like a 
prosecutor, seeking evidence to depict the individuals and the society with disbelief. In this way, 
the takfir, became applicable to both sovereign leaders and those who assist them, as well as 
large sections of the Muslim community.559 Nonetheless, Faḍl did not stop at this point of takfīr 
but rather declared that all the members of al-ṭā’ifa al-mumtaniʿa are apostate without the 
need for further investigation. 
Before Revisions: Al-Ṭā'ifa al-Mumtaniʿa (The Abstaining Group) 
 Al-ṭā’ifa al-mumtaniʿa refers to those (individuals or groups) that abstain from adhering to the 
Sharia and some of its associated mandatory observances. It could also refer to a group that 
refrains, by its power and authority, from coming under the control of the Muslim state where it 
lives. Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiya, Ibn Ḥanbal560 (d. 855) and others have opined that 
the Muslim state has to fight such a group until it observes the rite which it has stopped 
practicing.561 Though the concept of the refraining group refers to a group which challenges the 
Muslim state's authority of implementing the rites of the Islamic Sharia and therefore they are 
to be fought by the state itself, Jihadists reverse the order and consider the state to be a 'group' 
and put themselves in place of the state.  
Many Jihadists consider rulers, who are the heads of this group, apostate along with their main 
government figures such as ministers, being members of this refraining group. However, Faḍl, 
had a more radical view by widening the scope of the refraining group to include not only rulers 
and their ministers but also all of the above categories such as members of the parliament and 
those who elect them, judges, lawyers, police officers and soldiers as well as anyone who works 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the latter refers to the mujāhidūn who fight for Islam. He further opined that the most important duty of the 
members of the Supported Denomination is fighting the apostate rulers. See Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 87-9. 
559 Markaz al-Dirāsāt, Dalīl al-Ḥarakāt, 339; Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 11. 
560 Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Ḥanbal are given as examples here, though this view is not exclusive to them, because 
Jihadists and Salafis in general follow their opinions and hold them in the highest esteem.  
561 See, for example, Muḥammad b. ʿee, al-Ḥanbalī al-Baʿlī, Mukhtaṣar al-Fatāwā al-Miṣriyya li Ibn Taymiya, ed. 
Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Dammam, Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim, 1986), 1: 458; Ḥusayn b. ʿŪda al-ʿAwāysha, Al-
Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya al-Muyassara fī Fiqh al-Kitāb wa al-Sunna al-Muṭahhara (Amman, Jordan: Al-Maktaba al-
Islāmiyya, 1423 A H), 7: 287. 
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in a position that supports those rulers or serves any of their institutions, as a result of their 
violation of the ḥākimiyya of God.  
Faḍl even went even further and issued takfīr against each individual member of these sectors in 
person without considering the fulfilment of the conditions and the absence of impediments. He 
dismissed these conditions because of Jihadists’ inability to bring members of the refraining 
group under control and punish them, i.e. because members of the refraining group have 
positions of power and authority which make Jihadists incapable of making sure of the 
fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments, not to mention punishing them for their 
apostasy.562 By setting these new rules, Faḍl opposes not only the general Sunni stream of Fiqh 
on this issue but also Jihadists themselves. 
Though Jihadists consider the reframing group to be apostate, they issue that ruling on the 
general theoretical level, but they refrain from considering each individual member of this group 
an actual apostate. They refrain from doing so because naming an individual as apostate (Takfīr 
al-muʿayyan) requires the presence of several conditions and the absence of many 
impediments, and Jihadists cannot make sure of the presence of these conditions and absence 
of these impediments with respect to each individual member of the refraining group. This is 
known as judging the 'act' and not the doer of the act, i.e., considering the act or saying as 
causing kufr or apostasy, without extending this ruling of apostasy to the person who committed 
that act or saying. Therefore, Jihadists name only rulers as apostates in person but not the 
individual members of the refraining group.563 
Faḍl further argued that as helpers of those rulers observe the practices of the Islamic Sharia 
such as prayer, zakat and fasting, they are considered apostate apparently in the matters related 
to this world but not in the matters related to the Hereafter because of the inability to make 
sure of the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments. He further stated that each 
Muslim should deal with each of the members of the refraining group based on his/ her own 
knowledge of their affairs. So a Muslim may deal with one of the members as an apostate while 
another Muslim may deal with the same member as a believer.564 The implication of that is very 
serious as giving individuals the freedom to treat others as apostate constitutes an implicit 
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permission for those individuals to violate the life and property of those who are considered 
apostate. 
Faḍl’s main evidence in this regard is what he considers the decisive consensus (Ijmāʿ qaṭʿī) of 
the companions of Prophet Muhammad on the apostasy of every individual member of those 
who believed in the prophethood of Musaylima and Tulayḥa.565 The Prophet's companions 
reached that consensus, Faḍl argued, when the Caliph Abū Bakr asked those who repented 
among the members of this refraining group to accept that those who died among them would 
go to the Hellfire. The rest of the companions did not object to the saying of Abū Bakr, and that 
was why this was counted as decisive consensus by the companions that every individual 
member of those who died would go to the Hellfire. According to Faḍl, because it is clear that 
the dead are individuals and it is also known that scholars of Ahl al-Sunna do not testify that a 
specific individual will be in the Hellfire unless that individual is certainly a disbeliever, this is a 
proof that the companions agreed that every individual member of the refraining group is an 
apostate in person.  
This, Faḍl argues, is a clear text and a decisive consensus from the Prophet's companions that 
each individual of those people is apostate without considering fulfilment of the condition and 
absence of impediments which do not have to be checked when the apostates are too powerful 
to be brought under control. Faḍl further considered the ‘consensus of the companions’ in this 
regard to be very clear and indicative in a way that makes it decisive, and ‘whoever rejects a 
decisive consensus of the companions becomes an apostate’.566 Faḍl then transferred the ruling 
of the apostates at the time of Abū Bakr to the supporters of current rulers. So, every individual 
person of those who fight with the apostate rulers or support them with words or actions is a 
disbeliever without the need to verify the fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments.567 
If this is taken as an example to evaluate Faḍl's approach, it becomes clear that because of his 
understanding of ḥākimiyya, Faḍl practised too much constraint lifting and frame alignment 
                                                          
565 These are the names of two persons who claimed to be prophets during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad, but 
they gained more followers greater powers only after the Prophet died and that is why the Prophet's companions 
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strategies to the extent that he depicted large sections of the Muslim community as 
disbelievers. This approach affects not only members of what he considers a refraining group 
but also those who disagree with his deductions in this regard. Faḍl’s concern for ḥākimiyya 
made him go as far as driving millions of Muslims nowadays outside the fold of Islam. He 
amplified a single saying of Abū Bakr to the status of ‘consensus’ as it has not been challenged 
by other companions, which means they approved of what Abū Bakr said. Then he escalated this 
kind of consensus to be so clear and decisive that the acceptance of which as a Sharia proof 
becomes compulsory and the denial of which becomes equal to the denial of a Sharia decisive 
text which renders the deniers apostates.  
Faḍl's claim of ijmāʿ can be easily challenged by the fact that there is no consensus on what ijmāʿ 
is and who needs to be in agreement. In addition, only a few companions were present and 
their non-objection could not be considered ijmāʿ as the definition of ijmāʿ that is accepted by 
the majority of Muslim scholars is: the agreement on a particular point of all of the mujtahid 
scholars of all the Ummah of Prophet Muhammad in a specific age after Prophet Muhammad's 
death.568 Only some and not all of the companions were attendant when Abū Bakr said this 
phrase which the author used to claim ijmāʿ. Because of his ‘excessive’ takfīrī approach, Faḍl 
was severely criticised on this issue even by Jihadists themselves such as the Jordanian 
renowned jihadi ideologue ʿAbū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī and the jihadi sheikh and activist Ḥasan 
Qā'id (aka Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī).  
For example, the Jihadist Sheikh Ḥasan Qā’id responded in detail to Faḍl’s claims in this regard 
arguing that that the ijmāʿ claimed by Faḍl cannot be considered qaṭʿī as the qaṭʿī ijmāʿ must be 
expressed by all mujtahids verbally or expressed by some of them and practiced by the rest. The 
silent ijmāʿ (the one that has been expressed by some mujtahiḍs while the others kept silent 
without showing objections or approval) as in this case, is classified, according to the 
preponderant opinion, as non-decisive, for the decisive is what is expressed or practiced clearly 
by all the mujtahids. Some scholars even argued that silent ijmāʿ cannot be considered 
acceptable ijmāʿ.569 
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He further argued that even if this was an ijmāʿ qatʿī, transferring the ruling from this incident to 
the supporters of the current rulers would be through qiyās (analogy) which is by no means a 
decisive Sharia proof and is even unacceptable to some scholars, such as Ibn Ḥazm, as one of the 
sources of arriving at rulings in the Sharia. In addition, using qiyās here requires full agreement 
between the two cases in terms of the conditions that lead to giving the ruling of the old case to 
the new incident. However, this is not the case here as there are several differences between 
the two parties of qiyās.  
In the incident that happened at the time of Abū Bakr, the followers of Musaylima and Ṭulayḥa 
were considered apostates as they denied the prophethood of Prophet Muḥammad and 
believed that someone else was a prophet or was a partner of prophethood with Prophet 
Muhammad, which constituted a denial of a huge number of decisive Sharia texts from the 
Quran and the Sunna regarding this issue in addition to their undermining of the whole Islamic 
religion by denying its Prophet. Supporters of current rulers do not deny any text in the Quran 
but they rather declare their belief in Prophet Muhammad alone as the last Prophet of God. So 
the two cases are too different for analogy to work properly.570 
 Thus, what made Faḍl arrive at this conclusion and go to this extreme way of interpretation is 
his understanding and interpretation of ḥākimiyya where he considers any breach, even if 
indirect, of ḥākimiyya an act of apostasy, which made him lift any constraints in this regard and 
drove him directly to the conclusion that those people were apostate without the need for 
fulfilment of conditions or absence of impediments in the same way followers of the two false 
prophets were. This shows how Faḍl’s concern for ḥākimiyya could lead him to amplification of 
such extremely dangerous judgments that affect millions of Muslims worldwide. Moreover, 
Faḍl’s concern for ḥākimiyya was further amplified by considering all Muslim countries to be 
lands of disbelief because of their violation of ḥākimiyya. 
Before Revisions: Dār al-Islām wa Dār al-Kufr (Land of Islam and Land of Disbelief) 
Dār al-Islām wa Dār al-Kufr (Abode of slam and abode of disbelief) is a classification used in the 
classical books of Fiqh to differentiate between Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries 
based on the majority of each country’s population. However, Faḍl uses the concept as a 
                                                          
570 For more replies and refutations of Faḍl's argument in this regard, See Qā'id, "Naẓarāt fī al-Ijmāʿ al-Qaṭʿī." 
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ḥākimiyya-related frame and therefore he divides lands as per the kinds of laws dominating 
them not according to the majority of their population. As per his understanding of ḥākimiyya, 
Faḍl sees that Muslim countries nowadays are lands of disbelief because they are ruled by 
positive laws of disbelief. He argues that the number of population and practicing Islamic rites in 
a specific country are irrelevant to its classification as a land of Islam or a land of disbelief, and 
therefore he refuses classifying lands on any basis other than that of the laws governing them 
(ḥākimiyya).571 He classifies lands into more detailed sub-categories and he classifies Muslim 
countries nowadays in the category of 'lands of apostasy' (Diyār ridda) He defines these lands as 
the lands that used to be lands of Islam but have been dominated by apostates who have 
applied laws of disbelievers therein.  
An example of these lands, Faḍl notes, is the so-called Islamic countries nowadays, including all 
Arab countries. He emphasises, "…. I draw the attention here to the fact that I always describe 
these lands in my writings as 'Lands of Muslims' with view to the majority of their population. 
However, this term is not equal to the term ' lands of Islam' as these  lands are in fact lands of 
disbelief and apostasy, and launching jihad against its apostate rulers is an individual obligation 
on its Muslim residents."572 By this, Faḍl disregards the fact that the majority of laws in these 
lands are in line with the Islamic Sharia, and considers the application of a few laws that 
contradict the Sharia to be a neglect of the whole of the Islamic Sharia. This is based on Faḍl’s 
view that neglecting even a single issue of the Sharia is equal to neglecting the entire Sharia, 
which also branches from his conception of ḥākimiyya.  Perhaps, Faḍl’s view of Muslim counties 
as abodes of apostasy is what made him feel that the whole of Islam is endangered as there is 
no longer any abode of Islam on the face of earth, which has greatly influenced his views not 
only on takfīr but also on what is known as tatarrus (human shield) where killing Muslims taken 
as human shield is allowed under certain conditions. 
Before Revisions: Tatarrus (Human Shield) 
Tatarrus refers to the case when some Muslims are taken as human shields by non-Muslims in a 
war between two armies. Modern and pre-modern Muslim jurists573 discussed this case and said 
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573 For details and elaborations of scholars’ opinions on this issue, see, e.g., Wizarat al-Awqāf, Al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya 
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that it would be allowed to attack the Muslim shield only if the Muslim army and the human 
shield will be destroyed if the shield is not attacked. Yet, Jihadists broaden the scope of the term 
to include Muslims who exist accidentally at the time of Jihadists’ attacks on ‘disbelievers’ whom 
they consider legitimate targets. Basically, this stems from their broader conception of jihad as 
they consider these attacks to be ‘jihad’ and therefore whatever applies to jihad applies to these 
attacks.  
Thus, as the tatarrus frame is employed by Jihadists to legitimise and justify the killing of 
innocent Muslims during attacks on what Jihadists consider legitimate targets, Faḍl framed it in 
a way that allows attacking the Muslim shield even if there is no fear on the Muslim army and 
even when it is Muslims who take the lead and attack ‘disbelievers’ while some innocent 
Muslims exist accidentally at the time of Muslim attacks on the disbelievers (offensive 
operations). This also applies even if Muslims are not taken as human shields. Faḍl framed it in 
this way to allow Muslims (here Jihadists) to defend the ḥākimiyya of God by attacking apostate 
rulers and their supporters even if this involves killing some innocent Muslims. “Killing such a 
Muslim shield is not more sorrowful than killing the Muslim fighters by disbelievers during 
fighting,” Faḍl argues.574  
He further asserted that this does not mean that Muslims are violable but it means that it is 
allowed to kill them while attacking the disbelievers if there is a religious benefit from that. In 
response to the hypothetical question of: if there is no fear on the Muslim fighters, what 
religious benefit would be more important than lives of Muslims? The answer was ‘ḥākimiyya’. 
There is no doubt, Faḍl adds, that the harm afflicting Muslim from the dominance of apostate 
rulers is much graver than the harm of killing some Muslims while fighting the enemy. Muslim 
countries are running towards comprehensive disbelief and apostasy. What harm is graver than 
this? Based on the juristic principle of giving priority to preserving the religion over preserving 
life and based on the rule of choosing the lesser harm, it would be permissible to kill some 
Muslims for a greater cause which is protecting the religion from the disbelief and apostasy of 
those rulers.575 This again branches from and is justified by Faḍl’s conception of ḥākimiyya. This 
together with the previous views explained above show that Faḍl is unwilling to compromise 
when it comes to ḥākimiyya and would lift any constraint that would hinder the application of 
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his view on ḥākimiyya, to the extent that he would allow killing large number of innocent 
Muslims for that reason. 
 Faḍl has also counter-framed opponent’s critique by criticising those who say that disbelievers 
must be distinct from Muslims in order for Muslim fighters to attack the disbelievers. He has 
mentioned his rivals’ evidence in this regard which is verse 25 chapter 48 of the Quran. In this 
verse, God told Muslims that they were not allowed to fight on the Day of al-Ḥudaybiya when 
they were prevented by the pagans of Mecca from performing pilgrimage because there were 
Muslims amongst the disbelievers. Had Muslims fought disbelievers at that time, they could 
have killed other Muslims who concealed their faith and that was why God prevented Muslims 
from fighting. Faḍl considered the argument of those who ban killing Muslims because of this 
verse to be a misconception as, according to Faḍl, this verse is speaking about this occasion only 
and cannot be extended to other occasions for this will cause the cease of jihad because all 
countries nowadays have Muslims mixed with non-Muslims. 
If Faḍl's argument in this regard is compared with his argument against the specificity of the 
main verse of ḥākimiyya, Faḍl's selective and justificatory approach will come clearer. Though 
Faḍl acknowledged that many of the companions of the Prophet opined that the relevant part of 
the main verse of ḥākimiyya [Quran 5: 44] was revealed regarding the Jews as the whole verse is 
speaking about the Jews, he insisted that apostate rulers must be included in that verse because 
the juristic rule states that what is considered is the general applicability of the text rather than 
the specificity of the occasion regarding which this text was revealed.576 However, when this rule 
did not help his framing on tatarrus, he argued that the verse prohibiting fighting non-Muslims if 
Muslims would be included in the attack is specific to a single occasion and cannot be 
generalised. The above attempts of Faḍl to remove any obstacles that might bar his view on 
rebellion as shown in his arguments on tatarrus and takfīr fall within the framing strategy of 
constraint-lifting, a strategy whereby Faḍl tried to lift constraints on the prognostic framing of 
rebellion that is seen by him as the only valid way to deal with those who violate God’s 
sovereignty. This is also what he did by lifting the constraint of ‘excuse due to ignorance’ that 
constrains applying his rules of takfīr. 
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Before Revisions: Al-ʿUdhr bi al-Jahl (Excuse due to Ignorance)577  
Ignorance relates to takfīr as one of the impediments (constraints) that could prevent issuing a 
judgment of takfīr against others if they ignorantly commit an act of disbelief. In this regard, 
Faḍl agrees with other Muslim scholars that a Muslim who ignorantly commits an act of disbelief 
cannot be considered disbeliever until he is informed of his kufr and the truth is made clear to 
him (iqāmat al-ḥujja). However, what is different in Faḍl’s argument is that he considers that the 
truth would be considered clear not when the person who committed the act of disbelief is 
informed of it, but when he is able to look for it. Thus, as a constraint-lifting strategy, Faḍl’s 
argument is that if a person can find the truth but he has not tried to look for it, his excuse of 
ignorance will not be accepted and he will be considered kāfir. As it is easy, Faḍl adds, to find 
the truth in Muslim countries nowadays through travel or by asking people of knowledge 
through the phone or mail, there is no acceptable excuse of ignorance in such countries except 
in extremely vague matters of religion that are recognised only by specialist scholars.578 Thus, 
though Faḍl in theory accepts al-ʿudhr bi al-jahl, he annuls it in practice by considering ignorance 
in Muslim countries unjustifiable and thus unacceptable and by arguing that knowing the truth 
takes force by having the ability to look for it not by the fact that it reaches the person who 
committed the act of disbelief. By so doing, Faḍl has removed another constraint that could 
have prevented him from issuing takfīr against this huge number of Muslims, which further 
proves his excessive takfīrī tendencies that stem from his conception of ḥākimiyya. 
In fact, Faḍl is not in real need of this argument on excuse due to ignorance as he has already 
established before that members of the refraining group (anyone who directly or indirectly 
helps apostate rulers) are automatically rendered apostate without the need to check the 
fulfillment of conditions and absence of impediments. As excuse due to ignorance is one of the 
impediments, speaking about it is not very important as, according to Faḍl’s argument on the 
refraining group, it does not have to be checked in the first place when it comes to helpers of 
apostate rulers. However, speaking about it here could help in other cases that apostatise 
because of their breach of ḥākimiyya without being helpers of rulers. Only in such a case, they 
will not be considered a refraining group and fulfillment of conditions and absence of 
impediments will have to be checked.  
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These are the matters that are exclusively related to the main frames of ḥākimiyya and takfīr 
and affect only Muslim communities. The following frames, except ḥisba, are also related by 
Faḍl to ḥākimiyya in one way or another but they also have another function and have influence 
on non-Muslims. These are categorised, as mentioned in the introduction, firstly according to 
their proximity to ḥākimiyya and secondly according to their influence on local and then foreign 
non-Muslims. 
Before Revisions: People of Dhimma (Non-Muslim Residents of Muslim lands) 
Dhimmīs are non-Muslims (Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians) living permanently in Muslim 
lands under a permanent covenant of protection.579 According to this covenant, they pay jizya (a 
yearly sum of money paid by the adults among them to the Muslim state in return for 
protection) and abide by rulings of Islam as they reside in lands where rulings of Islam are 
applied.580 In al-Jāmiʿ Faḍl framed in this concept to express his views on Muslim relationship 
with non-Muslims living in Muslim countries and the criteria governing dealing with them. As 
with the previous concepts, he linked this topic to his central frame of ḥākimiyya, noting that 
governing with laws other than those of God is what prompted him to speak about rulings of 
Dhimmīs as both topics are related. This means that he classifies this as a top important issue 
because it relates to the most important issue of ḥākimiyya which is ‘the core of tawḥid’. It 
relates to ḥākimiyya as the rulings governing Muslims' relationship with those people have been 
dropped as a result of abandoning the rulings of the Sharia. In this regard, Faḍl has counter-
framed opponents’ views by criticising some modern Muslim writers such as Subḥī al-Ṣāliḥ and 
Muḥammad Ḥumaydullāh, who have changed these rules “under the pretext of renewing 
Islamic thought or tolerance and peaceful coexistence with others.”581  
The details of the covenant of dhimma are known as the ‘ʿUmari condi ons’ as it was the second 
Muslim caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb who first contracted these conditions. Faḍl has counted these 
conditions and added that paying the jizya and accepting Islamic laws are the most important of 
these conditions though they are not mentioned in the ʿUmarī conditions. Therefore, dropping 
the jizya and cancelling the ʿUmarī conditions means that Dhimmīs have broken the covenant of 
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dhimma and have become like other combatant disbelievers. Faḍl insists that this applies 
whether it is Dhimmīs who broke the covenant or it is the apostate rulers who dropped the 
conditions of dhimma. In either case, it means that the conditions of dhimma have been broken 
and Dhimmīs are no longer abiding by the covenant of dhimma, which makes them violable. 
Faḍl further argues that even if it is the ruler who has dropped the conditions as a consequence 
of the non-implementation of the Sharia, the Christians of Egypt, for example, have welcomed 
this and have tried to resist any call for the application of the Sharia or restoration of the 
conditions of dhimma. He has counted some examples on this and has concluded that the 
concept of Ahl al-Dhimma no longer exists on earth nowadays as the conditions of dhimma are 
no longer applied anywhere in the world.582  
One of the common mistakes of contemporary Muslim writers, Faḍl notes, is that they consider 
People of the Book in Muslims' lands nowadays as Dhimmīs, which is completely wrong as their 
conditions nowadays are completely different from the conditions applied by Muslims to 
Dhimmīs.583 As rulings of dhimma are to be applied on non-Muslims in lands of Islam, Faḍl did 
not justify why he would expect Dhimmīs to apply the rulings of the Sharia in countries that he 
considers lands of apostasy and disbelief. Furthermore, his observation that these conditions 
are unchangeable and inadaptable means that they must be applied exactly as they were 
applied by early Muslim generations, without any consideration to the change of times and 
circumstances. This again branches from his static view on ḥākimiyya and whatever relates to it.  
Therefore, Faḍl has further criticised and accused of disbelief those who say that these 
conditions are not binding on Muslims, emphasising that they are binding because they are a 
Sunna of a Rightly Guided Caliph (Khalīfa Rāshid) and are further supported by the consensus of 
the companions of the Prophet. However, Faḍl notes that these conditions are binding only 
when Muslims are powerful and have the upper hand. In case of weakness or incapacity, 
Muslims are not asked to compel people of the Book to commit to these conditions. Yet, no 
other conditions contradictory to the Sharia and ḥākimiyya, such as principles of nationalism or 
citizenship, may be applied as this will take those who laid these conditions to the circle of 
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disbelief. So whoever calls for dropping the conditions of dhimma and adopting the principle of 
citizenship in lands of Islam is ‘apostate’.584 
 By declaring so, Faḍl has again re-emphasised that what matters of the conditions of dhimma is 
what relates to the application of the Sharia (ḥākimiyya) i.e., the theoretical aspect that pertains 
to the texts of the Sharia. However, he is flexible on the practical implementation (the practical 
aspect) of these conditions when Muslims are weak and incapable of imposing these conditions. 
Again this shows that Faḍl is strict when it comes to the issue of ḥākimiyya but can be flexible 
when it comes to some practical matters (application of some conditions) when incapacity 
hinders Muslims from imposing them. While the concept of dhimma has influence on local non-
Muslim citizens of Muslim countries, the concept of amān has influence on foreign non-Muslims 
coming to Muslim lands in addition to an influence on non-Muslim countries who give visas to 
Muslims. 
Before Revisions: Amān (Covenant of Security) 
Amān is a term used in Islamic jurisprudence to indicate a covenant of security and protection 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim whereby one of the two parties is given assurance of being 
secure and unharmed when they visit or live in the area or country of the other party.585 The 
concept is used by Jihadists to frame and justify violence against non-Muslim foreigners who 
come to Muslim countries, under the pretext that they do not have a valid amān. It is also used 
in the argument and framing on whether or not a visa given by non-Muslim countries to a 
Muslim is considered amān that prevents that Muslim from attacking or harming citizens of that 
country. In this regard, Faḍl sees that when a Muslim is given amān by a non-Muslim, that 
Muslim has to respect that amān and avoid any breach of the amān and any treachery. He must 
not cause any harm to that non-Muslim or to those living with him in the same country as he has 
been given the amān based on these principles. This is because God asks Muslims to fulfill their 
promises and because treachery is not allowed in Islam. Visas given by countries of original 
disbelievers (countries that were never ruled by Muslims), Faḍl argues, are considered valid 
amān since they respect Muslims and protect them from harm and abuse as they do with their 
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citizens. So Muslims who enter their countries must treat them equally even if they enter 
therein with a fake visa that the authorities of these countries thought to be genuine.586 
On the other hand, Faḍl views that once a Muslim gives amān to someone, the person who is 
given amān enjoys all the privileges of security granted by the covenant. However, as Faḍl sees 
that rulers and governments of Muslim countries are apostates because of ḥākimiyya, he argues 
that their amān is of no value as the acceptable amān must be given by a Muslim whereas these 
rulers and their employees are not. So, the visa given to non-Muslims by the apostate ruling 
regimes does not lay any obligation of amān on Muslims. However, if a non-Muslim is invited by 
another Muslim, even if wrongdoer, this will be considered valid amān and it becomes binding 
on all Muslims to respect that amān.587  
Faḍl's argument on the prohibition of causing harm to non-Muslims if a Muslim is granted a visa 
by non-Muslims generally conforms to the arguments of other Muslim scholars, as amān in this 
case does not relate to hākimiyya. However, when it relates to ḥākimiyya, which is, in this case, 
the amān given by 'apostate' regimes, he considers that amān does not take effect and thus a 
Muslim can violate the life of a non-Muslim as the amān is given by someone who apostatised 
due to violation of hākimiyya. In this regard, Faḍl gave priority to the implications of his 
conception of ḥākimiyya not only over the safety of the innocent people whose lives could be 
endangered by this verdict but also over other Islamic instructions that urge Muslims to treat 
others kindly. This clearly shows how he is unwilling to compromise when it comes to ḥākimiyya. 
Faḍl also did not consider the practical fact that the only legal way for foreigners to enter a 
Muslim country would be through a visa from the government that he considered apostate. 
Though he has stated that if a non-Muslim enters Muslim countries with invitation from a 
Muslim, this should be considered a valid amān, Faḍl has not given any clues of how can people 
know that the foreigner coming to Muslim lands was invited by a Muslim or not and has not 
considered that this could have extremely serious implications on the lives and safety of 
foreigners who cannot enter a Muslim country except through a visa from a governing 
authorities. This further confirms the point that the frame of ḥākimiyya dominates Faḍl in 
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almost all of his arguments and that he is unwilling to compromise, irrespective of the 
consequences, when it comes to anything related to ḥākimiyya. 
Before Revisions: Al-Walā' wa al-Barā' 
Al-Walā' means love, allegiance and loyalty to the believers and al-Barāʿ means disassociation 
from the disbelievers. Jihadists frame in the concepts of al-Walā' wa al-Barā' as another tool, 
after ḥākimiyya, to prove the apostasy of rulers and their regimes as they show walā` to 
disbelievers. It is also used by Jihadists to frame their relation with non-Muslims and justify 
hatred, animosity and violence against them. Faḍl notes that it is a duty upon Muslims to 
declare his barā' from the disbelievers during their life and after their death. A Muslim's barā' 
from the disbelievers in their lives means animosity and hatred to them and to their disbelief, as 
well as relinquishing their whims and approaches and avoiding socialising and mixing with them. 
Barā' after death occurs by not asking forgiveness for them, not allowing them to buried with 
Muslims, not inheriting from or getting inherited by Muslims.588  
In al-Jāmiʿ, Faḍl has reviewed the linguistic and religious meanings of the derivatives of the word 
walā` and has framed it in this way: walā` means showing support, agreement, following, 
obedience, affection and love, and that any of these qualities is considered walā`. Such walā` 
must be devoted only to God, His Messenger and the believers. Anyone who obeys, loves or 
supports the disbelievers is considered to have taken them as allies (Walā`) and whoever takes 
them as allies is committing disbelief even if this does not cause any harm to the believers. Such 
disbelief is further confirmed if it causes any harm to the believers.589  
As with the previous concepts, Faḍl linked this to his main concern of ḥākimiyya when he 
emphasised that rulings of walā` and barā' not only apply to ‘original disbelievers’ but also to 
rulers who apostatised because of ḥākimiyya. Anyone who helps, verbally or in practice, those 
rulers is considered to have taken them allies and thus has apostatised because of walā` to the 
apostates who fight for the sake of ṭāghūt and act in animosity towards God and His 
Messenger.590 Thus, the concept of al-walā' wa al-barā' has been used by Faḍl as another tool of 
takfīr on the local scene (Christian minorities and rulers of Muslim countries) and international 
                                                          
588 Faḍl, Al-ʿUmda, 255. 
589 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 679-81. 
590 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 681& 689-90. 
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scene (foreign non-Muslims or original disbelievers), which shaped and framed his worldview of 
the ‘other’. 
Before Revisions: Relationship with the ‘Other’ 
Influenced by his framing of jihad, dhimma and al-walā' wa al-barā', Faḍl had a very rigid 
worldview as he considered the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim as that of war 
and fighting rather than that of peace and coexistence. This stems from his view of jihad as a 
criterion that governs the relationship between Muslims and others. Thus, considering jihad as a 
‘norm’ (i.e., considering fighting non-Muslims as the default in Muslim/non-Muslim relations), 
Faḍl rejects peace and coexistence with non-Muslims except under necessity. He argues that the 
Muslim Ummah is originally an Ummah of jihad and that is why all of its policies and resources 
must be tailored to serve that cause (jihad). Based on this, the relationship between Muslims 
and non-Muslims is based on war. So, fighting is the norm and peace is the exception.  
As long as Muslims are stronger than their enemies, there should be no peace, truce or treaties. 
Only when Muslims are weak can they resort to truce and peace treaties. Even in such cases, 
these truces or peace agreements must be limited with a specific timeframe and not open-
ended as this will lead to the neglect of jihad. In addition, Faḍl’s view of jihad and al-walā' wa al-
barā' made him exclude any other form of coexistence and peacefulness based on any 
considerations other than those of religious ties. Faḍl stated that there should be no 
consideration for ties of citizenship or nationalism as they oppose the religious ties. The only 
acceptable tie is that of faith while other 'pagan’ ties are valueless.591  
This relates to ḥākimiyya in the sense that jihad here is meant to implement the Islamic Sharia 
(ḥākimiyya) in the countries of original disbelievers after ousting the apostate rulers and seizing 
power in Muslim countries (the near enemy) to take them as a base for launching jihad against 
‘the far enemy’. These are the issues which together formed Faḍl’s views of Muslim rulers and 
communities in addition to the ‘other’ non-Muslims.  
The above review shows that almost all of Faḍl’s framings are driven by his concern for 
ḥākimiyya and that he is unwilling to compromise in anything related to ḥākimiyya. However, he 
can be flexible with the practical side at times of weakness or incapacity as well as in the other 
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few issues that he did not relate to ḥākimiyya. Despite its importance, ḥisba is an example of 
matters that Faḍl did not pay enough attention to (i.e., an example of the issues that he did not 
discuss thoroughly, but instead mentioned very briefly without delving into details) as they are 
not related to his main concern of ḥākimiyya. 
Before Revisions: Ḥisba (Enjoining the Right and Forbidding the Wrong) 
Ḥisba means enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong according to the principles of 
the Islamic Sharia. It could be made by words or by actions gently or violently if required 
according to some conditions and etiquettes. While acknowledging the importance of ḥisba, 
Faḍl spoke about ḥisba in general terms and highlighted its importance without mentioning any 
etiquettes or principles that govern the issue of ḥisba. He merely listed some sources that talk 
about ḥisba and referred his readers to these sources for more information on ḥisba.592 This, 
when contrasted with his lengthy arguments and dedicated framing on ḥākimiyya and its related 
issues, proves that issues that are not related to ḥākimiyya such as ḥisba are not of major 
concern to him. It is only the IG which gave greater importance to ḥisba and used the concept to 
justify some acts of violence. Thus, though ḥisba is one of the concepts used by some Jihadists 
to practice some acts of violence, it is not part of Faḍl’s pro-violence frames. Nonetheless, 
mentioning ḥisba here is necessary because it show that Faḍl would extensively cover and argue 
on concepts of ḥākimiyya and takfīr and what is related to them and would just hint to other 
issues that are not related to or influenced by ḥākimiyya. 
 
Conclusion 
The above demonstration shows how Faḍl was so concerned about ḥākimiyya that he related 
most of the other concepts to it, categorised people into rigid templates of belief and disbelief, 
drove millions of people outside the fold of Islam, and removed any constraints that would 
hinder him from using his most influential tool of takfīr to effect his only acceptable prognostic 
framing of rebellion. To put things in their right context, this worldview must not be interpreted 
away from the context of Faḍl’s life. Faḍl not only failed to change the 'un-Islamic' reality and 
achieve the aspired community of believers, but also failed to achieve his aspirations at the 
personal and organisational level as he was further forced to resign from the leadership of al-
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Jihād Organisation after he had been the most obeyed and respected emir. The widespread 
corruption and injustices together with his nostalgic vision of an idealistic Muslim society drove 
him to classifying people into templates of good and evil to distinguish ideal believers who 
would be ’saved’ from disbelievers who would be ‘doomed’, and casting charges of treachery 
and apostasy on whoever fails to achieve that idealistic form of life.593 Faḍl’s nostalgia and 
failure to achieve his aspiration in the practical world made him flee this world into the realm of 
texts, where he surprisingly excels and finds his nostalgic aspirations. Therefore, in his book al-
Jāmiʿ, he attempted to develop a work that was conclusive and representative; something that 
all believers should adhere to if they were to be counted among those who belong to the saved 
sect. Thus, al-Jāmiʿ- a work intended exclusively for the elite (not the masses) – may be depicted 
as the ‘Fiqh of necessity, exception and feeling of insecurity. It is not the normal Fiqh or 
principles that interact with people in their daily lives.594 
Textually speaking, this chapter highlights and explains in detail the theological concepts 
employed by Jihadists in general and al-Jihād Organisation in particular (as presented by Faḍl) to 
frame and justify violence, with the aim of exploring and explaining the assumptions 
underpinning the theological process of justifying violence from Jihadists’ perspective in general 
and from Faḍl’s perspective in particular. The most important of these concepts are ḥākimiyya, 
takfīr and rebellion against the rulers. The three concepts are interrelated for in order to justify 
rebellion, takfīr must be used, and ḥākimiyya is the main tool used to issue takfīr. Faḍl’s 
conception and framing of ḥākimiyya led him to link the majority of other issues to it and 
conclude that contemporary social and political mechanisms such as democracy, working or 
voting for parliaments, working in the judiciary or giving any kind of help in running these 
processes contradict God’s ḥākimiyya, and thus render whoever exercises them apostate. He 
also introduced new rules of takfīr and arrived at some new conclusions that included vast 
sections of the Muslim communities in the circle of disbelief, especially when he practically 
disabled the concept of ‘excuse due to ignorance’ that might prevent someone who committed 
                                                          
593 Many scholars of the relationship between religion and violence employ a crisis theory approach to understanding 
the link between Islam and violence. Ranstorp, for example, after stating that a survey of the major religious militant 
groups in existence worldwide in the early 1990s revealed that almost all experience a serious sense of crisis in their 
environment, he noted that perceptions of crisis engender a sense of besiegement that prompts a defensive reaction 
that may take shape in a religious form. The amorphous, ever-shifting external environment prompts some 
individuals to adopt a powerfully dualistic Manichean worldview, parsing societies and individuals into rigid templates 
of good and evil. See. e.g., Ranstorp, “Terrorism in the Name of Religion,” 60. 
594 On this, see Markaz al-Dirasāt, Dalīl al-Ḥarakāt, 338; ʿAbd al-Jawwād, “Sayyid Imām fī al-ʿUmda wal Jāmi;” Ibrahim, 
“Jihadists Quit Violence,” 11 
160 
 
an act of disbelief from being considered a disbeliever. Faḍl’s new deductions and conclusions 
were deemed too radical even by his fellow Jihadists.  
Other concepts towards which Faḍl took very radical views because he saw them as being 
related to ḥākimiyya include: the refraining group, the abode of Islam and abode of disbelief, 
tatarrus or human shielding, and the concept of dhimmah. The discussion also covered some 
concepts which Faḍl partially related to ḥākimiyya such as the concepts of amān and al-walā' 
wa al-barā', and showed that Faḍl would issue radical judgements whenever he linked any of 
these issues to ḥākimiyya while he was flexible on other practical issues such as ḥisba. These 
concepts together shaped Faḍl’s antagonistic worldview towards the ‘other’.  
In framing terms, Faḍl linked almost all of his frames to his central frame of ḥākimiyya using the 
two basic interactive, discursive processes that generate collective action frames; i.e., frame 
articulation and frame amplification or elaboration.595 Frame articulation refers to connecting 
and aligning events, experiences and strands of moral codes in a way that makes them hang 
together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion.596 In this regard, Faḍl used frame 
articulation by connecting and aligning events and experiences (injustices) that Jihadists and 
Muslims in general face and making them hang together in a relatively unified and compelling 
fashion under the rubric of the religious moral code of ḥākimiyya and related concepts. Though 
theological issues discussed and presented by Faḍl are not new nor are the experiences and 
realities linked to them, he managed to give them a special novelty not so much through the 
originality or newness of its ideational elements, but through the manner in which he spliced 
them together and articulated them, in a way that granted them a new angle of vision, vantage 
point and interpretation through assembling, packaging and collating pieces of the observed, 
experienced and recorded ‘reality’, and linking them to the general frame of ḥākimiyya. 
The frame amplification or elaboration process involves accenting and highlighting some events, 
issues, or beliefs as being more important than others.597 Faḍl attended to this process by 
highlighting and accenting the dogmatic issues of ḥākimiyya, takfīr, jihad and their related 
elements as being more salient than others such as ḥisba and other fiqh issues. These 
punctuated or accented elements of ḥākimiyya served the whole articulation process of 
                                                          
595 For a general theoretical explanation of the above theoretical processes, see Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing 
and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 130-2; Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 623. 
596 Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 130. 
597 Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 130. 
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violence by providing a conceptual connection for linking together the various events and 
concepts. In other words, these punctuated issues, beliefs, and events functioned much like 
synecdoches, bringing into sharp relief and symbolising the larger frame of which it is a part. The 
group’s slogans such as ‘Rule of God, Rule of Islam, Golden Age, Implementation of Sharia, 
Restoration of Caliphate’ illustrate this function as these slogans directly reflect and assign 
special emphasis to the articulated and amplified frames of ḥākimiyya, etc. 
Thus, in addition to providing a detailed review of Faḍl’s ideology before revisions, the main 
argument in this chapter is that the issue of ḥākimiyya and its consequence of takfīr constitute 
Faḍl’s major concern, central frame and most influential tool to justify violence, that his 
obsession with ḥākimiyya made him link the majority of other concepts to it, and that other 
ḥākimiyya-unrelated issues were of secondary importance to the overarching goal of the 
implementation of the Sharia. Therefore, this conclusion constitutes a necessary premise for the 
arguments in the next chapter as understanding the nature and degree of change in Faḍl’s 
ideology in general can be judged and measured by the changes he presents in his new 




Chapter Four: Al-Jihād Organisation: Ideology after Revisions and Dynamics of Change 
 
Introduction 
After reviewing Faḍl’s ideology before revisions in chapter 3 and establishing the fact that 
ḥākimiyya was his main concern and central frame that he would link most issues to, and that 
he would take radical views when it comes to anything related to ḥākimiyya; chapter 4 explains 
the new interpretations of the concepts that were used to justify violence as presented by Faḍl 
in his ‘revisions’ and shows how he framed them to argue against acts of violence. The final 
analysis in this chapter sheds light on Faḍl’s approach and methodology; explains whether there 
is any change in the ideology and the extent of this change. It also explains the dynamics of 
change in Faḍl’s ideology.  
This chapter has two main sections and answers three basic questions. The first section answers 
the question: What are the new interpretations of the religious concepts upon which Faḍl 
framed his previous pro-violence ideology? This is answered by giving overviews of the 
interpretations of these concepts and how they are employed to stop violence, which will 
together offer a detailed description of Faḍl’s ideology after revisions and how it is framed. This 
section also shows that Faḍl has employed Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) to 
account for his new views and support his new arguments. 
The second section answers two questions: Has Faḍl really changed his ideology and what is the 
degree of that change, if any? And how could Faḍl justify violence and non-violence based upon 
theological Islamic concepts either way? This will be achieved by analysing and explaining Faḍl’s 
texts and arguments using textual analysis, coupled with the relevant framing aspects. These will 
be the main tools to analyse the tenets of Faḍl’s ideology as presented in his literature. 
Although Faḍl has resigned from al-Jihād Organisation and some of his views have been rejected 
by the Organisation and other Jihadists for being ‘too radical’, he remains in the eyes of Jihadists 
the principal, most respected and weighty ideologue of the Organisation and one of al-Qaeda’s 
most respected jihadi scholars. Faḍl is still seen as a high profile scholar, his books are still held 
in the highest esteem by Jihadists and are still taught by jihadi groups worldwide.598 His previous 
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writings are still published on jihadi websites and taught in jihadi circles.599 Faḍl’s radical views, 
in the sight of his own Organisation and other Jihadi scholars, are no more than minor mistakes 
that would never undermine the whole great contribution of Faḍl as a spectacular jihadi 
ideologue. This is expressed by Jihadists, such as Abu Muḥammad al-Maqdisī and Ḥasan Qā`id 
(Abu Yaḥyaā al-Lībī), who critiqued some points in Faḍl’s al-Jāmiʿ.600 The same with Faḍl’s own 
Organisation, they still hold his writings in the highest esteem but they have removed from 
them only the views that they considered ‘too radical’ and his critique of other jihadi 
movements such as the IG. 
 As discussed before, Faḍl has recorded his revisions in a book titled Wathīqat Tarshīd al-ʿAmal 
al-Jihādi fī Miṣr Wa al-ʿĀlam (Document of Right Guidance for Jihadi Activities in Egypt and the 
World). In this Wathīqa Faḍl argued against rebellion and condemned acts of violence in general 
using an Uṣūlī601approach, supporting his arguments with juristic proofs. However, he doid not 
speak about all frames or concepts of violence he had previously discussed in his earlier works. 
He spoke only about some of what he covered in his pro-violence writings and some actions of 
other Jihadist movements, particularly al-Qaeda.602 In addition, contrary to Faḍl’s previous 
writings, many of the titles in his Wathīqa refer to the practical implications of the concepts of 
violence rather than the concepts themselves. For example, rather than titling an article in the 
Wathīqa ‘amān’ as he did in his pro-violence writings, Faḍl entitles it with one of the practical 
implications of the Jihadists’ understanding of amān which is: ‘Killing non-Muslim Civilians in 
Lands of Disbelief’. 
Thus, there are differences between the concepts and topics covered in Faḍl’s previous writings 
and those in the Wathīqa. Therefore, below are overviews of only the frames and topics which 
are mentioned in the Wathīqa. Many of these are categorised by Faḍl under the general frame 
                                                          
599 See, for example, Faḍl’s writings on the famous jihadi website: Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa al-Jihād: www.tawhed.ws. 
600  See, for example, al-Maqdisī’s introduction to his annotations on Faḍl’s al-Jāmiʿ. These comments are attached to 
the version of al-Jāmiʿ used in this dissertation.  
601 ‘Uṣūlī’ is an adjective derived from Uṣūl al-Fiqh’ which means Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. It is beyond the 
scope of this research to discuss each individual rule and detail the scholars’ acceptance and rejection of them. 
However, all the Uṣūlī rules employed by the two groups under discussion are acceptable to the majority, but not 
necessarily to all, mainstream Sunni Muslim scholars, including those highly respected by Jihadists. Thus, framing in 
these rules means that both Jihadists and non-Jihadists accept them in general terms and thus can be employed to 
prove a religious argument based on rules recognised by mainstream scholars. This is confirmed by the fact that 
critics of the revisions did not question the validity of these rules per se or their general applicability but instead cast 
doubts on their application to the current state of affairs, as framed by writers of the revisions.   
602 Reasons for this will be mentioned in the final analysis at the end of this chapter.  
164 
 
of ‘jihad’ which is the common denominator of most of the topics covered in the Wathīqa.603 
The main message of Faḍl in the Wathīqa is: stop violence against the regime and others, for 
this is a mistaken concept of jihad. Therefore, unlike the previous chapter, the overview of Faḍl’s 
arguments after revisions will start with jihad and matters related to it. It will also be arranged, 
like the topics of the previous chapter, according to their influence on local Muslims, local non-
Muslims and then foreign non-Muslims. These topics according to the above order, include: 
jihad and forced ḥisba; ḥākimiyya, takfīr and rebellion; targeting civilians in ‘Muslims’ lands’; 
People of the Book living in Muslims' lands (Dhimmīs); attacking tourists and foreigners; 
attacking non-Muslims in their lands and tatarrus; killing non-Muslim civilians in lands of 
disbelief; and rulings on Muslims living in ‘lands of disbelief’. The overviews of these concepts 
will show that Faḍl either overgeneralised or kept silent on issues that relate to his 
understanding of ḥākimiyya and its consequence of takfīr, which will also highlight his new 
approach and methodology and help evaluate his new interpretations.  
 
Faḍl’s Views after Revisions 
Faḍl’s starring chapter in the Wathīqa asserts that the anger of God is not called forth by 
anything more than bloodshed and destruction of properties.604 Faḍl wrote the Wathīqa to warn 
against appalling actions that are unlawful in Islam and are perpetrated in the name of jihad, 
particularly in Islamist movements’ confrontations and conflicts with governments and 
systems.605 To clear his responsibility for violent acts that Jihadists committed based on his 
writings,  Faḍl states that he is not a scholar or a mufti and that the content of his works is 
basically generic, academic observations and that, as such, are unable to be implemented in 
definitive cases; only adequately proficient scholars could do that. Whatever exists in his 
writings and looks like fatwas, it is among his personal views that are not binding on anyone. 
Faḍl also adds that if anything in his writings proves to be wrong, he takes it back.606 So, the 
general line of argument in the Wathīqa is: Stop acts of jihad as you misunderstood and 
misapplied jihad. This is shown clearly in the following arguments on jihad and forced ḥisba. 
                                                          
603 For a summary of all the articles of the Wathīqa, see Ibrahim, “Jihadists Quit Violence,” 12-13. 
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After Revisions: Jihad607 and Forced Ḥisba 
Unlike his pro-violence writings wherein Faḍl used ḥākimiyya as a general and central frame, 
‘correct jihad’ was the general and central frame used by Faḍl in his revisions to argue against 
violence. Therefore, he discussed jihad and ḥisba together because both of them were used to 
justify acts of violence in Egypt, though acts of violence based on ḥisba were practiced by the IG 
rather than Faḍl’s own organisation al-Jihād. In his attempt to prove that jihad is not the right 
option nowadays, Faḍl framed incapacity as a condition for any act to be considered a religious 
duty and then applied this to jihad, it being one of these religious duties. 
Unlike before, Faḍl has amplified the importance of capacity by giving prolonged details about it 
as a condition for jihad. Though he mentioned capacity as a condition in his previous writings, he 
insisted that the lack of capability requires preparation. Now he argues that the lack of capacity 
waives the obligation altogether. Each of the two arguments suit the purpose of his writing at 
each respective stage. In his previous writings he was trying to encourage others to launch 
‘jihad’ or make necessary preparations for it, and that is why he was removing constraints that 
might hinder this objective, which was reflected in his request for preparation at times of 
incapacity. Now he is trying to convince others that jihad is not the right option, which was 
reflected in his argument that the lack of capacity completely waives the obligation. This also 
affected his conception of the scope of capacity as in the new argument Faḍl expanded his 
framing of capacity by including the wider context as part of it, noting that capacity is not 
limited to the physical or financial ability of the mujāhidūn themselves but also extends to the 
surrounding circumstances.  
Then Faḍl attended to his main goal: applying the general description of incapacity to Jihadists, 
which results in waiving the obligation of jihad. "A look at the reality reveals that situations of 
Islamist movements that are trying to implement the Sharia and forbid evil in most of the 
Muslims’ lands nowadays vary between weakness and incapacity."608 Faḍl also framed 
extensively the Uṣūlī principle of weighing harm and benefit to support his arguments on the 
futility of jihad and ḥisba. He argued that because of the great harm involved, it is impermissible 
                                                          
607 All the conditions and arguments stated under this title apply to jihad in general including, but not limited to, ‘jihad 
against apostate rulers.’ The latter is covered separately later in this chapter.  
608 Faḍl, Al-Wathīqa, article 3. Al-Wathīqa is a book that was not published in a book form, but instead in the form of 
newspaper articles. The newspapers introduced the articles as part of the whole book and published them on daily 
basis. The total number of the published articles makes the whole book.    
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to change evil with the hand [forced ḥisba] except for someone who has authority over 
something, such as a father with his family. Another exception is when it is necessary to 
interfere to save a Muslim from an immediate threat. Likewise, it is not permissible to clash with 
the governing authorities in Muslims’ lands in order to implement the Sharia. Due to the fact 
that changing evil by force and clashes are unattainable as Sharia-approved options, they are 
not compulsory.609 
As Faḍl has declared that jihad is not the suitable option due to weakness and incapability of 
Jihadists and because experience has proven its futility and grave harm, he had to suggest other 
options and provide alternatives. These are: daʿwa, emigration, seclusion, forgiveness, 
condonation, turning away, patience when faced with harm, and concealing faith. The Prophet, 
Faḍl notes, and his companions practised all of these options according to their ability and 
circumstances. Faḍl also widened the scope of capacity to include resources. According to Faḍl, 
jihad is not obligatory for a person who does not have sufficient resources with which to carry it 
out. Resources, Faḍl notes, are not only what is needed to make jihad but also what will be 
sufficient to support the family and dependents of the mujāhid.610  
Faḍl extended his new framing of ‘incapacity waives the obligation’ to the point that he applied 
it even if jihad is an individual obligation. In this regard, Faḍl has criticised those who— in order 
to perform jihad which is not obligatory because of the lack of resources— commit unlawful acts 
such as kidnapping others to request a ransom and commit robberies that may lead to killing 
inviolate people. Those who carry out such acts have committed what is unlawful in order to 
perform something which is not compulsory on them. By this, Faḍl is referring to some jihadi 
groups which used to do these acts, more particularly the Egyptian IG. As the end does not 
justify the means in Islam, these acts of robbery, burglary and kidnapping to finance jihad are 
forbidden, and the good intention of financing jihad is not an acceptable reason or valid 
justification to commit such unlawful acts.611 By linking the lack of resources to incapacity and 
connecting both to such acts that are commonly abhorred by people and perceived as unlawful 
as robbery, burglary and kidnapping, Faḍl has practised both frame bridging, frame amplification 
and frame extension strategies. 
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 To further consolidate his argument Faḍl placed more constraints on jihad by stating that one of 
its conditions is having the permission of parents and creditors. Without it, a person would not 
be allowed to go for jihad. Faḍl has further amplified this by stating that the condition of such 
permission could apply even when jihad is an individual obligation; if jihad is likely to cause harm 
to parents. Faḍl, however is silent on the permission of creditors when jihad is an individual 
obligation.612  
In his previous writings, Faḍl has stated that parents and creditors' permission is necessary only 
in jihad when it is a collective obligation (al-Jihād al-Kifā'ī),613 but when jihad is an individual 
obligation, this condition is dropped. Faḍl's previous argument complies with what is stated by 
other Muslim scholars in this regard, but the fact that he has not dropped this condition when 
jihad is an individual obligation is a new opinion that contradicts his old view as well as what 
Muslim scholars have agreed upon.614 According to Muslim scholars615 such as Abū Ḥanīfa, 
Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Ḥanbal, jihad becomes an individual obligation in three cases, one of 
which is when the enemy attacks Muslim lands. In this case, everyone has to defend the lands of 
Islam with whatever means they have and without permission from parents or creditors.  
In al-Jāmiʿ Faḍl considered jihad an individual obligation on everyone nowadays as all Muslim 
countries are under attack either by foreign invaders or by apostate rulers and regimes that 
apply laws of disbelief. Therefore, Faḍl noted, the condition of having one's parents’ and 
creditor's permission does not apply in practice nowadays, as jihad is an individual obligation. 
Thus, applying the condition of having parents’ permission to individual jihad in the Wathīqa is 
another constraint tailored to suit Faḍl’s current purpose, which is to discourage Jihadists from 
attacking their regimes. This shows the difference between the old strategy of lifting constraint 
on rebellion and the new one of placing them.   
Faḍl has disclosed the message he wants to communicate by speaking about these conditions 
when he said, “What is sorrowful nowadays is to see some Muslims going for jihad and traveling 
from their countries to another country to participate in jihad or a martyrdom operation 
without their parent's permission or even knowledge, and sometimes without their creditors' 
                                                          
612 Faḍl, Al-Wathīqa, article 4. 
613 That is when jihad is an obligation on the Muslim Ummah collectively, in the sense that a sufficient number of 
Muslims has to undertake it but not necessarily every individual Muslim. 
614 For elaboration of scholars’ opinions on this issue, see, e.g., Al-ʿAwāysha, Al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya al-Muyassara, 7: 
85 ff; Wizarat al-Awqāf, Al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya, 16: 132 ff. 
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168 
 
permission. At times they even do not leave necessary expenses for their dependents. All of 
these are sins that a Muslim must avoid. They might die or get killed in that jihad while having 
these sins."616 
Faḍl has also framed in pragmatism and contextualisation by emphasising the importance of 
taking the milieu into consideration. To do so, he employed a number of Usūlī pragmatic rules. 
For example, he stated that God has founded this life on the cause and effect rule (i.e. the rule 
that success (effect) depends on the efforts made and the surrounding circumstances), not on 
supernatural occurrences which might occur but they are not the original norm. By this, Faḍl is 
asserting that pragmatism and calculations of powers are necessary and must not be overlooked 
under the pretext of having God's protection or support, as Jihadists do. Another Usūlī 
pragmatic rule employed by Faḍl is ‘the means and end rule’ which Faḍl stressed by framing 
jihad as a means and not an end, arguing that the goal behind jihad is to establish the religion 
and support the believers and that protecting Muslims against destruction is one of the principal 
objectives of the Sharia. Hence, if jihad is not going to achieve its end and will result in harm to 
Muslims it should be stopped, which is the case now.617 
On occasions, Faḍl would employ history and the biography of Prophet Muḥammad to support 
his general organisational frames of incapacity and weighing the harm and benefit. In this case 
he supported his view by stating that God did not make jihad, walā' and barā' or changing evil 
with the hand compulsory for Muslims in Mecca before emigration to Medina as Muslims were 
weak and doing any of these three obligations would have caused grave harm and evil to the 
community. Thus, though these three obligations are necessary, they are not allowed if they 
bring harm to Muslims and more particularly when they are not going to achieve their purpose 
of establishing the religion. When something is more harmful than beneficial (the rule of 
weighing harm and benefit or costs and gains), it must be banned, as preventing harm is given 
priority over securing benefits.618 By this line of reasoning, Faḍl is shifting from his previous 
creedal approach to another approach in his arguments concerning jihad. He is framing in 
pragmatism using an Islamic approach based on principles of Uṣūl al-Fiqh, particularly those of 
incapacity and weighing harm and benefit. 
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Part of the new pragmatic approach is ‘equivalence of powers’, which Faḍl counted as a 
condition for jihad. According to Faḍl, it is impermissible to drive Muslims towards unequal 
confrontations that will cause their destruction. He argued for this using the ‘means and end 
rule’, re-emphasising that jihad is a means and not an end. Jihad is not meant in and of itself, 
Faḍl argues, but is meant for the benefit of Muslims; and if it will not achieve that benefit but 
bring harm, it must be banned. Again, historical occurrences are used to substantiate Faḍl’s 
general frame of ‘harm and benefit’. Faḍl argues that although jihad was prescribed in Medina 
after hijra, treaties and conciliations were also allowed when necessary. The Prophet did all of 
this: he fought, held treaties and conciliations and kept silent about other enemies without 
fighting, treaties or conciliations to secure the benefit for Islam. However, Faḍl confirms his 
employment of the notion of capacity when he notes that it is not permissible to have peace or 
conciliation with the enemies of Islam if the Muslims are stronger and are more likely to defeat 
their enemies, which is not the case now. These conditions of capacity and weighing harm and 
benefit even apply to jihad against ‘apostates’.619 
In article 11 Faḍl argued against those who say that jihad is an obligation even if launched by 
individual(s). He re-emphasised his previous argument, but framed it differently, that jihad by an 
individual person (or a small number of individuals) is permissible and not an obligation. 
However, unlike before and in compliance with his new approach, he placed constraints rather 
than lifting them on this kind of jihad, by stating that for this kind of jihad to be considered 
permissible, some conditions must be fulfilled. The harm and benefit rule is the first of these 
conditions, as Faḍl states that this kind of jihad must be likely to bring benefit to Muslims and 
not cause harm to the religion or other Muslims. Other conditions (constraints) include 
obtaining the approval of the emir; that this jihad does not violate those inviolable under the 
Sharia, and that it should not constitute treachery or break a covenant held between Muslims 
and others.620 By this, Faḍl has laid the conditions of ‘jihad’ in general whether it is against the 
near enemy or against the far enemy, which has enabled him to direct his critique towards al-
Qaeda. 
After stipulating these conditions, Faḍl has shifted to the objective for which he has stated these 
conditions. He criticised al-Qaeda and its leaders, without naming them, for launching ' jihad' 
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against the US in 9/11 without the permission of the emir Mullah Umar of Afghanistan.621 Faḍl 
criticised al-Ẓawāhirī and other al-Qaeda figures, accusing them of fleeing battles, leaving their 
families and children behind whilst, at the same time, encouraging others to be steadfast and 
engage in clashes for which they have no capability or power. Faḍl has further warned Muslim 
youth against al-Qaeda leaders whom he depicted as 'internet sheikhs', 'microphone leaders', 
'slogan merchants', and the 'biggest exporters to graves and prisons'. Hence, this article seems 
to be tailored not only to argue against Jihadists or convince al-Jihād members of the futility of 
violence but also to criticise al-Qaeda and accuse it of treachery and destroying Islam, which 
reflects the nature of relationship between Faḍl and his ex-fellows at that time. 
 Such a critique and counter-framing also helps achieve the hoped results of the Wathīqa and 
helps Faḍl and his fellows earn favour with the prison authorities. This is supported by the fact 
that Faḍl has already mentioned most of these conditions of jihad before in his previous 
writings. What is new here is that he has applied these general conditions to his ex-fellows of al-
Qaeda to arrive at the conclusions described above. However, these conditions are not as 
important or relevant to his Wathīqa as other matters about which he kept silent, such as 
ḥākimiyya and the intricacies takfīr.  
After Revisions: Ḥākimiyya, Takfīr and Rebellion  
Despite his prolonged discussion of ḥākimiyya and takfīr in his previous writings, Faḍl has not 
dedicated a section to the issue of ḥākimiyya in the Wathīqa, and spoke about takfīr in a very 
generalised way. However, he does make scant reference to ḥākimiyya in parts of the Wathīqa. 
For example, in the introduction, Faḍl said that implementing the Sharia is an obligation on 
every Muslim. A Muslim who neglects such an obligation will be sinful and his faith will be 
questioned. In article one he declared that the implementation of the Sharia brings welfare and 
goodness for Muslims in this life and the next and that non-implementation of the Sharia is the 
reason for ruin in this life and the next. Faḍl has specified article 9 for the criteria governing the 
issue of takfīr. However, he mentioned only a general outline of takfīr as one of the Sharia 
rulings in addition to some criteria that govern the issue in general. He has not spoken about 
                                                          




any specific case that may cause takfīr, nor has he discussed any of the several issues related to 
takfīr that he discussed in detail in his pro-violence writings.622  
Faḍl has also emphasised the difference between the general theoretical ruling of takfīr and 
applying this ruling to a specific individual (takfīr al-muʿayyan). He argues that the general 
theoretical ruling cannot be applied to a specific individual except after the fulfilment of 
conditions and absence of impediments, and this can be done only by a qualified judge. The only 
exception to this is apostates, whom Muslims cannot bring under their control because of their 
power (Al-mumtaniʿ bi al-qudra). In this case, fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments are not requirements that need to be met.623 
This is actually what he stated before in his al-Jāmiʿ, but this time he did not speak about the 
refraining group and followers of apostate rulers. He just referred readers to the details of takfīr 
in the seventh chapter of his al-Jāmiʿ. Moreover, he acknowledged that takfīr is not an easy 
issue, which  is why it needs high juristic qualifications and prolonged study of the Sharia in 
addition to long experience in fatwas and Sharia judiciary.624 Given Faḍl’s prolonged discussion 
of takfīr in his previous writings, this contradicts his statement at the beginning of the Wathīqa 
that he is not a scholar, jurist or a mufti. 
In article 5, Faḍl talked about rebellion against the ruler, which is the main topic in his Wathīqa. 
Unlike his previous writings, he did not link rebellion to ḥākimiyya. He argued that episodes of 
insurrections that occurred during the early phase of Islamic history took place because of the 
despotism of the governing leaders of the time and these were not right, as those who revolted 
at that time depended, in their religious rationale, on the familiar command to alter wickedness 
by means of the hand as some ḥadīths indicate. Using these ḥadīths as a proof is wrong, Faḍl 
maintains. As these ḥadīths are speaking in general terms, it is not correct to implement them to 
governing leaders as specific ḥadīths ban insurrection against governing leaders who are 
Muslims.625 He framed this judgment by evoking the Uṣūlī rule which states that specific Sharia 
texts are to be given priority and preference over those that are general in nature.  
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Faḍl has quoted a number of sacred texts626 to reinforce his point of view that it is disallowed to 
dissent and rise up and confront governing leaders that are Muslims. This is so even if such 
leaders are guilty of despotism. However, his view in this regard did not introduce anything new 
as even jihadists believe that it is prohibited to rebel against Muslim rulers. The problem of 
rebellion arises only when the ruler is classified as apostate. Therefore, Faḍl started discussing 
the ruling of rebellion if a ruler becomes apostate. However, he did not specify any reason that 
could render the ruler apostate. He just made a distinction between being cognizant of the 
disbelief of the ruler and insurrection against him; which, it is important to note, is not 
mandatory if the people are unable to depose him or if it entails harm, specifically if the harm is 
grave and goes beyond the normal costs known in jihad.627  
Thus Faḍl disallowed rebellion even against apostate rulers by framing in his two major 
organisational Uṣūlī frames: the rules of capacity and harm and benefit. After that Faḍl 
substantiated his theoretical argument by invoking past historical experiences of rebellion and 
showing how harmful they were. He discussed examples- throughout the recent past - of 
attempts to oust governing leaders with the purpose of applying Sharia. Fadl says that such 
endeavours brought about serious corruption and damage, not only to the Islamic groups, but 
also the countries that directly witnessed the insurrection. The very nature of insurrection is 
serious damage and ruin, therefore, it is incumbent to evaluate it according to the Uṣūlī rule 
which states that it is not permissible to abolish harm by bringing about another form of harm 
that is much the same or even worse than the original one.628  
Faḍl supported his argument on harm and benefit by quoting some juristic rules from the Uṣūlī 
writings of his oft-quoted Salafi Scholar Ibn Taymiya: For example, he quoted Ibn Taymiiya’s 
assertion that are two cases wherein it is permissible to countenance an immoral action. First, to 
prevent an act that is even more wicked, and there is no other way to do this. Second, in order 
to obtain a thing that provides more benefit than preventing the immoral act, if this is the only 
way to do so. Likewise, there are two cases wherein an acceptable act may be given up. First, if 
maintaining the acceptable act results in the loss of something superior to it. Second, if the 
result is that a wicked act ensues, the harm of which is more serious than the result of the 
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acceptable action.629  This suggests two things.. Firstly, that Faḍl is insisting on his new Uṣūlī 
approach and secondly, that he is still situating himself within the Salafi tradition albeit from a 
different angle. 
If we consider Faḍl’s emphasis on the futility of ‘jihad’ nowadays due to incapacity and the harm 
involved in framing and collective action terms, it is a form of accentuating the lack of political 
opportunity. As framing research proposes: “though political opportunity structures can 
facilitate or constrain collective action framing processes, the degree or extent of political 
opportunity in any society is seldom, if ever, a clear and easily read structural entity. Rather, its 
existence and openness is subject to debate and interpretation and can thus be framed by 
movement actors as well as by others.”630 Therefore, Faḍl’s emphasis on the lack of political 
opportunity was contested by al-Ẓawāhirī and other jihadists631 through a different reading and 
interpretation of the political climate and available opportunity.  
After stating that jihad is not compulsory nowadays due its harm and lack of capacity, Faḍl 
further amplified his framing by stating that ‘jihad’ nowadays involves some acts that are 
unlawful under the Sharia so is therefore prohibited. He provided some practical examples of 
the violations committed by Jihadists. Some such examples include slaying those who are 
blameless and doing so under the pretence of tatarrus. Next, acquiring unlawful wealth in ways 
such as theft, taking people captive and giving the excuse for doing so of providing funds for 
jihad. Betraying the disbelieving people and breaking covenants with them when entering their 
countries while having leave to do so, then proving to be unfaithful to them. Finally, being 
rendered incapable of maintaining the security of Muslim families during times of conflict. 
Therefore, Faḍl, employing another Uṣūlī rule,632 concludes that jihad is impermissible as 
militants “committed what is unlawful for them in order to do something that is not mandatory; 
they are not required to perform jihad if they do not have the capacity to do so.633 Thus Faḍl’s 
argument that jihad is not obligatory due to the lack of capacity is a necessary premise to his 
subsequent argument that jihad as practised by Jihadists nowadays is impermissible as it 
involves unlawful acts. He arrived at this by using the juristic rules of weighing different Sharia 
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rulings and prioritising one of them in case of collision. This enabled him to arrive at the 
conclusion that it is impermissible to commit an illegal act to achieve a lawful non-compulsory 
end. 
Faḍl made his general arguments against rebellion more specific by referring to the case of 
Egypt and then implementing both Sharia and rational deductions to that case. At the 
conclusion of the Wathīqa, he referred to six Sharia and rational deductions that determined it 
was unlawful to seek to overthrow the regime in Egypt. He noted that in many countries the 
preconditions and requirements of performing jihad are simply not present. As a consequence, 
daʿwa and means of reform should be the object of people’s focus. The reason for this is that 
confrontation and conflict bring about serious harm and numerous examples in history and 
pragmatism attest to this fact. To further support this specific framing, Faḍl again employed 
history to prove his arguments and emphasised that taking history into consideration is a 
religious obligation. By reviewing the history of Egypt, Fadl clarified that change – both political 
and social – (in Egypt) only took place by means of foreign incursion or the government being 
overthrown by people and groups within it. The jihadi movements are incapable of either way, 
as they do not fit the criteria of foreign aggressors and they are also not participating in the 
working of the regime itself. Moreover, Faḍl referred to the geographical components and 
chronicled facts of Egypt to justify his stance; that modern day attempts of Jihadists to oust the 
regime would never be met with success (constraint placing).634  
In fact, his referring to historical facts to justify his stances is a new tool to buttress his view of 
the futility of any jihadi operations against the Egyptian regimes. However, it should be noted 
that this new approach is not to prove a religious argument but to prove a practical fact which is 
that any military attack conducted against Egypt by anyone other than its own army or foreign 
enemy will not be successful. After establishing this fact, Faḍl used it as a premise for his 
religious argument. 
Faḍl’s conception of futility of jihad against the Egyptian regime is a consequence of his 
exposure to the unpleasant reality after the failure of his previous jihadi project that led him and 
his fellows to triumph over miserable conditions in prison. The direct exposure to the reality in 
Faḍl’s practical life somewhat alienated him from his utopian realm of texts and brought about 
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some change in his recognition and reaction to the reality. This is reflected in the pragmatic 
approaches and methodologies he used to argue for, or against this reality.  
People of the Book Living in Muslims' Lands (Dhimmīs) 
Under this title, Faḍl discussed his new view of the relations with non-Muslim minorities living in 
Muslim countries, particularly the Christians of Egypt. As with previous concepts, Faḍl shifted 
the focus of dealing with Dhimmīs from ḥākimiyya into his new general frames of incapacity and 
harm and benefit. To do so, he removed local non-Muslims from the category of dhimma, 
stating that they are no longer considered Dhimmīs because they are considered by 
constitutions of these countries as citizens and not treated according to the ʿUmarī conditions of 
the covenant of dhimma. Therefore, they are ‘People of the Book not included in a covenant’. As 
the ʿUmarī conditions are unchangeable to Faḍl, he stated that these conditions are binding on 
Muslims only when they have the capacity to enforce them.635  Thus, Faḍl managed to shift his 
opinions on non-Muslim minorities living in Muslim lands mainly when he moved them from the 
category of dhimma and dropped the obligation of enforcing the ʿUmarī conditions based on the 
juristic notion of incapacity. 
In addition, he framed in the general principles of the Sharia to argue for treating them kindly. 
He sees that Muslims have to treat non-Muslim minorities kindly for three reasons:636 
1- It is not they who failed to fulfil these conditions; they have not been met because of 
the implementation of modern laws that apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This stands in 
clear contradiction of Faḍl’s previous argument that the Christians tried hard and were happy 
with changing these conditions. 
2- For the most part, they treat Muslims kindly, so equal treatment is required from 
Muslims. This also contradicts his previous statement that they abused and violated Muslims. 
3- The Quran [60:8] instructs Muslims to treat non-Muslims kindly. Non-Muslims are also 
neighbours of Muslims and Islam urges Muslims to be kind to neighbours, regardless of their 
faith. According to Faḍl, kind treatment should be observed more particularly with the Egyptian 
Christians because Prophet Muḥammad advised Muslims to take special care of them as they 
share kinship relations with him. This line of argument is new from Faḍl as he is using general 
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guidelines of the Sharia (treating people and neighbours kindly) to arrive at a ruling (the way to 
deal with non-Muslims not included in a covenant) regarding which there is a specific instruction 
from the Sharia, an approach which he himself criticised before. A similar approach was used in 
arguing against attacks on tourists and foreigners.   
Targeting Civilians in ‘Muslims’ Lands’  
In his criticism of jihadist movements in article 8, Faḍl spoke about their attacks against civilians 
in Muslim countries. Faḍl rationalised these attacks as being due to jihadist movements’ inability 
to attack their regimes, which prompted them to target civilians who are an easy target, only as 
a means to disturb the regimes they were unable to attack. As with other concepts above, Faḍl 
argued against targeting civilians employing an Uṣūlī approach. According to Faḍl, people in 
‘Muslims’ lands’ are either apparently Muslims (Mastūr al-ḥāl) who are known to be Muslims 
while there is no evidence to prove that their faith has been disturbed, or anonymous (Majhūl 
al-ḥāl) as there is nothing to indicate whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. In both cases, 
targeting these people is not allowed as the outward Muslim is assumed to be an inviolable 
Muslim and the unidentifiable cannot be considered non-Muslim until we make sure of that.637 
 Faḍl also utilised the differences in circumstances between the past and the current ages to 
support his view, an Uṣūlī approach that he rarely utilised in his previous writings as he did not 
approve of the validity of such changes. He argued that in the past those whose faith was not 
outwardly manifest in lands of Islam were considered Muslims as non-Muslims were forced to 
wear clothes different from those of Muslims and the Sharia punishment for apostasy was 
applied. However, nowadays both matters (having a different dress code and punishment of 
apostasy) are not applied. Hence, people in Muslims' lands nowadays are a mixture of different 
kinds.638 This allowed him to utilise the rule that: a person’s status of faith cannot be changed 
except with sufficient evidence to the contrary; and the Uṣūlī rule that when the prohibited 
mixes with the permissible, the prohibited takes priority.  
Therefore, he concludes, based on these rules, that it is prohibited to attack a mixture of people 
that include Muslims, non-Muslims, those who are outwardly Muslims and those whose faith is 
unknown as doing so will definitely lead to attacking the inviolate. Faḍl also proceeds with his 
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Uṣūlī approach noting that mass killing in bombings is either completely prohibited or dubiously 
prohibited, and when something certainly prohibited mixes with something dubiously 
prohibited, both must be treated as completely prohibited. After all, targeting the anonymous is 
not allowed except after making sure of their situation, which is unattainable nowadays. Faḍl 
finishes his comments on this point saying that he does not consider targeting common people 
in Muslims' lands to be an act of 'jihad' as there is no justifiable reason to target these people.639 
 The same applies when it comes to targeting other Muslim sects such as the Shiites. Killing 
them is completely prohibited as they are still Muslims despite their ‘evident aberration’. So, 
killing based on the dogmatic affiliation is as prohibited as killing based on nationality, 
appearance, identity, skin or hair colour, etc.640 Though Faḍl argued against targeting civilians in 
his revisions, he did not argue to the contrary in his previous writings though some of his 
writings on tatarrus could have been used to justify such attacks. Therefore, his opinion in this 
regard cannot be categorised as revisions as he did not call for the contrary before. What he 
directly justified before was attacking non-Muslims in Muslims’ lands by framing in the concept 
of dhimma. 
Attacks on Tourists and Foreigners (Amān) 
In his previous writings, Faḍl stated that if foreigners enter ‘Muslims’ lands’ with a visa from the 
government, it does not constitute a valid amān as this visa is issued by apostates and not by 
Muslims. As a result, Muslims would not have to respect it unless they were invited by a Muslim. 
However, in his revisions, he reframed this issue differently by directly speaking about the 
reasons why tourists and foreigners must not be targeted. As with other concepts, Faḍl based 
his new argument on several reasons that are related to or based upon Uṣūl al-Fiqh that will be 
discussed below.   
Employing the Uṣūlī approach of contextual differences, Faḍl noted that differences between 
the current circumstances and those of the past must be taken into consideration. He noted 
that in the past Muslims lived in lands of Islam and non-Muslims in lands of disbelief. Now they 
are mixed and it is too difficult to distinguish them. In Islamic countries in the past, non-Muslims 
were distinct from Muslims in their dress code, as conditions of amān were enforced. Now 
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Muslims are unable to force non-Muslims to have a different dress code because of the inability 
to apply the Islamic laws.641  
Also, Muslims are now spread worldwide and it is not possible to distinguish them from non-
Muslims, which makes it imperative to avoid harming them if they would be included in any 
attacks on other targets. This last argument is based on the Uṣūlī rule that when the permissible 
inseparably mixes with the impermissible, impermissibility takes priority. As a person's 
nationality, ethnicity, language, colour of skin or hair, Faḍl emphasises, is not an indication of 
being a Muslim or a non-Muslim, these physical features cannot be taken as a justification to kill 
that person.642  
Faḍl further amplified his framing by utilising some aspects of his previous interpretation of 
amān. He argued that even if the foreigners were distinct from Muslims and they were certainly 
non-Muslims, it is impermissible to attack them for they may have a valid amān if they have 
come to Muslims’ lands through an invitation from a Muslim. Such an invitation is a valid amān 
that must be respected and thus it is illegal to harm those visitors as they have proper amān 
from a Muslim. The visa given by the governing authorities does not prevent this amān given by 
a Muslim from taking effect. Faḍl has also argued that some scholars opine that whatever non-
Muslims understand as amān  should be considered valid amān.643 In fact, this argument on 
amān is not new from Faḍl as he made the same argument in his previous writings. 
He also noted that even if foreigners in Muslim's lands are undoubtedly unbelievers and are 
distinct from Muslims, most of them such as children, women, old people, professionals and 
clergymen are still inviolable under the Sharia. The Sharia prohibits killing these people, as long 
as they do not fight Muslims, even if they were in the disbelievers' encampments during 
fighting, let alone killing them when there is no fighting.644  This too rests on the Uṣūlī rule that 
when the permissible inseparably mixes with the impermissible, impermissibility prevails. 
Faḍl further supported his argument by framing in some general guidelines and principles of the 
Sharia on dealing with people kindly, a new approach that he did not employ before. An 
example of this is his statement that the general rule in dealing with non-Muslims is 'treat them 
as they treat you' except in things which are impermissible under the Sharia. Generally, these 
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people treat Muslims kindly and respect them when Muslims enter their lands and take good 
care of them. If there are some breaches in this regard, these are taken as exceptions that do 
not disturb the general rule. So they should be treated equally when they come to Muslims' 
lands.  
The fifth reason is that those people are not guilty or part of any dispute between Muslims and 
their regimes. If a person has issues or disputes with his government, why should those people 
pay the price?645 
The sixth reason is that most of those non-Muslims do not come to Muslims' lands for war. They 
come for trade, tourism or the like. Thus, treating them kindly is required in this case based on 
the general Quranic instruction in this regard. In addition, tourism is permissible in general and 
the punishment for illegal acts committed by non-Muslims during their visits is not killing. Their 
disbelief is graver and Islam does not force them to embrace Islam or punish them for being 
unbelievers. Faḍl ended his arguments by stating that these six reasons are enough to ban 
causing any harm to those foreigners.646  
Thus, the last few arguments made by Faḍl show how he embarked upon the new approach of 
framing in the general guidelines and principles of the Sharia on how to deal with people in 
general. However, his employment of these general guidelines can be, and was, easily 
challenged by counter-framing the contextual claims of treating Muslims kindly by non-Muslims 
and mentioning examples of violations against Muslims by non-Muslims. A similar approach was 
taken on the other side of amān, which is when a Muslim is granted visa to enter non-Muslim 
countries.  
Attacks on Non-Muslims in their Lands and Tatarrus  
 In article seven, Faḍl argues that when Muslims travel to non-Muslims’ lands, they are not 
allowed to cause any harm or trouble to them as they are given valid amān by those non-
Muslim states which has to be respected. This, he notes, is the issue of ‘jihadi operations inside 
abodes of war’ [i.e., lands of disbelief]. This is because the visa granted to Muslims is a valid 
contract of amān that Muslims must respect, even if it was a fake visa that people of these 
countries thought to be valid.  
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Faḍl has already made this point in his previous writings. What is new in the Wathīqa is that he 
has employed the Uṣūlī approach to develop other reasons to justify why attacks on non-
Muslims in their lands are prohibited. This is mainly because Muslims exist almost everywhere in 
the world nowadays and it is likely that they will be included in the attacks, especially attacks on 
a large scale, such as bombings. This has brought him to the issue of tatarrus. 
 Faḍl framed his new argument that the concept of tatarrus cannot justify killing Muslims by 
attending to the Uṣūlī concepts of necessity and its scope; weighing harm and benefit; the 
impermissibility of actions when the permissible and impermissible apparently contradict, and 
the concept of contextual differences. Killing a Muslim, Faḍl argues, under the pretext of 
tatarrus is not sanctioned by a Sharia text but is a kind of ijtihād based on an individual’s 
understanding and thus is allowed only when absolutely necessary. Scholars who allow killing 
the Muslim shield, Faḍl notes, allow this only in defensive jihad when some Muslims are taken 
by disbelievers as human shields and there is a real fear that the Muslim army and the shield will 
be destroyed if this human shield is not attacked, and there is no other way of preventing the 
enemies’ attack except by killing it.  
This is not the situation in offensive operations inside abodes of war (i.e., Jihadist attacks on 
non-Muslims in their lands). There is no real necessity for war operations inside abodes of war 
as these are offensive operations that will cause no harm to Muslims if left or delayed. Tatarrus 
works only when there are two armies and a group of Muslims is taken prisoner by the army of 
disbelievers to prevent Muslims from attacking them and allow them to defeat the Muslims. 
Nowadays, Muslims in lands of disbelief are not prisoners of war but citizens and residents. In 
addition, they are not taken as human shield in situations when there are two warring armies. 
Furthermore, there is no war status so that Muslims can take precautions and keep away from 
the battlefield. Rather, they are killed suddenly and without warning (contextual differences). 
Scholars who allow killing Muslims in such a situation have conditioned that there must be an 
absolute decisive necessity, as this entails allowing the killing of inviolable people while there 
are numerous Sharia texts that prevent killing them (rules of necessity; mixing of the permissible 
and the impermissible and the scope of necessity). To override these texts, there must be an 
absolute decisive necessity, which means certain total destruction of the Muslim army if the 
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Muslim shield is not killed. This is not the case in bombing planes, trains and buildings in the 
‘lands of disbelievers’ as there is no decisive necessity for these operations. 647 
Re-employing the previous approach of applying the general principles of Islam, Faḍl concluded 
that attacking non-Muslims after entering their lands is a breach of the covenant of amān and is 
thus treachery and betrayal, which are completely prohibited in Islam. In addition, this is 
transgression and God prohibited Muslims from transgression. Even if some non-Muslim 
countries transgress against Muslims and indiscriminately kill them, Muslims are not allowed to 
transgress against their citizens as treachery and transgression are not among the things in 
which equal treatment should be observed. The rule is to treat non-Muslims as they treat 
Muslims but in matters that do not violate the teachings of the Sharia.  
Indeed, killing the inviolate among them, treachery and the unnecessary destruction of property 
are all violations of the teachings of the Sharia, and therefore equal treatment does not apply to 
them.648 By extending his arguments to include some general Sharia guidelines of concern to 
most people, Faḍl is employing the frame alignment strategy known as frame extension, a 
strategy that he also employed in his framing against killing non-Muslim civilians in non-Muslim 
countries. 
Killing Non-Muslim Civilians in Lands of Disbelief (Non-Muslim Shield) 
Under this title, Faḍl uses the same approach to argue that it is impermissible to kill non-Muslim 
civilians in lands of disbelief even if there is no contract of amān and even if Muslims are certain 
that all of those under attack are disbelievers. Killing non-Muslim civilians in planes, trains and 
buildings is impermissible because in this case killing the non-Muslim shield is not allowed. 
Killing the non-Muslim shield is allowed only if they exist in the arena of war and fighting the 
disbelievers will not be possible without attacking them for it is impossible to distinguish them 
from fighters. So, blowing up these civilian targets is an intentional killing of civilians, an act 
which is completely prohibited in Islam.  
Following the same approach of emphasising the general Islamic principles of justice and 
prohibition of treachery and betrayal, Faḍl stresses that killing non-Muslim civilians is prohibited 
whether in peace or in war as it is an act of treachery and betrayal of the covenant of amān 
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while God says, “O you who believe, fulfil your covenants,” [Quran 5:1] and the Prophet says, 
"indeed, treachery is not allowed in our religion."649 
Muslims Living in Countries of Disbelief 
Under this title, Faḍl argues that Muslim residents of non-Muslim countries are not allowed to 
harm people of these countries or launch any attacks against them. In addition to the reasons 
mentioned above, Faḍl argues that it is not permissible for Muslims to betray those foreign non-
Muslims who offer them residence, security, education and jobs, even if they are unbelievers 
and there is no contract of amān.650  
As Faḍl has not argued to the contrary of this in his previous writings, the reason he mentioned 
this issue in his Wathīqa appears in the fierce attack he launched against al-Ẓawāhirī and 
members of al-Qaeda at the end of that article. Faḍl attacked his ex-fellows in the form of a 
warning to Muslim youth, "I say to residents of foreign countries and to all Muslims: beware of 
those ignorant people and be careful of the heroes of the internet and leaders of microphones 
who have addicted the issuing of statements and who throw you to the fire and then flee, 
leaving everyone behind, even their women and children. They have thrown lots of people 
before you into burners and prisons using money of intelligence apparatuses. The names and 
sums paid are there."651 Thus, the message seems to be that of warning against his ex-friends 
who have countered his ideology of the near enemy and deviated from the right path by 
committing these illegal acts. 
 
Analysis and Evaluation 
As the authors of Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists note, “It is extremely difficult to determine 
whether an individual is truly de-radicalized or merely disengaged; the only way to judge an 
individual’s underlying objectives is by observing his or her words and actions. Yet words and 
actions do not always accurately reflect objectives. This problem is particularly acute in the case 
of Islamist extremists, who often participate in de-radicalization programs after being detained 
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and thus have strong incentives to misrepresent their beliefs in an effort to secure their 
freedom.”652 
Founded on Faḍl’s arguments in the Wathīqa and the general features of his approach explained 
above, the arguments below are reflections of Faḍl's thoughts and ideology before and after 
revisions based on textual analysis of his theological textual arguments, combined with some 
contextual evidence. By textually analysing and contrasting Faḍl’s current and previous 
arguments and approaches, this section will reveal if there is a real change in the ideology and 
will explain the dynamics through which Faḍl could argue for or against violence using Islamic 
religious arguments in both cases. As this study is concerned with the ideological element of the 
whole process, the gauge according to which the ideological change will be measured is the 
reversal or reinterpretation of the previous core ideological constructs that were used to justify 
violence (as identified and explained in the previous chapter), particularly ḥākimiyya, takfīr and 
their related concepts. Thus, a genuine revision is defined here as the reinterpretation and 
unconditional reversal or modification of the core constructs that were used to justify violence. 
If these core concepts and frames are not seen to be changed, then there is no genuine 
ideological revision as the reasons why violence was legitimised remain in force despite the 
actual halt of violence. As Dina Al Raffie argues, behavioural transformation (the practical 
cessation of violence) alone is insufficient as an indicator to judge that specific individuals or 
groups have de-radicalised. Thus, “any study of deradicalization should also seek to gauge 
changes in individuals’ actual worldviews. This includes accounting for motivations underlying 
the behavioral shifts, and assessing the extent to which these are merely strategic or indeed 
permanent rejections of previous ideological positions.”653 
Thereupon, a scrutinising look at Faḍl’s texts and arguments reveals that there is no genuine 
change in the main frames of his ideology. Faḍl has not said that he has been wrong or that his 
previous writings were mistaken, nor has he said that he is revising his thoughts. All he said is 
that his writings were misunderstood and abused by others. In addition, there is inconsistency in 
Faḍl’s arguments. In the introduction, he stated, in what seems to be an attempt to escape 
blame for the consequences of his previous writings, that he is not a scholar, a mufti or a 
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mujtahid in the Sharia and that all that is in his books is no more than communication of 
knowledge to people, which does not require reaching the level of ijtihād. 
 However, this claim is contradicted by the fact that he filled his writings, including the Wathīqa, 
with arguments and deductions and arrived at serious rulings using such phrases as, ‘this is 
lawful, and this is unlawful’; ‘such is a wrongdoer’, and ‘such is an apostate’.654 These verdicts 
and ways of reasoning can be made only by the most qualified and spectacular scholars and 
muftis. In addition, his challenge to the rules of the greatest scholars of Islam and criticisms of 
almost everyone are other proofs that he has considered himself a qualified scholar, mujtahid 
and mufti.  
 Faḍl’s inconsistence is further evident in his declaration that "it is impermissible for those 
unqualified in the Sharia among members of the jihadi movements to transfer the general 
theoretical rulings in the writings from the Righteous Predecessors and bring them to our 
current worldly reality. Despite texts of the Sharia (the two major sources of Islam: the Quran 
and the Sunna) being immutable, they are valid for all times and places. This is recognised only 
by those who are well-versed in the Sharia.”655 In fact, Faḍl, who has denied being a qualified 
scholar or mufti, has filled his writings with examples of what he is warning against now. His 
verdicts and deductions have not only challenged Islam's most qualified scholars but have also 
had extremely serious consequences and implications on Muslim communities at large. 
In article 10 of the Wathīqa, Faḍl notes that takfīr is not a straightforward issue, which is why it 
requires high juristic qualifications and prolonged study of the Sharia, in addition to extensive 
experience in issuing fatwas and working within the Sharia judiciary. This further shows 
inconsistency, as he has spent hundreds of pages in his al-Jāmiʿ discussing takfīr and issuing 
judgments of apostasy against large sections of the Muslim community, which means that he 
considers himself qualified enough to do so. 
To further rid himself of the responsibility of the acts of violence inspired by his writings, Faḍl 
has claimed that his writings are general theoretical knowledge (aḥkām muṭlaqa) that cannot be 
applied to a specific individual or case without ensuring the fulfilment of conditions and absence 
of impediments which can be applied only by qualified scholars, and he is not one of them. 
However, this contradicts the fact that he has not only applied general knowledge to specific 
                                                          
654 Faḍl’s al-Jāmiʿ and al-ʿUmda are laden with such examples.  
655 Faḍl, Al-Wathīqa, article 2. 
185 
 
cases in the past and new writings but also set the general theoretical rulings that other 
'qualified scholars' should use as guidelines to judge others' faith and behaviour. 
Furthermore, although Faḍl claims that the rulings included in his previous writings are general 
theoretical ones and not fatwas, a review of his writings shows otherwise. Faḍl has applied 
many of his rulings to specific cases such as Egypt and other Islamic countries. He also criticised 
two of the IG's books that specifically spoke about Egypt and considered them to be faulty from 
a theological perspective. The IG books were applying the general theoretical rulings of al-walā' 
wa al-barā’ and the refraining group to the Egyptian regime, and he did not criticise them for 
that, he just criticised them for having what he considered serious theological mistakes. In 
addition, he has insisted that each individual ruler and each member of their supporters are 
apostates in person without the need for fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments. 
Declaring each individual member apostate is an application of the general theoretical ruling to 
each individual member in person, which contradicts his claim that his writings are only general 
theoretical rulings. 
In addition, Faḍl has applied, in several cases, the general rulings to the Egyptian and other 
regimes and gave examples in many of his rulings specifying countries such as Egypt and other 
modern Muslim countries.656 The latest example of this is notice two of the Wathīqa where he 
argues why rebellion against the Egyptian regime is not allowed, which is a clear example of 
applying the general ruling of prohibition of rebellion to a specific case, Egypt. After all, Faḍl has 
not said that he was wrong or that he has misinterpreted a single issue of what he wrote in his 
previous writings. It is ‘others’ who misunderstood them! In addition, he has not acknowledged 
that any of the views opposing to his has some sort of logic or is closer to the truth, nor has he 
called his Wathīqa revisions or even corrections. It is the media and government analysts who 
have given his Wathīqa that name.  
Faḍl’s statement that he takes back anything in his writing that contradicts the Sharia cannot be 
taken as a sign that he has renounced his old writings as this is a general disclaimer that is 
usually put by authors of Islamic books in the introduction of their writings. An example of this is 
Faḍl himself who placed this disclaimer in the introduction of his previous pro-violence 
writings.657 Such a statement could be considered a retraction from previous view(s) only when 
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an author declares that they have discovered that specific opinion(s) they previously held are 
wrong for whatever reasons and then starts correcting them, something which Faḍl has not 
done. On the contrary, his declaration that he takes back his opinions if they are found contrary 
to the Sharia means that he has made ijtihād (deductions by qualified scholars) that has enabled 
him to arrive at specific opinions and views which he sees compatible with the Sharia. In case his 
ijtihād proves to be mistaken, then he retracts it. 
The following arguments start with a briefing about the changeable and unchangeable aspects 
of the Islamic Sharia. This will help readers understand the argument on how Faḍl could shift 
from violence to non-violence, if he has done so at all, based on religious justifications in both 
cases. 
Fixed and Flexible Aspects of the Sharia 
Islamic legislation658 distinguishes between issues of two types, namely, those that are fixed and 
immutable – predominately referring to ʿaqīda (creed), acts of worship, and manners;659 and 
those that are flexible. These are mostly issues of fiqh; areas of life that are common to all 
people.660 ʿAqīda (fixed issues)  is derived only from uncompromising Sharia texts. The passage 
of time and varying locations and conditions do not allow these to be altered.661  
Despite the fact that Muslim scholars may disagree on specific issues of creed and different 
Muslim sects may adopt different versions of creed, each particular group classifies their version 
of creed as unchangeable. In other words, each group’s version of creed cannot change with 
time or due to different conditions. Conversely, the everyday matters of people’s lives are 
pragmatic in nature and issues related to these and transactions (muʿāmalāt) are believed to be 
within the flexible, changeable domain of the Sharia, whose judgements are determined from 
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sacred texts. At the same time, the conditions of people and the change of circumstances are 
taken into consideration and the benefits and harm should be weighed whenever a judgement 
is given. This means that personal reasoning (ijtihād) is of great significance to this type of 
rulings as sacred texts  covering these flexible issues are – most of the time – indeterminate and 
universal (ʿāmma wa ẓanniyya).662 In dealing with the changeable issues, the Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) are employed.663 Thus, these rulings  may be altered or reviewed in 
accordance with varying or different locations, times, situations, customs, etc.664  
In principle, Faḍl has emphasised that issues of governance, legislation and ḥākimiyya are all 
connected to the foundation of faith and the core of creed. So they are not among the 
changeable issues of Jurisprudence or issues of ‘branches’ (furūʿ) which can be changed with 
time and difference of places and circumstances.665 Thus, by placing these issues in the static 
side of the Sharia, Faḍl is closing the door of any possible discourse or negotiation over these 
issues and is also making it acceptable for himself to accuse of disbelief and/or deviation 
whomever opposes his views in this regard. This is what he has already done in his al-Jāmiʿ.  
Given the fact that Faḍl has classified his central frame of ḥākimiyya and issues of belief and 
disbelief (takfīr) in the unchangeable side, the fact that he did not say he was wrong or he was 
revising his previous views and the fact that his new writing is full of ambiguous 
overgeneralisation; none of Faḍl’s arguments in the Wathīqa should be considered a retraction 
or revision of his previous thought unless he expresses this directly or indirectly in his new 
arguments. In other words, if Faḍl has expressed any opinion in his previous writings and 
overgeneralised or kept silent on it in his Wathīqa, he will not be considered to have retracted 
the old view as there is nothing to indicate, directly or indirectly, that he has changed his view in 
this regard. This will be the general rule followed in this section, particularly due to the approach 
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665 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 900.  
188 
 
of the Wathīqa, which is overgeneralising and avoiding giving details of what contradicts Faḍl’s 
previous convictions and what may undermine the purpose of his Wathīqa. 
 Generally speaking, in issues where Faḍl still holds to his old views, he is either completely silent 
or is offering an ambiguous overgeneralisation, particularly in the points related to ḥākimiyya 
and takfīr, which are the main and most important issues to him. In principle, Faḍl has not 
renounced his old views or rules. He has just shifted the focus of his arguments from the static 
issues of ḥākimiyya and takfīr to the operational issues which are considered practical 
implications of these issues, such as rebellion, and thus can be measured by the Uṣūlī principles 
of harm and benefits, where he can make manoeuvres and few limited concessions.  
The argument will start with the most important issue of ḥākimiyya and its consequence of 
takfīr before it covers the practical implication of both concepts which is rebellion against the 
ruler. It has been established in the previous chapter that ḥākimiyya and takfīr are the major 
and most important frames which influence almost all of Faḍl’s pro-violence framing. And it has 
also been established that Faḍl’s views become very radical and inflexible when it comes to 
anything related to ḥākimiyya; yet he can make concessions in practical operational issues in 
case of incapacity and weakness. Thus, the degree of change in Faḍl’s ideology would be largely 
determined by the degree of change in his conception of ḥākimiyya and takfīr.  
Comparing the extended arguments and details given by Faḍl in his previous writings regarding 
these two issues with what he has mentioned in his Wathīqa reveals a huge gap between both. 
In al-Jāmiʿ, Faḍl dedicated more than 500 pages for ḥākimiyya and takfīr while in the Wathīqa 
he wrote no more than three pages of general guidelines on takfīr without giving any details, 
and he kept silent on ḥākimiyya and whether or not it causes apostasy. Given the above-
mentioned rule, this means that Faḍl has nothing new to offer in this regard. Furthermore, when 
it comes to details of takfīr, Faḍl is referring his readers to his book al-Jāmiʿ where he declared 
wide sectors of people apostate. This means that he still considers the arguments he made 
there as valid. Regarding rebellion, following is a reminder of how ḥākimiyya leads to takfīr and 
how takfīr leads to rebellion. 
As rebellion against Muslim rulers is prohibited even in the jihadi view, to justify rebellion 
against the ruler, this ruler must be considered apostate; and to consider him so, Jihadists use 
ḥākimiyya. However, to arrive at the final ruling of apostasy and then rebellion it is necessary to 
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follow a number of stages: first, belief that governing by a law other than what God prescribed 
(violating ḥākimiyya) renders the governing leader outside the fold of Islam because of 
committing major disbelief. Second, implementing takfīr - the generic theoretical ruling – to the 
governing leader in question, while ensuring that the conditions of takfir apply to the leader, 
and, at the same time, that no impediments are present that could mean the general ruling is 
not able to be applied to him. Third, directing the implementation of the ruling of takfīr against 
the governing leader. Fourth, having the capability to orchestrate a successful insurrection and 
ensuring that doing so will not bring about harm that outweighs any advantage derived from 
ousting the apostate leader.666 Implementing these phases to Faḍl's previous opinion reveals 
that he overstepped all of these stages: 1- He considered ruling with other than God’s laws a 
major disbelief that causes apostasy. 2- He applied the general theoretical ruling of takfīr to 
specific rulers. 3- He dropped the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments because 
rulers and their supporters are too strong to be subjugated. 4- He stated that capacity and 
preparation is necessary before making rebellion but practically overlooked the principle of 
harm and benefits. Consequently, he considered it obligatory to overthrow these regimes once 
the capacity is attained, and preparation becomes compulsory when capacity is missing.667 
In his new view, Faḍl has not changed any of the above except that he placed more emphasis on 
the issue of capacity and the principle of harm and benefits. He bans rebellion merely because 
of the lack of capacity and the existence of harm that is greater than the benefits of rebellion. 
He further adds that when capacity is missing, the obligation is waived. So, the stages of 
ḥākimiyya, takfīr and fulfilment of conditions preceding the stage of capacity and harm and 
benefits are still unchanged. 
 When we classify these steps according to the static and flexible domains of the Sharia, it 
appears that Faḍl still considers ḥākimiyya and its consequence of takfīr in the static side, which 
will not change and will not be weighed by the principle of harm and benefits or capacity. 
However, he has placed the operational issue of rebellion in the flexible side which can be 
changed as per the principle of harm and benefit and the factor of capacity. He has not banned 
rebellion because rulers of Muslim countries are not apostates. He has just banned it because of 
the lack of capacity and the existence of harm. Thus, it is just the focus of the argument which 
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has been changed from stress on the disbelief of those who violate ḥākimiyya to the 
consideration of the factors of capacity and harm and benefits. Each argument suits the purpose 
of the stage in which it was written. 
So, Faḍl has changed the focus of the argument to the juristic side of the equation, but has not 
changed his ideology regarding the dogmatic static side, which is the reason why he has called 
for rebellion. Therefore, although Faḍl has clearly expressed the prohibition of rising up against 
governing leaders, regardless of their having failed to apply the Sharia, he has not said that such 
leaders are not rendered apostate, because he has not changed his previous view and therefore 
has not introduced anything further in this regard. When harm, coupled with inability, make an 
action forbidden, this implicitly indicates that this action was, in the beginning, permissible or 
obligatory.668 Thus, forbidding rebellion because of incapacity and harm means that rebellion is 
originally permissible or obligatory, and it can be so only if the ruler is apostate because of his 
breach of God's ḥākimiyya in addition to the ruler’s walā’ to the disbelievers. Thus, Faḍl has not 
renounced his original position that governing with a law that is not Divinely inspired renders 
such leaders apostate. Therefore, he has not discussed ruling with manmade law or ḥākimiyya, 
because his view remained constant. This confirms the premise mentioned in the beginning of 
this section that Faḍl has only discussed that about which he is convinced and likewise, 
remained silent (or maintained a generalised view) about issues regarding which he still holds 
his old views.669 
This does not mean that Faḍl's views regarding apostasy of rulers are the only ones that remain 
unchanged. Rather, all of his views on issues related to ḥākimiyya and takfīr in general, with 
their applicability to rulers, their supporters and others whom he declared apostate in his al-
Jāmiʿ, are also still unchanged. For example, his classification of rulers' helpers and supporters as 
an apostate refraining group has not changed. He insisted in his al-Jāmiʿ that each individual 
ruler and each member of their supporters are apostate in person without the need for 
fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments and he has not said he was mistaken or 
that he retracted his views in this matter. This could also be understood from the fact that he 
has not forbidden rebellion because they (helpers of the apostate rulers) are not disbelievers or 
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because it is impossible to make sure of the fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments.  
As with apostasy of rulers, Faḍl has jumped to the last stage of harm and benefits when he 
banned attacks on the police and army forces whom he considered members of the refraining 
group. That is why he has argued in the Wathīqa that “it is impermissible to cause harm or to 
attack the army, police and security forces of the ruling authorities in Muslims' lands because 
this entails a lot of harm and corruptions.” So, this is not allowed because it “entails harm and 
corruptions,” not because they are inviolable Muslims. Thus, Faḍl still gives supporters of rulers 
the same verdict as the rulers even in the prohibition of attacking them because of the harm 
involved. This confirms that he still considers each individual member of the supporters of 
apostate rulers as apostates, without the need to make sure of fulfilling the conditions and 
absence of impediments. That is why when he has noted in the Wathīqa that the rulings he has 
mentioned are general theoretical ones, he made an exception saying that this applies 
“generally in most of the cases,”670 for he has declared each member of the refraining group to 
be apostate in person and he is unwilling to take this back. 
The interpretation of Faḍl’s statement “generally in most of the cases” can be found in another 
place where he speaks about the general guidelines on takfīr in article 10 of the Wathīqa. In this 
article, Faḍl states that the fulfilment of the conditions must be observed before issuing takfīr 
except in one case: the apostates whom Muslims cannot subjugate because of their powers (al-
mumtaniʿ bi al-qudra). This is exactly his previous argument in al-Jāmiʿ on the refraining group, 
which means he still classifies supporters of rulers as refraining groups whose members are 
individually apostate, like their leaders, and that he still holds his previous takfīrī rules. In 
addition, in the same article, he asked his readers to refer to his al-Jāmiʿ for specific rules on 
takfīr, which means he still considers them valid without change.  
Besides, when speaking about the reasons why he forbids attacking disbelievers who come to 
Muslims countries, Faḍl says that attacking them is an act of treachery because they could have 
come through invitation from a Muslim, which is considered a valid amān that has to be 
respected. However, he has not mentioned the visa given by authorities as it is given by 
apostates whose amān will be invalid for an acceptable amān is only what is given by a Muslim. 
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He even stated that the visa given by authorities does not affect the valid amān given by a 
Muslim.671 
Moreover, though there are plenty of sacred texts proscribing revolt against a Muslim governing 
leader, regardless of whether he is a tyrant, Faḍl did not refer to any of these sacred texts when 
contending for his judgement (prohibiting rising up against the regime in Egypt) as they discuss 
Muslim governing leaders and governments; not apostates.672 The fact that he did not use any 
of these sacred texts to buttress his stance (ban of rebelling against the Egyptian government)  
suggests that he is not speaking about the Muslim ruler but rather about apostate ones. In the 
second notice of the Wathīqa, Faḍl underpinned his stance regarding disallowing insurrection 
against Egyptian authorities by outlining six reasons and in none of them does he mention a 
sacred texts that prohibits rebellion, thus, suggesting that he maintains his stance that 
governing with manmade law entails apostasy 673 and that whoever helps those who violate 
God's ḥākimiyya is also apostate. 
The same applies to the ruling of lands that Faḍl has considered ‘lands of disbelief and apostasy’. 
As there is no change in his conception of ḥākimiyya, there is no change in anything related to it. 
While talking about rulings of lands in al-Jāmiʿ, Faḍl stipulates that he calls such lands in his 
works ‘Muslims’ lands’ or ‘lands of Muslims’ rather than ‘lands of Islam’, "… I draw the attention 
here to the fact that I always describe these lands in my writings as ‘Muslims' lands’ in regards 
to the majority of their population. However, this term is not equal to the term ‘lands of Islam’ 
as these are in fact lands of disbelief and apostasy, and launching jihad against its apostate 
rulers is an individual obligation on its Muslim residents."674 So, Faḍl considers Muslim countries 
lands of apostasy because he holds the view that a land is to be characterised by the laws that 
govern it and should not be classified according to the greater part of its population. Should a 
country be governed by Islamic laws, then such country would be characterised as Islamic. 
Likewise, if a country follows laws that are other than Islamic, it would be considered a land of 
disbelief, regardless of whether or not the bulk of its population is Muslim.  In the Wathīqa, he 
still uses the same term ‘Muslims’ lands’ and he never refers to Islamic lands or lands belonging 
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to Islam when discussing Muslim countries. This means that he continues to consider Islamic 
countries as lands of disbelief and apostasy, which branches from his static view on 
ḥākimiyya.675  
This is also true with tatarrus. Although tatarrus is an operational issue that is subject to the 
principle of harm and benefit, still there is no change in Faḍl's ideology as far as tatarrus 
pertains to the near enemy or apostate regimes, which are his main concern.  As Faḍl’s major 
concern is the 'near enemy' as per his understanding of the issue of ḥākimiyya, which he 
considers the core of Tawḥīd, he is not unwilling to adopt another view in operational matters 
that relate to the far enemy, particularly because his view in this regard is that Muslims are not 
allowed to target ‘original disbelievers’ in their countries when Muslims are given a visa that is 
considered valid amān. What he has done is shifting the target of his previous view on tatarrus 
from the near enemy to the far enemy to enable himself adopt another view that on the one 
hand does not contradict his old view and convictions and on the other hand contributes to 
depiction of his rival al-Ẓawāhirī and his ex-fellows who ousted him and contradicted his 
ideology of the near enemy.  
A closer examination of Faḍl's previous arguments on tatarrus reveals that his controversial 
views in this regard were in the context of attacks on soldiers and supporters of apostate rulers 
who usurped the ḥākimiyya of God and therefore he would adopt any argument that would 
allow attacking them, being apostates. This however, is different from the original disbelievers 
who do not have to be punished by death like Muslims who apostatised through ḥākimiyya. 
Thus, Faḍl's ban of tatarrus in the Wathīqa is related to offensive operations against original 
disbelievers, which is not his main concern being unrelated to the issue of ḥākimiyya. His 
previous arguments that allowed tatarrus were centred upon attacks on the local apostate 
regimes which he allowed due to the necessity of applying the Islamic Sharia, which is, according 
to him, a benefit that is greater than safeguarding the lives of Muslims. 
After all, Faḍl’s objections to violent acts in general are not because they are wrong in principle 
but because of the mistakes committed when launching them. While clarifying his motive for 
writing the Wathīqa, Faḍl said that when implementation of the Sharia was suspended, Muslims 
tried to revive its implementation through a number of means. One of these was to clash with 
the governing regimes. During these clashes, several religious mistakes and violations were 
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committed, which is why he and the signatories on the Wathīqa draw attention to these 
violations and mistakes so that Muslims can avoid them. This means that the objection is not to 
the mere idea of clashes themselves but to the violations committed in these clashes. That is 
why he still describes these violent actions as 'jihad'. This is further reflected in the title of the 
Wathīqa itself: Right Guidance to the Jihadi Activities in Egypt and the World. It is clear that the 
Wathīqa is not concerned about the traditional concept of jihad but about the acts of violence 
conducted by Jihadists, which he still labels ‘jihad’ and ‘Jihadi activities’. Had he considered the 
mere idea of clashes themselves to be intrinsically wrong, he would not have called them jihad, 
as jihad is a highly respectable duty in the Islamic Sharia whose name cannot be assigned to 
something wrong or mistaken. The only thing Faḍl has declared that he does not believe can be 
called jihad is targeting common people in ‘Muslims' lands’.676 In all other acts of violence which 
he has spoken about, he labels them ‘jihadi acts’.  
In all of the arguments in the Wathīqa, Faḍl’s point is to say that jihad (here, violence and 
clashes with local regimes) is not a suitable option at this stage. This carries the implication that 
it is still an option but not the most suitable one at this particular moment due to the lack of 
capacity and the harm involved. This is what he has actually stated before in his al-ʿUmda and 
al-Jāmiʿ. What is different in the Wathīqa is not the call for avoidance of clashes but the focus of 
the call. The focus in books promoting violence was on proving the apostasy of local regimes and 
the necessity of change, which was reflected in the space assigned to arguments of ḥākimiyya 
and takfīr. In the Wathīqa, the focus is on stopping clashes, so greater details and arguments 
were given to this area.  
A look at the other options which Faḍl proposed (da`wa, emigration, seclusion, forgiveness, 
condonation, turning away, patience in the face of adversity, and concealing faith) reveals that 
he does not consider political opposition and participation in elections as acceptable options. 
This is because he believes that political participation is an act of disbelief, as explained in the 
previous chapter that explored Faḍl’s views regarding democracy and political participation. 
These democratic political tools violate ḥākimiyya, an area regarding which he is unwilling to 
negotiate. Hence, he has not considered political participation or democracy one of the 
available options. Instead, this is one of the issues about which he remains silent. By confining 
means of reform to these options, Faḍl makes it easy for tyrannical regimes to subjugate and 
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enslave their peoples without facing even minimal opposition that will force them to make 
reform and allow people more freedom and rights. He is completely reluctant to employ 
modern means of political reform, being ‘polytheistic’, and therefore confines means of social 
change to things practised by the Prophet and his companions who lived fourteen centuries ago, 
at a time when political opposition was not an option. 
This applies also to Faḍl's argument on Dhimmīs. He reiterated what he said in al-Jāmiʿ with a 
little change in the practical application of these conditions to people at times of weakness and 
incapacity. The fact that he has not considered People of the Book in Muslim countries to be 
Dhimmīs is not a new positive stance but is a negative one. The People of the Book living in 
Muslim countries are no longer Dhimmīs because they are no longer governed by the 
‘unchangeable’ conditions of dhimma and are treated according to the new conditions of 
citizenship, which Faḍl considers at odds with the Islamic teachings represented in the 
unchangeable ʿUmarī conditions. These conditions of citizenship were laid by the polytheistic 
constitutions of secular (apostate) states that replaced Islamic laws with positive ones, including 
new terms of citizenship that replaced the Islamic terms of dhimma. So, not considering non-
Muslim minorities of Muslim countries Dhimmīs does not mean that Faḍl accepts treating them 
as citizens but it means that they are no longer governed by the contract of dhimma that 
guarantees them due protection. This leads to the consequence that no protection is due to 
them on the part of Muslims because "to Muslims, they are People of the Book not included in a 
covenant."677 This means that they are treated as ‘combatant disbelievers’ as per Faḍl's 
classification of non-Muslims in his al-Jāmiʿ.678 However, because saying that they are violable 
will undermine the whole purpose of his Wathīqa, particularly because of the sensitivity of the 
Coptic issue to the Egyptian regime, Faḍl stated that they should be treated kindly because it is 
not they who dropped the ʿUmarī conditions, and because they are neighbours who treat 
Muslims kindly. As a result, they should be treated kindly because of the general guidelines of 
the Sharia which apply to everyone, not because they deserve to be treated kindly in principle as 
subjects of Muslim countries.  
When it comes to the few issues that are not related to ḥākimiyya, Faḍl does introduce positive 
views such as a ban of attacking tourists in Muslims' lands and non-Muslim civilians in non-
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Muslim countries. However, these are still not new views, as he did not call for the contrary of 
this in his past works and there is neither evidence in his writing to say that one should assault 
visitors to a country and residents of non-Muslim countries nor is there any support for doing 
so. On the contrary, in al-Jāmiʿ Faḍl asserts that should a Muslim come to countries populated 
and governed by disbelievers, they are not permitted to cause any harm because of the 
covenant of security they took; in the form of a visa (even if it is not a valid visa) and in Islam, all 
covenants are to be adhered to.679 So, even in these issues, Faḍl has not provided new 
arguments that counteract his previous arguments, most likely because these are issues related 
to the civilians of the far enemy which is not his main concern. 
 However, he still holds radical views in this regard. For example, he forbids attacking them 
because of the amān given by them to Muslims, not because this should not be done in 
principle. He still considers non-Muslim countries ‘abodes of war’ (dār al-ḥarb) and still calls 
operations against non-Muslims "jihadi operations inside abodes of war’ [i.e., lands of 
disbelief].680 He also still sees that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
originally based on war and that Muslims are not allowed to enter into permanent peace 
agreements as this will lead to the abandonment of jihad.681 
To summarise, in the Wathīqa, Faḍl either kept silent or overgeneralised regarding the static 
issues, and shifted the focus of his arguments to those issues that are flexible. In so doing, he 
categorised insurrection against a governing leader – regardless of whether he is apostate – in 
the latter category; such issues are designated according to the principle of harm and benefit. In 
this way he rendered it disallowed to rise up against a governing leader – apostate or not. In so 
doing, Faḍl is still employing the same approach and style of writing which is typical of 
traditional Salafi literature. He still speaks of the ‘land of Islam and land of war’ (dār al-Islām wa 
dār al-ḥarb) and still uses the conventional Salafi way of reasoning that grants precedence to 
classical Islamic sources written by the Salaf, thereby practically re-refusing any calls for renewal 
in Islamic Jurisprudence or any attempt of reinterpreting the classical concepts to match the 
new developments and the new world order.682 This is further reflected in his employment of 
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sources in the Wathīqa where he has not used a single modern source to support any of his 
religious arguments. Faḍl has continued to quote his classical Salafi scholars even after changing 
the focus of his arguments from the creedal to the juristic issues, which has entailed a change in 
the sources employed.  
As he has focused on the practical issues related to the flexible side of the Sharia, Faḍl has 
employed the methodology of the flexible: that is Uṣūl al-Fiqh. As explained above, throughout 
the Wathīqa, Faḍl still quotes the sources of his preferred classical scholars, most particularly 
Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim, however, he concentrated on their works concerning Uṣūl al-
Fiqh; rather than ʿAqīda. The Wathīqa cites the word Salaf 14 times, Ibn al-Qayyim 14 times, Ibn 
Taymiya 24 times, and he buttresses his points of view by referring to 35 rules of Uṣūl al-Fiqh.683 
Thus, although Faḍl had to use more juristic and Uṣūlī sources due to the change in the focus of 
his arguments, he used the juristic sources of the same classical scholars he repeatedly quoted 
in his previous work. This demonstrates, along with the above arguments on issues related to 
ḥākimiyya and takfīr, that Faḍl is still using the same tools and the same classical Salafi 
approaches and that he is still in his Salafi Jihadist camp without moving or attempting to move 
to another camp or typology. 
Shifting to the Uṣūlī approach led to small alterations in how Faḍl perceived reality (al-Wāqiʿ). 
Fadl’s works that call for violence, paid little attention to reality because of the utopia which he 
sought in the realm of texts which can be noticed as he sought to lay down a collection of rules 
that he deemed ideal and which he believed it was incumbent on sincere Muslims to adhere to 
zealously; regardless of their time, place and circumstances. In the Wathīqa, however, Faḍl was 
disclosed to the complications of the practical world after he and his fellow Jihadists had been 
detained and faced the atrocities of prisons, in addition to the failure of the jihadi project to 
establish an Islamic rule in Egypt or elsewhere in the world after the consecutive military and 
spiritual defeats it received from the governing regimes.684 All of this has made him recognise 
that his utopian approach is no more than a theory in the text that cannot exist in the everyday 
lives of people and so it is necessary that he manage the reality – regardless of how distasteful it 
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might be. For this reason, he moved on to the Fiqh of reality and necessity making these few 
concessions and manoeuvres.685  
The shift in Faḍl’s consideration of reality influenced his attitude towards capacity. In his pro-
violence writings, Faḍl argued that if capacity is not present, obtaining it must be ceaselessly 
pursued, but the new argument is: if capacity is missing, there is no obligation. When he was 
free he was asking everyone to resist; now he has accepted the defeat and is discouraging 
Jihadists from resistance. This may be termed ‘The Fiqh of reality, incapacity, vulnerability and 
weakness’ that constitutes the main tenets upon which Faḍl has built his ‘revisions’. So, 
although Faḍl's core ideological views are not genuinely changed, he has practically closed the 
door of violence under the pretext of the principles of harm and benefits, incapacity and 
weakness, a charge which has infuriated Jihadists and prompted them to respond. It is this 
meaning (denial of weakness and incapacity) to which al-Ẓawāhirī referred in the title of his 
rebuttal of the Wathīqa: Clearing the Blame from the People of the Pen and the Sword from the 
Flaw of the Accusation of Impairment and Weakness.686 
When it comes to Faḍl's strong condemnation of al-Qaeda, it is the contrast in ideology between 
Faḍl and al-Qaeda that has enabled him to make some views which others see as revisions. 
However, there is nothing in Faḍl's previous writings that calls for the matters in which he 
condemned al-Qaeda, such as their conception of amān and the illegality of considering 
Muslims or non-Muslims as violable human shields in offensive operations in ‘lands of disbelief’. 
Hence, his arguments in this regard cannot be called revisions, as he has never called for 
anything contrary to them before. 
 Moreover, Faḍl's condemnation of al-Qaeda and its acts of violence can be interpreted within 
the context of his personal animosity with al-Ẓawāhirī and his followers among members of al-
Jihād Organisation who ousted him and counteracted his ideology of the near enemy by 
adopting the ideology of al-Qaeda, which focuses on the far enemy. It was due to the 9/11 
attacks perpetrated by al-Ẓawāhirī and his fellows that Faḍl was detained, maltreated and most 
likely tortured after he had been leading a free normal life in Yemen.687 Faḍl's animosity with al-
Ẓawāhirī is particularly evident in the polemics they exchanged, especially in Faḍl's interview 
with al-Ḥayāt Newspaper and his polemic al-Taʿriya where he replied to al-Ẓawāhirī's al-Tabri'a. 
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In these two documents, Faḍl employed very harsh Language and expressions to depict al-
Ẓawāhirī of all possible shortcomings. 
Faḍl's criticism of al-Qaeda can also be understood as a cover for the radical approach and 
arguments that he tried to conceal regarding the near enemy. It could also be interpreted in the 
context of his attempt to gain an asset with the authorities so as to earn himself and his 
imprisoned fellows a release from prison, as happened with the IG leaders and members.  
This brings the question of why has Faḍl written the Wathīqa and made such manoeuvers to 
stop violence despite the reality that he has not genuinely recanted his previous ideology on the 
root causes of violence? A textual-contextual analysis of Faḍl’s texts and justifications shows 
that he has written the Wathīqa in this way to earn himself and his fellow imprisoned Jihadists 
release from detention - or even minimally – to have their sentences reduced; similar to a 
number of the IG members and leaders who were all freed at the time of the writing of Faḍl's 
Wathīqa. One of Faḍl's texts that refer to this is his interview with al-Ḥayāt Newspaper in which 
he mentioned that he has sought to convince fellow inmates from al-Jihād who rejected the 
Wathīqa, arguing that they have to sign the Wathīqa so as to liberate inmates from prison as it 
is religiously obligatory to free captives according to the Prophet’s saying “free the captive,” 
and, after all, it was they who were the cause of them being detained in the first place.688 
 In article 14 of the Wathīqa, Faḍl has argued that all Muslims are required – according to the 
Sharia – to strive their utmost to liberate prisoners in any way possible. Though this is a 
collective obligation, Faḍl argues, it may become an individual obligation on specific person(s) if 
it is they alone who can free those Muslim prisoners. He has quoted several religious sources to 
prove this. One of these is the story of ʿAbd Allāh b. Hudhāfa al-Sahmī, one of the companions of 
Prophet Muḥammad, when he was asked to kiss the head of the Byzantine King in order for 
Muslim prisoners to be released. Though kissing the head of a disbeliever king is impermissible, 
al-Sahmī kissed the head of that king in order to release the prisoners, and ʿUmar, the Muslim 
caliph at that time, appreciated what he did.689 By this, Faḍl contends that even if one had to do 
something illegal to free prisoners, they would be justified and excused as they would be trying 
to do something for the benefit of Muslims. This is what he has done in the bits and pieces of 
operational issues he discussed. 
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Thus, the incentive of release from detention, which Faḍl also bases on Islamic justifications, has 
emboldened him to develop the Wathīqa in that particular way and has played a central part in 
determining the nature of issues and topics included in the Wathīqa as well as its timing. 
Nonetheless, this incentive has not made him write anything that he does not sincerely believe, 
but instead led him to the overgeneralisation and manoeuvres which Faḍl has made in his 
arguments when it comes to things where he still sticks to his old views.690 As the government 
found the revisions of the IG very fruitful, they encouraged the revisions of al-Jihād and 
highlighted them with huge media coverage and analysts' contributions. However, to the 
regime, although these ‘revisions’ are not as satisfactory and advanced as those of the IG, they 
are better than nothing and help improve the negative image of the regime in the sight of the 
advanced world and human rights organisations.  
This interpretation is supported by the narration of ʿAbd al-Munʿim Munīb regarding what 
happened inside prisons when the security officers asked al-Jihād prisoners to make revisions 
similar to those of the IG. Munīb, who shared the same prison cell with al-Jihād members, stated 
that there were three different groups among al-Jihād members with three types of responses 
to the call of the security officers for writing revisions. The first accepted everything that the 
security officers wanted; the second rejected the mere idea of revisions and refused to make 
any concessions, and the third, led by Faḍl, accepted to make the revisions on the condition that 
they would write whatever they wanted without intervention from the prison authorities. 
Munīb added that even though the security officers acted favourably to those who accepted 
everything, the final selection was in favour of Faḍl because of his scholarly weight. Munīb also 
noted that the security officers asked Faḍl several times to change parts of the Wathīqa but he 
always refused and insisted on publishing it without any change.691 
Due to this, Faḍl has kept silent on all the issues related to ḥākimiyya despite the fact that they 
are closely related to the core topic of the Wathīqa. If he had spoken about them he would have 
mentioned his old view and would have still been perceived as a fundamentalist; therefore, the 
incentive to obtain release for himself and his fellow jihadists would be rendered unlikely.692 
This is also why he over-criticised jihadists and did not criticise the Egyptian regime.  
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This chapter has provided a detailed overview of Faḍl’s new framing of jihad, forced ḥisba, 
ḥākimiyya, takfīr, rebellion, targeting civilians in ‘Muslims’ lands’, dhimmīs, attacking tourists 
and foreigners, attacking non-Muslims in their lands, tatarrus, killing non-Muslim civilians in 
lands of disbelief, and Muslims living in ‘lands of disbelief’. It has proven by textual evidence 
from Faḍl’s writings that Faḍl’s ‘revisions’ are not genuine as he has not changed the core beliefs 
that justify violence even though he has argued that violence is not currently a suitable option. 
He merely shifted the focus of his arguments from the issues that he places in the static side of 
the Sharia such as ḥākimiyya and takfīr into the operational issues that he classifies in the 
flexible side of the Sharia where he can provide new deductions based on the principles of 
incapacity and harm and benefit. Thus, he kept silent or overgeneralised on issues that pertain 
to ḥākimiyya and takfīr and spoke in detail about operational issues such as jihad, forced ḥisba 
and rebellion, which he prohibited due to incapacity and the associated harms. These findings 
and the textual-frame analysis employed to arrive at them are unique to this study. They also 
prove that frames can sometimes be manipulated to mask true ideological intent.693 
The shift in the focus of arguments entailed a similar change in the major frames. So the 
previous creedal central frames of ḥākimiyya and takfīr were replaced with the new Uṣūlī 
central frames of incapacity, harm and benefit and general principles of the Sharia. This brought 
about a different methodology to Faḍl’s framing, which is the methodology of Uṣūl al-Fiqh that 
is used to deal with juristic operational issues. However, though the change of the methodology 
entailed a change in the nature of the sources, Faḍl held to the old classical sources of the Salaf 
and refused to use any modern sources, which suggests that he is still working within the Salafi 
parameters and has not moved to any other school or typology. 
By proving that Faḍl’s ideological revisions are not genuine and that the best description that 
can be accrued to them is a call for temporary ‘behavioural disengagement’ , the arguments of 
this chapter establish that the long-heated controversy among observers, analysts and media 
figures (discussed in chapter 2) on whether Faḍl's ‘revisions’ or changes represent his own 
convictions or are product of torture and coercion, is of no real value given the fact that there is 
no real ideological change to discuss if it is based on conviction or a product of torture. What 
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really needs to be addressed is whether or not there is a genuine change in the ideology, which 
has been achieved in this chapter. The conclusions of this chapter also prove the efficiency of 
the textual approach compared with other causal and structural approaches as the textual 
approach could verify the authenticity and degree of change in the ideology which other 
structural and political process approaches could not. The textual arguments in the following 
two chapters on the IG will enhance this premise and prove how the textual approach can 







Chapter Five: The IG Ideology before Revisions 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the arguments of the IG on the concepts used to theologically justify 
violence in the pre-revisions stage. The following chapter will highlight and analyse the IG anti-
violence arguments to explore the general features of each stage. The conclusion will trace the 
dynamics and tools of change and will answer the main question: How could the Ig leaders 
change support and then retract violence using Sharia-based arguments in both cases? 
Thus, this chapter seeks to answer two main questions. First: What were the religious 
theological concepts and justifications upon which the IG leaders founded their violent ideology 
and how did they frame and interpret them? Second: What were the general features at that 
stage and how did they lead to violence? These will be answered by presenting a detailed 
overview of the IG ideology before revisions and an explanation of these concepts and how they 
are employed to frame and support violence. The chapter will show that the IG pre-revisions 
theological views practically targeted three main categories of people: Muslim rulers and those 
who work for them, foreign and local non-Muslims and other Muslim groups. The chapter will 
also show, in theological textual terms, how the IG arrived at its pro-violence views by focusing 
mainly on dogmatic issues in classical Salafi literature and transferring the rulings contained 
therein into contemporary reality without sufficient attention being paid to the differences in 
times or contexts as well as a lack of consideration concerning the consequences and outcomes 
of their actions. 
It is worth reminding the reader here that it was the historical IG leaders who either individually 
authored or co-authored the literature on non-violence and some of them authored most of the 
literature on violence. The IG leaders who were in Egyptian prisons at the time of the initiative 
are those who instigated the non-violence initiative and wrote the literature. These are Karam 
Zuhdī, Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm, ʿAlī al-Sharīf, ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid, Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, ʿIṣām Darbāla, 
Usāma Ḥāfiẓ and Fu’ād al-Dawālībī.694 These leaders constitute what is known as the IG Shūrā  
                                                          
694 These are the leaders who participated in drafting the literature on both violence and revisions as they were 
imprisoned inside Egypt. However, the founding members of the IG Consultative Council included, in addition to 
those leaders, Ṭalʿaṭ Fu’ād Qāsim, Usāma Rushdī, Ṣalāḥ Hāshim, Ṣabrī al-Banna and Rifāʿī Ṭāha. See Ṭal’aṭ Fu’ād Qāsim 
interview in Hisham Mubarak, “What does the Gama'a Islamiyya Want? An Interview with Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim,” Middle 
East Report (No. 198. [January- March 1996]), 40. The profiles of these leaders and their collective actions, tactics and 
roles are provided in chapter 2. Some of this material will be recalled here in the main text, when necessary. 
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Council. All the above leaders were jailed since Sadat’s murder until after revisions.695 Moreover, 
the IG leaders did not produce any literature when they were free, before the assassination of 
Sadat. They relied solely on preaching and disseminating small pamphlets quoting some classical 
fatwas, like those of Ibn Taymiya on the Tartars, and applying these fatwas to contemporary 
reality. This was partly due to their preoccupation with practical tactics because of the continual 
nature of the government’s surveillance and pursuit of them which left them with no 
opportunity to lay the theoretical foundations of their thoughts in written literature.696  
Thus, the IG leaders only produced literature in jail when they were able express their thoughts 
in writing. Simultaneously, extensive lessons that were given to the members. As most of the 
leaders were imprisoned from 1981 until after the revisions, the books were written by these 
leaders inside prison under severe repressive conditions. The main authors at that time were 
Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm, ʿIṣām Darbāla and ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al- Mājid who were all imprisoned.697 This literature 
included books like Mīthāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, Al-Qawl al-Qāṭiʿ fīman Imtanaʿa ʿan al-Sharā’iʿ, 
Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha and Al-Risāla al-Līmāniyya fī al-Muwālāh (The Limānī Treatise on 
Allegiance).698 
The most important and the most comprehensive of these books is Mīthāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī 
(Charter of Islamic Action) which was first released in 1984 and carried the name of the IG as a 
group. It appears from the title that the IG considers this book to be their charter and manifesto 
of working for Islam. The second most important book, also collectively authored, was 
Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha (Inevitability of Confrontation) which was also written in prison, in 
1987. It considered a confrontation with the regime as an inevitable fact and a duty on all 
Muslims.  
The third book frames and explains the IG view on those who refuse to implement the Islamic 
Sharia and breach the ḥākimiyya of God. It was entitled Al-Qawl al-Qāṭiʿ fīman Imtanaʿa ʿan al-
Sharā’iʿ (The Decisive Say on Those Who Refrain from [Implementing] the Sharia). It was written 
by ʿIṣām Darbāla and ʿĀṣim ʿAbd al-Mājid and first appeared in the late 1980s. Al-Risāla al-
Līmāniyya fī al-Muwālāh (The Līmānī Treatise on Walā’) also appeared towards the late 1980s 
                                                          
695 Ashour, “A world without Jihad,” 96-7.  
696 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 9-10. 
697 Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 104. 
698 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 10. 
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and was written by Ṭalʿat Fu’ād Qāsim who was freed from prison later and managed to flee 
Egypt to Europe. The treatise framed the IG view of al-walā’ wa al-bara’ and how they can bring 
about disbelief.699 Another book on ḥisba was written by the second-in-line commander ʿAbd al-
Ākhir Ḥammād who entitled it: Jawāz Taghyīr al-Munkar bi al-Yadd li Āḥād al-Raʿiyya 
(Permissibility of Changing Evil with Hand (force) for individual subjects). The book was first 
released in 1988. These are the books that laid the theological foundations of the concepts that 
were used to justify violence by the IG. 
 However, there was another genre of books that did not present theological debates on these 
issues. Instead, they either highlighted the injustices of the regime, such as the book titled 
Shāhid ʿalā Jarā’im al-Niẓām al-Miṣrī (A Witness on the Crimes of the Egyptian Regime), which 
was released in 1992. This book presented the witness of the Egyptian journalist ʿĀmir ʿAbd al-
Munʿim on the subhuman treatment and systema c torture that was afflicted upon the IG 
detainees when he was imprisoned with them. Another book entitled Maṣraʿ Ṭāghiya (A 
Tyrant’s Demise) presented the IG historical narrative and their view on the assassination of 
Sadat. After spending a long time in prison and undergoing severe conditions without achieving 
their goals, the IG wrote a book entitled Risāla ilā Kull man yaʿmal li al-Islām (A Message to All 
those who Work for Islam). The book appeared in the early 1990s and was directed to those 
who were suffering in prison and in hideouts, seeking to encourage them to be steadfast and 
have the glad tidings of triumph despite hardship and difficulty.  
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the IG views on the jihadi concepts that 
contributed to violence as presented by their leaders. In doing so it depends mainly on the first 
genre of books that presented the theological legitimisation of violence based on the theological 
concepts discussed below. These concepts and frameworks will be arranged according to their 
importance to the IG dogma and their contribution to violence, as follows: ḥisba, ḥākimiyya, 
takfīr and rebellion, the refraining group and fatwas of Ibn Taymiya, al-walā’ wa al-barā’, 
democracy and participation in political life, jihad, relationship with non-Muslims, jizya and the 
attitude towards the ‘other’ local non-Muslims, amān, tourism and the attitude towards the 
‘other’ foreign non-Muslim, and finally the attitude towards ‘the other’ Muslim. However, 
                                                          
699 These two books are no longer available, even online on jihadi websites. However, a detailed summary and 
critique of these two books can be found in in Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 656-739. 
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before discussing these concepts the chapter will discuss the means of change approved by the 
IG.  
Views of the IG before Revisions 
Means of Change 
In their Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī (Charter of Islamic Action), the IG leaders repeatedly declared 
that their tools of dealing with reality and enslaving people to their Lord lie in three things: 
daʿwa, ḥisba and jihad. Daʿwa is for those who are willing to listen. It addresses their hearts and 
minds with proofs and evidences to change the wrong and false convictions that people believe 
in. Ḥisba deals with Muslim individuals who commit apparent sins and are reluctant to listen to 
daʿwa. ‘Jihad’ is the only way to deal with those who fight the religion of God and try to 
implement their own desires and laws. The IG leaders emphasise that the three processes, 
which constitute the IG prognostic framing of dealing with the reality, must be applied 
simultaneously.700 The fact that the IG saw that the remedy lies in these three means, while Faḍl 
saw that the remedy lies only in armed rebellion, confirms the observation in some case studies 
on social movement framing that the prognostic dimension is one of main points in which social 
movements of similar goals differ from one another.701  
The difference between the three approved means of change is that daʿwa is the missionary 
work taking place in mosques and on various pulpits that is meant to guide Muslims and non-
Muslim individuals, telling them about the true teachings of Islam so that they would gain inner 
faith and Islamic discipline. Ḥisba is an on-the-ground action that is generally intended to 
protect and enhance the moral integrity of the existing Muslim community by preventing 
apparent sins from being committed. Though it is practised against individuals, its overall 
outcome ensures the well-being of the entire Muslim community. Jihad will then be used to 
fight non-Muslim entities whether local ‘apostate’ regimes, refraining groups, or foreign powers 
to restore the usurped Sharia and the missing glory of Islam.  
The process of linking these three means of change and their related framing concepts to 
people’s needs and aspirations is known as ‘frame bridging’, which refers to the linking of two or 
                                                          
700 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 56-9. 
701 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 617. 
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more ideologically harmonious but structurally unconnected frames (such as: ḥākimiyya leads to 
the implementation of the Sharia which restores the glory of the religion and brings justice and 
welfare) regarding a particular problem or issue through the linkage of a movement 
organisation and ideas with an un-mobilised sentiment pool or public opinion cluster. This 
frame-bridging process is part of the strategic efforts made by the IG and al-Jihād to link their 
interests and interpretive frameworks with those of prospective constituents and actual or 
prospective resource providers.702  
Another strategic process of frame alignment that is applied by the IG, and is close to frame-
bridging, is known as ‘frame extension’, which portrays the group’s interests and frames as 
extending beyond their primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to 
be of importance to potential adherents.703 The difference between this and frame-bridging is 
that frame-bridging links the frames to commonly and communally sought principles such as 
justice, welfare, peace and economic betterment, while frame extension links the main 
frameworks to the individual or specific group’s needs belonging to actual or potential 
adherents.704  
As da’wa is not one of the concepts that contribute to violence, it will not be covered here. Only 
the last two means of change will be covered. Ḥisba will be mentioned first as, practically 
speaking, it is the most important and most practised element in the IG dogma and the one that 
first alarmed the regime and made it launch its raids against the IG, which later provoked 
excessive violence from both parties. As discussed in chapter 2, the IG overuse of ḥisba in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s provoked the regime and made it respond by excessive military 
campaigns, detentions and torture of the IG members.705 This in turn provoked IG retaliatory 
violence against the regime.  
The IG leaders themselves confessed that their clash with the regime was “not to implement the 
Sharia nor to oust and replace the ruler, but was an objection to afflicted oppressions and an 
                                                          
702 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 624. 
703 See, e.g., Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,”625. 
704 For example, Maḥmūd Shuʿayb, one of the IG adherents, states that he joined the IG when one of the IG members 
linked their ideas to his personal needs as he “took interest in me, and even took interest in my personal problems. So 
I became emotionally dependent on that man.” Maḥmūd Shuʿayb’s interview in Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murāja‘a, 
132. 
705 Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 116. 
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attempt to restore lost rights.”706 Hence, the main goal behind the clash between the IG and the 
Egyptian regime was releasing their prisoners and was provoked as a retaliation and reaction to 
the attacks of the regime707 that started mainly because of IG excessive use of ḥisba. When it 
came to fighting because of the Sharia, the leaders believed in the necessity of fighting and that 
this fighting would need proper groundwork for which they were preparing. So, the IG 
conception of jihad, ḥākimiyya, rebellion against the apostate ruler and their quest for the 
implementation of the Sharia remained no more than theoretical concepts in their literature 
and were not the actual reasons for acts of violence against the state. They were summoned at 
the stage of confrontations to justify and support the IG practical acts of violence.  
In addition, the IG was known much more for ḥisba than for jihad. This is further supported by 
the fact that some Jihadists consider the IG to be a group of ḥisba rather than that of jihad,708 
and that members of the IG were sometimes described in some press reports as ‘members of 
the Group of Enjoining the Right and Forbidding the Wrong’.709 Thus, contrary to Faḍl and al-
Jihād Organisation, the IG was practically more concerned with ḥisba than with ḥākimiyya, 
takfīir and rebellion. Therefore, the discussion will start with ḥisba. 
Before Revisions: Ḥisba 
As ḥisba means enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, it can be done both verbally with 
tongue and physically with force, and therefore it could lead to violence. So, this section shows 
how the IG framed in ḥisba and how this led to violence and confrontation. The IG framed in 
ḥisba to enforce its attempt to monitor the community practices, gender relations, public 
manners and mores and even to censor cultural products such as public celebrations and films. 
For them, the use of violence was an acceptable means to apply this injunction. 
After mentioning a number of Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions that prove the 
importance of ḥisba, the IG Charter quotes Ibn Taymiya’s argument that ḥisba is a collective 
                                                          
706 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 94; Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 147.  
707 For more information on this point, see Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 122 ff. 
708 Abū Qatāda al-Filisṭīnī, “Ḥawla Tarājuʿāt al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya wa Tarājuʿāt Sayyid Imām,” Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa al-
Jihād (N. P, N. D.), 1.  
709 Al-ʿAwwā, Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, 72. 
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obligation and that it becomes individual obligation710 if nobody else did it or if the number of 
Muslims to undertake it in a particular situation is insufficient.711 The implication of considering 
ḥisba a collective obligation is that all of the Muslim community will be sinful and deserves 
God’s punishment if ḥisba is not performed properly or if there is no enough participants to 
undertake it efficiently. 
To outline the IG conception of ḥisba, the Charter identified and explained the constituent 
elements of ḥisba: the person undertaking ḥisba (al-muhtasib), the perpetrator (al-muḥtasab 
ʿalayh), the subject of iḥtiṣab (al-muḥtasab fīh) and the act of iḥtisāb itself.  
The muḥtasib (the person who makes ḥisba) must have the ability to perform iḥṭisāb. Therefore, 
those who have physical or incorporeal disability are exempted from making ḥisba. An example 
of incorporeal disability is the fear from unbearable harm that will afflict the muḥtasib. If such 
fear exists, ḥīsba will not be compulsory. However, if a person who will face such harm knows 
that he can endure the harm, he is encouraged to make ḥisba even if the harm is great. This 
corresponds to the IG pre-revisions line of thought that does not pay much attention to the 
consequences. Therefore, the leaders were asking the muḥtasib who will go through great but 
bearable harm to carry out ḥisba and they also stated that the exemption because of harm does 
not apply to little harm such as verbal abuse or cursing; instead a muḥtasib has to be prepared 
to receive this kind of harm and abuse. This constitutes the constraint-lifting strategy of IG 
framing of ḥisba.  
A similar line of thought is in the leaders’ argument that if the capacity exists but it is more likely 
that iḥtisāb will not yield any benefit, ḥisba is still compulsory. “The role of the muḥtasib is to 
enjoin and remind not to make people accept what he says.”712 This shows that the IG’s pre-
revisions approach was characterised by indifference to outcomes and lack of pragmatism, 
                                                          
710 ‘Collective obligation’ means an obligation on Muslims collectively but not necessarily on each individual Muslim. 
In other words, if a sufficient number of Muslims perform this obligation, the rest of Muslims will not be required to 
perform it, but if the number of Muslims who take part is insufficient to adequately perform that obligation, every 
individual Muslim will be sinful. The three means of change approved by the IG (jihad, ḥisba and daʿwa) are classified 
as collective obligations because not everyone has to do them, but only a number of Muslims that is enough to 
achieve the desirable results of these obligations. ‘Individual obligation’ means a mandatory action that has to be 
performed by every capable individual Muslim. The five daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage are examples of this as 
every individual Muslim has to observe them.  
711 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 59 
712 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 69-70.  
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which is driven by their general belief that they must perform ḥisba and jihad irrespective of the 
results or consequences. 
The IG did not consider appointment by rulers as one of the conditions of the muḥtasib even if 
the ruler is legitimate and recognised. Though the leaders acknowledged that ḥisba would 
ideally be made by a person who is appointed by the ruler, they insisted that this is not a 
condition the lack of which makes ḥisba inapplicable. As the IG perceived current rulers to be 
apostate, they denied them any legitimacy or authority over Muslims and therefore these rulers 
were not entitled to appointing any muḥtasib: “what is compulsory is ousting them, not asking 
their permission to perform iḥtisāb.”713  
As the legitimate ruler or imam nowadays is not existent, ḥisba must be carried out by others. 
‘Others’ here refers to those working in the service of Islam. By implication this refers to 
members of the IG who should constitute the ṭalīʿa or vanguard of ḥisba.714 To further support 
their stance on the necessity of practising ḥisba by individuals who are not appointed by the 
state, the IG devoted a book to ḥisba in which the author emphasised the IG view of the 
permissibility of changing evil with hand to individuals and common people and refuted the 
view that ḥisba should be done only by appointed muḥtasibs.715 
The second constituent element of ḥisba, the perpetrator (al-muḥtasab ʿalayh), is defined as the 
person who is committing any act that requires compulsory or voluntary ḥisba. Such a person 
does not have to be an adult.716 This implies that iḥtisab can be practised against children and 
minors. The third element of ḥisba is the subject of iḥtisāb (al-muḥtasab fīh). This refers to the 
wrong act that requires intervention of the muḥtasib. This wrong or evil act is termed munkar, 
which is broader than sin because if a minor or a child commits a wrong act, such as drinking 
alcohol, this is wrong (munkar) act but is not a sin or disobedience as minors are not taken into 
account or considered sinners if they do something wrong.717 For a munkar to require ḥisba, it 
has to be agreed upon by scholars that it is munkar. Hence, if there is an acceptable 
                                                          
713 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 70. 
714 Stein, “Uncivil Partnership,” 869.  
715 ʿAbd al-Ākhir Ḥammād, Jawāz Taghyīr al-Munkar bi al-Yadd li Āḥād al-Raʿiyya,’ (second edition, N.P.: Minbar al-
Tawḥīd wa al-Jiḥad, 1418 AH/ 1995.) First edition was released in 1988. 
716 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 70. 
717 This refers to the Islamic belief that people starts to be accountable for their deeds only when they reach puberty. 
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disagreement among scholars on whether that act is munkar or not, ḥisba should not be 
observed. Invalid or unacceptable opinions should not be considered.718 
 Though this condition closes the door of dispute over thousands of acts that Muslim scholars 
disagree on their rulings, it entails that the muḥtasib should not only be knowledgeable of the 
juristic opinions and debates on the act that may require ḥisba but also has the ability to make 
ijtihād and decide if the disagreement on that munkar is acceptable or not. As the IG did not 
condition that the muḥtasib must be a scholar or knowledgeable of jurisprudence, this raises the 
question of: how can a non-scholar muḥtasib know that there is disagreement among scholars 
and, if any, whether it is acceptable or not?  
This becomes more problematic given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the IG 
members are laypeople who did not study Sharia or obtain a degree in Islamic theological or 
juristic sciences. Most of them were either professionals, graduates or students of scientific 
subjects such as medicine, engineering, science, etc. Even the leaders themselves were neither 
graduates of a religious institutions, nor did they receive religious training from any recognised 
scholar or institution,719 and therefore they appointed Al-Azhar professor sheikh ʿUmar ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān as their mufti before he fled Egypt. So, the IG members and leaders did not receive 
proper theological and religious education that would qualify them for making such judgments 
on religious issues, which undermines their argument on the above point. The lack of proper 
religious education was reflected in the IG inability to recruit graduates of religious education as 
well as the apparent discrepancy between their theory and practice as shown below. 
Thus IG framed in ḥisba to characterise its relationship with and practise authority over the 
Muslim community. To do so, the ills extant in the community and misconduct of some of its 
members served as injustice or diagnostic frames, practising of Iḥtisāb served as prognostic 
framing and having a strong, religiously committed Muslim community that deserves the 
pleasure of God served as the motivational framing. However, the practice veered from theory. 
An example of discrepancy between theory and practice is the IG statement that munkar must 
exist at the time of iḥtisāb. This means that if the munkar is expected and not actually occurring, 
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ḥisba cannot be made.720 The fact that members of the IG attacked musical bands before they 
start their performances and burnt video shops stands as another example where practice 
diverted from theory.  
The condition that the munkar must exist at the time of iḥtisāb also means that if the munkar 
has already been committed and no longer exists, ḥisba should not be practised as ḥisba targets 
only munkars that are being done. If the munkar has been done, then the punishment should be 
afflicted by rulers or those whom they appoint and it is not left for common people. However, 
this condition does not work in reality as the IG considers current rulers to be apostate, which 
disqualifies them from implementing such punishments.721 This leaves the question open on 
who should implement the punishment in the absence of the legitimate ruler? It seemed that 
the IG, in practice, has undertaken this task when it started enforcing its rules and regulations 
on the areas where it had strong existence, which reveals another aspect of discrepancy 
between theory and practice. 
Another example of discrepancy between theory and practice is their statement that for ḥisba 
to be implemented, the munkar must be apparent not hidden, and that the muḥtasib is not 
allowed to spy to find a munkar.722 This theoretical condition is contradicted by the practice of 
the IG members who used to stop men walking in the streets with women and ask for a proof 
that they are married or relatives. Though the wrong implementation of the IG theory of ḥisba 
reflected discrepancy between theory and practice, both theory and practice were meant to 
enhance public manners and religious commitment, which explains how framing concepts like 
ḥisba drew on cultural currents and practices regarding the public manners and traditions, 
gender relations, the family, and corruption caused by the media and modem cultural products. 
The IG doctrine of ḥisba, despite the restrictions laid in this regard, was described723 as a 
doctrine of revolution given the IG’s approach of jāhiliyya towards the larger Egyptian society. In 
other words, as ḥisba was historically intended to rectify deviant behaviours, and the IG 
considered much of Egyptian society to have lapsed into jāhiliyya, the conservative aspect of 
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ḥisba fell down and it became a doctrine for cultural revolution.724 However, depicting the IG as 
a group that considered the majority of the society as jāhilī lacks evidence from their writings 
and actions. In fact, there is nothing in the IG writings or statements, before or after revisions, 
that depicts the society of jāhiliyya. Accusing the society of jāhiliyya was a charge that was cast 
upon the IG by their detractors and pro-regime media. As will be shown in this chapter the IG 
considers only the regime and its positive laws as jāhilī but not common people or the society 
itself. To the contrary, the IG is known to be a social group that interacts with people and 
provides them with services and social care. Moreover, the IG leaders and members persistently 
negate that charge and insist that they mix with people and do not question their faith or 
consider them to be inferior Muslims.725  
The fourth element of ḥisba is the act of iḥtisāb itself. This should follow, when having the 
capacity, a series of escalating steps that start with informing the wrongdoer that his action is 
munkar. The second step is to advise him and remind him of God and His severe punishment. 
Steps 1 and 2 should be done with lenience and gentleness. Step 3 involves reproaching the 
wrongdoer with harsh words. However, the reproach must be with hard words that are 
permissible in the Sharia and should not involve any impermissible or taboo words and should 
not be overdone. The fourth step is to change the wrong with force (al-taghyīr bi al-yadd), e.g., 
to spill the wine or break musical instruments. This must be done by the muḥtasib only if he 
cannot force the owner of the munkar objects to destroy them himself. This also should be 
restricted to what is necessary and should not extend to other permissible stuff.726  
The fifth step is to threaten the culprit of an action against himself. Threatening must be with 
permissible things only and the muḥtasib must not threaten the culprit with anything that is 
impermissible in the Sharia. The sixth step is to hit the culprit with hand, feet or any other 
means. This also must be restricted to the necessary amount and must not be overdone. If 
hitting will cause each party to summon his relatives and supporters for a fight, the IG leaders 
state two opinions. The first is that this can be done by individuals and the second view says that 
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jāhiliyya as the former means ignorance while the latter mostly refers to disbelief. 
726 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 71-2. 
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this can be done only by rulers and needs their permission.727 Again, these escalating steps were 
not observed by the IG members when practising ḥisba, which reveals further discrepancy 
between theory and practice.  This is partly because implementing all of these steps would 
require special training and detailed knowledge of the Sharia, which was not available to the IG 
members. This also contradicts the IG previous statement that ḥisba could be made by 
laypeople.  
As ḥisba places restrictions on people’s freedom, the IG tried to make it culturally resonant by 
associating it with public and communal benefit and linking it to the concept of harm and 
benefit. The IG notes that if any of the above-mentioned steps will result in harm or evil that is 
greater than the munkar or will result in missing a greater benefit, the ḥisba should not be done 
and if it is observed the muḥtasib will be sinner as his action resulted in greater harm. If the 
culprit is doing something good and something bad at the same time and they cannot be 
separated, the muḥtasib must look at which of the two is greater. If the good action is greater, 
the muḥtasib must command the muḥtasab ʿalayah to do it even if this will bring about a minor 
munkar. Forbidding the small munkar in that case becomes impermissible. If the munkar is 
greater, it must be forbidden by the muḥtasib. If they are equal, the muḥtasib must stay silent 
without commanding right or forbidding evil.728 
Though the IG leaders stipulated that the harm and benefit must be determined in accordance 
with the scale of the Sharia, they did not give any details on what kind of skill or training would 
entitle the muhtasibs to know or determine that any of the above steps can cause greater harm 
than the munkar or lead to missing a greater benefit. If this requires religious knowledge or skill, 
the overwhelming majority of the IG members do not have this, and if this is left to the 
discretion of the muḥtasib, personal judgements vary and perceptions of the beneficial or 
harmful and which is greater than the other also vary from a person to person.  
Another discrepancy between the IG theory and practice of ḥisba is reflected in one of the 
examples the leaders gave on the munkar that can be changed with force. They mentioned 
musical instruments as a munkar that can be changed by force, and the way to change this is to 
destroy these instruments. While they stated before that ḥisba must be observed only in things 
                                                          
727 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 72. 
728 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 72. 
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that scholars agree that they are munkar, it is well know that Muslim scholars disagree on 
whether or not music is permissible.729 Thus the condition that there must be no disagreement 
among scholars on considering the subject of Iḥtisāb as munkar was not practically observed in 
this and similar examples, which further reveals the divergence between theory and practice.  
The Charter then started to counter-frame opponent’s anticipated objections to the IG framing 
of ḥisba and its application in current times. The leaders argued that the muḥtasib does not 
have to be an upright Muslim, even disobedient and rebellious Muslims can practise ḥisba. This 
is again problematic in light of the fact that the muḥtasib should be able to judge the harm and 
benefit and which is greater in addition to having the required knowledge to determine if the 
munkar is agreed upon or not and if the disagreement is acceptable or not.  
The leaders also counter-framed the objection that ḥisba should be done only by a muḥtasib 
that is appointed by rulers. As the Prophet encouraged people to advise their rulers and rectify 
any deviant behaviour rulers might do, nobody can claim that those people would need 
permission from rulers to make ḥisba against them. The Charter also rejects the notion that 
ḥisba should be organised only by the Islamic top authority which is the Caliphate. God says, 
“And Let there be amongst you an Ummah who invites to good and enjoins what is right and 
forbids the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful” [Quran 3:104]. According to the IG 
pre-revisionist interpretation of this verse, ḥisba is requested from the Muslim Ummah in 
general whether they have a caliph or not, and this Ummah will never cease to exist even if the 
political power stops to be in their hands. These claims, the Charter notes, are without 
foundations in jurisprudence or Prophetic traditions. Indeed, the leaders emphasise, ḥisba is 
even more pressing in the absence of a Muslim caliph.730 The IG devotion of a comprehensive 
book731 to this point reveals how essential this issue was to them, for if this point had not been 
framed and substantiated enough, all of their acts of ḥisba that were not authorised by the state 
would have been considered impermissible under the Sharia.  
The Charter also responds to the claim that ḥisba must be temporarily set aside so that the 
powers and efforts of Muslims would be gathered for fighting the greatest munkar which is the 
apostate rulers who replaced the Sharia and for implementing the greatest injunction which is 
                                                          
729 See, e.g. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Ḥalāl wa al-Ḥarām fī al-Islām (Cairo, Maktabat Wahba, 1997), 261.  
730 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 74-6. 
731 Ḥammād, Jawāz Taghyīr al-Munkar. 
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the Islamic Sharia itself. While conceding that these are of top importance, the IG leaders 
insisted that the ḥisba and jihad are complementary of each other and not contradictory and 
that is why they must be observed simultaneously. Thus, the Charter renounces the philosophy 
of some jihadi groups, such as al-Jihād Organisation, that da’wa and ḥisba should be delayed 
until the apostate regimes is overthrown and a legitimate ruler appointed. Setting aside this top 
important Islamic imperative, the leaders argue, ‘would benefit only the infidel jāhilī regimes’.732 
The above argument of discrepancy between the IG theory and practice was confirmed by the 
leaders in several interviews wherein they admitted that the action of the members diverted 
from theory in many cases where force was overly used and some people were killed or injured. 
This was particularly the case in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the contact between 
imprisoned leaders and members was almost unattainable due to strict security measures in 
prisons.733 However, the above demonstration shows that deviation of practice from theory 
cannot be ascribed to the lack of communication alone. When it comes to ḥisba, this is also 
because of the lack of the necessary training and qualifications that would entitle members of 
the IG to properly observe the theoretical criteria and regulations of ḥisba set in this regard.  
Before Revisions: Ḥākimiyya, Takfīr and Rebellion.  
As previously explained, the concepts of ḥākimiyya, takfīr and rebellion are interlinked. 
Rebellion cannot be theologically justified unless the ruler is deemed apostate and ḥākimiyya is 
the main concept used to judge the ruler as apostate. Therefore, ḥākimiyya and takfīr are 
necessary to frame and rationalise any violent act against the ruler or the regime. Before 
revisions, the classified the ruler as apostate mainly because he did not implement the Sharia. 
Regimes that do not rule with Sharia are, in the IG view, ‘jāhilī’ ‘apostate’ regimes. Depending 
on a literal interpretation of the verses of ākimiyya, the IG leaders considered rulers apostate 
because they substituted the laws of God with secular ones and refused to implement the 
Sharia. Thereby these rulers were considering themselves as deities with God, as Allah the 
exalted says, “Or do they have other deities who have ordained for them a religion to which 
Allah has not consented?” [Qur’an 42:21]. These rulers are apostates because Allah stated, 
                                                          
732 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 76; Stein, “Uncivil Partnership,” 870.  
733 This was explained in chapter 2. 
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“Nay, by your Lord, they will not believe (in truth) until they make you (Muḥammad) judge of 
what is in dispute between them.” [Qur’an 4:65].734 
Rulers have apostatised as they neglected the implementation of the Sharia, which makes it 
compulsory to fight them to restore the laws of God. The leaders consolidated their view by 
quoting verses from the Quran which severely threaten those who do not rule according to the 
Sharia. Examples of this include verse 105 of chapter 4 and verse 40 of chapter 12. After 
counting Egyptian laws which are at odds with those of the Sharia,735 The leaders concluded that 
Egypt is full of infidel systems and laws which are clear-cut disbelief and therefore any ruler who 
implements them has committed apostasy736 This was how the IG articulated its frames, as the 
leaders assembled, collated and packaged slices of experienced and observed reality (injustices) 
along with moral directives or callings (religious interpretations) to arrive at their conclusions. 
The frames were further elaborated and amplified by accenting and highlighting the events, 
issues, or beliefs under discussion as being more significant than others. 
 To support this version of reality and interpretation, the leaders quoted a number of fatwas of 
classical scholars that give similar interpretations. Because Muslims agree on overthrowing the 
ruler if he apostatises, removing these infidel regimes is therefore compulsory.737 Thus, framing 
rebellion against rulers was justified using the creedal concept of ḥākimiyya coated in practical 
pieces of reality (injustices). Therefore, the leaders emphasise that restoring the Sharia is not 
possible except by removing the apostate governments that bar this and replacing them with an 
Islamic caliphate which would be established on the fact that only the laws of God are the ones 
to be followed and implemented.738 Thus, as with Faḍl, for the IG view on rulers and 
governance, ḥākimiyya and takfīr represented the diagnostic or injustice framing, rebellion the 
prognostic framing and establishing Caliphate and implementing the Islamic rule the 
motivational framing. Though Quṭb’s writings were not directly used , it is obvious that almost 
all of the IG arguments on the ḥākimiyya and the jāhiliyya are based on those of Quṭb.739 This is 
not only proven by the similarity of the IG arguments in this regard to those of Quṭb but also by 
direct acknowledgement of this by Ṭal’aṭ Fu’ād Qāsim who is one of the IG leaders. In his 
                                                          
734 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 10-12& 22 ff; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 30-1.. 
735 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 13-24. 
736 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 24; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 31. 
737 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 25-31.  
738 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 56-7.  
739 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 32. 
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interview with Hisham Mubarak, Qāsim plainly stated that the IG leaders studied the writings of 
Quṭb and that the ideas of Quṭb influenced not only the IG but also all of those interested in 
jihad throughout the Islamic World.740 The views and interpretations of the IG intersect with 
those of Quṭb in that both were written in jail under harsh repressive and inhumane 
circumstances.741 Also, a close examination of the IG extended views and arguments on apostasy 
of rulers due to ḥakimiyya reveals that these views and arguments are almost the same as those 
of Faḍl and that both employ a mixture of Quṭbian and classical interpretations of ḥakimiyya to 
frame their ideas and arrive at their conclusions. 
 So, ideologically speaking, Jihadists derived their views and interpretations from both classical 
and one modern sources. Interpretations and views of the Salafi classical scholars, more 
particularly Ibn Taymiya, concerning those who neglect the implementation of the Sharia, 
constitute the old and classical source form which Jihadists derived their views and legitimacy.  
Modern interpretations of the notions of ḥākimiyya and jāhiliyya as framed by al-Mawdūdī and 
Quṭb who introduced political interpretations of these concepts, constitute the modern 
resource from which Jihadists derived their views and interpretations.742 The classical heritage 
granted modern sources the Salafi appeal which accredited them and guaranteed to the 
followers that they are not deviating from the path of the Salaf. On the other hand, modern 
sources supplied the classical ones with the tools and language of the modern age, especially 
concerning ḥākimiyya that was never subjected to such an extensive and enhanced discussion in 
such a political sense in the classical Islamic writings as it was in the writings of Quṭb and similar 
Salafi Jihadists. The two sources were coined within an encapsulating framework of sociocultural 
and religious injustices to form what is now known as Salafi Jihadism.743 This confirms Tarrow’s 
assertion that “the symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a cultural closet 
and arrayed before the public. Nor are new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes 
of revolt are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres into collective action frames in 
confrontation with opponents and elites.”744 
                                                          
740 Qāsim in Mubarak, “What Does the Gama'a Islamiyya Want,”41. 
741 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 32. 
742 Kamāl Ḥabīb, “Khibrat Tanẓīm al-Jihād fī al-Murājaʿāt,” in Ḍiyā’ Rashwān, ed., Al-Murājaʿāt mina al-Jamā‘a al-
Islāmiyya ilā al-Jihād (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrām li al-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsiyya wa al-Istirātijiyya, 2008), 59. 
743 Ḥabīb, “Khibrat Tanẓīm al-Jihād,” 59; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 11. 
744 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 118.  
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 As the views of both the IG and Faḍl are almost identical on the reason why they consider rulers 
apostate, no further details will be given on the IG interpretation of these concepts. However, 
the IG leaders differ from Faḍl in their refusal to extend charges of apostasy to the soldiers and 
helpers of rulers, whom they consider as refraining group, because they cannot make sure of 
the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments and because they excuse them due to 
their ignorance.  
Moreover, to the IG, ḥākimiyya, is not the only major concern as it is for Faḍl, which is reflected 
in the space given for the concept in the writings of both. The IG did not link most of other 
things to ḥākimiyya as Faḍl did.  Thus, though the motivational framing of the IG is similar to 
that of al-Jihād, they vary in the scope and number of their diagnostic and prognostic framing. 
This confirms the assertion that “collective action frames may vary in the degree to which they 
are relatively exclusive, rigid, inelastic, and restricted or relatively inclusive, open, elastic, and 
elaborated in terms of the number of themes or ideas they incorporate and articulate. 
Hypothetically, the more inclusive and flexible collective action frames are, the more likely they 
are to function as or evolve into ‘master frames’.”745  
Framing researchers assert that the range of collective action frames of most movements 
encompasses only a set of related problems and is limited to the interests of a particular group. 
However, some collective action frames are very broad in terms of their scope, which allows 
them to function as a kind of master algorithm that shapes and restricts the orientations and 
activities of other movements.746 Therefore, terms like jihad, caliphate, and supremacy of Islam 
serve as master (motivational) frames for both organisations as well as for all Jihadist 
movements in general. 
Before Revisions: The Refraining Group and Fatwas of Ibn Taymiya 
To emphasise the obligation of rebellion against the local regime and frame and legitimise 
violence against regime supporters such as army soldiers and police officers which were not 
classified as apostate as per the Ig dogma due to the lack of fulfilment of conditions and absence 
of impediments, the IG did the same as Faraj who quoted the fatwas of Ibn Taymiya on the 
Mongols and ‘the refraining group’ and transferred the rulings contained therin to modern 
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746 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 618-19.  
220 
 
regimes, soldiers, and rulers’ helpers.747 The IG classified the Egyptian government as a 
refraining group because it declined to implement many of the rulings of the Sharia. Because the 
IG saw that religion must be implemented in full as it means full submission and obedience to 
God. Therefore, it argued that if regime declined to implement even few rulings of the Sharia, it 
would be assigning part of the religion to God and part of it to others, which is an act of 
apostasy. Therefore, the regime must be fought as God states, “And fight them until there is no 
sedition and [until] the religion, all of it, is for God.” [Qur’an 8:39]. So fighting is compulsory 
whether all of the religion was abandoned or part of it. There is no difference in this regard 
between applying all of the rites of the religion or some of them, even if few. Therefore, fighting 
the Egyptian regime, which abandons many of the rulings of the Sharia, is compulsory. God 
warns the believers that they will face destruction if jihad against those who abandon the rites 
of Islam is neglected.748 
The arguments of the IG in this regard highlight an important characteristic in the IG pre-
revisions ideology. The IG wanted everything and every single Islamic law to be applied and it 
would be willing to fight a state that applied even most of the Islamic injunctions but did not 
apply one or more rulings. The IG would invoke old fatwas of classical Salafi scholars whom it 
always quoted and preferred but would not take into consideration any kind of challenges, 
obstacles or circumstances that might have prevented the state from applying a specific ruling 
of the Sharia. All the arguments looked merely at the texts while paying no attention to 
differences of time and contexts, difference of realities or practical difficulties that might have 
caused some rulings to be suspended. 
An example of this is replacing the ʿUmarī conditions of dhimma with principles of citizenship 
that pay Christian subjects of Muslim lands equal treatment with Muslims. The IG looked at this 
as a suspension of the texts of the Sharia in this regard without paying attention to the 
differences between the time of ʿUmar and the twentieth century, to the new world order and 
the international pressures on Muslim countries to treat their citizens equally. This, however, 
has changed in the new thought; and change of circumstances and world pressures were among 
the major frames upon which the IG leaders relied in revoking their old ideology.   
                                                          
747 As explained before, Ibn Taymiya stated that that any group which stops implementing one of the rituals of the 
Islamic Sharia has to be fought until it returns to the implementation of that ritual. The war led by the first Muslim 
caliph Abū Bakr (d. 13 A.H.) against those who declined to pay Zakat is the most significant quoted example of fighting 
against a refraining group. 
748 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 31-2; Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 32-3. 
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The difference between the IG and Faḍl in their framing of the concept of the refraining group is 
that the IG did not consider individual members of this group, with exception of the ruler, to be 
apostate as long as they did not deny (make jaḥd of) the obligation of the Islamic rite they 
stopped to observe. However, they lifted the constraints on fighting them by emphasising that 
members of this group who assist rulers in their apostasy and relinquishment of the Sharia of 
God must be fought even if they do not deny the ruling they are reluctant to implement, even if 
they cannot be classified as apostate, even if there is no Muslim ruler or caliph to lead Muslims 
in their fight against this group, even if the ruler is the leader of that group, and even if they do 
not initiate fighting.749 
 In addition, whoever helps them will be fought as well even if he is forced to fight with them. 
Muslims must not stop fighting them until they make sure that they have observed the rite(s) 
which they neglected. Fighting this group, the leaders note, is not the same as fighting rebels 
(qitāl al-bughāh) as the rebels revolt against the Muslim caliph or ruler while this group rebels 
against the rites of the Sharia. Thus, fighting them is of the same kind as fighting the Khawārij 
and those who refused to pay zakat. By this, the IG and other jihadi groups, facilitated framing in 
this concept and lifted the constraint by reversing the order of the classical concept that 
stipulates that ‘the state’ is the one to fight the ‘refraining group’. The IG reversed the order by 
arguing that they ‘the group’ are the ones that should fight ‘the state’, considering the state to 
be a ‘group’ and positioning itself in place of the state.750 
All of this does not make this group apostate, however. A ruling of takfīr is issued only if they 
deny the rite which they stopped to observe (jaḥd). In this case, they will be considered 
apostate and Muslims must fight them until they come back to the religion or get killed all of 
them. Even if the group was considered apostate because of jaḥd, each individual member of 
that group cannot be considered apostate except after the fulfilment of the conditions and 
absence of impediments.751 As a practical implementation of the concept of the refraining 
group, IG, two days after Sadat’s assassination, framed in this concept to justify the attacking 
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751 This is the summary of a research the IG has conducted in this regard and documented in a book that argues for 
the necessity of fighting the group that refrains from observing one or more of the rites of Islam. This book is known 
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Asyut Security Administration and killing large number of soldiers and police officers as they 
considered them members of the refraining group.752  
The IG leaders gave no clue or rationale on why they did not treat rulers in the same way they 
treated their helpers and supporters. Why is the ruler considered apostate even if he did not 
deny the rites of Islam that he did not observe or consider the things prohibited by the Sharia to 
be lawful (jaḥd and Istiḥlāl)? In other words, why would members of the refraining group be 
considered Muslims if they did not deny what they stopped to observe while their leader not? 
And why the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments must be observed with them 
but not with the ruler? 
Thus, though both Faḍl and leaders of the IG agree on the necessity of fighting the refraining 
group, Faḍl sees that every individual member of that group is apostate without the need to 
make sure of the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments and irrespective of 
whether they commit jaḥd and Istiḥlal or not. Therefore Faḍl sees that they must be fought as 
‘apostates’ while the IG sees that they must be fought as a ‘Muslim’ refraining group.753 That is 
why Faḍl severely criticised leaders of the IG in this regard in his al-Jāmiʿ as they, according to 
Faḍl, did not make any distinction between sins that require jaḥd or istiḥlāl and those that 
automatically render their doers apostate without the need for jaḥd or istiḥlāl. “This is a major 
mistake in creed”, Faḍl notes, “and is the view of excessive among the Murji’ah.”754  
However, contrary to Faḍl’s claim, the IG does draw a distinction between these two types of 
sins and does not consider jaḥd and istiḥlal a condition of takfīr in all kinds of sins. The Leaders 
in their Charter conceded that some sins, such as blasphemy or deliberate desecration of the 
Quran or the Sunna, automatically lead to apostasy without the need for jaḥd or istiḥlal.755 So 
Faḍl and the IG agree on the general principle that some sins automatically cause apostasy with 
or without jaḥd or Istiḥlal. The difference between them in this regard is just regarding what 
                                                          
752 Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, interview in Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 132. 
753 There are several practical differences between fighting ‘Muslims’ and fighting ‘apostates’. There are also several 
different implications between both cases because if a member of the refraining group is considered apostate and 
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754 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 664-5. The Murji’a is a group that existed since the early days of the Islamic Caliphate and argued 
that a Muslim’s belief cannot be interrupted by committing any sin whatsoever as long as he has faith in his heart. 
Contrary to this belief, the Khawārij issue a judgement of takfīr against any Muslim who commits a major sin. As both 
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755 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 24: footnote 2. 
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kind of sins are included in the category of sins that does not require jaḥd or istiḥlal. The obvious 
is that Faḍl considers supporting the apostate ruler as one of the sins that cause immediate 
apostasy while the IG does not. Thus, Faḍl not only over-criticised the IG for something they did 
not say, but also classified this to be a creedal rather than juristic mistake and likened their 
saying to that of the excessive Murji’ah. 
The IG further supported and granted credibility to their views on the refraining group by 
quoting a fatwa of Ibn Taymiya in which he opined that fighting the Mongols (Tartars) was 
compulsory because they did not implement the Sharia but instead followed their scripture 
‘Yāsā’. Thus, they must be fought even though the majority of them were Muslims and their 
leaders declared that they embraced Islam. By analogy, as modern heads of Muslim states and 
their governments replace the Sharia with Western laws, they are similar to the Tartars and 
therefore have to be fought.756 This is in fact the same as the argument developed by Faraj in his 
al-Farīḍa al-Ghā’iba. This approach is also employed in their interpretation of the concept of al-
walā’ wa al-barā’. 
Before Revisions: Al-Walā’ wa al-Barā’ 
The IG leaders framed in the concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā’ to express their views on the 
relationship with Muslims and non-Muslims and to enhance their view of the apostasy of the 
ruling regimes. The leaders argue that believers are one community and their walā’ (love and 
loyalty) is exclusively devoted to God, His Messenger and to one another. What ties Muslims 
together is only the tie of faith; any other tie, such as blood or marriage relations, national or 
tribal affiliations, language or ethnic ties—all of these, if considered at the expense of the tie of 
faith, are ties of jāhiliyya and everything that belongs to jāhiliyya is under the feet of Islam.757 As 
for barā’ (disassociation and enmity), it is for those who commit oppression, whether major 
oppression: the disbelievers, or minor oppression: wrongdoing Muslims. The disbelievers are 
met with nothing but full hatred and enmity; “Islam defines the attitude of the party of God 
towards the party of Satan, determines the attitude of the believers towards the disbelievers: it 
is hatred, enmity and harshness, nothing else.”758   
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If a Muslim shows loyalty to the disbelievers, the consequence is determined according to the 
kind of loyalty. Interior heart-driven loyalty constitutes a major disbelief that drives a person 
outside the fold of Islam. However, exterior loyalty is either a major sin or a minor one, based on 
the nature of the action committed. An example of exterior loyalty is to give disbelievers some 
sensitive information about Muslims to obtain a worldly gain while hating them in the heart and 
adhering to Islam.  Regarding the attitude of loyalty and enmity towards wrongdoing Muslims, 
these must be loved for the good qualities they have and hated for the evil qualities they have. 
Neither full love nor full hatred is permissible. Love and hatred must be assigned as per the good 
and bad behaviour of a sinning Muslim.759  
The IG devoted a pamphlet for detailed discussion of the issue of muwālāh (walā’) and titled it 
‘al-Risāla al-Līmāniyya fī al-Muwālāh’.760 This pamphlet is in fact complementary to their book 
on the refraining group. As the IG does not consider members of the refraining group 
(supporters of apostate rulers) to be apostate as a result of the issue of ḥākimiyya, it might 
consider them apostate because of the interior walā’.761 Thus, the most practical reason why the 
concept of muwālāh is discussed in this pamphlet is to explain how the concept of walā’ can 
lead to apostasy of this group in general. 
As the IG leaders see that interior loyalty to disbelievers (particularly apostate rulers) causes 
kufr, they argue that if the support given by members of the refraining group to the apostate 
regimes is interior heart-driven support, this constitutes disbelief after making sure of the 
fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments. If this support is exterior, then it 
constitutes a sin and not disbelief. Hence, the theoretical classification of muwālāh into exterior 
and interior one has a practical consequence on those who work for the regime. If this work 
involves direct support to the apostate ruler and his oppression, such as working in the Egyptian 
police, it causes apostasy if the person who has this kind of work loves it and is satisfied with 
this kufr. However, if such a person works to get a worldly gain while his heart is satisfied with 
faith and hates that kufr and wishes that it would be removed, he is only sinful, and the degree 
of his sin is determined by the kind and degree of the support given to the regime.  
                                                          
759 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 140-2. 
760 Ṭalʿat Fu’ād Qāsim, Al-Risāla al-Limāniyya fī al-Muwālāh, in Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 704-49. Though the book is ascribed to 
only one of the IG leaders, the introduction of the book states clearly that it is collectively approved by IG leaders and 
that all the views expressed in the book are those of the IG as a group. 
761 The author defined muwālāh as “support, love, honouring, respect and being with the beloved in an interior or 
exterior manner.” P.9. This means that any kind of exterior or interior support, love, honouring, respect from a 
Muslim to a non-Muslim constitutes the forbidden muwālāh. 
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However, the IG added a third category in which it would be allowed, even recommended, to 
work for the regime. It is when working there would achieve a Sharia-approved benefit or 
thwart anticipated harm.762 The IG added this third category to exclude members of Islamist 
movements who work in the army or the police to clandestinely support Islamist movement. 
Example would be ʿAbbūd al-Zumur and Sadat’s assassins. By implication, this means that 
Muslims cannot work as employees to non-Muslim governments, whether apostate rulers or 
followers of other religions, as this will be classified as either exterior or interior muwālaḥ, 
unless there is a Sharia-approved benefit from that. Earning one’s livelihood is not mentioned as 
one of the approved reasons. This can also be inferred from the example given by the IG when 
they considered Prophet Joseph’s work for the king of Egypt as exterior muwālāh but acceptable 
as there was a Sharia-approved benefit from that work.763 
This too mirrors a general feature of the IG writings at this stage, which is considering the text 
only without paying attention to the difference of conditions and circumstances and difference 
of times and places. They, for example, did not pay attention to people’s need for work and the 
fact that if people stop working for the government, many of them won’t be able to earn their 
bread, which reflects the IG separation from reality and their endeavour to impose theory over 
the existing reality. 
Thus, the only reason (manāṭ) for considering the refraining group (in general) apostate in the 
sight of the IG is their interior walā’ to apostate rulers, and this general ruling of apostasy (Takfīr 
muṭlaq) cannot be extended to any individual member (Takfīr al-muʿayyan) of that group except 
after making sure of the fulfilment of conditions and absence of impediments. Thus the Egyptian 
regime in general, including state security personnel, can be described as kāfir if they have 
interior walā’ but this does not extend to any individual member of the regime, with exception 
of the head of the state, except after considering the conditions and impediments of takfīr with 
every individual member of that group.764  
The practical implication of conditioning the fulfilment of conditions and impediments by the IG 
is that they will not be able to issue a ruling of takfīr against individual members of this group 
                                                          
762 Qāsim, Al-Risāla al-Limāniyya, 30-8; Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 704. 
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764 Qāsim, Al-Risāla al-Limāniyya, 37-8; Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 726. 
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because of their inability to make sure of the fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments. This is one of the major differences between the IG and Faḍl in this regard and 
this is perhaps the reason why Faḍl rejects this obstacle and insists that when a group is very 
powerful, as in the case of the regime supporters, fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments must not be observed. Furthermore, Faḍl sees that there are three reasons each of 
which is enough to declare supporters of rulers as apostate. These are: 1- their walā’ to the 
apostate kāfir rulers, 2- their fighting for the sake of ṭāghūt;765 3- their hostility towards God, His 
Prophet and His religion. If they escape the first reason, the second is enough to declare their 
apostasy and if they escape the second the third is enough, but they actually, Faḍl insists, fall 
under all of the three categories.766  
Another difference is that Faḍl does not differentiate between interior and exterior muwāalāh 
when it comes to takfīr as the IG does. According to Faḍl, both interior and exterior muwālāh 
cause apostasy. Furthermore, Faḍl sees that fulfilment of conditions and absence of 
impediments must not be observed with members of the refraining group because they refrain 
by their power from yielding to Muslims and thus are too strong to be subjugated by Muslims.767 
That is why Faḍl extensively responded to the IG arguments in this pamphlet and counter-
framed their arguments his al-Jāmiʿ, describing the IG with harsh descriptions.768 
Before Revisions: Modern Means of Change: Democracy and Participation in Political Life 
The consideration of daʿwa, ḥisba and jihad as the only acceptable ways of change means that 
any other way is rejected. By confining means and tools of change to the above three, the IG 
leaders are excluding modern ways of change, being jāhilī, such as the democratic process, 
participation in parliaments and political parties, even though these are considered legal and 
acceptable means of changes to other Islamic movements such as the MB. Other ways of change 
are described as ‘heretic’ for God has not enjoined or prescribed them. Thus, all means of 
change presented by the ‘infidel regime’ through its institutions and systems and according to 
its principles and ways as tools of action or means of change are vetoed as they belong to 
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766 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 689-90. 
767 This has been explained in detail in chapter 3. 
768 Faḍl, Al-Jāmiʿ, 704-49. 
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jāhilliya.769 Therefore the IG wrote a study titled ‘Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya wa al-ʿAmal al-Siyāsī’ 
(Islamist Movement and Political Work) in which it criticised Islamists, particularly the MB, who 
joined the parliament in 1986 and argued, using similar points to those outlined above, against 
working within the established institutions of the apostate jāhilī regime.770 
Full reliance on texts alone and rejection of coping with new developments are distinctive 
characteristics of the IG approach before revisions that are evident in their rejection of modern 
tools of change for they were not supported by texts from the Sharia. The leaders emphasised 
that Islam has identified the means its followers have to to pursue to achieve victory and 
establish the religion, and therefore it is inacceptable that followers of Islam borrow other ways 
made by jāhiliyya and then claim that they are trying to establish the religion and achieve its 
ends. “Doing this is instead supportive of the jāhiliyya in its bid to achieve its goals and ends. It is 
no more than deviating from the path of Islam to join or come in line with the ends and goals of 
jāhiliyya,” the leaders emphasise, “means in Islam are not different from the Sharia nor are they 
a secondary matter that can be changed while keeping other Islamic features and characteristics 
intact.”771  
By equating means of change to the Sharia itself, the IG leaders are practically classifying tools 
and means of change in the static side of the Sharia that is not prone to change or modification. 
Therefore, the IG leaders clearly state that “Islam can never continue if we change its creed or 
rituals, nor can it continue if we change its ways and tools of handling matters. The former is the 
same as the latter and there is no difference whatsoever.”772 The IG leaders even reject the 
mere idea of holding a comparison between the approved means and modern ones as their 
pride in Islam makes it inconceivable for them to hold a comparison between their religion and 
other ways. “A man-made way of life does not dare to rise to a status that allows it to be 
compared with Islam, even in a single aspect of its approaches.”773 The argument that the IG 
pride in Islam makes it inconceivable for them to hold a comparison between their religion and 
other ways reflects how some of the IG arguments were emotional rather than rational, which is 
another feature of the IG approach at that stage. 
                                                          
769 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 58. 
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The above arguments are not only emotionally driven but also based on the assumption that 
Islam prohibits any thing coming from outside it and that any new tools or means that was not 
used before must be contradictory to Islam. That is why the leaders are reluctant to mere 
thinking of other ways or modern tools without considering that some of them might be in line 
with Islamic injunctions or at least not contradictory to them. A comparison does not mean 
showing the differences only but means showing differences, similarities and points when there 
is no contradiction. Thus, in the IG old approach, the dramatic differences between the past and 
present and the new challenges of life are completely discarded. Ironically, this might amount to 
the assumption of some detractors of Islam in their claim that Islam is rigid and does not adapt 
itself to the new requirements of life. This again branches from the IG full reluctance to consider 
new realities and full reliance on literal textual interpretations of the Sharia that led them to 
confining change to the old tools used by the Prophet and his companions, the era which is 
always described as the Golden Age and to which Jihadists in general and the IG in particular are 
extremely nostalgic. 
Before Revisions: Jihad and Relationship with Non-Muslims 
Jihad is the third variable in the IG approved means of change and is a master frame for all 
jihadist movements to justify violence in general, hence the name Jihadists. The term jihad here 
is broader than fighting local regimes and the refraining group. It means by way of priority 
fighting those in addition to fighting other original non-Muslims to spread Islam. This order is 
based on the IG dogma of the near enemy. Jihad is truly and rightly, the leaders argue, the 
‘neglected duty’.774 Jihad was viewed as inevitably dictated by several Sharia obligations. The 
reality, the leaders argue, is that Muslim lands are dominated by apostate rulers who enforce 
jāhiliya and replace the Sharia, that refraining groups who support those rulers suspend most of 
the rites of the Sharia, that there is no Muslim caliph, that Muslim lands are seized and that 
prisons everywhere are full of Muslim prisoners.775 Therefore, jihad is an inevitability dictated by 
the obligation of ousting the apostate rulers who replace the Sharia and enforce jāhilī laws on 
people, by the obligation of fighting the refraining group which stops practising any of the 
Islamic rituals, by the obligation of appointing a caliph for Muslims, by the obligation of 
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defending Muslim lands and restoring parts that were captured by disbelievers, and by the 
obligation of freeing Muslim prisoners.776 
So, the IG plan of action was to first free Muslim lands by following a series of military 
operations that would start with ousting apostate rulers and subjugating refraining groups (the 
near enemy) and compelling them to commit to the Islamic rites and installing a Muslim caliph 
who will be able to restore the Islamic rule. From there, they would proceed to the far enemy to 
restore usurped Muslim lands and free Muslim prisoners. The last stage is to send Muslim 
armies throughout the globe to call people to Islam through preaching for those who want to 
listen and the sword to those who refuse to listen. The only way to achieve this goal is jihad in 
the cause of Allah, which makes jihad inevitable.777 
There are many sincere Muslims, the IG criticises, who recognise the importance of jihad, but 
they do not practice jihad under the pretext that Muslims are weak and have no caliph or strong 
armies. So, they delay jihad claiming to be doing like Prophet Muhammad who delayed jihad 
when Muslims were weak and oppressed in Mecca. This is wrong, the leaders contend, as when 
the Prophet delayed jihad, there was a divine commandment to the Prophet to forgive and be 
patient at that stage. However, for current Muslim generations they are commanded with 
fighting not with tolerance and forgiveness as the Prophet did. The humiliating situation of 
Muslims nowadays is ascribed to the neglect of jihad; so any Muslim who neglects jihad 
nowadays is undoubtedly sinful. 
Like Faḍl, the IG lifted the practical constraints on jihad and argued that if there is no ability to 
launch jihad, preparation becomes compulsory as this is the only way out for the Ummah. Like 
Faraj, the IG leaders argue that the stage of weakness that Muslims experienced in Mecca was 
abrogated along with all of its rulings and injunctions. Thus, the IG continued to implement its 
purely textual approach by counter-framing a practical reality with a text when the leaders 
noted that the state of weakness Muslims experience nowadays is not similar to that stage of 
early Muslims for those Muslims who were in the stage of weakness were not ordered to fight 
or to prepare for fighting. But for current Muslims, they are ordered to fight and prepare for 
fighting as per the Quran 8:61. So this stage should be called the stage of preparation rather 
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than the stage of weakness. Again, Ibn Taymiya is quoted here to support this line of 
argument.778  
Moreover, the IG worldview and dogma of barā’ amplified their conception of jihad and 
inevitability of confrontation. They argue that what further makes jihad inevitable is the nature 
of Islam and the nature of jāhiliyya which are always in conflict and can never coexist. According 
to the leaders, conflict between Islam and jāhiliyya will never stop to exist even if Muslims try to 
overlook or ignore it because their enemies will never become content until they drive Muslims 
away from their religion. This is the goal of each party. Islam tries to annihilate and uproot kufr 
and the disbelievers try to annihilate and uproot Islam. So, Muslims will be ‘extremely stupid’ if 
they, after that elucidation, overlook that fact and stop making jihad before uprooting all 
material powers that help disbelief and its laws. Therefore, fighting must not stop before all 
features and system of disbelief are uprooted and levelled to the ground. Muslims have to know 
that even if they try to live peacefully with disbelief, disbelievers will not let them alone and 
they will uproot them and thus Muslims will lose twice, once in this life and another on the Day 
of Judgment.779 This reflects a conspiracy theory approach in the IG conception of how non-
Muslims conspire against Islam. 
The IG leaders employed history to support their views regarding disbelievers. However, their 
employment of history in their pro-violence writings was meant only to prove historical 
injustices and violations against Muslims, to serve as injustice diagnostic framing that requires 
violent actions that will stop these injustices (prognostic framing). They never used historical 
comparisons to argue for change of circumstances or difference of times and places that would 
require different ijtihād, which further proves their static view of the religion and its texts.  
They argued, e.g., that history would stand as a witness that the disbelievers tried to annihilate 
the Prophet and his followers though they did not fight them or cause them any material harm. 
Even when the Prophet immigrated to another city, they kept on fighting him. Several examples 
from history were given to support that view. Therefore, jihad is an historical inevitability as 
well. So the purpose behind jihad, Ibn Taymiya is quoted, is to dedicate the religion, all of it, to 
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God and to make the word of God the uppermost. “Though killing is an evil in itself, it is made 
permissible to prevent a greater evil which is the fitna of disbelief.”780 
Jihad was so bridged, amplified and extended that it was portrayed as the only way for Muslims 
to continue to exist. The IG framed jihad as the answer to the greatest challenge to Muslims 
nowadays: ‘to be or not to be’. If Muslims choose ‘to be’, they have to commit themselves to 
jihad, if they chose the other way, “then the interior of the earth is better for them than its 
exterior.”781 Though jihad is, generally speaking, a collective obligation except in a few cases, the 
IG sees that the cases when jihad is an individual obligation are present nowadays. Therefore, 
jihad is currently an obligation on all capable Muslims. As jihad is an individual obligation, 
preparation for it and whatever it requires is also an individual obligation.782 Framing ‘jihad’ as 
an individual obligation makes individual or small-scale acts of violence dependent on individual 
conditions and motivations and not on socio-political or organisational contexts or outcomes. 
This makes acts of violence more difficult to predict or prevent, which confirms the IG’s 
emphasis on the textual-only approach and its indifference to contexts and outcomes.  
Furthermore, as ‘jihad’ is very risky, the leaders connected it to strong motivational framings like 
martyrdom, saving Islam and Muslims, making the word of God superior, restoring the caliphate 
and Sharia, removing tyrants and repelling injustice. This shows that motivational frames are of 
special significance for jihadi groups, as they build increased confidence among recruits in their 
ability to confront the potentially deadly consequences of their involvement in violent activities 
and convince adherents to overcome significant barriers for high-risk activism.783 
Before Revisions: Jizya, Dhimma and the Attitude towards local Non-Muslims 
The IG framed in jizya, dhimma and rulings of the abode of Islam to justify their attitudes 
towards the Christians of Egypt and similar local non-Muslim groups. However, a few 
statements are given in the Charter about jizya and rulings of the abodes (aḥkām al-diyār). The 
leaders insist that everybody must be under the rule of Islam. If local non-Muslims do not want 
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to believe, they have to pay the jizya and abide by Islamic rule and rulings of the abode of Islam. 
If they refuse to believe or to pay the jizya and accept the rule of Islam, then fighting and killing 
is the alternative. Few verses were quoted to support this view such as 9:29.784 Despite being 
too concise, these few words clearly reflect the IG attitude towards local non-Muslims and their 
view on the abode of Islam and abode of disbelief. However, they did not explain how the rule 
of Islam would be imposed on those non-Muslims while they acknowledge that Islam does not 
rule even over Muslims. Therefore, their first step in this regard was to oust the ruler and 
impose the rule of Islam including jizya on non-Muslims. 
Thus, the IG saw that the Christians of Egypt as dhimmīs who revoked the covenant of dhimma. 
Hence the IG considered their blood and properties to be lawful for them as revoking the 
covenant of dhimma rendered those dhimmīs into combatant disbelievers. Moreover, Egyptian 
Christians were treated not only through the concept of revoked dhimma but also through the 
concept of barā’. This was practically reflected in the acts of violence practiced by the IG against 
the Christian minorities of Egypt, particularly in Upper Egypt where the IG was most active. The 
Report of the Religious Status in Egypt mentions that the IG would severely intervene violently 
against any Christian who had a dispute with a Muslim and that on 19 June 1992 in Asyut 
governorate the IG killed 17 Christians in avenge to the killing of one Muslim at the hands of a 
Christian in what was known as Dayrūt Massacre of 1992, an incident whose escalating 
implications transferred to the neighbouring governorate of al-Minya.785  
Incidents of robbery of gold shops owned by Christians in Upper Egypt and the consequent 
incidents of killing and violence against Christians786 were all, practically speaking, meant to fund 
the IG activities and put the Egyptian regime in trouble by showing its inability to protect 
minorities and thus press the regime to respond to the IG demands. However, these incidents 
were theologically framed in and justified by the refusal of the Christians to pay the jizya and 
reluctance to accept the rulings of Islam, which means that their covenant of dhimma was 
revoked and they became violable. This too reflects discrepancy between theory and practice. 
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Furthermore, the IG ignored the fact that it is only the state, not individuals or groups, which is 
allowed to collect jizya and take proper action against those who refuse to abide by the 
covenant of dhimma. However, their conception of the regime as Jāhilī enabled them to 
override that condition and appoint themselves in charge of implementing the rulings of Islam.  
Before Revisions: Amān, Tourism and the Attitude towards Foreign Non-Muslims  
As part of the IG reactions to the Egyptian regime’s violations, tourists were targeted by the IG, 
which was theologically justified by framing in the evils of tourism. Ṭalʿat Fu’ād Qāṣim, author of 
al-Risāla al-Līmāniyya, argues that many tourist activities are forbidden and therefore tourism 
as a source of income for the state is forbidden. He added that tourism in its present form is an 
abomination and a means by which prostitution and AIDS are spread. Tourism was also 
considered as a source of all depravities and a means of collecting information on the Islamic 
movement. For all of these reasons, the IG considered tourism impermissible and therefore 
must be destroyed. 
As tourism was not linked to ḥākimiyya and was forbidden only for the above reasons which are 
classified under the IG definition of munkar, targeting tourism should be technically classified 
under ḥisba and not under fighting the apostate regime. Given that fact, further discrepancy 
between the IG theory and action is reflected as nothing of the regulations and escalating steps 
of ḥisba was observed when the IG was striking against this important sector of the Egyptian 
economy. In addition, targeting tourism resulted in the death of some tourists, and forced ḥisba 
does not allow the muḥtasib to take the life of the offender. This discrepancy is further disclosed 
by Qāsim’s statement that “Striking at such an important source of income will be a major blow 
against the state. It does not cost us much to strike at this sector…. And it is one of our 
strategies for destroying the government.”787 
Thus even incidents of violence against Christians, targeting tourism and killing tourists were 
also meant to press and embarrass the regime to respond to the IG demands. Having been 
asked why would innocent tourists have to be killed? Qāṣim answered that they warned the 
tourists not to come to Egypt but they insisted to come and that the IG targets ‘tourism not 
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tourists’.788 The statement that they target ‘tourism not tourists’ is to rid the IG of the charge of 
killing innocents as they consider the tourists to have valid amān that makes them inviolable. 
However, the validity of the amān comes from what tourists understood as amān (i.e., the visa) 
though the visa is in fact not a valid amān as it was issued by an illegitimate apostate regime.789 
In other words the visa itself was not recognised by the IG as a valid amān being issued by an 
illegitimate regime. However, as tourists understood it to be amān, their understanding bars 
them from being killed as whatever non-Muslims understand as valid amān is considered 
acceptable even if it was originally invalid. This reveals more discrepancy between theory and 
action. 
Before Revisions: The Attitude towards Other Muslims  
The IG framed in the concept of muwālāh to justify its attitudes towards other Muslim groups. 
The IG views that achieving their goals of enslaving people to their Lord and establishing Islamic 
Caliphate must be achieved through collective work in a group or community that works 
according to the commandments of the Sharia. Thus collective work in a group is the correct 
form of muwālāh and is the meaning of the Divine order to be united and undivided. Based on 
that, the IG leaders criticise calls for isolation from society and refuse them altogether.790 
Though the IG is firmly calling for unity among Muslims, it practically excluded a large portion of 
Muslim movements from the aspired coalition under the pretext that their actions are not 
governed by the etiquettes of the Sharia. This came in the form of a condition that the IG 
leaders put for any group to qualify for joining the extended Muslim group: that is to be 
committed to the Islamic Sharia in its goals and objectives, in its creed and way of 
understanding, in its actions and endeavours. The leaders gave no clue on who would judge 
these aspects in other groups, nor did they determine which interpretation of the Sharia would 
be acceptable. The clear implication is that the IG leaders themselves would be the arbiters in 
this regard.  
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Furthermore, they did not take into consideration the inevitable variation among Islamic 
movements in their understanding and implementation of the commands of the Sharia and the 
differences in the way they work for Islam. Indeed, each group considers itself to be the true 
representative of Islam and the one closer to the way of the Prophet. As the IG leaders have 
explicitly stated that “many of these groups have freed themselves from the boundaries of the 
Sharia and have gone beyond the limits of its approved way of action,”791 the leaders are 
thereby practically excluding the majority of Muslim movements and disqualifying them from 
joining the unified Muslim group that will work for the religion.  
The leaders insist that unity is obligatory only if it going to be successful and not 
counterproductive, and it will not succeed except if the Muslim groups are united in their 
objectives, creed and understanding of the religion. Any differences in any of these categories 
constitute an obstacle to unity and any differences in other than these three categories are 
acceptable such as the differences in juristic issues. Examples of inacceptable differences include 
saying that music and singing are permissible and accepting figurative interpretation of God’s 
Attributes.792 
 However, these examples specifically are known to be subject to differences and debates 
among Sunni Muslim scholars and the issue of music is always classified among the juristic 
issues not those of creed, which confirms that the IG established itself as the arbiter of what 
kind of differences to be accepted and what to be rejected. Moreover, though the leaders state 
that they accept differences in juristic issues, they did not explain what kind of issues should be 
classified as juristic and what kind of issues should be classified as creedal. As will be explained 
later, this point, categorisation of the juristic and creedal issues, is in fact what made the IG 
dismissive of others before revisions and inclusive after revisions.    
Thus, the leaders have explicitly stated that they do not accept those who disagree with them in 
their understanding, objectives, ways, loyalties or animosities. They do not accept those who 
want to follow a course of action that is not approved by Islam such as political action or parties. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the list of those who are declined the right to join the extended 
Muslim group is lengthy. This includes in addition to the nationalistic and secularists, any heretic 
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who has a view different from those of the Salaf in any issue of creed; they reject the Shiites, the 
Sufis, the Murji’ah…..or anyone who contradicts the way or understanding of the Salaf.793 Yet, 
rejecting these groups does not mean avoiding interacting and cooperating with them in secular 
matters of mutual interest as this is permissible even with non-Muslims, but the difference 
between cooperating and uniting with them must be clearly noted.794 Even here the practice 
deviated from theory as the IG totally renounced, for example, the MB even in matters where 
they would accept cooperation with other groups. They insisted that, “Our disagreements with 
the Brothers prevent cooperation.”795  
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis of the IG and al-Jihād stances towards violence shows that they have 
exhibited behavioural manifestations consistent with most, or all, of the Salafi norms and are 
tied to Jihadists’ religious practice: adhering to a highly legalistic interpretation of Islam; trusting 
only core Salafi Jihadist scholars; perceiving an irreconcilable schism between Islam and the 
West; having a low level of tolerance for perceived theological differences; and attempting to 
impose their religious beliefs on others. These five behavioural manifestations were used by 
Gartenstein-Ross in his PhD dissertation as measurable variables applicable to most Salafi norms 
to determine the religiosity of Jihadists and the importance of religious ideas as a causal factor 
that drive people towards violence.796 This confirms the premise of this study that religious ideas 
and ideology are of paramount importance. 
The IG asserted that they wanted to establish the Islamic religion everywhere in the world and 
bring it to every human being, which could be realised only through making people fully 
submissive to God and by restoring the lost caliphate. This will not be achieved except if the 
                                                          
793 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 136.  
794 Al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiyya, Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī, 138. 
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ilā Jamāʿāt al-ʿUnf (Cairo: Wikālat al-Ahrām li al-Tawzīʿ, 1992), 176-7. 
796 For an overview and evaluation of these variables and how they are reflective of Salafi religious norms, see 
Gartenstein-Ross, “Significance of Religion,” 68-75. 
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government in power is also submissive to God so that Islam can become the true ruler over 
people. Thus, full establishment of the religion would be achieved only if  an Islamic system is 
installed.797This is why the IG believed in the ‘inevitability of confrontation’ with local 
governments to restore the Sharia; a belief that was mirrored in the title of the book that 
presented these views: Inevitability of Confrontation.798 
In framing terms, the leaders employed ‘frame articulation’ by connecting and aligning events 
and experiences (injustices) and making them hang together in a relatively unified and 
compelling fashion. This was done under the rubric of religious moral directives such as 
ḥākimiyy, caliphate and Sharia rule. As with Faḍl, though theological issues and the experiences 
and realities linked to these issues as presented by the leaders are not new, they were assigned 
special novelty; not so much through the originality or newness of their ideational elements, but 
through the manner in which these events were spliced together and articulated, in a way that 
granted them a new angle of vision, a vantage point, and an interpretation through assembling, 
packaging and collating pieces of the observed, experienced, and recorded ‘reality’ and linking 
them to an appealing interpretation of the Islamic moral code. Thus, the leaders served as skilful 
and compelling recruiters who knew how to weave interpretations of history, religion and 
present injustice into a tactical imperative. Therefore, it is this “weaving, this blending, this 
knitting or stitching together of strands of history, religious beliefs or ideology, conceptions of 
injustice, and selected events by movement and other sponsoring organisations that is the 
essence of the processes of frame articulation and elaboration.”799 
In these and similar arguments, the IG looked only at texts and interpreted them in their own 
way, completely discarding other considerations and contexts. Real world events and contexts 
were used only to develop injustices to help frame the texts. This was because they looked at 
the whole scene only through the eyes of the creedal issue of ḥākimiyya whose violation would 
require fighting to implement the commandments of God, irrespective of the ensuing 
consequences or aftermaths.800 
Though concepts like ḥisba, jihad and jizya are not new, the way the IG and al-Jihād framed and 
practised them did not tap into the majority of people’s existing cultural values, beliefs and 
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ideas. As one of the main factors affecting frame resonance is the extent to which the frame 
taps into existing cultural values and beliefs, both groups have resorted to what framing 
literature calls ‘frame amplification’. This involves the idealisation, clarification, invigoration or 
embellishment of existing values or beliefs (ḥisba, jihad, etc.,). The process of frame 
amplification is common to most movements, especially those like the IG and al-Jihād, which 
have been stigmatised because their beliefs and/or values contradict the dominant culture's 
core values.801  
Amplifying and reframing these concepts depended on the production of written literature but 
also on the multiplication of religious cultural products such as mosque lessons, small 
pamphlets, and audio and video tapes, along with the emergence of numerous actors (leaders 
and ideologues) with claims to religious authority. All this has given orientation to identity 
frames that utilise religious idioms and overlap with those of the Islamists and common people 
seeking solutions for their social and economic problems. Interpretative frameworks produced 
by the leaders arrayed religious and cultural concepts and symbols that appeal to people’s 
sentiments, emotions and needs. In this way, elements of their discourse could resonate well 
with segments of the population beyond immediate supporters and adherents.802  
Despite being coated in religious discourse, the prognostic and motivational frames of the IG 
also provided an attractive image of an idealised Islamic state, capable of solving Egypt’s 
numerous social, political and economic problems. Though led and inspired by leaders, these 
efforts are largely the result of an organisationally embedded process in which the articulation 
and amplification of strips of history, religious and personal injustices, selected segments of the 
Sharia texts, group-specific beliefs, and various contemporary events are woven together in a 
way that ultimately provides a compelling rationale for risky violent actions.803  
Thus, this chapter discussed the IG pre-revisions ideology on the concepts that were used to 
justify violence, and explained how these concepts were framed, interpreted and acted upon by 
the IG. The chapter also showed that the IG pre-revision frames targeted three categories of 
people: local regime and its supporters, local and foreign non-Muslims as well as other Muslim 
groups. The IG views regarding these three groups were, generally speaking, characterised by 
                                                          
801 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 624. 
802 Ismail, “Islamist Movements,” 401. 
803 Snow and Byrd, "Ideology, Framing and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 132. 
239 
 
antagonism, exclusion and a tendency to clash, rather than conciliation and compromise. 
Common features of their pro-violence framing include: heavy reliance on texts only while 
discarding pragmatic considerations, indifference about the outcomes of their actions, highly 
legalistic, literal and sometimes emotional interpretations of religious texts, heavy reliance on 
classical Salafi literature, trusting only Salafi scholars, having a low tolerance for perceived 
theological differences; attempting to impose their religious views on others,  perceiving an 
irreconcilable schism between Islam and the West, and  summoning the fatwas of classical 
scholars and applying them to current realities without noting the differences between the old 
and new realities or contexts. 
The IG literal and legalistic approach of interpretation and their indifference to outcomes was 
evident in its literal analysis of the verse of jihad, “Fight in the cause of God; you shall be asked 
only about yourself.” [Qur’an 4:84]. According to the pre-revision view, the verse means that a 
Muslim is not responsible for the results and consequences of jihad; he is responsible only for 
himself. This means that a Muslim is commanded to fight even if he does not possess tools of 
achieving victory and whether or not other Muslims are helping him in this regard.804 Thus, the 
views of the IG in this regard were presented mainly as a theological vision that relied 
extensively on classical Salafi interpretations which the IG accepted without questioning. As a 
Salafi group, the IG looked at the classical scholars as the ‘Salaf’ whose footsteps are to be 
followed and whose views must be irrevocably accepted as the only valid interpretation of the 
sacred religious texts. However, differences of time, place and context were not observed. 
The IG rigid worldview, influenced by dominant injustices, an unpleasant reality and a new 
world order, employed the context and the new world order- that is full of injustices- to justify 
violence while overlooking these realities and contexts as challenges and obstacles in their 
evaluation of the power of their opponents and the consequences of the application of their 
prognostic frames. Thus, they only looked at reality through the eyes of texts and paid minimal 
attention to practical considerations, pragmatism and outcomes. Thus, the status quo was 
employed only as injustice frames to support the IG understanding of texts but was ignored in 
determining the fruitfulness of the adopted means of change and their likely consequences. The 
IG wanted everything and every single Islamic law to be applied and was willing to fight a strong 
state that applied even most of the Islamic injunctions but did not apply one or more of its 
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rulings. They failed mainly because they insisted on violence without practical assessment of the 
consequences as they thought that violence would be a quick means of achieving their goals.  
Moreover, the acts of violence perpetrated by the IG swerved from theory as the members were 
drowning in retaliatory confrontations with the regime, which made most of their actions 
deviate from the details of the theoretical grounds the leaders had laid out for them. The 
discrepancy between action and theory was further fuelled by the lack of communication 
between the leaders and the grassroots due to the strict prison conditions imposed on the 
leaders, which marked the lack of any leadership to guide the members’ actions and ensure its 
compliance with the theory. The subsequent internal divergences on the appropriate use of 
violence between leaders and followers intensified micro-level dynamics of violence when the 
leaders lost the remaining executive and organisational control.805 
However, the greatest reason for the discrepancy between theory and practice, particularly 
when it comes to ḥisba, is the fact that the IG is a majority lay organisation whose members lack 
the necessary qualifications and religious training required to professionally understand and 
implement the theoretical literature. In the absence of guiding leadership, the lack of proper 
religious training caused adherents to misunderstand and misapply the theoretical details laid 
out in their literature. 
 Thus, instead of fighting to oust the ruler and implement the Sharia, they were only concerned 
with fighting to restore their lost rights and free their members without being governed by the 
regulations that were recorded in their literature. They even declared that they intended to 
strike against industry and agriculture. When they were asked about the time and extent of 
targeting agriculture and industry, their answer was, “It depends on the government’s hostility 
towards us.”806 However, though action on the ground deviated from theory, the theoretical 
literature was very important because the general ideas of takfīr, rebellion, refraining groups 
and ḥisba in the literature represented the general justification through which any act of 
violence would be framed and justified even though the individual details and regulations of 
each of these concepts were not observed. 
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The huge difference in power, weaponry and techniques between the regime and the IG helped 
the regime crush the IG fighters and put the majority of them in prison. The military defeat was 
coupled with spiritual defeat. In addition to counter-framing by official scholars and the 
campaigns of the media against them, the excessive use of forced ḥisba and the bloodshed that 
resulted from confrontations between the state and the IG, alienated people from the IG 
members and made them lose people’s sympathy. Thus, on the practical level they departed 
from their principles and could not build a strong base of public support and, on the theoretical 
level, they failed to act properly upon their doctrines and were concerned with ‘why to fight’ 




Chapter Six: The IG Views after Revisions 
 
Introductory remarks 
This chapter has two objectives: the first is to provide a detailed discussion of the IG attitudes 
concerning issues related to violence after revisions with the aim of exploring the main features 
of that stage and explaining how the IG leaders framed their new thought. To do so, the issues 
that affect the rulers and their regimes will be discussed first. These include: ḥākimiyya, takfīr, 
rebellion, inevitability of confrontation, the refraining group, fatwas of Ibn Taymiya on the 
Tartars, abode of Islam and abode of disbelief, jihad, extremism, and al-walā’ wa al-barā’. 
Thereafter, the chapter will discuss the issues and attitudes in the IG dogma that directly 
influence Muslim and non-Muslim masses, other Muslim movements and foreigners. These 
include: ḥisba, democracy and participation in political life, attitudes towards ‘the other’ – both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, – dhimmīs and jizya. 
 The second objective of the chapter is to answer the main question of how the IG could shift 
from violence to nonviolence based on Islamic theological interpretations in both cases. In 
addition to providing the reader with a summarised discussion of the ideas and arguments in 
the new views, the overviews are also intended to argue and prove that the IG leaders 
extensively framed in the Uṣūlī concepts of harm and benefit, Sharia general objectives, 
circumstantial justifications and interpretations to arrive at the new conclusions. The final 
analysis will build on this to show how these concepts were theologically employed to move 
from pro to anti-violence stances based on Sharia theological reasoning in both situations.   
As the writings of the IG after revisions are very extensive, it would be beneficial to remind the 
readers of the main sources written by the IG leaders and then explore the general features of 
the new literature before discussing the IG opinions on various issues. 
The IG leaders published several books about their new attitudes. The first series of books, 
called Taṣḥīḥ al-Mafāhīm (Correcting the Concepts), was issued in 2002 and included four 
books:  Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf: Ru’ya Wāqiʿiyya wa Naẓra Sharʿiyya(Non-Violence Initiative: A 
Sharia Perspective and a Realistic Vision), Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā’ ʿalā mā Waqaʿ fī al-Jihād min Akhṭā’ 
(Light Shedding on the Mistakes Committed during Jihad), Ḥurmat al-Ghuluww fī al-Dīn wa 
Takfīr al-Muslimīn (Impermissibility of Excessiveness in Religion and Accusing Muslims of 
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Disbelief), and Al-Nuṣḥ wa al-Tabyīn fī Taṣḥīḥ Mafāhīm al-Muḥtasibīn (Advice and Clarification 
on Correcting the Concepts of those who Perform Ḥisba). 
The first book explains the practical and theological reasons for the Non-Violence Initiative, 
while the second book illustrates the IG’s new understanding of the concept of jihad and sheds 
light on the mistakes the IG and other jihadist groups made in the name of jihad. The third book 
criticises extremism and excessiveness in religious matters and argues against the excessive 
takfīrī creed of Jihadists, while the fourth book deals with ḥisba and how it should be regulated. 
These four books generally cover and address most of the issues that were previously used to 
justify violence and they carry the names of the eight IG historical leaders. This was followed by 
a book in which the leaders recorded the memoirs of their life in prison and their revisions. They 
called it Nahr al-Dhikrayāt (River of Memories). 
Several books were published afterwards between 2004 and 2008, and each dealt specifically 
with one or more issues related to jihadi thought and relevant concepts. Most of these later 
books were written by the IG main ideologue, Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm, and were reviewed by other 
leaders. The most important of these is the book devoted to ḥākimiyya and titled, Al-Ḥākimiyya: 
Naẓra Sharʿiyya wa Ruʿya Wāqiʿiyy (Ḥākimiyya: A Sharia Perspective and Realistic Vison). Also 
included is a book on the fatwas of Ibn Taymiya and how they were interpreted to justify 
violence. This book is titled, Fatwā al-Tatār li Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiya: Dirāsa wa Taḥlīl (The 
Fatwa on the Tartars by Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiya: A Study and Analysis). Another book titled, 
Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha wa Fiqh al-Natā’ij (Inevitability of Confrontation and Fiqh of 
Outcomes), responded to the previous ideology of the IG on the inevitability of confrontation.  
Another category of books is devoted to a critique of al-Qaeda and commenting on its violent 
actions, such as, the bombing of Riyadh and Casablanca. These included books like Istrātijiyyat 
wa Tafjīrāt al-Qāʿida (The Strategy and Bombings of al-Qaeda) and Tafjīrāt al-Riyāḍ: Al-Aḥkām 
wa al-Āthār (The Bombings of Riyadh: Rulings and Consequences). Another category of books 
was devoted to societal issues and daʿwa. These include: Daʿwa li al-Taṣāluḥ maʿa al-Mujtama 
(A Call for Reconciliation with the Society), Hidāyat al-Khalā’iq bayna al-Ghāyāt wa al-Wasā’i 
(Guiding People between Ends and Means), Naẓarāt fī Ḥaqīqat al-Istiʿlā’ bi al-Īmān (Perspectives 
on Taking Pride in the Faith) and Tajdīd al-Khiṭāb al-Dīnī (Renewing Religious Discourse). 
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Generally speaking, the main ideas and arguments related to violence in the later books issued 
after 2002, are repetition or expansion on what was included in earlier books issued in 2002. 
The last category of books does not deal directly with issues related to violence. Therefore, in 
the overview of the new thought below, only the most relevant and earliest books would be 
used in referencing, as repeated and irrelevant material would be excluded. Later books, 
interviews and newspaper articles would all be used when they mention a relevant point that is 
not mentioned in the earlier books. Moreover, as these books were written by some of the 
historical leaders and reviewed, edited and approved by the rest of the leaders, the views in 
these books are considered to belong to all the leaders and therefore the reference will be to 
‘the leaders’ or the ‘IG’ in general, and not to a specific leader. 
Regarding the general features of the new literature, the leaders have stated from the outset 
that they follow the way of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā’a and al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (the righteous 
predecessors) as the general framework from which they derive their proofs and arguments and 
arrive at conclusions. This is their basis of judging any view or argument and ascertaining 
whether it is acceptable or not. However, the leaders did not directly mention details about the 
features of the way of the Salaf or Ahl al-Sunna or what distinguishes it from others. By stating 
that their approach is based on the way of Ahl al-Sunna and the Salaf, the IG leaders are 
requesting their readers to measure the validity of their writings by their commitment to the 
approach of the Salaf as indicated by the evidence and proofs presented. Stating so could also 
be a message from the IG that their approach – that depends on the way and writings of Ahl al-
Sunna – is what prompted them to depend exclusively on the sources approved by that way, 
and that excluding other Islamic sects or groups is not because of any animosity towards them 
but because the writings of these sects or groups contradict the approach of Ahl al-Sunna upon 
which the IG writings rely.807 
Stating that they based their arguments and conclusions on the approach of Ahl al- Sunnah wa 
al-Jamāʿa confirms the leaders’ commitment to the Sunni stream of thought as opposed to that 
of the Shia or any other Muslim sect that they consider deviant. However, this cannot be taken 
as evidence on the existence of a detailed specific methodology in the leaders’ writings, 
especially because they did not mention any details about the features and limits of that 
approach in their works. Therefore, all the theological arguments of the leaders are derived 
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from the variant Sunni sources as opposed to those of the Shia. These included old sources of 
classical Muslim scholars, such as Ibn Taymiya, Ibn al-Qayyim and al-ʿIzz b. ʿAbd al-Salām, as well 
as sources of contemporary Muslim scholars such as, al-Qaradāwī, al-Ghazālī and al-Būṭī. 
Nonetheless, the old sources outweigh the contemporary ones in the number that are used and 
quoted. This differs from the pre-revision stage where old sources were the only ones used in 
matters of the Sharia. In the new literature, the writings of many contemporary scholars are 
used even though they were considered deviant before revisions were made.  
Another general feature of the IG writings after revisions is the supremacy of the proofs from 
the Sharia over all other forms of proofs in explaining and exploring ideas and arguments. Any 
issue would be supported with evidence from the Quran and the Sunnah, and the leaders would 
also mention other related sources that explain the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah or build 
upon their explanations. References of numbers of verses from the Quran and the source in 
which a specific hadith is mentioned are given in most cases.808 However, selectivity in 
presenting and analysing the material which serves the leaders’ views is quite clear in the new 
literature as it was in the old literature. The leaders would select the sources and material which 
would serve their point of view, while ignoring others. This is clear in selecting specific Sharia 
sources and points of view, especially when speaking about rebellion, ḥisba, takfīr and the 
relationship with non-Muslims.  
It also seems that the leaders tried, or were told, not to speak about the role of the government 
in the revisions though the revisions could not have been written, the leaders would not have 
been allowed to tour prisons to explain the new thoughts to the grassroots, and the books 
would not have been revised by al-Azhar and printed and distributed widely without the 
permission and support of the regime.809 The same applies to the critique of the regime or the 
government. The general line of thought tries to evade speaking about the faults and injustices 
of the regime. 
Another common feature of the literature is repetitiveness and excessive details. In their 
attempt to devote a book to every single issue related to violence and commenting on the new 
events as they occur, the leaders wrote over 20 books and had tens of interviews and hundreds 
of newspaper articles. In all of these writings they repeat the same arguments and rules, 
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especially when speaking about the rules of Principles of Jurisprudence and matters related to 
harm and benefit as well as those related to the reality. This is sometimes necessary due to the 
overlapping of the concepts, and at other times it could be intended to confirm the same ideas 
and prevent any misinterpretation by repeating them on several occasions and in different 
contexts. Examples of these include, repeating the same arguments on takfīr in several places,810 
providing excessive details about the historical accounts of the consequences of rebellion 
against rulers,811 and speaking repetitively about the reasons for revisions and the enemies of 
the IG, Egypt and the religion.812  
Another common feature is the employment of history as evidence to prove the new views. 
Examples include, providing a historical chronology of takfīr in Egypt, a historical account of 
reconciliation among Muslims,813 and historical examples of rebellion against Muslim rulers 
throughout Muslim history.814 While narrating these historical accounts, the leaders have 
acknowledged their mistakes in not properly taking lessons and examples from history in their 
previous thought, justifying this with their preoccupation with daily actions and confrontations 
with the regime, which deprived them of the peace of mind required for such contemplation.  
Another given reason for the leaders’ neglect of history in their previous writings is the lack of 
cooperation and coordination with other Muslim movements, which could have made the IG 
consider history more efficiently.815 However, though the leaders have argued that history, in 
general, Muslim and non-Muslim, is a store for lessons and learning, they hardly used examples 
from non-Islamic history, perhaps because they were speaking about Islamic issues that require 
support from Islamic history. Similar to this is the consideration of domestic, regional and 
international circumstances and the conditions of the country and Muslims in the new world 
order when issuing judgments or arriving at Sharia rulings. The consideration of these aspects is 
a completely new feature in the IG writings.  
Another methodological feature is the leaders’ adoption of the language of dialogue, softness 
and leniency of discourse in their discussions and debates with others. The new literature 
generally adopts rationality and leniency in calling others, such as other jihadi movements, to 
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change their stances or attitudes or to reconsider them in light of the new reality in and outside 
Egypt. This represents severance with the previous approach of rigidity and animosity towards 
others. Therefore, the leaders always declare their condemnation of rebuking, assaulting or 
accusing others of kufr. Examples include, the Sharia justifications for revisions,816 employment 
of the Jurisprudence of harm and benefits817 and the prohibition of issuing takfīr against 
government employees.818 Adoption of dialogue, leniency and rational arguments with 
opponents is a confirmation of the new peaceful and accommodating stances of the IG. 
 
Views of the IG after Revisions 
As stated before, the IG leaders declared their non-violence initiative in 1997, started to tour 
prisons to discuss the initiative and convince the grassroots in 1999 and started publishing their 
literature in 2002. As this literature was meant to criticise and correct the previous thought as 
well as the interpretations and practices that resulted in catastrophic consequences for the IG 
and the community at large, the leaders stated from the outset that there is no harm in 
changing and revising some of the previous views regarding jihad or any other Sharia matter 
that was decided based on ijtihād. By this the IG is emphasising from the outset that revising 
their thoughts is acceptable and is supported by several proofs from the Sharia and examples 
from several Muslim scholars and Jurists. So there is no blame on the IG or any other Islamist 
movement if they wanted to revise some or all of their previous thoughts as long as they are 
returning to the truth and their new changes are supported with evidence from the Sharia.819  
The leaders also responded to the claim that reconciliation means letting down the religion. 
“This is untrue,” the leaders emphasise, “because reconciliation is supported by the texts of the 
Sharia and is good for all parties even though it would involve some injustices.”820 Thus the 
leaders established the necessity and acceptability of their revisions before introducing their 
new thought. 
As this section discusses the IG attitudes towards issues related to violence after revisions, it will 
start with the most important issues that affect rulers and their regimes. These include 
                                                          
816 Ḥāfiẓ, Ḥurmat al-Ghuluww, 18 ff. 
817 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 26-7. 
818 Ḥāfiẓ, Ḥurmat al-Ghuluww, 169. 
819 Ḥāfiẓ, Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā’, 25-40. 
820 Ḥāfiẓ, Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā’, 132-6. 
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ḥākimiyya, takfīr, rebellion, inevitability of confrontation, the refraining group, fatwas of Ibn 
Taymiya on the Tartars, abode of Islam and abode of disbelief, jihad, extremism, and al-wal 
ā’wa al-barā’. Then the issues and attitudes that directly influence the Muslim and non-Muslim 
masses, other Muslim movements and foreigners in the IG dogma will be discussed. These 
include ḥisba, democracy and participation in political life, the attitudes towards ‘the other’ 
Muslims and non-Muslims, dhimmīs, and jizya. 
After Revisions: Ḥākimiyya, Takfīr and Rebellion  
The leaders have, in the new thought, introduced new argument on ḥākimiyya which managed 
them to solve the issue of not applying the Sharia. This helped them solve the dilemma of having 
to fight as ḥākimiyya constituted the basic foundation and main justification to acts of violence 
against the state. Changing the interpretation of the verses on ḥākimiyya and accepting the view 
of some other Muslim scholars821 who opined that refraining from applying the Sharia does not 
render people disbelievers unless they mock the Sharia or say that God’s laws are inappropriate 
or inferior to other laws (Jaḥd and istiḥlāl). To support this interpretation, they framed in the 
Uṣūlī concepts of harm and benefits and contextual circumstances, arguing that contemporary 
rulers are excused if they do not apply the Sharia because of global or national conditions, 
which, if neglected, may cause harm that is greater than the benefits of implementing the 
Sharia.822 Accepting local and international contexts and circumstances as irresistible factors 
that may oblige rulers to not implement of some Sharia rulings is a new approach in which the 
IG takes the circumstantial contexts into consideration before applying the textual rulings of the 
Sharia to any issue, an approach which the IG completely discarded before when it relied only 
on textual arguments.823 
In addition to the discussions of ḥākimiyya in many of their books, the IG devoted an 
independent book to ḥākimiyya titled: Al-Ḥākimiyya: Naẓra Sharʿiyya wa Ruʿya Wāqiʿiyy 
(Ḥākimiyya: A Sharia Perspective and Realistic Vison).824 The title of the book shows how 
ḥākimiyya was reframed to reflect considerations of reality and practical circumstances. The 
main theme which the book presents and defends is that the verses of ḥākimiyya mean that 
                                                          
821 The different views on verses of ḥākimiyya were explained in chapter 3.  
822 Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, interview in Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 108.   
823 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 35. 
824 Full referencing of this book was given earlier in chapter 2. 
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rulers cannot be considered apostate unless they exhibit rejection or mocking of a Sharia ruling, 
or prefer another over it, which current rulers do not do. Therefore, making takfīr or launching 
rebellion against the contemporary regimes based on ḥākimiyya is prohibited. According to the 
new view presented in that book, Divine ḥākimiyya still belongs exclusively to God.825 
However, by attending to the common Muslim conception of the flexibility of Sharia and its 
suitability for all times and places and the Uṣūlī rules of changing fatwas based on changing of 
human needs, times and places, the book argued that God has granted humans a form of 
ḥākimiyya to help them manage their changing daily affairs. As God knows that the Sharia is to 
be applied in this world and amongst humans and at different times, places and circumstances 
that make events vary and change all the time; God has granted humans the right to make 
legislations and judge between people within the general objectives of the Sharia. This is in 
order for people to cope with new incidents in their life regarding which there is no decisive text 
in the Sharia. This human ḥākimiya must work within and be guided by that of God. So human 
ḥākimiyya and human legislations are not rejected in Islam but what is rejected of them is what 
contradicts the decisive legislations of God. 
 God has restricted this human ḥākimiyya with criteria and conditions and granted it only to 
qualified scholars, rulers and intellectuals of the Ummah. The main condition for the ḥākimiyya 
of humans is that it must stick to the tenets and principles of Islam without revoking any of its 
principles or general objectives. By stating that human ḥākimiyya works within that of God and 
that it is in fact an implementation of Divine ḥākimiyya, the IG bridged human ḥākimiyya with 
that of God. He further amplified his frame by arguing that the absence of human ḥākimiyya 
makes the Sharia paralyzed and unable to cope with the movement of life and the newly arising 
events and incidents. It would also give a change to extremist secularists and enemies of Islam 
to attack Islam and depict it with backwardness and the inability to adapt to life needs and 
fluctuations. Therefore, the IG bridged and amplified the new frame of human ḥākimiyya by 
saying that it is secret behind the continuity of the Sharia and its ability to exist at all times and 
places as it allows humans to device new rulings and prescriptions that suit the new occurrences 
and make the Sharia flexible to the new arising needs of humans.  
The frame of human ḥākimiyya was further extended by stating a number of functions that it 
serves to help people. It allows qualified people to use indecisive texts of the Sharia that are 
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prone to different interpretations to legislate whatever is more convenient for people at a 
particular place and time. It also allows humans to weigh different Juristic opinions and chose 
whichever is more convenient for their environment and more fulfilling of their interests. Even 
weak opinions, in terms of their textual evidence, can be chosen at the expense of the stronger 
ones if the weak opinions would achieve more benefits and minimise harm. Human ḥākimiyya 
also allows people to draft rulings of the Sharia in the form of laws to be used in courts and 
judiciary (codification of the Sharia). It also allows humans to decide on the application of the 
Sharia rulings to their daily lives and determine the suitability of applying the textual Sharia 
ruling to the practical cases of life. So, human ḥākimiyya  complements that of God, but if it tries 
to challenge the divine orders and render halal the things which God made haram or haram the 
things which God made halal, such as allowing adultery or homosexuality or prohibiting 
polygamy, then human ḥākimiya is rejected.826 
Despite the very detailed discussion and analysis of the concept of human ḥākimiyya, all of 
these arguments are in fact of no real credit to the issue of ḥākimiyya as the examples and 
explanations given by the author are features of what is known as ijtihāḍ. So the author changed 
the term ijtihād into human ḥakimiyya and mentioned the subcategories of ijtihad as features or 
subcategories of ḥākimiyya. Also the fact that human ḥākimiyya must work within Divine 
ḥākimiyya makes the whole concept irrelevant to the jihadi understanding of ḥākimiyya as the 
takfīr of rulers was not because of mere issuing of legislations but because of making legislations 
conflicting with those of God. 
Theologically and technically speaking, the IG managed to change its position on ḥākimiyya by 
extending the condition of Jaḥd and Istiḥlāl it applied to the supporters of the regime and the 
refraining group to the ruler himself. As they did not previously provide a justification on why 
the ruler was the only one who is not entitled for this exemption from apostasy if he did not 
deny or mock the Sharia, they now apply the rule equally to everyone including the ruler. Not 
including the ruler in the condition of jaḥd and Istiḥlāl was a gap in the IG’s old theory of takfīr, 
and through this gap the IG managed to revoke the old stance regarding the ruler by extending 
the condition of jaḥd and Istiḥlāl to the ruler as well. 
In addition, they have introduced new contextual justifications that could excuse the ruler for 
not applying the Sharia in some cases. They have stated that the interests of Muslim countries 
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and the benefit of Islam should be taken as the deciding factor in handling matters of 
international relations. This entails that that a ruler is justifiable if he pursues the benefit of his 
own country while interacting with other international actors even if he had to neglect some 
Sharia rulings under necessity. Moreover, to completely block any venue for rebellion, the 
leaders framed in the Uṣūlī concept of harm and benefit, by arguing that even if the ruler has 
apostatised, rebellion is not permissible if its harm is greater than the benefits of ousting that 
apostate ruler.827 
Thus, in their revisions the IG leaders were so lenient with rulers that they not only declared 
that they are not apostate but also excused them in some cases and argued that rebellion is 
completely prohibited even if rulers were to be considered apostate. They even emphasised 
that ḥākimiyya has been misused to cast charges of kufr on every Muslim leader, without 
considering their pros and cons, under the pretext that they are not applying the Sharia in full. 
Ḥākimiyya, the IG confirms, means that “the ultimate reference in governance should be God 
and the Prophet, but not that every rule or judgement must be found in these sources…While 
the ruler must not govern in a way that contradicts the sharia, the Qur’an and the Sunna do not 
address every single issue that a leader might confront.” The IG also moved the focus of blame 
in ḥākimiyya away from rulers by arguing that ḥākimiyya applies to everyone, not only to rulers, 
and therefore requires all people to act in accordance with the Sharia, as all people are equal 
before the Divine law. Therefore, people should not be stricter on rulers just because they are 
rulers; everybody commits sins, but this does not render them disbelievers.828  
By emphasising that rulers should not be treated differently when it comes to ḥākimiyya, the IG 
is now promoting a sense of equality that is not meant, as it was in the past, to bring the 
oppressed up to the level of the elites, but rather to protect those elites from rebellion and 
undue criticism.829 The fact that the revisions, as a form of compromise, serve to preserve the 
autocratic regimes is neither new nor surprising, given that the literature of the early 
democratic transitions acknowledged that compromises often preserve many elements of 
existing power configurations.830 Furthermore, speaking about some sort of human ḥākimiyya is 
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a departure from the former purely textual stance that all matters of governance and 
judgement belong only and exclusively to God. 
The new argument produced by IG about ḥākimiyya means, in textual theological terms, that 
the Egyptian regime is not apostate and thus, there is no religious ground to fight it or replace it 
with an Islamic regime. It also indirectly recognises the legitimacy of the state by conceding 
governance to it, and it acknowledges that the state is well-equipped to defend Islam, 
implement the Sharia and protect the interests of Muslims and non-Muslims. This affected all 
the objectives of the Organisation which were amended to include compliance with the state, 
nonviolent assistance to the state, and nonviolent opposition to laws and positions that clash 
with Islam.831 
However, the leaders did not suffice with the textual arguments; they also framed in the 
concepts of harm and benefit and pragmatic considerations to argue that the harm caused by 
rebellion against rulers, even if they have apostatised, far exceeds the benefits accrued from 
that rebellion. Thus, it is pragmatically erroneous and theologically prohibited to rebel against 
rulers. The most significant of the listed practical considerations that make rebellion erroneous 
are: when rebellion  does not secure the benefits for which it was permitted, when it opposes 
the objective of guiding people, when the ability to launch successful rebellion is lacking, when it 
leads to demise of the fighters, and when the harm of rebellion is greater than its benefits’.832 
The pragmatic factors that ban rebellion against apostate rulers, as presented by the IG, are the 
same as those introduced by Faḍl. However, the difference between Faḍl and the IG leaders in 
this regard is that the former banned rebellion only because of these practical constraints, not 
because the ruler is not apostate or because the application of some human laws does not 
constitute kufr; while the IG emphasised that the ruler is not apostate in principle, and even if 
he were to be considered apostate, rebellion would be prohibited because of these pragmatic 
considerations. 
So the IG used both ways of reasoning: they argued, using Sharia proofs, that the regime is not 
apostate based on new interpretation of ḥākimiyya and therefore rebellion is prohibited; and 
for those who do not believe in the Sharia evidences presented by the IG, the practical 
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considerations make rebellion pragmatically mistaken and catastrophic. The change in attitudes 
towards ḥākimiyya, takfīr and rebellion entailed a similar change in the concepts that branch 
from or relate to these issues such as the refraining group, fatwas of Ibn Taymiya and 
inevitability of confrontation. 
After Revisions: Inevitability of Confrontation, the Refraining Group, Fatwas of Ibn Taymiya 
and Abodes of Islam  
These issues branch from ḥākimiyya and takfīr as confrontation was considered ‘inevitable’ in 
order to fight the apostate rulers and the refraining groups and implement the Sharia. Muslim 
countries were considered abodes of disbelief because they were not governed by the Sharia, 
and the fatwas of Ibn Taymiya were the tools through which these rulings were assigned to 
rulers and Muslim countries. The revisions criticised ‘inevitability of confrontation’ and argued 
that ‘defending a just cause does not make confrontation inevitable’,833 for only God can declare 
something as inevitable.834 Regarding the ‘refraining group’, the IG have changed the argument 
and stated that none but the appointed government of a state can fight those who abstain from 
implementing compulsory rulings of the Sharia. Therefore, individuals or groups are not allowed 
to fight the state itself.835 
As the IG reversed that order before when it placed itself in place of the state and considered 
the state as a group, the IG has now corrected the order and returned to the classical 
interpretation of the concept. They framed the new stance using the Uṣūlī concept that 
‘sovereign and governmental matters are to be handled only by the state’. This was also framed 
in the principle of harm and benefit as ‘giving individuals or groups the right to intervene with 
sovereign matters results in harm, anarchy and seditions’. Therefore, soldiers and police officers 
are not considered refraining groups as they “implement the orders of the ruler who is excused 
in not applying some of the rulings of the Sharia because of the pressures of international 
conditions and circumstances.”836    
Also, The Fatwas of Ibn Taymiya were reframed using the Uṣūlī concept of ‘change of fatwas 
with the change of times, places and circumstances’. Therefore, fatwas of Ibn Taymiya regarding 
                                                          
833 Ibrāhīm, Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha, 41. 
834 Ibrāhīm, Hidāyat al-Khalā’iq, 209.  
835 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 37. 
836 Ḥamdī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, interview in Aḥmad, Mu’āmara am Murājaʿa, 133. 
254 
 
the Tartars were considered valid only at his time. Thus, they do not apply to contemporary 
rulers as these fatwas were meant for a specific time and context, and applying them to 
contemporary regimes was considered a fatal mistake because there are huge differences 
between the Tartars and contemporary regimes, and thus drawing analogy between 
contemporary regimes and the Tartars is erroneous.837 
In their new argument on ‘abodes of Islam and abodes of disbelief’, the IG leaders hold that 
Muslim lands nowadays are abodes of Islam and not abodes of disbelief. As with other concepts, 
the arguments in this regard relied upon circumstantial justifications as well as Juristic and Uṣūlī 
rules to arrive at this conclusion. The leaders argue that if the takfīr of individuals is extremely 
dangerous, the takfīr of the country as a whole is much more dangerous as it completely 
destroys the religion and abolishes Muslim countries and their sacrifices as well as the heritage 
of over fourteen centuries of Islam. As Islam certainly existed and persisted in Muslim countries 
with its rulings, practices, rites and manners throughout centuries, it is not fair to ignore all of 
the virtues in these centuries because of an emergency or a limited breach of the rulings or 
application of the Sharia. This too was based on the Uṣūlī rule that ‘certainty cannot be revoked 
except with a similar certainty’.  Therefore, the leaders argue that “as Muslim countries have 
been described as abodes of Islam with certainty, such a description cannot be withheld except 
with similar certainty.”838  
The Uṣūlī rule which states, ‘if some of the causes behind the issuance of a specific ruling 
continue to exist, the whole ruling remains in force’ was also employed to support this line of 
argument. So, the leaders argue that even if some of the Islamic rulings are no longer applied, 
other rulings are, and the manifestations of Islam is everywhere as ‘rulings of Islam’ are not 
restricted to laws and legislations but also extend to the issues of creed, manners, transactions 
and acts of worships which all exist in Muslim communities nowadays. The leaders add that the 
above is confirmed in most of the constitutions of Muslim countries, such as the Egyptian 
constitution, which state that Islam is the religion of the state and the principles of the Sharia 
are the main source of legislation.  
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 Thereupon, though it is true that the Sharia is not fully applied in Muslim countries, the lack of 
part of the Sharia does not mean the lack of the whole. Therefore, it is not fair or correct, the IG 
argues, to deny the existence of Islam in a Muslim country because some of the rulings, such as 
corporal punishments (ḥuḍūd), are not applied. This is because the rulings of Islam are not 
confined to these rulings. They have also employed the Uṣūlī tool of counter implicature 
(mafhūm al-Mukhālafa) when they argued that as the Juristic rule states that “the existence of 
some of the rites of Islam in a society with a majority of non-Islamic rites does not make that 
land an abode of Islam,” the opposite would also be true: “The existence of some non-Islamic 
rulings in a society where the majority of the rites are Islamic does not render that society non-
Muslim.”839 The above arguments clearly show framing in Uṣūl al-Fiqh to support the new 
opinions. 
The leaders also re-stressed their new approach of taking domestic, regional and international 
circumstances and the conditions of Muslims into consideration when deciding on Sharia 
matters. They argued that Muslims live in a world full of challenges, accords and international 
bodies governed with treaties, agreements and commitments. “These new developments and  
commitments necessitate the existence of a new contemporary individual and constitutional 
ijtihād on the Fiqh of abodes that should be governed by the principles of the Sharia but also 
takes into consideration the international challenges, the weakness of Muslims and strength of 
their enemies and the new world order.”840As the above concepts together formed the IG 
conception of ‘jihad’, the changes in the IG conception of these concepts have influenced its 
conception of jihad as an Islamic imperative. 
After Revisions: Jihad  
The leaders counter-framed their previous interpretation of jihad by framing in the Uṣūlī 
principles of ‘means and end’ and ‘harm and benefit’, supported by historical incidents, to argue 
that ‘jihad’ in its current form must be stopped as it contradicts the end for which it was 
prescribed. They emphasised that jihad in Islam was never meant to subjugate people or shed 
their blood. It was a jihad of guidance that was regulated by the Islamic principles that prevent 
injustice and bloodshed. The most important of these principles is that ‘jihad is a means and not 
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an end by itself’. Jihad was not prescribed except to preserve the religion and keep its might and 
strength. That is why the Prophet would sometimes fight, sometimes go back without fighting, 
sometimes enter into alliances with non-Muslims, and sometimes make reconciliations and 
treaties. Because jihad is a means and not an end, it has to be governed by the criteria governing 
the means. Therefore, jihad becomes impermissible if its conditions and criteria are not met and 
if it is going to cause harm that influences one of the objectives of the Sharia or one of the 
reasons why jihad was prescribed. Thereupon, as historical experiences show that jihad in the 
way practised nowadays by Jihadist movements results in harm and bloodshed without 
achieving any tangible benefit, it must be banned.  
In their discussion of jihad, the leaders criticised some misconceptions related to the 
interpretation of jihad, basing their argumentations on the pragmatic Uṣūlī principle of harm 
and benefit as well as purposive interpretations of the Sharia, which are all aspects of Uṣūl al-
Fiqh. The leaders declared that “it is mistaken in logic and prohibited in the Sharia to believe 
that jihad is permissible even if it will lead to destruction of the Muslim fighters.” Those who 
fight strong governments are throwing themselves into destruction without achieving any 
benefit for themselves or for Islam; they rather cause lots of harm, evil and restriction on daʿwa 
and preachers, which is prohibited.841 The leaders also condemned killing civilians during jihad, 
arguing that even when jihad is necessary, the Islamic law of war makes it prohibited to kill 
women, children, aged people, people under a covenant of dhimma, the blind, clergy men, 
professionals such as farmers and craftsmen, and civilians who do not participate in the war. 
Islam also prohibits mutilation of dead bodies, destroying the houses of the fighters, destroying 
their produce or killing their animals without a justifiable reason or benefit from that.842  
The leaders further framed in history and the ‘harm and benefit’ rule to explain how ‘jihad’ was 
misused to justify rebellion against local regimes. Jihad against rulers (rebellion) is prohibited 
because previous experiences in Islamic history prove that it causes more harm than benefit and 
results in unwarranted bloodshed. To prove this, the leaders devoted a chapter titled ‘A look at 
history’ in which they mentioned five major incidents of rebellion in Islamic history and 
highlighted the consequences and harm caused by these incidents, and thus concluded that 
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rebellion is prohibited for it always leads to harm and bloodshed.843 Speaking about 
misconceptions in jihad led the leaders to exploring the main reason behind this mistaken 
understanding of jihad, which is extremism and excessiveness in religion. 
After revisions: Excessiveness and Extremism 
The IG framed in extremism as one of the main reasons why the youth resort to takfīr and 
fighting against their regimes. Extremism results in rigidity with people and harshness in making 
daʿwa and thinking bad of others. It bars having a realistic vision and understanding of the 
society as the extreme person looks at the society as if it were an angelic society that has no 
place for mistakes or sins, an approach that can lead to the trap of takfīr.844 
In the IG opinion, extremism and excessiveness occur due to several reasons such as: the lack of 
religious insight and knowledge which is caused by the tendency to interpret texts literally in 
accordance with their external meanings only; keeping oneself busy with side issues at the 
expense of important issues; excessiveness in declaring things prohibited without a sound proof 
from the Sharia, depending on indecisive texts and leaving the decisive ones; and not acquiring 
knowledge at the hands of reliable scholars. Extremism is also caused by the lack of experience 
in life and not learning lessons from history and universal norms, which together block the youth 
from properly reading the conditions of their societies and the limits of the acceptable or 
unacceptable ways of change.845 Ironically, these were the same critiques directed against the IG 
by other Muslim movements and scholars who criticised their violence and code of practice. By 
this, the leaders seem to criticise their own and their followers’ practices before revisions.   
It is noticeable that when speaking about extremism and its dangers, the leaders relied heavily 
on the writings of al-Qaraḍāwī especially his book al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya bayna al-Juḥūd wa al-
Taṭarruf (Islamic Revivalism between Rejection and Extremism). Relying heavily on the writings 
of al-Qaraḍāwī who is intellectually affiliated with the MB indicates the IG openness to other 
Muslim moderate movements and scholars that they flatly rejected before. Also, the IG 
discussed the definition, reasons and manifestations of extremism but did not cover its 
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consequences or outcomes. They also did not provide clues on how to treat or annihilate 
extremism though their main source of al-Qaraḍāwī dealt with this extensively.846 According to 
the IG, extremism and its causes were also the main reason behind the wrong understanding of 
al-walā’ wa al-barā’ 
After Revisions: Al-Walā’ wa al-Barā’ 
The IG reframed in walā’ as one of the concepts the misunderstanding of which leads to takfīr 
and extremism. Therefore, they discussed it in the context of speaking about the mistakes made 
by the youth of the Islamist movements. According to the leaders, some of the youth of Islamist 
movements considered any walā’ to disbelieves as an act of disbelief without distinguishing 
between the external and the internal muwālāh. The IG responded to this by emphasising its 
previous interpretation of walā’ that divided it into external and internal; and argued that the 
external muwālāh, unlike the internal heart-driven one, does not constitute kufr. In this regard, 
the IG has criticised those who consider the employees of the government to be disbelievers 
because of walā.847  
As the ruler and his regime are no longer considered apostate, working for them is no longer a 
problem. Only in one case can a job cause kufr: it is when an employee does a job that involves 
injustice and oppression while he hates Islam and Muslims and loves disbelief and disbelievers, 
and signs of this are shown in his actions and sayings. Even in this case the kufr is not because of 
the nature of the job but because of the attitude of the employee.848 By this the IG removed 
those who work for the regime from the refraining group and declared that they are good 
Muslims. 
So, in light of these views regarding walā’, it can be concluded that the IG’s classification of 
walā’ after revisions is not different from its classification before revision. The only difference is 
that they have removed the discussion on how walā’ might affect the refraining group. This is 
because they have revised their understanding of the refraining group and their attitude 
towards the regime, not because they have revised their conception of walā’.  Another aspect in 
the IG new vision of walā’ is that it emphasised that kind treatment and cooperation with non-
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Muslims in a way that does not involve approval or support of their beliefs is recommended and 
not an act of the prohibited muwālāh.849 
The above concepts were the ones that led to takfīr of the ruler and his regime and the 
subsequent attempt to enforce rebellion against them. The following section shows the 
concepts that would directly influence the masses and foreigners in the IG dogma, on top of 
which comes ḥisba. 
After Revisions: Ḥisba 
Because ḥisba was the most active element in the IG means of change before revisions and 
because it was ḥisba that led to clashes with the regime in late 1980s and early 1990s, the IG 
devoted a book for ḥisba and dealt with it extensively in their revisions. As a group of ḥisba, the 
IG reemphasised the importance of ḥisba after revisions.  However, the leaders reframed ḥisba 
in light of their new understanding of the relationship between the Islamist movements and the 
state and the society in general. They reemphasised that ḥisba was prescribed to protect the 
community and to save the creed and teachings of Islam from distortion and negligence. It is a 
great duty that is necessary for upbringing the individual and the society. The opposite of ḥisba 
is negativity which leads the society to destruction and collapse. Therefore ḥisba is still viewed 
as collective religious obligation that needs sufficient members of muḥtasibs, or the entire 
Ummah will be sinful.850  
The muḥtasib has to observe the etiquettes of ḥisba which are sincerity, gentleness and 
leniency. Also, the munkar must be visible and ḥisba must not result in a greater harm. 
Therefore, the muḥtasib must also avoid:  thinking ill of people, spying on others, disgracing 
those involved in sins, causing harm to any party and forcing people to commit to his Juristic 
view. Thus, most of the etiquettes of ḥisba are the same as those mentioned before in the IG 
Charter.851   
However in compliance with the new tolerant and reconciliatory approach, special attention 
was given to framing in the condition of leniency and gentleness as “a person who is deprived of 
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leniency is deprived of all good.”852 Harshness could lead to the rejection of the muḥtasib and 
reluctance to cooperate with him and might provoke the muḥtasab ʿalayahi to increase his 
munkar. The leaders admitted that the harsh behaviour of some of those who used to practise 
ḥisba resulted in creating in people’s minds the image of the muḥtasib as a stiff, harsh-hearted 
frowning person, especially with the verbal and physical violations that accompanied ḥisba.853  
They also framed in the principles of Uṣūl al-Fiqh through linking ḥisba to the Uṣūlī principles of 
‘harm and benefit’ and ‘capacity’. They emphasised that ḥisba must not cause harm to people or 
to the muḥtasib himself, in implementation of the Sharia principle that ‘there must not be harm 
or reciprocation of harm’, and the rule that ‘harm must not be removed by a similar or greater 
harm’.854  Also, the decision to make ḥisba should be based on the power and capacity of the 
muḥtasib, which includes his ability to bear the consequences of his iḥtisāb. The condition of the 
lack of harm and the ability to bear consequences was extended by stating that this does not 
apply to the muḥtasib only but also his parents and relatives. The verses and ḥadīths that speak 
about capacity as a condition for actions to be taken were invoked in this regard.855  
The new approach brought another change in the leader’s attitude towards considering 
usefulness and effectiveness of ḥisba by classifying it as a means and not an end. Contrary to the 
old approach, the IG now frames in pragmatism by adopting an Uṣūlī purposive approach and 
interpretation of ḥisba. It argues that if the muḥtasib thinks that ḥisba will not yield any positive 
results, he should not observe it, as ḥisba is not intended for itself but is rather intended for an 
objective. If this objective cannot be achieved, then the means which is the ḥisba should be 
left.856 Ibn Taymiya’s writings on ḥisba were also utilised by the IG to support and add Salafi 
credibility to their new thoughts on ḥisba as on other matters.857  
As the previous framing of ḥisba challenged the authority of the state, the IG now declares its 
retraction from and condemnation of the old practices that it depicted as ‘a form of rebellion 
against the state, an aggression against its authority and a rejection of its right to regulate 
society’. Therefore, the new framing of ḥisba confirms the authority of the state and the ruler 
who can now appoint official muḥtasibs. Therefore, there are two kinds of muḥtasibs:  the 
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appointed and the volunteer. As the escalating steps of ḥisba are the same as in the previous 
view, the new view argues that only the appointed muḥtasib can follow these escalating steps 
that include threatening of use of force.  
Volunteer muḥtasibs can only assist if requested by the state-appointed muḥtasib, and they are 
not allowed to intervene if the latter is present or can easily be summoned in a time enough to 
prevent that munkar. However, intervention of the non-appointed muḥtasib should be 
restricted to crimes or munkars that are commonly recognised as such by the society and the 
Law such as rape or killing. The muḥtasib should not intervene at all if preventing the munkar 
would break the law of the state or if the kind of munkar being practised is commonly 
acceptable to people in this area or if the harm resulting from preventing that munkar is greater 
than the benefit.858 
The above arguments show that the IG maintained most of its previous interpretations of ḥisba 
with exception of the points that caused clash with the authorities. In this regard, the IG argued, 
contrary to their previous arguments, that forced ḥisba is not for unauthorised individuals and 
that the main task of the non-appointed muḥtasib is to help, not to oppose and challenge, the 
state and the police perform their duties of forbidding munkar.859 By this, the IG retracts its 
previous view that forced ḥisba can be done by everyone even common people. The old view 
emphasised this as the IG did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the ruler or those appointed by 
him, but now the regime is legitimate and so are those appointed by it. 
 When it comes to munkar things that are not prohibited by law and not forbidden by the police, 
practising ḥisba in this regard was disallowed by the IG through framing in the Usūlī principle of 
harm and benefit. The IG argued that, based on previous experience, making forced ḥisba by 
individuals on these matters would result in harm that is greater than the benefit of forbidding 
these evil; so change with force is disallowed based on the principle of harm and benefit.860 By 
this the IG has placed many constraints on practicing ḥisba that made it practically limited to 
those appointed by the state i.e., policemen except in cases that the society sees it legitimate 
for common people to use force such as preventing rape, killing or the like. 
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Stein notes in his study on the IG ḥisba that this even agrees with the legal environment in 
Western communities where normal people are allowed to use force to prevent life threatening 
crimes from taking place. Therefore the IG new conception of ḥisba has become a mandate for a 
form of civic responsibility leading up to citizen’s arrest that would not be unusual in most 
Western countries.861 Stein further notes that the IG new approach to ḥisba shows unwarranted 
confidence in the self-regulatory potential of Egyptian patriarchal society and authoritarian 
governance, as well as an appeal to the positive role of official law enforcement that many 
Egyptians would find excessively optimistic.  
It also ignores the fact that the Egyptian police exercises a very limited degree of control over 
behaviour in many areas and, where it is actively present, is regarded as aggressive, unreliable 
and corrupt. Thus, the new interpretation of ḥisba that assumes the presence of an official 
police system that is respected and considered just by the public is as fanciful as the old one. In 
another sense, the IG previous thoughts stemmed from an ideal Salafi vision of the world and 
the rejection of the legitimacy of the regime, while it now proceeds from an idealised view of 
existing state–society relations in Egypt.862    
However, this is not applicable to ḥisba only but is rather a general approach in the revisions as 
the IG not only avoided blaming the regime but also lauded the state and its efforts in several 
occasions and unreasonably justified the official stances of the Egyptian regime on several 
issues. Examples include lauding the Egyptian foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue and 
describing it as rational, fair and for the benefit of the Palestinian people; a description that is 
considered unjustifiable and unrealistic by most of the peaceful political players in Egypt. 
Another example was the IG declaration that they would ‘accept any form of activity that the 
state would allow them’.863 This is also confirmed by the IG severe criticism of Islamists who 
challenged the state and ‘caused a lot of harm to Muslims’ without assigning any sort of blame 
to the state or speaking about harm caused by the state’s tyranny, corruption and confiscation 
of freedoms and rights. The IG condemnation and severe criticism of all acts of violence that 
happened before the revisions without similar criticism of the state or providing a vision on the 
role of the state in putting an end to violence by treating its socio-political and economic 
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reasons—all of this made the IG seem like a governmental tool meant only to criticise and attack 
the political violence of the government’s rivals. 
The attempt of the IG leaders to not directly criticise the regime is perhaps the reason behind 
their approach of giving examples of problems and challenges that happened in the past while 
ignoring the present and the future. This is clear in their discussion of ḥisba as all the examples 
of wrong practices of ḥisba given by the leaders are within the context of individual behaviour or 
moral practices of individuals, not of the state or the regime, such as destroying musical 
instruments or burning video shops and breaking into houses of people to find if they are 
committing adultery. All of these are individual past occurrences. No single contemporary 
political issue is mentioned or criticised; and there is no discussion of the challenges facing 
Islamic movements with the aim of finding future solutions for them. 
 The same applies to the leader’s discussion of the constraints of jihad and the concept of harm 
and benefit. Though plenty of details were given on the importance of the context and reality, a 
deep and detailed reading of contemporary national, regional and international realities was not 
provided. All what was provided in this regard is a critique of not considering the past realities 
and a call for not repeating the mistakes in addition to a very simplistic explanation of how any 
conflict between the Islamist movements and their local regime will benefit only Israel, the West 
and extreme secularists. Indeed, the IG new interpretations of ḥisba branches from its 
conception of the relationship between the state and the Islamist movement as well as from the 
change in its attitudes towards state-approved principles of democracy and political life. 
After revisions: Relationship with the State, Democracy and Participation in Political Life  
This section highlights the IG’s post-revisionist attitudes towards the state, its institutions and 
tools of democracy as well as its Muslim and non-Muslim members and movements. Though 
before revisions the IG completely refused democratic ways of change and considered them as 
heretic and anti-Islamic, they did not write directly on their views towards democracy and 
participation in political life after revisions. However, the IG vision of the relationship between 
the state and the Islamic movements reflects some of that. The leaders framed in the general 
principles of ‘efficacy’, ‘benefit and harm’ and ‘role distribution’ to argue that the state should 
make use of the power and efforts of Muslim youth in developing the society and refining its 
manners while Islamist movements have to completely renounce violence and prove to the 
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governments that they do not want to seize their thrones. So, Islamic movements in general 
should leave sovereign matters to the state and the state should leave the moral, social, 
reformist and educational role to the Islamic movements. And there must be no conflict on 
power that Islamists will not obtain; and if they were to obtain it, they would be forced to leave 
it under international and regional pressures as happened with Hamas in Palestine and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.864  
This argument of the IG is a representation of what is known as ‘political learning’ in a range of 
studies such as those on social choice and rational choice theories, social movement studies, 
and the literature on democratisation. ‘Political learning’ refers to the process through which 
individuals or groups modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, 
frustrations, and dramatic changes in the environment.865 This argument of the IG confirms 
Huntington’s note that the ‘desirability of compromise’ is not only based on one’s own 
experiences but also on witnessing and learning from the experiences of others.866 
Thus, the IG saw itself after revisions as a social movement whose main role is to make daʿwa 
and spread virtue and proper Islamic education in the society. They did not have political 
aspirations, perhaps because of the restrictions laid upon them by the Mubarak regime that did 
not allow them to disrupt its plans and hegemony of power even through peaceful political 
means. This is supported by the fact that after the fall of the Mubarak regime, the IG became 
politically active. The Group’s active political participation was reflected in its establishment of a 
political party, participation in elections and drafting of the Egyptian constitution,867 which 
practically confirms the changes in their attitudes towards democracy and participation in 
political life and their acceptance of democracy as a tool of social and political change. As with 
other concepts, this change is based on the IG’s re-evaluation of these issues away from the 
creedal concept of ḥākimiyya by placing them on the Juristic side of the Sharia which is 
characterised by pragmatism and the adoption of principles of harm and benefit. 
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 However, there is disagreement among the historical leaders in their personal practical and 
political attitudes towards participation in political life after the collapse of the Mubarak regime. 
This disagreement is reflected by the fact that only some of them have engaged in political life 
while others disappeared completely from the political scene, even after the fall of Mubarak. 
This is also confirmed by the oft-repeated attitude of the main ideologue, Nājiḥ Ibrāhīm, which 
he expressed in many of his writings both before and after the fall of the Mubarak regime; that 
Islamist movements should quit political work and engage only in charitable activities and 
daʿwa.868  
Ibrāhīm always argues that “political work would put Islamist movements in confrontation with 
the state and the West…. and even if Islamists win elections, they will be forced to leave power 
as happened with Hamas and the Taliban.”869 However, this disagreement on political 
participation differs dramatically from the previous pre-revisions position, as the previous 
approach considered political participation an act of disbelief while those who reject 
participation after revisions consider it lawful, but pragmatically unsuitable to Islamist 
movements, who should concentrate mainly on daʿwa and guidance.  
Such internal disagreements are common among social movements and are called ‘frame 
disputes’ or ‘framing contests’ that occur not only between movements and their opponents but 
also internally. However, as in the case of the IG, internal disputes are essentially differences of 
opinion over reality, or about frame resonance, which entails disagreements regarding how 
reality should be presented to maximise mobilisation and future gains.870 So, the IG leaders’ 
disagreement on the efficacy and consequences of participation in political life is an example of 
the IG leaders’ internal disputes about the interpretation of present or projected reality. The 
disagreement over framing of the motivational frames that encourage engaging in political life 
constitutes a dispute about the resonance of these frames and processes. In addition, the fact 
that political and democratic participation was undertaken by the IG, and not by al-Jihād, 
indicates that while Islamists may rationally respond to opportunity structures, “the menu of 
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possible responses are often limited by ideological parameters that may render some choices 
unimaginable.”871 
After Revisions: The Attitudes towards other Muslims 
The change of the attitudes towards the above categories entailed a similar change in the 
attitudes towards other Muslim members of the society that the IG used to describe before as 
‘the other’. The new positions show that IG after revisions is trying not only to rebuild itself 
peacefully but also to reintroduce itself as an interface between the society and the state. The 
tolerant, lenient discourse and strong presence of the IG leaders in public debates and 
discussions and involvement in interviews and public issues, particularly after the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime, suggest that the Group is trying to reintroduce itself to the society as an 
effective public social force to get its old image corrected. 
The IG refashioned its relationship with other Islamist movements by framing in the general 
Islamic principles of tolerance, cooperation, understanding and respect. Unlike before, the IG 
emphasised its openness to all other Islamic movements despite the existence of some 
differences in views and means of achieving objectives. The literature on revisions exhibits 
openness to all Sunni groups and reference to writings of scholars from different orientations. 
The leaders in their writings even defended some scholars whom they considered deviant 
before, such as al-Qaraḍāwī, Ibn Bāz and scholars of al-Azhar.872 
In its discourse with other Islamist movements, the IG used a reconciliatory tone, particularly in 
situations where the IG holds views different from those of these movements. This is reflected 
in the fact that the leaders would always emphasise that they do not suspect or question the 
faith or sincerity of other movements who disagree with them.873 Though the leaders sometimes 
blamed and severely criticised some practices of Islamists, they never questioned their sincerity 
or religious credentials. Contrary to the pervious approach of clash and hostility, the leaders in 
their revisions used reconciliatory terms like ‘Islamic movements, Muslim youth, youth of the 
Islamic movement, youth of this Ummah, the righteous people who gave priority to the 
Hereafter over this world, our brothers’ etc. By this the leaders always remind the readers of the 
Islamic nature of those who differ with the IG in their Islamic interpretations and the fact that 
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they have some differences with them does not mean that the other groups are deviant or that 
they are less religious or sincere than the IG.  
Nājiḥ Ibrāhim, the IG main Ideologue, explained the IG attitude towards other Muslim 
movements by emphasising that the IG leaders and members ‘love and wish good for all 
Muslims in general and members of Islamic movements in particular.’ They ‘read for all scholars 
and Jurists of the Islamic Movement’, and they ‘defend them when they are attacked’.874 They 
see that ‘work for Islam is open for all’, and that after their hard experience in prison the IG 
members are, ‘no longer fanatic to a specific individual, group or country’.875 They rather 'wish 
good for all those who wronged or imprisoned them. They “came out of prison with love to 
everybody and certainty that mercy is the greatest of all the manners of Islam and that Islam can 
be summarised in two statements: glorifying God and having mercy on His creatures.”876  
 He extended this beyond the IG by advising all Muslims to love those who differ with them in 
beliefs or intellectual or Juristic orientations as long as ‘others’ do not contradict the founding 
principles of the religion.877 Comparing these new conciliatory language and acceptance of 
others with the old approach of clash and hard language reveals the magnitude of change in the 
ideology between the old ideology that was dismissive of other movements and the new 
approach that is inclusive and accommodative of others. The old views framed in ḥākimiyya, 
jihad and barā’ while the new ones framed in the general principles of the Sharia such as 
tolerance, cooperation and understanding as well as in the concepts of harm and benefit. Thus, 
the IG new position towards ‘the other’ moved towards a pluralist conception that emphasises 
plurality and cooperation instead of the previous singular exclusionist voice. 
After Revisions: The Attitudes towards non-Muslims 
The IG also revised its conception of the relationship with non-Muslims by framing in the 
general principles of the Sharia and reframing the concepts of ‘amān’ ‘dhimma’ and ‘al-walā’ wa 
al-barā’ that were utilised before to shape the old antagonistic view. These are divided below 
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into local non-Muslim residents of Muslim lands, foreign non-Muslims visiting Muslim lands 
(tourists) and foreign non-Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries. As opposed to the 
previous ideology that adopted clash in dealing with non-Muslims, the new ideology argues that 
Islam has not come to abolish the right of others to exist and coexist with Muslims. To the 
contrary, Islam has endorsed principles of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and those 
who disagree with them in faith as long as they did not transgress against Muslims. Peaceful 
coexistence is the norm of Islam and Muslims with those who live with them in Muslim 
countries and is also the norm of Muslims with those whom they live with in non-Muslim 
countries. History was used to support this line of argument when the leaders argued that such 
was the practice of the companions of the prophet when they lived with the Christians in 
Abyssinia in peace and coexistence.878 This time, the Islamic instructions on tolerance, peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation with non-Muslims were mentioned and the claim they were 
abrogated was not used. 
However, in an attempt to introduce balanced views that protect their understanding of the 
concept of al-walā’ wa al-barā, the leaders argued that peaceful coexistence and kind treatment 
of others do not mean accepting the religion or creed of non-Muslims, but it means 
acknowledging their right to exist and choose their religions and creeds without compulsion 
while preserving Muslims’ right to disagree with them and renounce their beliefs. Therefore, 
coexistence and mutual understanding must replace fighting and clashes. The leaders also 
emphasised their belief in the coexistence of cultures through dialogue and cooperation and 
their rejection of the clash of civilisations theory.879 
Even in case of wars, Islam has laid many moral rules and regulations to minimise the 
consequences of wars and protect human rights. So war in Islam is not meant to subjugate or 
annihilate others but to remove harm and corruption from humanity.880 Thud, framing in the 
general principles of the Sharia enabled the leaders to replace the previous attitude of clash, 
hatred and inevitability of confrontation with the new approach that promotes reconciliation 
and coexistence. This is applicable to all non-Muslims including residents of Islamic countries. 
After Revisions: Local Non-Muslims (Dhimmīs) and Jizya 
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The new attitudes of the IG towards local non-Muslim minorities is characterised by tolerance 
and kind treatment as it framed mainly in the general principles of the Sharia rather than in the 
concepts of dhimma and jizya. The general line of discussion when speaking about People of the 
Book emphasises the dangers of mistreating or abusing them and the importance of dealing 
with them according to the principles of justice as a sublime Islamic principle because the Quran 
(60:8) instructs Muslims to treat non-Muslims kindly and with justice.881 
Again, to preserve the classical concept of ‘muwālāh’ and keep the new views balanced, the 
leaders emphasised that treating non-Muslims kindly and with justice is not a form of the 
prohibited muwālāh. The prohibited muwālāh is to love or support the religion or creed of 
disbelievers or spy on Muslims for their benefit, to prefer their religion to that of Muslims or to 
help them fight Muslims. So the prohibited muwālāh does not include treating them with justice 
and kindness as Islam ordains justice and kindness on Muslims in their dealings with everyone. 
Kindness to non-Muslims is, therefore, a ‘following of the Prophetic manners’.882 
The previous hostile attitude towards the Christian of Egypt was based on three justifications. 
The first was political: to pressurise the regime to accept the IG demands by showing its inability 
to defend the minorities and forcing it to buy the security of the Copts with the security of the 
IG members. The second was a theological stance that viewed the necessity of punishing the 
Copts for breaking the contract of dhimma by not paying the jizya. The third was financial to 
fund the IG activities from the money of the Copts which the IG considered as lawful booties as 
the Christians broke the terms of the covenant of dhimma.  
Placing pressure on the state is no longer needed after the initiative and the concept of Jizya 
was revised to arrive at the conclusion that targeting the Copts is impermissible and 
consequently their money and properties are no longer considered violable. Though the IG 
leaders did not challenge the classical interpretation of the concept of dhimma, they argued that 
as long as People of the Book showed their willingness to have a contract of dhimma with 
Muslims and pay the jizya, they have to be given that right, and fighting or harassing them 
because of jizya becomes impermissible even if the contract of dhimma is not effective. This is 
because Muslim countries nowadays do not ask People of the Book to pay jizya and do not hold 
contracts of dhimma with them.  
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To prove that, the leaders employed history to argue that jizya was not always a basic element 
of the contract of dhimma when they argued that the second Caliph ʿUmar once doubled the 
charity paid by the Christians of Taghlib in return for dropping Jizya from them and that the 
Prophet’s Companion Abu ʿUbayda returned the jizya to some Syrian Christians when he had to 
withdraw from their city without defending it. They also argued that the Christians of Egypt 
continued to pay jizya until the ruler of Egypt dropped it when he decided to appoint them in 
the Egyptian army to joint Muslims in defending the country. This was based on a fatwa at that 
time that when People of the Book defend the country with Muslims, the jizya should be 
dropped from them because it was taken from them in return for defence in which they now 
have participated.883 
Additionally, the leaders framed in the Fiqh of sovereign matters when they stated that there 
are some commitments attached to the contract of dhimma that only the Muslim state, not 
individuals or groups, can provide. These commitments include defending People of the Book 
against transgression and giving them security. Because ‘those who work for Islam’ cannot give 
that protection or defend People of the Book and because Muslim countries are not fully ruled 
according to the Sharia and do not demand jizya from them, it is not permissible for individuals 
or groups to fight non-Muslims as it is not they who refused to pay the jizya but it is the Muslim 
state who did not demand it from them. Therefore the Muslim youth should not blame the 
Christians of Egypt or conduct any violent acts against them because of that.884 This has become 
acceptable now though it was not before because the governing authorities are now considered 
legitimate and therefore their decisions are legitimate whereas in the past they were considered 
apostate and therefore their decisions were not accepted. 
 As with other concepts, the new interpretations of jizya were also reframed in light of the Uṣūlī 
concept of ‘harm and benefit’. The leaders argued that incidents of violence against Christians in 
Egypt based on the mistaken understanding of the concept of jizya did not achieve any benefit 
but rather caused much bloodshed and harm, put restrictions on daʿwa and gave more chances 
for secularists to influence people and agitate them against Islamists.885 Also, the international 
context was utilised to justify the cancellation of jizya based on the same Uṣūlī concept of ‘harm 
and benefit’. The Leaders argue that no Muslim country nowadays dares to break the 
                                                          
883 Zuhdī, Nahr al-Dhikrayāt, 182-3; Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 82. 
884Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 82-6. 
885 Zuhdī, Nahr al-Dhikrayāt, 182-3; Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 82-6. 
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internationally implemented system of citizenship as it will result in international isolation of 
that country, intervention of other countries and might lead that country to end up occupied by 
foreign powers under the pretext of protecting religious minorities. They also utilised the Uṣūlī 
principle that ‘collective benefit takes precedence over the individual one’. They argued that 
because Islam gave priority to collective (national) benefit over that of individuals and groups, it 
is not logical to accept that a Muslim country be occupied, economically besieged or isolated 
from the World because of jizya or because of a single ruling of the Islamic Sharia.886  
The foregoing arguments show that IG reinterpretation of the relationship between Muslims 
and non-Muslim residents of Muslim countries was based on the same traditional concept of 
dhimma without going further or accepting more reformist interpretations that tried to develop 
a new concept that replaces dhimma based on the argument that the concept of dhimma was 
developed in a context and circumstances that have been replaced by new  political, historical 
and international contexts in which states are based on the principles of citizenship. Therefore 
these reformist interpretations argue that the contract of dhimma was a historical contract 
whose reasons and justifications have come to an end with the arrival of new national states 
and the adoption of citizenship as a system in these countries based on general legal and 
constitutional rules.887 Thus the IG handling of this and similar issues shows its commitment to 
the traditional Salafi approach and traditional Islamic Jurisprudence as well as a refusal of new 
interpretation based merely on contextual circumstances without reliance on textual evidences. 
So, the IG conception of the relationship with People of the Book has partly changed as Jizya 
was overlooked because Muslim states dropped it not because the IG accepted the principles of 
citizenship as criteria that provide equal rights to citizens irrespective of their religious or 
dogmatic affiliations. The new position of the IG towards the Christians of Egypt and non-
adoption of the new national system of citizenship would off course be considered as 
insufficient and unsatisfactory for the government, Christians and secularists of Egypt and might 
affect the entire process of revisions. Therefore, the IG did not publish its book on People of the 
Book. The book was available on the IG website for a very short period and suddenly 
                                                          
886 Nājiḥ Ibrāḥim, “Ḥiwār Nājiḥ Ibrāḥim maʿa al-ʿArabiyya dut nit,” the IG website. Available at: 
http://egyig.com/Public/articles/interview/6/56260817.shtml (Accessed 14 December 2013). 
887 An example of these new interpretation is that presented by Fahmī Huwaidī in his book ‘Citizens not Dhimmīs’. See 
Fahmī Huwaidī, Muwāṭinūn Lā Dhimmiyyūn, 3rd edition (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1999). 
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disappeared and was never published until now.888 However, this shows that IG new frames do 
not merely present views to please the government or specific people or groups; they present 
only what they are convinced of. This also reemphasises the previously stated fact that for 
Islamist movements, possible responses to challenges are limited by ideological restrictions that 
may bar some movements from considering or accepting particular choices.     
Regarding non-Muslims who come to Muslim countries for tourism, business or other affairs, 
these are treated according to the concept of amān rather than jizya. The change of considering 
the regime to be Muslim and legitimate entailed a similar change in the attitude towards the 
visa issued by this regime. Though in the old view the IG considered visitors of Islamic countries 
to be in a contract of amān, this contract of amān was not considered valid because of the visa 
given to them but because of what non-Muslims understood as amān though in fact it was not. 
Now as the regime is Muslim, the visa issued by the regime is a sound contract of amān that 
cannot be violated. This amān applies to visas granted for any reason whether tourism, work, 
visit or any other purpose. As this visa is a valid contract of amān, it is impermissible to afflict 
those non-Muslims with any kind of harm.889 
 In this regard the leaders admitted that their argument that they targeted tourism and not 
tourists was mistaken as targeting tourism will often result in killing or injuring tourists, which is 
prohibited. They supported this with the Uṣūlī rule which states that “whatever leads to a 
forbidden act is forbidden even if it was originally permissible.”890 This may suggest that the IG 
sees that targeting tourism is originally permissible but it becomes prohibited because it results 
in killing or harming tourists, which is impermissible. Yet, the leaders elsewhere said that 
tourism involves things that are permissible, things which are impermissible and things which 
are reprehensible and therefore permissibility of working in tourism depends on the nature of 
the work and its compatibility with the Sharia. The leaders also concluded that it is permissible 
for any Muslim country to dedicate part of its resources and efforts to attract tourists in order to 
generate other sources of income and help the country towards progress. However, this must 
                                                          
888 The book was written by ʿĀsim ʿAbd al-Mājid and titled Īdāḥ al-Jawab…Su’ālāt Ahl al-Kitāb. ’I have got a soft copy 
of that book before it was deleted from the website and it generally pronounces the same views expressed above but 
with more details and explanations. No explanation was given as to why the book was removed from the website and 
why it was not published. Most likely this was because of actual or anticipated governmental pressure as the views 
expressed in the book were not satisfactory for the government and secularists. 
889 Ḥāfiẓ, Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā’, 86-100. 
890 Ḥāfiẓ, Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā’, 100. 
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be governed by preserving the Islamic customs and traditions of Muslim countries.891 This 
reflects a change in the attitude towards tourism which was previously considered, all of it, 
impermissible and a threat against the Islamic identity of Egypt. 
The leaders supported their prohibition of targeting tourists by framing in ‘harm and benefit’ 
and the ‘international context’. They have argued that aggression against tourists would be met 
by a similar aggression of the countries of those tourists against Muslims as they would consider 
Islam as a religion that calls for violence and bloodshed, which would make these countries ally 
against Islam and consider it to be their enemy. As this would result in harm to Islam, it must be 
prevented. 
After Revisions: The Enemy (Exceptions from the IG Attitudes towards ‘the Other’) 
Despite the new reconciliatory tone and acceptance of ‘the other’, the IG leaders did not forsake 
the pre-revisionist idea of the ‘enemy’ who is plotting against the Ummah though their 
conception of the enemy before revisions is different from that after revisions. The main enemy 
before revisions was the local regime. Now the enemy is either an abstract enemy represented 
in poverty and backwardness or a physical enemy represented in Israel, the West as well as the 
extreme secularists. This raises questions on the centrality of the concept of the enemy is in the 
intellectual and organisational heritage of the IG. 
 However, the concept of the enemy here is mentioned within the context of justifying the new 
stances. By framing in the concepts of enemy and the surrounding dangers, the leaders 
managed to portray a state of danger threatening the Muslim community and Muslim countries, 
which requires unity and change of attitudes towards other segments of the community to 
confront that danger. Furthermore, framing in the concept of the enemy helps bring the new 
ideology more into line with prevailing norms and mores, which is one of the strategic processes 
affecting frame resonance.  
Thereupon, the leaders argue that the fight between the state and the Islamist movement has 
to stop because it weakens both of them and allows the enemies to weaken or destroy both of 
them. The power of the state and the Islamist movement has to be directed towards their 
common real enemies rather than towards each other. As a result, violence has to stop in order 
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not to give a further chance for the enemies of Egypt to exploit incidents of violence to distort 
the image of Islam. These enemies, according to the IG, agree on one goal, despite their 
differences, which is destroying Muslims and their countries. The first enemy is an abstract 
enemy that threatens everybody. This is poverty and backwardness. This type of enemy did not 
receive detailed discussion from the IG despite its importance. The second type of enemy is a 
physical enemy which includes three categories: Israel, America and the West and extreme 
secularists. 
According to the IG892  Israel, with the help of the West, is trying to launch several types of 
military, economic, cultural and psychological wars against Egypt and other Muslim countries. 
By launching these three wars, Israel wants to marginalise or abort Egypt’s role, which would be 
the most serious consequence of the conflict with the Jewish state. Surrender of Egypt to 
attempts of marginalisation would allow Israel to freely do what it wants in the area and would 
waste the rights of Muslims in and outside Palestine as this will deprive the Palestinians from 
the biggest support they receive from the biggest Arab country against the Israeli weaponry 
supported by all Western countries.893 By this, the IG has practically revoked the previous 
ideology of the near enemy but retained their conception of the far enemy though the strategy 
of fighting that far enemy has been changed. Now the previous ‘near enemy’ is an ally in the IG 
resistance against the ‘far enemy’ and the previous major enemy of Islam is now the protector 
and defender of Ummah. 
The second physical enemy, according to the IG, is America and the West who consider Islamist 
movements as their enemy after communism and the Soviet Union. Therefore, they hold 
meetings to confront this new threat and to instigate Arab and Muslim countries against Islamic 
movements. The objectives of these countries is to end or limit Egypt’s leading role in the area 
by placing it in domestic fights and confrontations with the Islamist movements so that Israel 
would replace Egypt as the leader of the area and would neutralise Egypt’s power, which will 
make Egypt unable to confront the Zionist threat and stop its aggressive expansion. 
 On the other hand, Western countries encourage confrontations with Islamist movements as 
their goal of capturing the treasures and riches of these countries would not be achieved unless 
Muslim peoples are busy with domestic fights and continuous internal upheavals that would 
                                                          
892 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 40-3. 
893 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 40-3.  
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give them no chance to confront their original enemies and achieve their own welfare and 
progress. Therefore, Muslims must not yield to Western pressures, whether military, economic, 
financial or technical. This requires of Egypt and Muslims to unite their efforts and powers and 
advance in all walks of life to be able exist in a new world order that has no place except for the 
powerful.894 
Thus, the IG framing in the concept of foreign enemy both before and after revisions is in line 
with the framing of most Islamist movements that follow a similar discourse. According to 
Wiktorowicz, “An important component of most Islamist diagnostic frames is to blame the 
spread of Western values and practices for a wide variety of social ills…Most frames go a step 
further and argue that this process of cultural imperialism is a conscious Western strategy to 
weaken Muslim societies for economic, political, and military purposes. International 
institutions, media outlets, the marketplace, and secular modernization projects are all framed 
as vehicles for the strategic infusion of alien value systems calculated to undermine the strength 
of Islam.”895 
As the IG new framing in the concept of the enemy is meant to justify the new stances and make 
them necessary without calling for violence, the leaders argue, despite all of the 
aforementioned dangers and violations, that all of this does not necessitate war or clash 
between Muslims and these countries as “the relationship between Egypt and other non-
Muslim countries must be based on cooperation and mutual interests not on war and 
conflict.”896 Moreover, the tyranny of the enemies does not justify killing or attacking their 
civilian subjects. The leaders argued that in spite of the American tyranny, violation of the 
sanctities of Muslims, usurping their resources, occupying their lands and shedding their blood 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as their support to the Israelis in killing Muslim children and 
violating the sanctity of Jerusalem, Islam does not consider these violations a valid justification 
of indiscriminate killing of Americans just for being American citizens. A distinction must be 
made between the military and the civil Americans and also between women and children and 
between military men etc. Therefore, the indiscriminate attacks on Western civilians are 
                                                          
894 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 43-4. 
895 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 16-17. 
896 Zuhdī, Nahr al-Dhikrayāt, 189-90. 
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impermissible as Muslims have entered their countries with a valid contract of amān that makes 
harming or killing them impermissible.897 
The leaders amplified this interpretation by emphasising that the relationship with the West is 
not based only on military issues, but is rather a complicated relationship that involves 
cooperation, alliance and other forms of interaction. This is also framed and weighed with the 
scale of ‘capacity’ and ‘harm and benefit’ based on the argument that targeting the West by 
jihadists’ attacks renders it into a wild enemy against Islam and Muslims. Therefore, a specific 
group or organisation must not put all of the Muslim Ummah in confrontations that they are not 
ready for as the Ummah is undergoing the worst phase in its history. “This phase requires 
wisdom and rationality in actions and practices and a good planning to face the great economic, 
educational and social challenges facing the Ummah, rather than putting it in unwanted and 
unequal confrontations.”898 
 The third enemy is the extreme secularists (ghulāt al-ʿalmāniyīn). The IG states that the majority 
of the Egyptian secularists are good and give priority to the interests of their countries over their 
own interests. Yet, some of these secularists ignored the interests of Egypt and the rights of 
others and paid attention only to their own interests at the expense of those of the country and 
the society. Therefore, they always behaved in hostility towards Islamic movements by 
instigating against them and calling for their annihilation. They further tried their best to plant 
discord between the government and Islamists and bring any possible agreement between the 
two into failure so that the confrontations would weaken both the government and Islamists 
and allow secularists to take control.899 Thus, despite considering extreme secularists as 
enemies, the rhetoric towards ‘moderate secularists’ was moderated. Even though the new 
vision still denounces secular ideologies, it now recognises secularists as an integral part of  the 
Egyptian society.900  
These are the three enemies that the IG post-revisionist thought sees as the real enemy that 
needs to be confronted. This new characterisation of the enemy is meant in principle to indicate 
                                                          
897 Ibrāhīm, Tafjīrāt al-Riyāḍ, 116. 
898 Ibrāhīm, Tafjīrāt al-Riyāḍ, 116-17. 
899 Ḥāfiẓ, Mubādarat Waqf al-ʿUnf, 43-6; Ḥāfiẓ, Taslīṭ al-Aḍwā, 17. Examples of the campaigns of instigation against 
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the secularists’ stark attacks on the minister of interior who tried to end the IG violence through mediation of some 
renowned Muslim scholars. Secularists attacked the minister and his attempt and accused him of accommodating and 
reconciling with ‘terrorism’, which resulted in failure of reconciliation and the sacking of the minister. 
900 Hamzawy and Grebowski, “From Violence to Moderation,” 12. 
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that the real enemy is not the regime or the ruler. Therefore, instead of fighting the regime and 
the ruler, they should receive support and cooperation from Islamist movements as they have a 
common enemy that both Islamist movements and the regime need to fight against. Though 
ample space was spent on explaining how dangerous these enemies are, no details are given on 
how to confront and neutralise their threats especially when it comes to the West and extreme 
secularists. 
The leaders wrote only about the need to revive the leading role of Egypt and the need to be 
united without saying how this can be achieved. Furthermore, though the IG main Ideologue 
criticised and argued against the conspiracy theory in one of his books,901 the leaders’ 
conception of these enemies and how they conspire against Islam and Islamists explain how the 
IG adopts this theory in practice despite the rejection of its main ideologue to it in theory. This 
could be also interpreted as differences of views among the leaders regarding this issue. 
 
A Summary of the views 
The above views represented the IG new dogma and ideology after revisions. However, due to 
the length and variation of the above overviews, it would be beneficial to account the reader 
with a short brief of these views before delving into the dynamism of these stances and their 
general analysis. In order for the IG to revise its previous thoughts, it had to provide a different 
interpretation of the concept of ḥākimiyya. So the leaders presented a new vision of ḥākimiyya 
and the relationship between the ruler and subjects. They argued that non-implementation of 
the Sharia cannot be considered disbelief unless it is accompanied by rejection of God’s 
commandment or preference of man-made laws to those of God.  
They also argued that there is a human ḥākimiyya that does not conflict with the Divine one, but 
rather works within and complements that of God. They also devoted a book902 to sovereign 
matters where they argued that sovereign matters such as launching wars, carrying out corporal 
punishments, holding peace treaties and domestic security are to be undertaken only by the 
state and not open to common people or groups as these matters require special power that is 
not available except for rulers and their representative irrespective of their religious 
commitment. 
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902 Ibrāhīm, Taṭbīq al-Aḥkām.  
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As they employed some fatwas of classical Muslim scholars, such as the fatwas of Ibn Taymiya 
on the Tartars, to justify violence in the pre-revision period, the IG leaders have revised their 
interpretations of these fatwas and their application to contemporary regimes. The leaders 
acknowledged that the application of these fatwas to contemporary regimes is erroneous and 
have concluded that contemporary regimes and armies of Muslim countries are completely 
different from those of the Tartars and therefore using analogy to compare those to these is 
erroneous. The leaders also revised some of the concepts that they took for granted in the 
previous stage such as ‘inevitability of confrontation’, and they concluded that ‘nothing is 
inevitable except that which is made so by God’. Thus, confrontation with regime is not 
inevitable as the fact that their cause is fair and legitimate does not mean that they have to fight 
to fulfil their demands. 
The IG rethinking of ḥākimiyya and its consequence takfīr and rebellion and their confession 
that their application of old fatwas to contemporary regimes was wrong led them to rethinking 
the concept of jihad as a whole. They argued that jihad is meant for defence and guidance and 
that is why it was regulated by the Islamic principles and criteria that prevent bloodshed. 
Because jihad is a means and not an end, it has to be governed by the criteria governing means. 
So, it becomes impermissible if its conditions and criteria are not met and if it is going to cause 
harm that influences one of the objectives of the Sharia or one of the reasons why jihad was 
prescribed. Thereupon, as experience shows that ‘jihad’ in the way practised nowadays by 
Jihadist movements, results in harm and bloodshed without achieving any tangible benefit, it 
must be banned.  
Also, the IG criticised their old understanding and application of the concepts of walā’, jizya and 
revised their relationship with ‘the other’ whether Muslims, People of the Book or the world in 
general. All the new stances towards ‘the other’ call for tolerance and cooperation though the 
IG specifies some enemies from the West and extreme secularists in addition to Israel. This 
tolerance and cooperation was framed in a way that does not contradict the concept of al-walā’ 
wa al-barā’. Also their previous understanding of ḥisba was revised and the conclusion was that 
forced ḥisba should be implemented only by the ruler or those appointed by him. After the 
process of self-criticism, the IG leaders started to criticise other jihadi groups such as al-Qaeda; 
dedicating two lengthy books to respond to and criticise the thought and acts of al-Qaeda. The 
first book shed light on the strategy and bombings of al-Qaeda and the Islamic rulings on them 
279 
 
and the second book spoke about the bombings that happened in Riyadh, Casablanca and Rabat 
and the Islamic rulings regarding them. 
In all of their arguments, the IG used reconciliatory language and employed a completely 
different approach by framing in the general principles of the Sharia and the Uṣūlī concepts of 
harm and benefit or what is known as Fiqh of consequences or Jurisprudence of results and 
weighing matters. So, the conclusion was that any clash with others on the domestic, regional or 
international levels that results in harm to Muslim countries or Muslim people is prohibited as 
these clashes would lead to weakening of Muslim countries and would be used as justifications 
by their enemies to invade them. 
 
Dynamics of the Change 
 This section highlights the theological tools and mechanisms through which the IG leaders were 
able to shift from violence to non-violence by framing in religious justifications in both cases. 
Thus, the section answers the main question of this chapter. These tools and mechanisms are 
highlighted in the following sub-sections.   
Pragmatic and Contextual Reading of the Sharia 
As explained in chapter 2, the IG was utterly defeated in its military confrontation with the 
regime and lost the sympathy of the people because of the bloodshed resulting from these 
confrontations and because the regime launched an ideological counter-framing war via mass 
media and official scholars against the thoughts and practices of the IG. Subsequently, not only 
daʿwa, guidance and all the peaceful Islamic activities of the IG were lost as a result of violence, 
but also severe personal, social and cultural consequences were faced by the IG leaders and 
grassroots. As prevalent norms on the legitimacy of particular tactics affect the cost-benefit 
calculations of organisations,903 the IG found itself obliged to revise its strategies, means and 
tools in order not to lose its main goals and objectives of guidance and daʿwa. The Group had to 
choose between ending its activities completely and restarting them in a different way, with a 
different approach that rectifies the catastrophic consequences of the old approach. 
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Thus, the revisions of the IG are in fact not a revision of the targets and objectives of the Group 
but a revision of the tools and means of achieving these objectives, by revising the way and 
approach of effecting a change. Therefore, the IG still does not approve of the status quo as 
such but is, rather, trying to adapt to it and change it by means of various peaceful tools and 
approaches. The catastrophic consequences caused by the previous approach made them 
realise that peaceful actions such as daʿwa and charitable activities, build and construct while 
violent acts and practices demolish what the daʿwa has built. As the Group derived its legitimacy 
and credibility from being an ‘Islamic’ group that serves Islam and people based on Islamic 
principles and interpretations, the new tools have to be Islamic and not at odds with Islamic 
principles.904 The solution to this dilemma was found in the changeable Uṣūlī side of the Sharia. 
The Uṣūlī side of the mainstream Islamic teachings offered the leaders a way out of their 
practical dilemma and miserable conditions while redeeming themselves in the eyes of God, 
their followers and the masses. 
As highlighted and proven above in the reviews, the IG’s new thought reinterprets most of the 
issues within the general principles of the Sharia using an Uṣūlī approach. This allowed the IG to 
shift its interpretation to the Jurisprudence of consequences and weighing matters that depends 
on weighing the harm and benefit of any action while taking into consideration the surrounding 
circumstances before interpreting texts of the Sharia. By this the IG has shifted from textual to 
pragmatic, purposive and contextual interpretations of the Sharia. The IG leaders established 
the validity of their new framing by arguing that people’s interests and benefits are the main 
objectives of the Sharia and its religious texts. Therefore, there must be no conflict between the 
text and the interests of people as the Sharia came to achieve people’s interests. 905   
Having spoken extensively about the significance of the jurisprudential principles relating to 
benefits and harm, the leaders of the IG applied this very principle to the attacks and clashes 
that had taken place, concluding that they actually breached established Sharia standards, as 
they caused harm while yielding no benefits. The new approach that links acts to their outcomes 
and consequences enabled the IG to arrive at the conclusion that if the result of armed combat 
was devastating, it could not be considered correct in a religious sense, even if one of the 
                                                          
904 For example, one of the IG members explained his frustration at the 1997 non-violence initiative before it was 
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fighting groups is right and the other is wrong.906 To overcome the difficulty resulting from 
possible clashes between some Sharia texts and the established status quo without 
compromising Sharia texts, weak juristic opinions were given considerable weight. Although 
these weak opinion are feeble in terms of their basis in texts, they could be considered stronger 
as relates to practicalities and the understanding of what was actually occurring (Fiqh al-
wāqiʿ).907  Such feeble opinions could be the only solution to disasters that befall great nations 
as, if they are not adopted, Sharia rulings may be disregarded in their entirety.908 The conclusion 
that can be drawn from this is that their new discourse is framed in a purposive interpretation of 
the Sharia that heavily depends on the principles of harm and benefits or, to use different 
phraseology, costs and gains.909 
In addition, the new arguments continually repeat and emphasise the Uṣūlī issues of benefit and 
harm, practicalities, understanding what was actually occurring and its relationship with the 
milieu. They maintained that being aware of the context and circumstances of an issue where a 
fatwa is required is essential. As a result, a fatwa should not be given unless the mufti is fully 
aware of its context, or has understanding of the reality behind the matter.910 To change a 
fatwa, the leaders contend, is not something that should be done haphazardly, or due to one’s 
whims but must be based on satisfying the interests of Muslims, as the Sharia’s goal is to 
maximise benefits and minimise harm. In this regard, changing a fatwa could be done, subject to 
the ever changing needs and interests of the Muslim community. They use as evidence of this 
the statements of a number of Uṣūlī scholars, such as al-Shāṭibī (d.790/1388), Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 
751/1350) and al-ʿIzz b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262).911 
 They present these arguments using harm and benefit rule and the general objectives that the 
Sharia seeks to attain for the Ummah, with the outcome being a new ijtihād that operates 
within these general objectives of the Sharia (al-maqāṣid al-ʿāmma li al-Sharīʿa). This method of 
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ijtihād, in the IG’s view, is the only way feasible to solve the problem facing the Muslim Ummah 
in having an infinite number of occurrences but a finite number of Sharia texts with which to 
deal with them.912 Their line of reasoning, renewing ijtihād in this manner, and seeking to meet 
the masses’ interests, is a strong indicator that they have departed from their previous 
methodology of basing their stances purely on  their understanding of theoretical texts. To 
bolster this new discursive approach, the IG leaders used history. For example, historical 
narrations are extensively used to enhance their discourse on the impermissibility of 
insurrection due to the severe harm it may result in, calling for learning lessons from the past 
which demonstrate that violent uprisings never result in beneficial outcomes but instead cause 
harm and the bloodshed of Muslims. 913 
 Their previous consideration of history was in fact a search for injustices in history with the aim 
to use them as frames of injustice and motivations of jihad. Now history is employed much more 
extensively but with a different focus to prove the futility of rebellion and constrain violence. 
Accordingly, the previous employment of history was to prove the historical nature of conflict 
and injustices that call for a violent response. Now the side of history that shows the severe 
consequences of these acts of violence is utilised more extensively. Thus, the use of history in 
the IG writings is not new, but the angle through which they have looked at history is now 
different. This selectivity could be partly justifiable as usually authors employ proofs that are 
supportive of their views and discard others. In the past, the perception of clash as the only 
viable way in dealing with rulers facilitated arguments in favour of clash; however, in the new 
stance the desire for conciliation has given priority to opinions that call for tolerance and 
conciliation, which is the common theme in each stage respectively. 
Weighing acts of violence through the Uṣūlī scale of harm and benefit and the general objectives 
of the Sharia is significant not only because it argues against violence but also because it extends 
to almost all the Sharia matters that the IG leaders have discussed. This entailed a similar shift in 
their approach, which is looking at the anti-Sharia stances and decisions of the state in light of 
the regional and international circumstances and challenges faced by the state and the Arab 
conflict with Israel, as well as the general relationship with the West. 
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Means and Ends  
The belief that jihad is a religious obligation and that God will reward Jihadists for their devotion 
in the afterlife is the most significant barrier that prevents jihadi individuals and organisations 
from abandoning violence.914 Therefore, arguing that the group’s previous understanding and 
implementation of jihad was erroneous and thus non-rewardable was essential to delegitimising 
the previous thought. 
In this regard, IG has emphasised that jihad is a means to an end which is guiding people to the 
straight path of Islam. So jihad is not an end in itself. Due to the fact that the ends are giving 
weight over means (i.e. achieving objectives is prioritised over the means of achieving these 
objectives) and it has been established that the way in which jihad has been waged by the IG 
and other Jihadists hinders this goal, it follows that jihad of this nature has to stop. “Jihad is 
legislated to uphold the religion. If it is the case that it does not achieve this but instead results 
in the loss of lives, it should be prohibited.”915 This is an example of what could be called the 
jurisprudence of means and ends, the subject about which the IG leaders wrote their book: 
Hidāyat al-Khalā’iq bayna al-Ghāyāt wa al-Wasā’il (Guiding the Creation: Ends and Means). In 
this regard, the IG also reframed its previous motivational framing of re-establishing Islamic 
caliphate as a means, not as an end. The leaders argued that to make the establishment of the 
Islamic state an end in itself is a mistaken belief. Islam’s encouragement to establish a state is 
simply a proxy to establishing the religion. With this being the case, the fundamental priority is 
to establish the religion, with the establishment of the state being a by-product, and if there is 
any conflict between these two objectives, establishing the religion takes priority.916 The 
dominance of the Uṣūlī approach runs throughout this discourse, exemplifying the IG’s volte 
face in their attitudes and theology, reframing events within the general aims of the Islamic 
legislation, as defined in the Science of the Principles of Jurisprudence, as opposed to their 
former methodology of relying purely upon literal understanding of the texts.917   
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From ʿAqīda to Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
As explained in chapter 5, affairs that relate to beliefs or creed (ʿaqīda) are strictly derived from 
religious texts, irrespective of the ever-changing circumstances, and are absolute. Matters of 
jurisprudence, in contrast, are malleable and implemented alongside texts as dictated by the 
milieu. They are flexible, reflecting the flexibility and fluidity of time, places and wider contexts. 
For the main part, they are governed by the principle of harm and benefit and the broader 
objectives of the Sharia. 
The IG, during the violent phase, used to view different issues as they consider the laws of 
physics: as a set of immutable rules created by the Lord.918 Their approach to any and every 
religious matter was as though it were a matter of creed. An example of this can be seen when 
they discussed the issue of rising up against the ruler, which they used to look at only through 
the lens of ḥākimiyya. With ḥākimiyya being an issue of creed, texts were interpreted without 
consideration of the wider (socio-political) milieu in which they were being applied. With such 
an approach, practical considerations and the jurisprudence of outcomes do not come into play.  
It was exactly as Faraj framed it, “Forming the Islamic state is an enactment of God’s orders, and 
we are not, however, responsible for the results.”919  
Indifference concerning outcomes was a major issue with the IG political and theological 
attitudes as it rendered the organisation into an entity of insurrection rather than that of reform 
and betterment. Such a methodology restricted the IG’s interpretations and actions within the 
textual and theological realms, without having any bearings of a socio-political, national, 
regional or international milieu– factors that have no connections with issues of belief, which 
represent the religion in the pristine sense in which they understood it. Evidence of this can be 
seen in their radical literature wherein creedal concepts of tawāīd, submission and ḥākimiyya 
are frequently cited. Matters of creed are determined via absolute revelation, not through 
reasoning or contexts. Therefore, by viewing contexts merely through the lens of creed, the IG 
affiliates took their theological stances and creedal ideologies as the sole driver of their political 
actions.920 
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From a theological standpoint, the Group leaders were able to smoothly alter their viewpoint on 
the use of violence when they reinterpreted such actions within the banner of the malleable 
side of the Sharia, having previously categorised them under the unchangeable side of creed. 
The result of this is evident in their subsequent writings, where an Uṣūlī methodology was more 
closely adhered to. By utilising this approach, the IG leaders framed their understanding of 
concepts that were previously used to justify violence through the principles of benefit and 
harm, making a compromise between their ideology and the pragmatic reality that surrounded 
them. ‘Sharia Objectives ‘benefits and harm’, ‘jurisprudence of outcomes’ and ‘jurisprudence of 
weighing matters’ are all new concepts that featured heavily in their new writings due to the 
shift to the Uṣūlī approach. As a whole, the group’s old approach was to adapt the reality to the 
texts, something which naturally led to revolution, but their refreshed approach is to adapt the 
text to the context- contextualisation.921 Therefore, they have shifted from ‘doctrinarianism’ to 
pragmatism and ‘contextualism’.  
 Changing the approach is manifest in the nature of the sources employed in the IG writings in 
each stage. As previously explored, the works of classical Salafi scholars, in addition to those of 
al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb, were used to justify taking up arms against local regimes.922 As the ideas 
posed by the IG in their previous thought were mainly theological and juristic views based on 
traditional classical Islamic literature that was written by Muslim scholars at times when Islam 
was the dominant ruling power, the IG took this literature for granted as coming from the Salaf. 
Because the IG is a Salafi movement that follows the footsteps of the Salaf and because of its 
indifference to contexts or changing circumstances, it took that Jurisprudence as it is without 
reviewing its suitability for the current different reality. 
After revisions, the Salafi nature and orientation of the IG that grant it credibility and currency in 
the eyes of its followers had to continue to exist. Therefore, the Salafi literature continued to 
dominate their writings but through another dimension and interpretation by moving from the 
perspective of ʿAqīda to Principles of Jurisprudence that allows for consideration of the reality in 
order to reach their reality/text-based conclusions. This is particularly clear in the leaders’ 
continuity to look at Christian residents of Muslim lands as people of dhimma and the 
classification of countries into abodes of Islam and abodes of disbelief, as in the traditional 
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classical sources, despite the concessions presented in the attitudes towards them and the way 
of dealing with them. This confirms that for Islamists the theological, creedal /juristic discourse 
represented, and continues to represent, the referential authority that would assign religious 
and theological legitimacy to, or withdraw it from, acts of violence that influence an unlimited 
number of people worldwide. 
In their revisions, the IG leaders confessed they were mistaken, having erroneously applied 
classical fatwas in contexts in which they did not apply.923 Yet, the leaders continued to use the 
works of some of the same classical Salafi scholars, such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim. 
However, this time they used the writings that focus on issues of Jurisprudence rather than 
those that focus on issues regarding creed. Creed-related concepts are mentioned only to 
critique the previously-held understanding related to them. Their latter focus is on works that 
deal with the general principles of the Sharia, as per the Jurisprudence of benefit and harm.  
Another shift was that they started employing the works and ideas of contemporary scholars, 
whom they had previously renounced. Al-Qaraḍāwī and those of his standing were used in their 
new writings, particularly when the leaders discussed matters related to excessiveness and 
extremism, the dangers of takfīr, the tolerance of Islam, flexibility of fatwas and rulings changing 
with times and circumstances, as well as the Jurisprudence of outcomes and weighing 
matters.924 In addition, they renounced the Quṭbian literature as that of “a man of letters who 
deals with general issues, and not of a Jurist who employs Islamic Jurisprudence and its 
Principles to arrive at precise Sharia rulings.”925 
 
Conclusion 
Generally speaking, revising any thought involves two processes. The first is acknowledgement 
of failure and a severe criticism of the previous thought and its application to actual events in 
the world. The second is the drafting of new thought, different from that of the past that shapes 
the present and the future of the revisionists and their relationships with their community and 
the wider context around them. For the revisionists covered in this study, the previous thought 
was based on their interpretation of and engagement with texts, while the new thought is based 
on interpretation of the reality and context and how to efficiently adapt to them. These 
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processes allowed the IG to move from one category of Islamist movements to another. The first 
category is that of groups that adopt a top-down approach, whereby ‘apostate’ rulers are 
violently removed, any resistance from the population is swiftly or forcibly suppressed, and the 
Sharia is instituted after establishing an Islamic state.  
The new category is that of moderate movements of political Islam that do not see their local 
regimes as apostate or pagan but instead, see them as needing to be reformed through peaceful 
means. Therefore, they  have employed a steady indoctrination of populations into accepting 
their worldview and political agendas through a grassroots approach that involves such peaceful 
means as daʿwa, non-violent activism, lobbying and/or political participation.926 However, this is 
not the case with the revisions of al-Jihād which, despite banning violence, still holds to most of 
its radical ideological stances. 
Based on the founding ideology, each group has a set of goals, and a set of tactics that are 
acceptable to pursue in order to achieve those goals. Over time, external factors such as cultural 
context or structural conditions, and internal factors such as organisational cohesion and 
constituency, pressurise the group and influence the extent to which a particular tactic is 
possible or effective. This may generate a process of re-evaluation or revision that is 
conceptualised as an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of different tactics in fulfilling the 
most important goals of an organisation. As certain tactics become impossible or ineffective, the 
organisation is forced to adjust and either narrow its array of tactics or, if necessary, change its 
priorities and adopt new tactics. Gradually, this strategic adjustment, in response to external 
pressures and organisational dynamics, can cause the group to revise its very ideology. 
However, any adjustment must also be principled, which means that any alternative tactics are 
evaluated in relation to their ability to promote a particular mission and vision.927 
As guiding people through ḥisba and daʿwa has been the primary objective of the IG since its 
establishment, this has made it easier for the Group to change when violence proved 
counterproductive to the main goal of guidance. By this, the IG returned to its original objectives 
upon which it was initially founded before it was drawn into violence.928 The tolerant, lenient 
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discourse and strong presence of the IG leaders in public forums and discussions and their 
involvement in interviews and public issues shows that the Group is trying to reintroduce itself 
to the masses as an effective public and social force and have its old image corrected. However, 
the somewhat conservative views regarding some issues, such as dhimma, gives the message 
that the IG’s attempt to reintroduce itself and revise its thought is not at the expense of the 
general tenets of Islam, the referential authority of the Sharia and the supremacy of the Muslim 
majority in Egypt. 
The IG sought to found a utopian society that would take the place of the current, un-Islamic 
one. In order to bring this change about, the use of force, which they branded jihad, would be 
inevitable. The concepts of ḥākimiyya, takfīr and jāhilī regime were the foundations of their 
theology to bring about the change that they saw essential. They interpreted all Quranic and 
Prophetic texts devoid of their contexts,929 and used them to support their discourse. Without 
official religious guidance, the youth understood the fatwas of scholars of past ages without any 
steering, applying them to contexts that differed from the ones in which they were given.930   
A key flaw in the IG’s thought was that they sought utopia in a context and society in which it 
would not be possible. Although religious preaching and activities increased under Sadat’s era, 
the faithful youth saw this as deficient, seeking to establish a full Islamic state, mirroring that of 
the Rightly Guided Caliphs, in what was dubbed as the ‘Golden Age of Islam’.931 Egyptian 
society’s relationship with the state was projected as a negative archetype, seen through the 
lens of the old ‘Golden Age’ (this being the ideal). Through this approach, the status quo was 
seen as a flagrant deviation from the ideal.932 The objective then became to restore the epitome 
that was reached in the past, rejecting the current reality and violently rising up against it. In the 
belief that it would incite the masses to revolt against the regime, they assassinated Sadat and 
tried to capture the governorate of Asyut.933 This did not, however, prove successful as they had 
failed to connect with the masses and form a basis of wider support, so the insurrection lacked 
the basic tools of success. As Kepel puts forward, they failed to understand the concerns and 
priorities of the Egyptian masses who had not felt allegiance to the Ummah in the nostalgic 
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manner which Islamists had imagined, nor had they broken with the values of Egyptian society, 
values that are primarily, but not solely, made up of Islam.934 
The fact that the IG adopted a creed-based methodology and a literal interpretation of the texts 
was a more serious problem. Their own understanding of Islam consisted of a number of 
elements. The primary element is that Islam is essentially a creed, which is to submit fully and 
comprehensively to God, with all other elements measured through this scale. The second 
element was the literal interpretation and application of religious commandments, linking them 
to God’s ḥākimiyya, which is the keyword in jihadi literature.935 The aims behind this is to 
actualise ultimate submission to God, something that can only be achieved only after ousting 
apostate regimes and establishing Islamic governance. This is a creed-based methodology in 
which the literal interpretation of the sacred texts is given priority over outcomes or 
consequences. Yet, Looking at the world with its pragmatic nature solely through the lens of the 
texts is, indeed, problematic and unrealistic.936 
 After failing to face and change the practical challenges on the ground, losing peoples’ 
sympathy, receiving military and psychological defeat and failing to achieve any of their goals, 
the IG leaders recognised that taking authority through force was as fanciful as restoration of 
the Golden Age which they sought. Thus, they renounced the top-down approach of Islamising 
the society by forceful seizure of political power and accepted restricting their role to peacefully 
maintaining religious ethics in the society. However, following revisions, the status of the 
Golden Age is still held as the pinnacle of Islamic society, yet without viewing the current 
established order negatively. Through peaceful means, the IG seek to restore what they can of 
the Golden Age, aiming to adapt to the current reality, rather than revolting against it.937 The 
result has been a renewed methodology based on Uṣūlī principles (such as the Jurisprudence of 
Outcomes, of harm and benefit and of Sharia general objectives) that makes use of and adapts 
to the current reality, rather than rebelling against it.938 This enabled the leaders to move from 
purely legalistic to a widely contextualised interpretation of the Sharia.  
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The IG perception of jihad as a means and not an end in itself facilitated the cessation of armed 
conflict when it became apparent that it did not result in the outcomes they had hoped for, 
outcomes that had been deliberated upon by leaders during their incarceration in 1981 until the 
decision to cease violence in 1997. When the IG leaders wrote about jihad in their enthusiastic 
youth, they justified their motivations behind it. They did not however, consider its practical 
constraints, or the challenges it brings. The harsh reality caused the leadership, now older and 
wiser, to shift their discourse from concentrating on the motivations of waging jihad to the 
practical difficulties in doing so. The shift of the discourse from speaking about motivations of 
jihad to its obstacles indicates the level of the ideological change.939  
The contexts in which events took place are now considered along with the texts, and a 
compromise between the two is made. They now view Islam from a wider context and with a 
more measured vision. They achieved a balance between their theoretical principles and the 
surrounding reality; and they now differentiate between flexible and the fixed matters.940 What 
this tells us in general is that the ideological framework on which Islamist groups are founded 
regulates the central goals of the group and determines what set of tactics are acceptable. 
However, when the social, political and cultural contexts constrain movements and show them 
that not all goals are achievable and that not all tactics are viable or effective, these groups try, 
in their day-to-day practice, to adjust to the context, and over time these adjustments can lead 
to ideological revisions.941 
Thus, the IG and al-Jihād’s initial framing was intended to engender collective action to arrive at 
the motivational framing of implementing the Islamic Sharia, restoring the caliphate and 
attaining the dominance of Islamic rule. These motivations were combined together under the 
statement ‘establishing the religion’. As framing literature suggests, to proffer collective action 
frames is to suggest the existence of an opportunity to bring about social change, and that 
people can act as potential agents of their own history. Because the framing of political 
opportunity is an essential component of collective action frames,942 both Faḍl and the IG, 
before revisions, interpreted political space in ways that emphasise opportunity rather than 
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constraint; which generated violent collective action to seize the opportunity and maximise their 
gains. This has changed after revisions as, due to the defeat and catastrophic consequences, 
they interpreted political space in ways that emphasise constraint rather than opportunity. This 
confirms that framing processes and political opportunity are linked interactively. 
However, one of the drawbacks of the revisions is that they were mainly meant to criticise the 
past attempts at violence, as most of the issues discussed in the literature on revisions relate to 
practices and concepts that manifested themselves in the past without providing any plans or 
viable alternatives for the future. This can be attributed to the fact that the revisions came at a 
moment of incapacitation, organisational weakness and disillusionment with the initial cause, 
and not at a moment of organisational strength. This may also explain why the focus was not 
offering an alternative agenda and model of activism, but rather on revising the founding 
ideology in order to continue to have a coherent raison d’etre and organisational identity.943 
However, as the revisions criticised the past without offering a new viable alternative for 
changing and opposing the current reality, they seem to be an approval of the current 
repressive reality. Therefore, the two groups in their new attitudes cannot be considered as 
political opposition forces as they have neither political programs nor do they offer a realistic 
program for change. Having an alternative vision and active political opposition role will 
dissipate any fears that the revisions are meant to approve the current harsh reality and support 
the regime. This will also add to the credibility of the revisions as it will remove the suspicion 
that they are supportive of the current status quo and the tyrant regime. This will also allow 
them to be seen as an attempt to change the approaches and ways of dealing with reality to 
reach better results after the path of violence has proven to be futile.  
Unlike al-Jihād, this has been undertaken by the IG after the collapse of the Mubarak regime.944 
As the IG only established a political party and participated in the parliamentary elections and 
political life after the collapse of the Mubarak regime, this suggests that it was the Mubarak 
regime that did not allow them a socio-political role when it was in power. However, the 
political role of the IG and other Islamic movements has been largely paralysed again after the 
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military coup of 2013, which indicates that it is authoritarian military regimes that tend to 
restrict and impede the peaceful political opposition of Islamist movements. 
Furthermore, the revisions in general, and those of al-Jihād in particular, though considered a 
breakthrough in the jihadi thought, are still limited in their scope and presentation of new ideas 
and the way ideas and ideology are structured. The revisions, coming from Salafi groups, still 
work within the parameters of the old classical interpretations from which they derive their 
theoological and religious legitimacy. Therefore, the revisions dare not criticise the classical 
interpretation whether in terms of its theorisation, approach or interpretation.  
This is mainly because of the political, theological, dogmatic and intellectual environments in 
Egypt which are subject to several restrictions imposed on them. This is also because any 
departure from the Salafi approach in deduction and arriving at rulings would be met with flat 
refusal from the grassroots of these Salafi movements. Thus, the revisionists depended, in 
changing their interpretations regarding the concepts related to violence, on a change of their 
tools of deduction and means of analysis, rather than revising the whole ideological and 
theological Salafi set of ideas and foundations upon which the ideology of these and similar 
groups were generally founded. Therefore, the revisionists, despite the importance of their new 
thought, cannot be considered religious reformers as they not only failed to question the 
traditional structure of Jurisprudence but also because they are still working within them and 
using their tools and means of deduction. 
 Therefore, the two groups cannot be classified as reformist groups, but their revisions can be 
described as a transition towards moderation and peaceful coexistence with the society.945 
Though they are not arguing for a democratic future in the conventional or liberal sense, the 
revisions of the IG are forward looking (rather than being nostalgic) and introduce what some 
have called an ‘alternative modernity’.946 This, together with the significant difference between 
the IG and al-Jihād revisions, proves that ideologies of Salafi jihadists are not as adaptable as 
suggested in recent de-radicalisation literature, and cannot change merely because of external 
causal factors. 
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Findings and Implications 
 
This study has explored the theological and intellectual ideas and concepts that were employed 
to justify/retract violence by two Islamist groups in Egypt in the period between 1968 until 
present. In connecting this to the socio-political milieu in Egypt, the study explores the 
ideational and ideological justifications of Islamists and the role they played in legitimising or de-
legitimising political violence. By positing a specific relationship between thought and action, 
this study distinguishes itself from other studies, such as that of Omar Ashour, that focus on 
structural conditions and the political process. In this way it fills a significant gap in the existing 
literature. 
The study employs various approaches to realise this goal: the political process approach to 
explain the context, textual analysis to explain texts and ideology, and framing to explain 
mobilisation/tactics and link thought to action. The three approaches integrate to address and 
connect the main aspects of this study and answer its main questions. Therefore, the conclusion 
below, in a nutshell, highlights how the three approaches explain the different aspects of this 
study: ideology before and after revisions, mechanisms of change in textual theological, 
structural and framing terms, together with the implications that the findings of this study 
reveal and how this all contributes to the literature on the topic. As the theological textual 
findings constitute the focus of this study, they will be unpacked first, followed by the structural 
and framing aspects. 
Out of the two groups covered in this study, textual analysis has established that the revisions of 
the IG reflect a genuine change in the ideology while those of al-Jihād Organisation, as 
presented by their ideologue Dr. Faḍl, do not. The latter can be best described as 
‘disengagement’ or, according to Ashour’s categorisation, as ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘ideological’ 
or ‘substantive' de-radicalisation. Although Faḍl has practically closed the door of violence under 
the pretext of the Uṣūlī principles of harm and benefit, incapacity and weakness, all of his 
previous views on issues related to ḥākimiyya and takfīr remain unchanged. Moreover, the 
actual behavioural disengagement from violence took place before the revisions and was not a 
consequence of the revisions but a consequence of the defeat and lack of capacity.  
This confirms the premise of this study, which is also the view of Schwedler, that examining 
political behaviour alone, as other studies on moderation and de-radicalisation do, provides 
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insufficient evidence of moderation because it leaves open the possibility that political actors 
might act as if they are moderate while harbouring radical agendas.947 It also shows the value of 
textual analysis in examining the moderation of Islamists and its extent in more precise terms, 
for academic studies that pursued structural or political process approaches on the revisions of 
the two groups failed to explain the ideological nuances between the two groups or identify the 
lack of genuine change in Faḍl’s new views .  
Furthermore, the variation in the degree and genuineness of the revisionist of the two groups, 
as explained in this study, shows how ideology can challenge, as much as it can be influenced by, 
structural socioeconomic and political considerations. Thus, this study differs from other studies 
in that it proves that while changes in structural conditions or political opportunity may provide 
the strategic logic for Islamist groups to cease violence, they do not always lead to ideological 
moderation, and for ideological activists, certain red lines may not be crossed even when there 
is strong logic for behavioural moderation.948 Therefore, the findings of this study challenge 
Ashour’s emphasis that his hypothesis and variables work for all Islamist movements and 
perhaps for movements of political violence in general. The present study shows that a process 
that works for one group or locality may not work for other groups or localities, and emphasises 
that the best way to study Islamism is on a case-by-case basis, because the diversity of contexts, 
ideologies, objectives and motivations of the different Islamist movements renders each 
movement distinct and makes generalisation of little value.  
As regards the IG, textual analysis has shown that the IG revisions utilised several textual and 
contextual methods to argue against violence by framing in the general objectives of the Sharia 
and principles of Uṣūlī al-Fiqh, particularly the notions of reality and harm and benefit, to come 
to the conclusion that as long as fighting has caused grave harm and evil without achieving any 
benefits, it becomes prohibited in both logic and the Sharia. The catastrophic consequences 
caused by the previous approach made the IG’s consideration of reality change, as the leaders 
started to use the status quo to determine the consequences of their actions instead of using it 
as a justification for their existing beliefs. Therefore, the status quo was used before revisions to 
justify their understanding of the text but not to determine how to effectively change that 
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status quo. So, the main driver of the group’s actions before revisions was their understanding 
of the text to change the ‘un-Islamic’ conditions.   
After revisions, the reality and circumstantial developments are used, along with the text, to 
determine how to deal with the status quo in light of what is possible. In other words, after 
revisions, the status quo plays an important role in determining how to react to the 
circumstances instead of being used to justify irrational responses to these circumstances. 
Consequently, the pressure of their predicament, defeat and the new world order made the 
leaders of the IG recognise that removing the ruling regimes by force was not only unattainable 
but also had led to catastrophic consequences, and that engaging in the society by calling 
people to true tolerant Islam and competing with others socially and politically is the only 
productive way to Islamise the society. Hence, the change in the language and the transition 
towards lenient discourse and guidance rather than that of clash and confrontation. 
In theological terms, the IG and al-Jihād derived their legitimacy and credibility from being 
‘Islamic’ groups that serve Islam and people based on Islamic principles and interpretations, 
therefore the new tools had to be Islamic and not at odds with the general principles of Islam. 
The solution to this dilemma was found in the flexible Uṣūlī domain of the Sharia. So, revisionists 
managed to change their views when they shifted issues related to violence from the Sharia 
fixed side of creed to its flexible side of Jurisprudence. This led to a new approach in their 
framing which is that of Uṣūl al-Fiqh or Principles of Jurisprudence. Replacing the methodology 
of creed which is based solely on text with a new Uṣūlī approach that takes contexts into 
consideration helped the leaders to revaluate and measure the concepts used to justify violence 
based on the general principles of the Sharia and notions of capacity and harm and benefit, 
which resulted in a relative conciliation between their ideological orientations and the status 
quo. Therefore, the revised literature is full of such Uṣūlī concepts as Sharia objectives, benefit 
and harm, the jurisprudence of outcomes and the jurisprudence of weighing matters. Instead of 
the previous methodology of trying to adapt the context and status quo to suit the text, which 
necessarily leads to revolution, the leaders now make a compromise between the text and the 
context. Thus, the previous revolutionary approach of adapting the reality to the text was 
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replaced with the new reconciliatory approach that enabled the revisionists to make a 
compromise between the text and the context.949 
The use by the two groups of the Uṣūlī approach as a tool and means of deduction, and the 
emphasis on considering the status quo and harm and benefit as determining factors to argue 
against violence, despite the difference in their magnitude and conclusions, reveals that any 
retraction of Islamist movements from violence, whether genuine or pragmatic, would be based 
on and generally framed in the Uṣūlī approach and its tools and means of deduction, as well as 
on the general principles of the Sharia. An examination of the revisions of other non-Egyptian 
Jihadist groups, such as the Libyan Islamic group,950 reveals a great deal of similarity in their use 
of the same tools and means of deduction to arrive at their new conclusions, which further 
reveals the generalisable nature of this point. This highlights a significant aspect in determining 
how best to counter the powerful ideas that are associated with jihadist violence. 
Moreover, as the revisions of the IG has used the Uṣūlī approach much more extensively than 
those of al-Jihād and has extended it to most of their arguments, this suggests that the degree 
of change in the ideology of each group corresponds to the number of concepts they have 
moved from the static to the dynamic domain of the Sharia.951 Faḍl has moved only rebellion 
without moving ḥākimiyya, takfīr or issues related to them, whereas the IG has moved most of 
the pro-violence concepts including ḥākimiyya and takfīr to the changeable domain. 
The fact that the revisions occurred only after the defeat of the two groups and the catastrophic 
consequences of confrontation suggests that de-radicalisation of groups and movements is 
mostly an internal retrospection and an acknowledgment by leaders and followers that their 
approach to political action had failed to achieve any positive results. This, together with the 
fact that de-legitimisation of violence by leaders has succeeded in convincing the grassroots 
while the efforts of official and independent prominent scholars to broker a cease fire between 
the state and the IG failed, even though the arguments used by both are quite similar and these 
sheikhs seem to have a greater authority on such kind of arguments, suggests three things.  
                                                          
949 Ibrahim, “Theology and Jurisprudence,” 44-5. 
950 See, e.g., The revisions of the Libyan Islamic Group in Al-Jamā‘a  alIsl āmiyya al-Lībiyya, Dirāsāt Taṣḥīḥiyya fī 
Mafāhīm al-Jihād wa al-Ḥisba wa al-Ḥukm ʿalā al-Nās (Tripoli: Al-Manāra li al-Iʿl ām, 2009). For an analysis of the 
causes of the revisions of this group see Ashour, "Post-Jihadism,” 377-97. 
951 This is a generalisable point: the degree of change in any jihadist movement reviewing its thought would 
correspond to the number of concepts they have moved from the static to the dynamic side of the Sharia. 
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The first is that internal debates on ideology and retrospections should primarily be understood 
in the organisational context in which they take place.952 This means that revisions have to be 
understood as an internal organisational process resulting from retrospection triggered by 
contextual factors such as defeat and changes in political opportunity structures, which proves 
to the leaders that their previous approach was wrong and therefore needs to be reviewed and 
corrected. Revisions do not occur in the form of ideological implantation or dictation of ideas 
marketed to the groups from outside. The second is that the religious authority that can have an 
impact on jihadist movements is not confined to the theological religious arguments presented 
to them. Rather, for these theological arguments to be acceptable and influential, they must be 
presented to these movements by someone who has some sort of ‘credibility’ and ‘heroic 
stance’ recognised by these movements. The third is that not all forms of religious authority can 
be effective with all audiences. Instead, Jihadist audience requires a different configuration from 
its own credible sources.953 This suggests that trust and credibility are essential to any Islamist 
organisation seeking recruits, as it seeks to maximise the resonance of a message with its 
intended audiences. Without credibility, organisations, especially those engaged in high-risk 
activism, have little hope of mobilising adherents to achieve their objectives.954 
Technically speaking, what enabled the IG leaders to revoke their previous thought regarding 
ḥākimiyya and takfīr was their consideration of jaḥd and istiḥlal as conditions for takfīr and their 
belief that the refraining group was Muslim, in addition to the necessity of fulfilment of 
conditions and absence of impediments before issuing any judgement of takfīr. Excluding the 
ruler from the above rules was an unjustified gap in their theory. Through this gap the new 
thought could revoke the previous argument on the rulers’ apostasy and the consequent 
necessity of fighting them. All they did in the new stance was to apply the conditions of jaḥd and 
istiḥlāl to the ruler as well; and they moved the ḥākimiyya to the flexible side of the sharia in 
which practical considerations would be considered.  
Faḍl, the ideologue of al-Jihād, could not do the same, as he considered rulers and their 
supporters equally apostate without the need for jaḥd or istiḥlal and without the fulfilment of 
conditions and the absence of impediments. Accordingly, he could not change the ideological 
stance in this regard and, therefore, he resorted to practical considerations only. Another 
                                                          
952 Drevon, “Assessing Islamist De-radicalization,” 302. 
953 Jackson, “Beyond Jihad,” 67. 
954 Page et al, “Framing Narratives,” 162. 
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methodological difference between the IG thought and that of al-Jihād is that the writings of 
Faḍl both before and after revisions maintained the same textual repetitive approach despite 
the limited employment of reality and context in his new writings. The IG, however, though 
maintained a textual approach, had more advanced, progressive interpretations and moved a 
great deal towards new ijtihād and analysis as well as a wider consideration of the reality. 
Therefore, the revisions of the IG are deeper, more comprehensive, more influenced with and 
reflective of contemporary reformist ideas, and more dependent on sources written by 
contemporary scholars. 
Nonetheless, the revisions of the IG are in fact not a reconsideration of the targets and 
objectives of the group, but a revision of the tools and means of achieving these objectives by 
revising the way and means of change. Therefore, the IG still does not approve of the status quo 
as such, but is, rather, trying to change it by means of different peaceful tools and approaches. 
Thus, the revisions of the IG represent a transition from the old thought that adopts the thought 
of exception and necessity, to the new thought that adopts the Fiqh of social or public life; a 
transition from the approach of insurrection to the approach of daʿwa; a transition from 
violence as a tool of social and political conflict to the peaceful struggle for change. 
The solidarity of the IG as a well-organised entity under a coherent, unified and highly venerable 
leadership made it easier for the leaders to market their new thought to their followers. 
However, this was not the case with al-Jihād, which since its establishment, has been made up 
of different scattered groups united only by the common belief of the necessity of using force to 
oust the ‘apostate’ Egyptian regime. The lack of unity of al-Jihād groups and the lack of a solid 
structure and unified leadership, hindered internal dialogue and retrospection and stalled the 
possibility to articulate a shared position. This made the internal processes of retrospection and 
argumentation inefficient in reaching conclusions similar to those of the IG and limited the 
available options to the views of Faḍl as the only referential authority accepted by most al-Jihād 
members. 
Furthermore, the organisational nature and founding objectives of each of the two groups have 
affected their revisions. Al-Jihād is originally a clandestine organisation that believes in the 
apostasy of the regime and its supporters and takes ousting that regime as a goal, a task that 
can be achieved only and exclusively through armed rebellion. Therefore, the Organisation 
adopts a careful system of selecting its members and affiliates. The IG, however, is originally a 
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social and public daʿwa group that promotes public activity and adopts ḥisba and daʿwa as 
primary tools for the Islamisation of the society. The IG focus on ḥisba and daʿwa, which are 
meant essentially for guidance, made it easier for them to change as violence proved 
counterproductive to the main goal of guidance. By revising its thoughts and means of achieving 
the founding objectives, the IG has returned to its original objectives upon which it was initially 
founded before it was drawn into violence. On the other hand, Faḍl’s focus on dogmatic issues 
of ḥākimiyya and takfīr shows that he is not as much concerned with guidance as he is with 
ḥākimiyya and categorising people into patterns of belief and disbelief, a posture that makes 
rethinking the ideas because of their futility in guidance farfetched, which was reflected in his 
strategic, rather than ideological recantations. 
Thus, this study proposes that the nature, organisational structure and the main goals of Islamist 
groups in general play a crucial role in deciding the nature and degree of their revisions. It also 
proves the note made by other studies on Islamist de-radicalisation, that de-radicalisation 
programs and studies lack an accurate way to measure success as they point to recidivism rates, 
which only measure disengagement,955 and that most Islamist de-radicalisation programs boast 
unverified claims of extremely high success rates.956 Furthermore, this study contributes greatly 
to providing solutions to these two problems by providing a framework for measurement, 
assessment and verification based on textual analysis of the revisionists’ texts and ideological 
attitudes. 
This study has also shown that even though Salafi Islamist movements rely on very similar texts, 
they vary greatly in their interpretations of these texts. Therefore, the study argues that both 
the text and context need to be considered. Even if texts and their interpretations are similar, 
the contexts are usually different from one country or group to another; and in the very rare 
case where the context is similar, as in the case of the two Egyptian groups, the interpretations 
of texts and their application to the reality are different from one group to another. Therefore, 
any study of radicalisation or de-radicalisation needs to take into consideration different 
ideological, cultural and contextual factors. The disagreements among leaders of the same 
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groups under investigation over some ideological issues suggests that even within the same 
group, ideological and cultural differences need to be taken into consideration. 
The study has also proven that even within a single country like Egypt where the structural and 
psychological, as well as the circumstances surrounding political process are common to the 
majority of movements, there are sharp disagreements and differences between various 
Islamist groups, despite the fact that they all draw from the same well of Islam. Such differences 
are based mainly on ideology, not on circumstances or structural conditions. This is a major 
reason why ideology is the focus of this study. By providing an in-depth understanding of the 
ideology of militant Islamists and how it is retracted, the study offers a deeper understanding of 
the core religious ideas and tenets that are used to attract new recruits and the counter-
ideological ways that can be effective in reversing violent ideology.  
The clear understanding of the ideology the study offers helps to better distinguish each group’s 
features and thoughts and thus, minimises the danger of mistakenly attacking wrong ideas or 
groups and prevents antagonising others, which inhibits complicating the problem. The detailed 
explanation of ideological similarities, differences and nuances between the two groups, using 
textual and frame analysis, breaks with the prevalent tendency of homogenising the ideology of 
Islamist movements. Such a tendency proves to be counterproductive because it ignores 
diversity and ideological variation among Islamist movements and glosses over the type of 
discursive work required to articulate and elaborate the array of possible links between ideas, 
events, and actions, thereby limiting our understanding of these movements and indirectly 
affecting the strategies for effectively combating and coping with the threats they pose. 
This, in total, has provided information and insights on Jihadist groups’ ideological recruitment 
and mobilisation strategies, which in turn contributes to counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, 
it helps arrive at ideas that can be effective and religiously acceptable alternatives to violent 
ideas and which can be offered to neutralise violence in the name of Islam or at least impede 
freelance and potential recruits by countering the appeal of the jihadist ideology. By showing a 
total reversal or relative moderation of some ideational elements (frames) and highlighting the 
ideological differences between two groups that stem from the same country and pursue similar 
goals, the study shows that the ideology of militant Islamist movements is not fixed, permanent 
or static but rather can be flexible and adaptable. 
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The variation in the ideological level of commitment to or retraction from violence based on 
both ideological and pragmatic considerations proves that Islamist movements are both 
principled and strategic, that the religious ideological tenets of groups can change and adjust 
over time and that the interplay between ideology and pragmatic and organisational 
considerations determine the level and degree of any revisions. Thinking of ideology as a two-
sided concept that contains both fundamental principles and day-to-day tactics (fixed and 
flexible sides of the Sharia), helps explain how change may take place and be driven by 
adaptation to a particular socio-political context. This conception of ideology as a two-sided 
concept helps avoid confusing tactical change with more fundamental adjustment to the overall 
vision and mission of a group.957  
The two groups’ refusal to change some of their ideas– though deemed radical by others – 
shows that though Islamists can be strategic and pragmatic, they are redlined by their religious 
vision and ideology. This suggests that cost-benefit calculations are not made in absolute terms 
but rather in relation to religious convictions and aspirations, and that religious interpretations 
provide significant filters through which the structural socioeconomic and political reality is 
interpreted. Thus, though structural conditions place Islamist groups under different pressures 
and incentives, these external incentives or deterrents are interpreted through the ideological 
principles driving organisational behaviour.958 Therefore, shifts in opportunity structures that 
provide social and political openings do not necessarily lead to moderation of Islamist groups as 
they are circumscribed by ideas and beliefs. 
In framing and structural terms, the initial success of Islamist movements vis-à-vis the state 
resulted from widespread socioeconomic and political injustices as well as political repression 
which eroded popular support for the regime. This affected the credibility of the regime’s 
‘official Islam’ among disaffected and marginalised groups, which prompted them to turn to 
‘popular’ Islam and reputable community leaders, including Islamic activists. Islamists invested 
in these by articulating Islamic frames or solutions and attributing them to reputable frame 
articulators (scholars) and the use of publicly recognised symbols and language that tapped into 
cultural experiences and collective memories. To maximise access to discontented segments of 
the society, Islamists merged religious themes with nonreligious factors to broaden their 
                                                          
957 Matesan, “Violent Escalation and De-escalation,” 380. 
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support base among those who were merely seeking a change to the status quo, rather than an 
Islamic transformation.959 
 Interpretative frames produced by the leaders arrayed religious and cultural concepts and 
symbols that initially appealed to people’s sentiments, emotions and social and financial needs. 
In this way, elements of their discourse could resonate well with segments of the population 
beyond their immediate supporters and adherents. Though coated in religious discourse, the 
prognostic and motivational frames of the two groups also provided an attractive image of an 
idealised Islamic state, capable of solving Egypt’s numerous social, political and economic 
problems.  
 However, these frames lost their resonance as they gradually lost their practical salience to 
targets of mobilisation when they failed to deliver the promised socioeconomic results. To the 
actual adherents, the comprehensive defeat, miserable conditions, severe consequences of pro-
violence frames and their failure to achieve their motivational framing heavily influenced the 
empirical credibility and resonance of these frames.960 The reduction in frame salience resulted 
from the apparent contradiction between these groups’ theory and tactical practice in addition 
to the lack of effectiveness and empirical credibility that were proven by the military and 
psychological defeat of the movements, which made the overwhelming majority of the groups’ 
followers and sympathisers end up in prison under miserable conditions or chased without 
achieving any of their objectives. This made these frames lose their mobilising potency and 
pushed towards a different framing. 
This explains why attempts to cease violence before the defeat of the two organisations failed. 
The success of the ideological reversal only after defeat and practical cessation of violence, and 
not before or during the confrontations, suggests that attempts to ideologically delegitimise 
violence during  the course of conflict are unlikely to succeed because an ongoing environment 
of military conflict is more conducive to negotiating pressing demands rather than supportive 
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religious interpretations, and because leaders are less likely to credibly address the religious 
legitimacy of the rationale for violence with their followers when an armed struggle is rising.961 
This is particularly true as during the conflict, frame resonance and credibility continued to hold 
their mobilising power, and the frames and tactics of these movement were not proven to be 
counterproductive. Experiencing multiple failures made the ideology prone to questions and 
criticism and exhausted the appeal, energy and justificatory legitimacy of violence. The attempts 
to maintain the existence and integrity of the group pushed towards abandoning some of its 
basic tactics and/ or principles. 
Subsequently, the empirical credibility—which refers to the apparent fit between the framings 
and real world events— of the collective action frames of both the IG and al-Jihād was shaken 
and proven to be unobtainable after their defeat.962 Therefore, their claims failed to be 
empirically verified as there was nothing in the practical world that could be seen as empirical 
evidence of the claims embedded in the framing. Nonetheless, the fact that some, such as al-
Ẓawāhirī and others, argued against the revisionists’ new frames of incapacity, weakness and 
harm and benefits, proposes that ’empirical credibility is in the eyes of the beholder’, and that 
the claimed connection between the frame and the real world does not have to be generally 
believable, but it suffices to be believable to some segment of prospective or actual 
adherents.963 
Furthermore, frame articulators (leaders and actual adherents) lost their field battle with the 
regime at a high cost in terms of bloodshed and excessive security measures in addition to the 
counter-framing of the state through media and official scholars, which alienated the masses 
from these movements and robbed them of the sympathy that people had initially felt for them. 
Thus, during that period, the ideological appeal of radical Jihadism was greatly damaged by 
violent confrontation with the state and the suffering that this conflict inflicted upon the 
Egyptian society. Segments of religiously-motivated Egyptians were shifting away from Jihadism, 
either to rediscover the value of the Brotherhood’s nonviolent approach or to embrace new 
forms of religiously-based civil society activities, such as preaching and providing social services 
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factual or valid, but whether their empirical referents lend themselves to being read as ‘real’ indicators of the 
diagnostic claims. See Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 620. 
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to the poor.964 This led the frames of these movements to lose their competition with ‘official 
frames’,  as the vacuum left by the frames of Islamist movements during and after their defeat 
and imprisonment was filled by official frames that sought not only to limit but also to eradicate 
the resonance of opposing unofficial frames of Islamist movements.965  
 The above changes in the cultural and political opportunity structures together affected the 
three dimensions of frame salience: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative 
fidelity or cultural resonance.966 Centrality refers to how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas 
associated with the frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilisation. Undoubtedly, prison 
under insufferable conditions for detainees, miserable conditions outside prison for their 
families and failing to achieve the motivational framing or even maintain normal living 
conditions, had affected the centrality of the frames of violence to the lives of the two groups’ 
actual and potential adherents. Thus, each group was forced by its own internal contradictions 
and by the pressures of the status quo to reproduce itself within the boundaries of its 
ideological redlines. For the same reasons, the frames also lost their resonance due to the lack 
of experiential commensurability which refers to how the frames are congruent or resonant 
with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of mobilisation; the hypothetical frames 
became practically too abstract and distant from the lives and experiences of the targets. This is 
reflected in the revisionists’ extensive use of such terms as ‘al-wāqiʿ’ (reality, status quo), ‘al-
maṣāliḥ wa al-mafāsid’ (benefit and harm), ‘ʿadam al-qudra’ (incapacity), ‘al-ḍaʿf’ (weakness), 
etc. 
The same also applies to the third element affecting frame resonance which is cultural 
resonance or narrative fidelity, which refers to the extent to which proposed framings are 
culturally resonant with the targets' so called, ‘cultural narrations’, ‘domain assumptions’, or 
‘inherent ideology’.967 The above conditions made it clear for the two groups that the 
interpretations offered for the proffered frames were not culturally resonant with people’s 
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inherent ideologies or common beliefs or even with the adherents’ ‘inherent ideology’ before 
they adopted the new ‘derived ideology’ that led them to such miserable conditions. This was 
faster and much deeper with the IG than with al-Jihād as the founding principles of the IG were 
more concerned with the religious precepts of avoiding harm and protecting the Muslim 
community, which made losing audience and public condemnation extremely costly on both the 
ideological and pragmatic levels. 
This led them to ‘frame transformation’ which is a strategic frame alignment process968 that 
refers to changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones (revisions) by 
constructing new powerful and compelling interpretations that serve as counter diagnosis of the 
issues that led to empirical failure in an attempt to lend empirical credibility, centrality, 
experiential commensurability, and cultural resonance to frame transformation efforts. This 
shows that it is not just the frames and ideas themselves that matter, but also the ‘process’ 
through which certain frames or conclusions are reached. The difference between al-Jihād and 
the IG in framing violence and revisions manifests itself, as discussed above, in the scope of the 
problems or issues addressed and the ensuing direction of the attribution of blame, which 
emphasises the observation of framing researchers that the most obvious way in which 
collective action frames vary is in terms of the issues addressed and the resultant direction of 
attribution.969 
So, in terms of framing, the present study shows how ideological narrative or space shapes 
political action and vice versa, and explains how the interplay of these variables facilitates, 
affects, restrains or transforms the ideological and practical commitments of Islamist 
movements. Moreover, the study offers a much-needed970 elaboration on the interaction of 
frames and ideology and how this could impact the dynamics of contention. In addition, the 
change in the frames presented by Islamist movements confirms that the extant ideologies of 
Islamist movements constitute “cultural resources from which collective frames are partly 
derived, but not in a determinative fashion. Rather, cultural or religious ideologies function 
much like established vineyards from which different varietals can be innovatively grafted 
together to generate a new yield.”971  
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This generally shows that the Islamic Sharia provides diverse options of social and political 
strategies from which Islamist movements can draw and adopt distinct ideologies. These 
ideologies define the goals and priorities of each movement and its acceptable tactics. Once the 
ideological commitments are established, the tactics and strategies of an Islamist group at a 
particular time are determined by the complex interaction between the group, the state and the 
society. These interactions make groups adapt and change every-day practices,972 which leads to 
fundamental ideological or strategic revisions.  
Furthermore, the fact that the revisions of the two groups are considerably different from each 
other, even though both groups have lived in the same country, have undergone the same 
structural restraints, the same socio-economic conditions, the same political process as well as 
the same prison environment, shows the failure of structural and causal explanations of violence 
and revisions in explaining the nature and degree of de-radicalisation in structural terms. This 
shows that though the revisions of the two groups under discussion largely employ cost-benefit 
analysis to justify their decision to cease violence, these cost-benefit calculations do not occur in 
an ideological vacuum, and, therefore, purely structural or rational-choice approaches are 
deficient due to their underestimation of the role of ideas in these cost-benefit calculations. In 
other words, cost-benefit calculations are translated through the ideological preferences of a 
group, so that a tactic might have different benefits to different groups even within the same 
social and political context, based on their ideological preferences and goals.973 This is further 
confirmed by the fact that political and democratic participation was undertaken by the IG, and 
not by al-Jihād, which proves that while Islamists may rationally respond to opportunity 
structures, possible responses are often limited by ideological parameters that may render some 
choices unacceptable. 
Thus, one of the major contributions of this dissertation is that it challenges the dominant 
literature in the field and proves that radicalisation/de-radicalisation does not lie in the 
structural grievances alone, but, more importantly, in the way Jihadists’ religious ideological 
framework interprets religious texts in light of these structural grievances. It shows the 
importance of the oft-neglected ideological element and the value of the textual approach in 
studying these groups and further proves that the nature, structure and the religious founding 
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objectives of Islamist groups in general play a crucial role in deciding the nature and degree of 
their revisions. The dissertation also contributes to the debate over the role of ideology in 
political violence and greatly supports the argument that religious ideology plays a crucial role in 
radicalising or de-radicalising Islamist movements and individuals. When it comes to the 
intellectual and ideological origins of violence, the dissertation confirms the previously discussed 
view that the problem lies in the Islamic subset of Salafi Jihadism and its interpretation of Islam, 
and not in Islam as a religion, since the orthodox teachings of Islam in its flexible side of Uṣūl al-
Fiqh have constituted the main methodology of revoking violence. Finally, the above findings of 
this study, its interdisciplinary nature and its mixed-method approach makes it a valuable 
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